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Abstract
This  thesis  considers  the  effects  of  nationalism  on  the  autonomy  of 
intellectuals in Egypt. I argue that nationalism limits intellectuals’ ability 
to  challenge  social  hierarchies,  political  authority  and  economic 
inequality, and that it has been more readily used to legitimise new forms 
of domination in competition with old ones. I analyse similarities between 
religion and nationalism, using the sociological theory of Pierre Bourdieu 
together  with cognitive linguistics.  Focusing mainly on the similarities 
between  priests  and  nationalist  intellectuals,  and  secondarily  between 
prophets  and  charismatic  nationalist  political  leaders,  I  show  that 
nationalism and religion are based on relatively similar concepts, which 
lend themselves to similar strategies for gaining credibility, recognition 
and  moral  authority.  I  present  case  studies  of  a  few  nationalist 
intellectuals,  focusing on ones who advocated views that  later  became 
dominant. The translator and teacher Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ  al-Ṭahṭāwī,  who was 
trained as a religious scholar before studying secular subjects in France, 
brought nationalism to Egypt by blending European nationalist concepts 
with centuries-old concepts from Islamic religious and literary traditions. 
In  the  early  20th  century,  the  nationalism  of  intellectuals  such  as 
Muḥammad  Ḥusayn  Haykal  enabled  them  to  compete  with  men  of 
religion  for  prestige  and political  influence,  and also served particular 
class  and  professional  interests.  Tawfīq  al-Ḥakīm’s  concept  of  the 
charismatic national leader influenced the young Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
who became a successful nationalist prophet and military autocrat. Iḥsān 
ʿAbd al-Quddūs articulated the concept  of  the nationalist  martyr,  who 
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dies for his country; this concept also contributed to Nasser’s charisma. 
Both al-Ḥakīm and al-Quddūs  arguably  lost  autonomy under  Nasser’s 
regime. Al-Ḥakīm was unable to criticise the regime until after Nasser’s 
death.  Al-Quddūs  was  imprisoned  and  tortured  for  advocating 
democracy, then became one of the most fervent supporters of Nasser’s 
autocracy.
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A Note on Transliteration
For the transliteration of  Arabic,  I  have used the DIN 31635 standard, 
which is well-known to students of Arabic thanks to its use in the Hans 
Wehr dictionary. I prefer it to the more common IJMES standard, because 
it has the advantage of being unambiguous: since each Arabic letter is 
represented by a single Latin letter, there is no question as to whether, for 
example, yushir means ‘he indicates’  or  ‘he keeps  awake’.  In order  to 
avoid  presenting  the  reader  with  a  confusing  array  of  different 
transliterations for the same word, I have changed all transliterated words 
in quoted passages to DIN 31635 form. In a few cases, I  have retained 
common spellings of Arabic words and names that have become standard 
in English, such as ‘jihad’, ‘hadith’, ‘sharia’, ‘shaykh’ and ‘Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’.
9
We have killed you, O last of the prophets [Qatalnāka, yā āḫir al-anbiyāʾ]
– Nizār Qabbānī, ‘Gamal Abdel Nasser’
To my heart, you [Egypt] are a religion after religion [li-qalbī anti baʿd  
al-dīn dīn]
– ‘Be Safe, Egypt [Islamī Yā Miṣr]’, the Egyptian national anthem 
from 1923-1936
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Introduction
This thesis attempts to answer a few questions, some of which are 
specific  to Egypt,  while others are more general.  What is  nationalism? 
When and why did nationalism appear in Egypt, and why did it become 
so  popular  there?  What  role  did  Egyptian  intellectuals  play  in  the 
development  of  nationalist  concepts  in  Arabic,  and  what  effect  did 
nationalism have on their autonomy from economic and political power? 
Finally,  how  can  we  account  for  the  many  similarities  between 
nationalism and religion, and what can the Egyptian case tell us about 
these similarities?
The field of nationalism studies, despite its rapid development since 
the 1980s, is still plagued with problems of definition. Özkırımlı’s remarks 
(2000, 57-59) are as valid today as they were a decade ago:
As Breuilly notes, nationalism can refer to ideas, to sentiments and 
to actions. Each definition will have different implications for the 
study of nationalism. . . . On the other hand, Kellas contends that 
nationalism is both an ‘idea’ and a ‘form of behaviour’. Nationalism 
is a ‘doctrine’ for Kedourie, an ‘ideological movement’ for Smith, a 
‘political  principle’  for  Gellner,  and  a  ‘discursive  formation’  for 
Calhoun.
At one level, this is a case of a ‘conflict over definitions’ (Bourdieu 
1998, 365-369), in which each participant attempts to define the field’s key 
terms, and thus its boundaries, in a way that is favourable to her own 
interests1. However, words relating to nations and nationalism also have a 
1 For example, it is sometimes asserted that there are distinctions between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ kinds of nationalism. Sometimes this is done by giving them different names:  
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wide  variety  of  meanings  outside  academia,  in  everyday  discourse  in 
countless languages. Words that are translated into English as ‘nation’ or 
‘nationalism’ have, to some extent, different histories and associations in 
their  original  languages.  For example,  Egyptian nationalists  have often 
referred to the Egyptian nation as having thousands of years of history, 
while American nationalists make no such claim for the American nation. 
Moreover,  different  Egyptian  nationalists  have  expressed  markedly 
different  nationalisms  (Gershoni  and  Jankowski  1986;  Gershoni  and 
Jankowski 1995). What, if anything, do all these nationalist concepts have 
in common?
The dominant theories of nationalism view nationalism (correctly, 
in my view) as a modern invention, and have focused on attempting to 
explain it  as a  political  phenomenon.  The theory of  Ernest  Gellner  ‘is 
generally  considered  as  the  most  important  attempt  to  make  sense  of 
nationalism’ (Özkırımlı 2010, 98). For Gellner, ‘Nationalism is primarily a 
political  principle,  which holds  that  the political  and the national  unit 
should be congruent’ (Gellner 1983, 1). The  influential  work  of 
historian  Eric  Hobsbawm  on  nationalism’s  ‘invented  traditions’ 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992; Hobsbawm 1992) adopts Gellner’s political 
definition of nationalism. Similarly, the well-known theory of Benedict 
Anderson defines nationalism by defining ‘nation’ in the following way: 
‘it is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign’ (1983/2006, 6).
‘“Our” nationalism appears as ‘patriotism’. . . . This distinction would be convincing 
if  there  were  clear,  unambiguous  criteria,  beyond  an  ideological  requirement  to 
distinguish  “us”  from  “them”’  (Billig  1995,  55).  Özkırımlı  (2000,  5) concurs: 
‘nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’ are ‘manifestations of the same phenomenon’.
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These theories have been extensively critiqued and debated; this is 
not the place to undertake a detailed evaluation of these debates, a task 
that  has  been  done  very  well  by  others  (Özkırımlı  2010;  Spencer  and 
Wollman 2002). Instead, this thesis proposes to construct an analysis of 
nationalism in a  different way, one that may be able  to  explain some 
aspects of nationalism that, in my view, deserve more attention than they 
have been given.
First, while nationalism has often been used for political ends, it is 
possible to find examples of apolitical nationalism. Chapter 2 of this thesis 
considers one such case in depth: that of Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭāwī, the founder of 
nationalism in Egypt. The aims of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s nationalism were basically 
economic rather than political; he was indifferent to the congruence of the 
political and the national unit, and did not regard the nation as sovereign. 
If nationalism is basically a political principle, how can we explain al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s  nationalism?  Moreover,  nationalists  who  make  the  sorts  of 
political  claims  that  Gellner  and  Anderson  have  in  mind  also  use 
nationalism for a wide variety of non-political purposes. In this thesis, we 
will  see  examples  of  how  nationalism  has  been  used  by  teachers  to 
legitimise their authority over their students, by writers to promote new 
literary  genres,  by  journalists  to  gain  credibility,  and  by  members  of 
certain  social  classes  to  compete  in  the  job  market.  Can  all  these 
phenomena be explained in terms of a political principle?
This thesis takes a different approach: it proposes that nationalism is 
basically  a  moral  principle  rather  than  a  political  one.  This  moral 
principle, described below, can be used to legitimise political aims, and 
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indeed this is very common. But it can also be used to legitimise non-
political aims, and even to formulate an apolitical nationalist belief system 
such as  that  of  al-Ṭahṭāwī.  There are  other  reasons  to  consider  this  a 
plausible approach. The justification for any political system is inevitably 
based on moral concepts, rather than the reverse. A person who believes 
in democracy justifies it by saying that it serves the common good; belief 
in the common good is not justified by saying that it serves democracy. In 
this  thesis,  we  will  consider  detailed  examples  in  which  nationalist 
strategies for legitimising political power were based on moral concepts. 
Moreover, one of the  main aims of theories of nationalism has been to 
explain how nationalism motivates people of all  social  classes to make 
great  sacrifices,  such  as  dying  for  their  country.  Mastery  of  political 
concepts is disproportionately found in dominant classes, while members 
of dominated classes who have not mastered political concepts are more 
at  ease with moral ones  (Bourdieu 1979, 463–514).  If  nationalism were 
fundamentally  a  political  principle,  one  might  expect  it  to  be 
disproportionately popular among educated elites, but this is not the case. 
I  suggest  that  it  is  precisely  because  nationalism is  basically  a  moral 
principle that it has been so useful in politics.
The theoretical framework adopted in this thesis is partly an answer 
to the call issued by sociologists Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov (2004) 
for the integration of cognitive theoretical tools into the sociological study 
of ethnicity, race and nationalism. In particular, as they argue:
Cognitive  perspectives  provide  resources  for  avoiding  analytical 
‘groupism’  –  the  tendency  to  treat  ethnic  groups  as  substantial 
14
entities  to  which interests  and agency can be attributed – while 
helping to explain the tenacious hold of groupism in practice. . . . 
Cognitive  perspectives  enable  us  to  analyze  ‘participants’ 
primordialism’ without endorsing analytical primordialism.
Cognitive linguistics, a type of linguistics designed to reflect what is 
known about the mind and the brain in the cognitive sciences and related 
disciplines  (Evans  and  Green  2006,  40–41),  has  shown  that  abstract 
concepts in all languages are based on concrete, everyday concepts (Evans 
and Green 2006, 15). It has developed sophisticated theoretical tools for 
analysing such abstractions, and I will be using a small subset of those 
tools in this thesis, in order to propose an analysis of nationalist concepts 
that is compatible with what is known about human cognition in general. 
Thus I suggest that the emotional power of nationalism is generated by 
abstract concepts based on universal human experiences, such as bonds 
between  parents  and  children.  These  concepts  can  be  constructed  in 
different ways in different social contexts, but on a highly schematic level 
they are the same: if one conceptualises one’s country as a person (such as 
a family member) towards whom one feels moral duties, the emotional 
force that those duties carry in the domain of interpersonal relations can 
be experienced in the domain of nationalism. By focusing on duty as a 
key element in nationalist concepts, this approach neatly explains why 
people are willing to die for their country, without relying on the specifics 
of any particular social context2.
2 One recent cognitive treatment of nationalism is that of Hogan (2009). Surprisingly, 
Hogan does not attempt a precise definition of nationalism in cognitive terms, and 
instead defines it rather vaguely as ‘any form of in-group identification for a group 
defined  in  part  by  reference  to  a  geographical  area  along  with  some  form  of 
sovereign government over that area’  (Hogan 2009, 4). The inclusion of ‘sovereign 
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In keeping with this cognitive approach, this thesis does not use the 
concept of ‘national identity’. Following Brubaker’s and Cooper’s (2000) 
pioneering article,  I  take the position that the word ‘identity’,  with its 
now-inevitable  accompanying  adjectives  (‘fluid’,  ‘constructed’, 
‘negotiated’,  ‘multiple’,  etc.)  is  inherently  an  oxymoron,  wavering 
ambivalently between essentialism and social constructionism, and should 
be abandoned in favour of precise terms drawn from cognitive science. 
Thus  this  thesis  is  a  study  of  categorisation,  a  cognitive  process  with 
social effects. While ‘identity’ is supposedly something that a person ‘has’, 
categorisation is something that a person does.
It  is  also necessary to  explain why nationalist  conceptualisations 
could  appear  plausible to  so  many  people.  I  propose  to  answer  this 
question  by  adapting  Pierre  Bourdieu’s  concept  of  habitus,  the  set  of 
socially  produced,  unconscious  or  semi-conscious  concepts  and 
dispositions that shape perceptions and guide actions in each individual, 
and thus determine what an individual is likely to see as plausible in any 
given  situation.  Habitus,  I  suggest,  is  equivalent  to  what  cognitive 
linguists  call  ‘entrenched  conceptualisation’,  i.e.  conceptualisation  that, 
through  frequent  use,  has  become  relatively  automatic  and  can  be 
accessed and  used  with  little  or  no  conscious  effort  (cf.  Schmid 2007; 
Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 103). I argue that nationalist concepts, even 
when new,  could  appear  plausible  for  two reasons.  First,  like  all  new 
government’  in  this  definition  seems  to  assume  that  nationalism  is  inherently 
political, and hence differs from the approach taken here.  More important, Hogan’s 
few attempts to link cognition with social realities do not engage with sociological  
theory. Thus he does not address the issue of competition for symbolic capital, which, 
I  will  argue  below,  is  the  main  social  interest  that  motivates  the  production  of 
nationalist concepts.
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concepts,  these  invented  concepts  were  constructed  using  existing 
concepts as raw materials. In order to clarify exactly how this was done, I 
will be using the theory of conceptual blending, developed in cognitive 
linguistics, as explained below. Thus I will argue that nationalist concepts 
were  constructed  as  conceptual  blends,  and  that  the  use  of  familiar 
concepts as inputs in these blends could make these new constructions 
seem familiar as well. Second, these blends appeared plausible because, at 
a sufficiently high level of abstraction, they resembled other blends that 
people already believed in.
Another  aspect  of  nationalism  that  this  thesis  explores  is  its 
resemblance to religion. Many scholars have noted similarities between 
religion  and  nationalism,  but  these  observations  have  been  more 
impressionistic  than  theoretical  (e.g.  MM  Mitchell  1931;  Hayes  1960; 
Smart  1983;  Hobsbawm 1992,  72,  81,  85;  Kedourie  1993,  40-43;  Stevens 
1997). It has been remarked that,  like religion, nationalism has prayers 
(Billig 1995, 86), temples, hymns and catechisms (Bell 2001, 1-3, 137, 165-
168), excommunication (Saad 1998, 402-403), saints and martyrs (Winock 
1997;  Bell  2001,  119-139),  prophets  (Tulard  1971,  85-92;  Gülalp  2005; 
Younis 2005, 132, 158, 207; Hazareesingh 2006) and priests  (Jacquemond 
2003). Yet attempts to explain these similarities have produced few results 
(Burrin 1997; Maier 2007). As Bell (2001, 22-23) observes:
Historically,  Western  nationalism,  patriotism,  and  religion  have 
twisted  around  each  other  like  sinuous  vines.  . . .  It  is  therefore 
surprising that few modern scholars have explored the connections 
in a satisfactory manner. . . . the tendency has been not simply to 
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connect,  but  to  equate  the  two.  . . .  Religion  often  serves  these 
writers  principally  as  a  convenient,  uncomplicated  symbol  for 
something else. It can stand for irrational fanaticism. . . . Or it can 
stand for  spiritual  comfort.  . . .  In neither schema, however,  does 
religion have much complexity or history, or do much of anything 
except vent its sound and fury and then, as modernity dawns, be 
heard no more.
Taking Bell’s point further, I would argue that attempts to explain 
the similarities between nationalism and religion have been unsatisfactory 
mainly because they have not benefited from insights that have arisen in 
the  sociology  of  religion,  and  have  instead  relied  on  ad  hoc 
phenomenological explanations, typically focusing on the idea that both 
religion and nationalism provide people with a sense of purpose in life, or 
a  moral  justification  of  death  (e.g.  Apter  1963;  Anderson  2006,  9-12). 
Lacking a sociology of religion, this approach does not consider how both 
religious and nationalist beliefs are related to forms of domination and 
social  distinction,  and  leaves  unexplained  the  vast  array  of  social 
practices, institutions and forms of cultural production that are common 
to  religion  and  nationalism.  It  also  does  not  distinguish  between  the 
different ways in which a given religion, or a given nationalism, serves 
the  interests  of  different  sorts  of  believers.  In  particular,  it  does  not 
explain the prestige and power that accrue to individuals who are seen as 
embodying religious or nationalist ideals. In this thesis, I argue that it is 
only  by  considering  these  social  relations  that  we  can  explain  the 
appearance and development of nationalism in Egypt, and at the same 
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time understand why nationalism and religion are so similar. In order to 
do this, I will be employing a particular sociology of religion to analyse 
nationalism.
Nationalist Conceptualisation
A great  deal  of  research  in  cognitive  linguistics  has  focused  on 
categorisation: how human beings construct and manipulate categories, 
and how categories are reflected in language. Understanding categories 
turns out to be essential for understanding semantics, because polysemy – 
the existence of multiple related meanings for the same word – is the 
norm in language. Cognitive linguistics holds that a word with multiple 
related meanings represents a mental category. The different senses of the 
word form a ‘semantic network’, whose links are constructed by means of 
certain basic cognitive operations. One of these is what Langacker (2008, 
17) calls  schematisation:  ‘the  process  of  extracting  the  commonality 
inherent in multiple experiences to arrive at a conception representing a 
higher level of abstraction’. More specific concepts are said to elaborate or 
instantiate more  schematic  ones.  The  theory  of  conceptual  blending 
(Fauconnier and Turner 2002) describes another way that new meanings 
can  be  produced  from  old  ones.  According  to  this  theory, 
conceptualisation involves the dynamic construction of ‘mental spaces’, 
which  group  together  concepts  for  the  purposes  of  thought  and 
communication. Often the concepts in a mental space are structured by 
the use of a ‘frame’, which represents a conventional scenario in which 
actors play particular roles. New concepts can be constructed by mapping 
elements  of  different  ‘input’  mental  spaces  onto  one  another,  then 
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constructing a new, ‘blended’  space in which selected elements of  the 
inputs  are  merged.  In  this  thesis,  I  will  be  using  conceptual  blending 
theory extensively to analyse the construction of nationalist concepts.
‘Nation’ and ‘nationalism’, and similar words in other languages, 
could arguably be analysed as a semantic network. I suggest that there is 
a schematic concept that is compatible with all the senses of these words. 
Since this hypothetical  schema is  highly abstract,  it  cannot predict  the 
multitude  of  more  specific  nationalist  concepts  that  instantiate  it. 
However,  I  will  argue  that  it  explains  a  great  deal  not  only  about 
nationalist concepts, but also about the social structures and practices that 
nationalism  has  involved.  The  proposed  schema  consists  of  two 
interdependent  concepts  and  a  relation  between  them,  represented  in 
Figure 1.
First, there is the concept of a geographical area, which in English is 
typically instantiated by the word ‘country’ (cf. familiar expressions such 
as ‘to serve your country’,  ‘he died for his country’, and in the US, ‘My 
country,  ‘tis  of  thee’,  ‘My  country,  right  or  wrong’,  etc.),  but  also 
sometimes ‘homeland’, ‘fatherland’, ‘motherland’  or simply ‘land’ (as in 
the American song  ‘This land is your land, this land is my land...’).  For 
clarity’s sake, in contexts where the polysemous word ‘country’ might be 
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Figure 1: A schematic concept of nationalism
ambiguous,  I  will  refer  to  this  as  the  schematic  concept  of  ‘national 
territory’.
Second, there is the concept of a group of human beings,  called a 
‘nation’  or  a  ‘people’  in  English,  in  which  membership  is  normally 
inherited,  but  members  are  not  typically  related  to  one  another  by 
kinship. I will refer to this as the schematic concept of ‘nation’.
Finally, what the members of a nation are conceptualised as having 
in common is a shared moral duty towards their country. In my view, it is 
this  concept  of  duty  that  makes  it  possible  to  motivate  actions  on 
nationalist grounds, and thereby makes it possible for nationalism to serve 
social ends. The notion of moral duty, even in its most schematic form, 
depends on the concept of a person who is the beneficiary of this duty. 
Hence the national territory is inevitably personified. We will see many 
examples of this in the course of this thesis.
When I  refer  to  the concepts  ‘nation’  (or  ‘people’),  ‘country’  (or 
‘national territory’, ‘fatherland’, etc.) and ‘nationalism’ (or ‘patriotism’) in 
this  thesis,  these  terms  should  be  read  as  referring  to  the  preceding 
definition  of  this  conceptual  schema.  Clearly,  all  nationalisms  involve 
more  specific  concepts,  many  of  which  are  commonly  found  in  most 
nationalisms. We will encounter a number of these common elaborations 
in the present study of nationalism in Egypt. For example, the concept of 
duty  towards  one’s  country  is  readily  elaborated  as  a  duty  to  defend 
territory in war, within the conceptual frame of military service. It is also 
very common to personify the nation, and to conceptualise it as fulfilling 
its  duty  by  exercising  a  unified,  conscious  will.  However,  it  is  also 
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important  to  understand  how  the  schematic  concept  of  nationalism 
motivates these  instantiations.  Nationalism can be many things,  but  it 
cannot be just anything: the schema facilitates some types of elaborations, 
and makes others difficult or impossible.
In  particular,  the  concept  of  moral  duty,  and  the  attendant 
personification of the country, has a crucial consequence. In order to fulfil 
one’s duty towards a person, one must know that person’s desires, needs 
or interests. However, in reality, a geographical territory is not a person, 
and does not have desires, needs or interests. Any beliefs or statements 
about these non-existent desires, needs or interests are therefore fictitious. 
Since  the  concept  of  ‘nation’  depends  on  the  concept  of  ‘country’,  it 
follows that nations, too, can only be fictitious. This is why there can be 
no scientific study of ‘the national will’ or ‘the country’s best interests’,  
and why there are often many conflicting views about  duties towards 
one’s country. Thus I disagree with the view, expressed by Özkırımlı in an 
otherwise admirable  critique of  nationalism  (2005,  46-47,  165-166),  that 
nations are real because people believe that they are real, and because this 
belief has real social effects. To draw an analogy, religious people believe 
that their gods are real, and this belief has real social effects, but it does 
not follow that all gods (or even any of them) are real. And as any of us 
can attest from our everyday experience, mistaken beliefs (about all sorts 
of things) often have real social effects. It is easy to think of examples of  
false beliefs that have been widespread and long-lasting, and have had 
tragic consequences, but are nonetheless false.
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In any given time and place, some nationalist ideas gain a degree of 
acceptance, while others do not. Since the popularity of these ideas cannot 
depend on their inherent validity,  it  can only depend on the harmony 
between them and their audiences’ existing concepts and beliefs, and on 
social strategies of persuasion. In particular, it often relies on the same 
strategies that are used in monotheistic religion to legitimise claims about 
human beings’ duties to God.
Religious and Nationalist Fields
Concepts of God and country have, as we will see in the course of 
this study, a great deal in common. At a basic level, however, there is a 
practical similarity: even among believers, God is not ordinarily thought 
to produce objectively observable utterances, e.g. by speaking in a voice 
that anyone can hear. Instead, it is claimed that messages from God are 
mediated through the intuition of special individuals (such as prophets) 
and  are  imperceptible  to  others.  In  this  respect,  claims  to  know  the 
country’s needs are like claims to know God’s will.
Nationalism,  too,  readily  generates  the  inference  that  there  is 
valuable knowledge (about the country’s desires, needs and interests) that 
is not readily accessible. Geographical areas do not have needs, desires, 
and  interests,  and  do  not  speak.  Nationalism  therefore  creates 
opportunities  for  individuals  to make competing claims to possess this 
knowledge.  Hence it  lends itself  to the formation of the type of social 
structure that Pierre Bourdieu calls a ‘field’: an arena of conflict in which 
players  who have  interests  at  stake  in  a  given  type  of  social  practice 
compete to attain dominant positions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 78). 
23
Participants in a field seek to acquire some form of ‘capital’, i.e. an asset  
whose  value is  recognized in  the  field.  For  Bourdieu,  forms of  capital 
include  economic  capital  (wealth),  cultural  capital  (knowledge,  know-
how), social capital (the advantages one can gain from one’s network of 
social  relations)  and  symbolic  capital  (prestige,  credibility,  moral 
authority), which grants its bearer the power to determine what counts as 
legitimate in a field (Bourdieu 1986, Bourdieu 1977).
In  his  analysis  of  the  religious  field3 (Bourdieu  1971a,  Bourdieu 
1987a;  Swartz  1996;  Rey  2007),  Bourdieu  describes  it  as  a  system  of 
symbolic power: priests and prophets use different strategies for gaining 
religious  capital,  which  is  defined  as  a  type  of  symbolic  capital  that 
consists of the ability to influence a lay audience by being perceived as a 
religious authority. Since the validity of religious beliefs (like the validity 
of  nationalist  beliefs)  cannot  be tested objectively, their  popularity 
depends  solely  on  their  ability  to  satisfy the  demands  of  the  laity, 
specifically the dominant class’s demand for legitimation (i.e. legitimation 
of their existence as the occupants of dominant social positions) and the 
dominated class’s  demand for salvation (i.e. the promise that things will 
be better for them in the future, either in this life or in the next).
For Bourdieu, the strategy of the prophets is based on charisma, the 
seemingly special quality of holy men that inspires awe and trust. Max 
Weber introduced the concept of charisma into sociological discourse, but 
was unable to explain why some individuals have it while others do not. 
Bourdieu solved this problem by analysing charisma in terms of habitus. 
3 Bourdieu’s analysis of the religious field is clearly aimed mainly at accounting for 
monotheistic religions, but it has broader applications; see Rey (2007) for a discussion.
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Charisma, he argues, is a relation between a prophet’s habitus and his 
audience’s habitus. Specifically, a prophet’s particular social background 
and experiences shape his habitus in such a way that his words or actions 
seem, in the eyes of his audience, to embody ideals that form part of their  
habitus.
In contrast, the strategy of the priesthood is based on professional 
competence.  In  general,  anyone  who  receives  the  proper  training,  i.e. 
acquires a certain type of cultural capital, can be consecrated as a priest, 
whether  by  a  formal,  institutionalised  religious  hierarchy  or  by  the 
informal recognition of  peers and laypeople.  Thus the priestly strategy 
involves an initial acquisition of cultural capital, which is then converted 
into  symbolic  capital.  There  are  often  ‘conflicts  over  definitions’ 
(Bourdieu 1998, 365-369) in which rival factions struggle to preserve, or to 
change,  the  accepted  definition  of  proper  training,  and  thus  the 
boundaries of the category of qualified priests. Relations between priests 
and prophets are characterised by interdependence as well as competition 
for  lay  followers.  Priests  often  reproduce,  systematize  and  adapt  a 
prophetic  message  to  meet  the  demands  of  different  sorts  of  lay 
audiences. They are also responsible for inculcating a religious habitus in 
successive generations of the laity, particularly at times when there is no 
prophet.
As Gaffney (1994, 4, 30–40) observes, the question of whether there 
is a ‘clergy’ or a ‘priesthood’ in Sunni Islam has been a controversial one. 
In using these terms, I am not referring to a formal institutional hierarchy 
such as the one found in the Catholic Church or in Shia Islam. Instead, I 
25
am using the term in the Bourdieusian sense of a group of individuals 
who,  by  virtue  of  their  religious  training,  successfully  claim  ‘the 
monopoly of the legitimate exercise of the power to modify, in a deep and  
lasting fashion, the practice and world-view of lay people, by imposing on 
and inculcating in them a particular  religious habitus’  (Bourdieu 1987a, 
126). Thus I agree with Gaffney and with Høigilt  (2010, 37) that in this 
sense, there is indeed a clergy in Sunni Islam. This category includes not 
only indivduals with formal  religious training and credentials,  such as 
ʿulamāʾ who are graduates of the mosque-university of al-Azhar in Cairo, 
but  also  shaykhs  who did  not  finish  their  studies  at  al-Azhar  but  are 
nevertheless regarded as religious authorities (such as the one in Maḥmūd 
Ṭāhir Lāšīn’s short story ‘Ḥadīṯ al-Qarya’, discussed in Chapter 3), leaders 
of Sufi  orders (such as the one in Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal’s  novel 
Zaynab,  also  discussed  in  Chapter  3),  and  all  sorts  of  preachers  and 
mosque teachers who successfully claim to speak authoritatively about 
Islam. Thus I use the term ‘clergy’ to encompass several  Arabic terms 
with overlapping meanings, such as mašāyiḫ (a plural of ‘shaykh’), riǧāl  
al-dīn (the men of religion) and ʿulamāʾ (a term in which the concept of 
formal training is particularly salient),  all of which refer to individuals  
who  employ  the  strategy  of  priesthood  (as  defined  here)  within  the 
Islamic field. There are naturally many divisions and conflicts within this 
very diverse category (Høigilt 2010, 30–52), but in this thesis I discuss the 
Muslim clergy only in terms of their shared interests, in order to consider 
how these interests brought them into conflict with the group that this 
thesis  focuses on: intellectuals  whose cultural  capital  was mainly non-
26
religious, who competed with the clergy to influence the habitus of the 
broader public.
In my view, the Muslim clergy in Egypt have occupied a dominant 
position in the field of cultural production throughout the 19 th and 20th 
centuries and up to the present day. This dominance is to be measured not 
simply  by  their  involvement  in  revolts,  such  as  those  discussed  in 
Chapters 1, 2, and 3, but more importantly by their ability to shape the 
habitus  of  Egyptians  deeply  and  durably.  The  importance  that  most 
Egyptian Muslims attach to Islam, and the lack of any significant public 
challenge  to  Islamic  religious  faith,  is  thus  the  best  testimony  to  the 
symbolic power of the Muslim clergy. This power is also reflected in the 
clergy’s  ability  to  mobilise  widespread  condemnation  of  anyone  who 
appears to challenge its competence or authority. The symbolic weapons 
used  in  these  cases  include  accusations  of  apostasy  (analogous  to 
excommunication); the resulting material sanctions (which need not be 
carried out by the clergy themselves) include censorship, dismissal, exile 
and physical attacks. For example, ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq was expelled from 
the ʿulamāʾ in 1925 for publishing a book that argued for the separation of 
Islam from politics  (as discussed in Chapter 3),  and Ṭāhā Ḥusayn was 
forced to censor his book on pre-Islamic poetry in 1926 because it was 
seen  as  questioning  orthodox  Islamic  doctrine  (Berque  1966).  In  1947, 
Azhar ʿulamāʾ accused Muḥammad Ḫalaf Allāh, a PhD student at Fuʾād I 
University, and his supervisor, Amīn al-Ḫūlī, of apostasy because of Ḫalaf 
Allāh’s  PhD thesis  on narration in the Quran;  the thesis  was rejected, 
Ḫalaf Allāh was fired from his teaching position, and al-Ḫūlī was forced 
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into  retirement  (Abū  Zayd 2006,  58;  Reid  1990,  155–156).  In  1959,  the 
novel  ʾAwlād Ḥāratinā by Naguib Mahfouz was censored by al-Azhar. 
After Mahfouz won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1988, several shaykhs 
used  this  novel  as  evidence  to  accuse  Mahfouz  of  apostasy  and 
blasphemy, and Mahfouz was then stabbed by Islamist  militants in an 
assassination attempt in 1994  (Najjar 1998). In 1992, after the secularist 
intellectual Faraǧ Fūda participated in a public debate with an Islamist 
shaykh, he was assassinated; at the murder trial, the shaykh in question 
declared that Fūda’s murder was a legitimate punishment for his apostasy 
(Najjar  1996).  In  1995,  in  retaliation  for  scholarly  work that  implicitly 
questioned  the  competence  of  the  ʿulamāʾ by  suggesting  that  modern 
linguistics  was  necessary  for  intepreting  the  Qurʾān,  Cairo  University 
professor  Naṣr  Ḥāmid Abū Zayd was condemned by colleagues  as  an 
apostate; his marriage was annulled, and in response to death threats, he 
spent the rest of his life in exile (Najjar 2000). In 2005, one of Abū Zayd’s 
intellectual  compatriots,  Sayyid al-Qimanī,  received death threats  after 
publishing  articles  critical  of  Islamism;  he  was  intimidated  into 
disavowing all his writings and promising never to publish again (Høigilt 
2010, 34–35).  Although, as I will  argue, intellectuals with non-religious 
cultural capital have been able to use nationalism to compete with the 
Muslim clergy for influence over the habitus of the laity, they have not 
gained sufficient symbolic power to enable themselves to fend off these 
sorts of attacks.
Nothing prevents the same individual from using the strategies of 
priesthood  and  prophethood  simultaneously,  at  different  times  or  to 
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different degrees for different audiences; these are strategies rather than 
Weberian ideal types. Moreover, these strategies are not usually conscious 
or  intentional.  Instead, those who employ them generally  misrecognise 
them as the disinterested pursuit  of ideals  (Bourdieu 1979,  94, 259-260, 
Bourdieu 1994a). If used successfully, they enable prophets and priests to 
exercise  symbolic  domination over  believers,  a  domination  that  can 
function only because it is perceived, by those who exercise it and by 
those  who  submit  to  it,  not  as  domination  but  as  natural,  legitimate 
guidance (cf. Bourdieu 1994b, 185, 200-211).
I suggest that nationalist concepts lend themselves to the formation 
of nationalist  fields  in which similar  strategies  are  employed.  In these 
fields,  the ‘prophets’  are charismatic  orators  and politicians  who draw 
cheering crowds by successfully claiming to speak and act on behalf of a 
nation, for the sake of a country. The ‘priests’ of nationalism, who are the 
focus of the present study, are cultural producers who successfully claim 
to  have  special  expertise  that  qualifies  them  to  make  authoritative 
statements about their nation and their country. For example, we will see 
in Chapter 3 how an Egyptian writer formulated the view that the literati 
were  especially  qualified  to  lead  the  nation.  Such  arguments  use 
nationalism to consecrate a certain type of knowledge, and thus bestow 
symbolic power on all those who possess that type of knowledge. Hence 
nationalism can be a  vehicle for  the rising prestige of  some particular 
category  of  cultural  producers  and  of  the  particular  types  of  cultural 
goods  they  produce,  whether  these  are  novels,  newspaper  articles, 
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academic research or teachers’ lessons. At the same time, these cultural 
goods can be used to promote new nationalist concepts.
In this study, I explain how and why Egyptian intellectuals adopted, 
championed  and  shaped  certain  nationalist  concepts  that  became 
mainstream  in  Egypt.  I  also  show  the  effects  of  these  concepts  on 
Egyptian intellectuals over the long term, and in particular on their ability 
to fulfil  the mission that  has conventionally been assigned to them as 
intellectuals:  to  act,  as  Richard  Jacquemond  (2008) puts  it,  as  the 
‘conscience of the nation’.  Playing this role effectively means being able 
to critique the social status quo, to challenge widely held beliefs and to 
contradict those in power.  By tracing the historical development of the 
Egyptian nationalist priesthood over a century and a half, I show that in 
the short run, certain intellectuals  used nationalism to justify these sorts 
of critical stances, at least to a limited extent and for a limited audience. 
However, in the long run, it undermined their ability to do so, because of 
the  inherent  characteristics  of  nationalist  concepts  and  the  strategies 
available in the nationalist field.
This  part  of  my  argument  hinges  on  Bourdieu’s  notion of  the 
relative ‘autonomy’ of fields and of knowledge producers.  The degree of 
autonomy of any field of cultural production depends on the degree to 
which it  requires specific  competence as an entrance fee  and excludes 
external  sources  of  legitimation  (Bourdieu  1976).  Thus,  in  a  highly 
autonomous  field,  producers  attain  dominant  positions  by  successfully 
producing for an audience composed only of their competitors in the field, 
who are their harshest critics. But by virtue of an apparent paradox, it is 
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only by acquiring credibility within a relatively autonomous field that an 
intellectual can gain the authority to challenge social orthodoxy in public 
debates (Bourdieu 1998, 543-558).
Nationalist fields and religious fields are inherently heteronomous, 
for identical reasons. Since claims about nations and national territories, 
like claims about God, cannot be evaluated objectively, it is impossible to 
formulate,  on  any  objective  grounds,  a  definite  set  of  criteria  for 
determining who is  competent  to  make such claims.  Hence nationalist 
cultural producers, like religious ones, are unable to protect the autonomy 
of their field by excluding unqualified interlopers. Crucially, this means 
that  they  cannot  prevent  the  successful  use  of  the  strategy  of 
prophethood.  Anyone  who  possesses  enough  charisma  can  potentially 
claim  to  speak  on  behalf  of  a  nation,  particularly  if  he  has  the  full 
resources of the state, including the media and the education system, at 
his disposal. And since the strategy of prophethood can appeal to a much 
wider audience than the priestly strategy, a highly successful prophet will 
tend to have much greater symbolic power than the priesthood. When it 
is widely believed that a nationalist leader is the very voice of the nation, 
it becomes impossible for the nationalist priesthood to claim to contradict 
him on behalf of the nation. The priesthood is thus left with no grounds 
on which to oppose him. This, I argue, is what happened to nationalist 
intellectuals  in  Egypt  when  Gamal  Abdel  Nasser  became  a  successful 
nationalist  prophet  and  autocrat  following  the  military  coup  of  1952, 
using concepts that those same nationalist intellectuals had done a great 
deal to promote, and in many cases with their active support.
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Nationalism in Egypt
At this point it will be clear that this thesis proposes a new way of 
understanding nationalism in general. But why is there a need for a new 
study of the origins of nationalism in Egypt in particular?
In fact, there is surprisingly little research on the reasons for the 
emergence of  nationalism in Egypt.  Baron  (2005, 4) observes:  ‘Scholars 
point to the ʿUrābī revolt (1881–82), which ended in British occupation, or 
the  anti-colonial  movement  that  surfaced  in  the  1890s,  as  the  earliest 
stirrings  of  Egyptian  nationalism’.  Khaled  Fahmy  (1997) suggests  that 
military  conscription  and  discrimination  against  non-Turkish-speaking 
army officers may have contributed to the emergence of nationalism in 
19th-century Egypt, but argues that nationalism did not appear until the 
ʿUrābī  revolt.  Yet  as  I  show in  Chapter 2,  it  was  a  scholar,  Rifāʿa  al-
Ṭahṭāwī,  who introduced nationalist  concepts  into  Arabic,  long before 
ʿUrābī.
It  might  be  supposed  that  the  appearance  of  nationalism  had 
something to do with a desire for Egyptian sovereignty in opposition to 
the French occupation of 1798-1801. Yet as I show in Chapter 1, while this 
occupation provoked strong opposition from Egyptians,  this  opposition 
was  not  nationalist.  Moreover,  during  this  period,  Ottoman  rule  was 
welcomed by the Muslim inhabitants of Egypt rather than being seen as a 
type  of  foreign  domination.  On  the  rare  occasions  when  ambitious 
military  leaders  in  Egypt,  such as  ʿAlī  Bey al-Kabīr  and Mehmed Ali, 
rebelled against Ottoman rule in the 18th and early 19th centuries, they did 
so not because they believed it was wrong in principle for Egypt to be 
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ruled by foreigners, but because the Ottoman Sultan’s authority conflicted 
with their ambitions to increase their own power; rather than fighting to 
create  an  Egyptian  nation-state,  each  of  them was  simply  fighting  to 
establish his own personal dynasty (Crecelius 1998; Fahmy 1997).
It  has  been  suggested  that  opposition to  the injustices  of  British 
imperial  rule,  following the British occupation in 1882,  at  least  helped 
make nationalism more popular once it had already appeared (Reid 1990, 
25). This may well be true, but it does not explain why opposition to those 
injustices was expressed in nationalist terms, rather than, say, in purely 
religious  terms.  Similarly,  Gershoni  and  Jankowski  (1986,  82-83) have 
argued that  the collapse of  the Ottoman Empire signalled to  Egyptian 
intellectuals  that  the  old  political  order  was  finished  and  a  new  one 
needed to be created, and that many of them took inspiration from the 
creation  of  a  nationalist  state  in  Turkey.  Yet  there  were  many  other 
possible responses to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Why was the 
most  successful  post-Ottoman,  anti-colonial  movement  in  Egypt  a 
nationalist  one,  rather  than  a  movement  for  a  new  Islamic  polity,  a 
campaign  for  local  autonomy  on  the  village  level,  or  a  Communist 
revolution as in Russia?
The  explanation  I  propose,  based  on  the  theoretical  framework 
outlined above,  explains all  these observations. Simply put, nationalism 
appeared  in  Egypt  when  it  did,  and  became widespread  when  it  did, 
because it  served the misrecognised interests  of  a new social  category, 
composed of individuals who possessed types of cultural capital that were 
new in Egypt,  thanks to the introduction of a new kind of educational 
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system  in the 19th century.  Cultural  producers who emerged from this 
group used nationalism to gain  access to the priestly strategy  described 
above,  enabling  them  to  convert  their cultural  capital  into  symbolic 
capital.
A brief  introduction to  nationalist  terminology in Arabic will  be 
useful at this stage; we will consider the history of the following terms in 
more  detail  as  we encounter  them in  the  study.  Arabic  now has  two 
words  for  ‘nationalism’  (as  defined  above):  qawmiyya and  waṭaniyya. 
Qawmiyya now tends to refer mainly to Arab nationalism; the associated 
word  for  ‘nation’  is  umma (pl.  umam).  Waṭaniyya is  used  for  other 
nationalisms within the Arab world,  such as  Egyptian nationalism;  its 
associated word for ‘nation’ is now  šaʿb (pl.  šuʿūb),  often translated as 
‘people’. In both cases, the main term for ‘national territory’ is waṭan (pl. 
awṭān); other, less specific terms such as  bilād (‘land’), which also have 
non-nationalist senses, are also used in this sense. As we will see, waṭan – 
a word with a long history, examined in depth in Chapters 1 and 2 – was 
first used in a nationalist sense in the early 19 th century. From that time 
until approximately the middle of the 20th century, the word for ‘nation’ 
in  Egyptian  nationalism was  usually  umma,  another  old  word  whose 
principal  earlier  meaning  was  a  community  of  religious  believers, 
especially the community of all Muslims. Waṭaniyya first appeared in the 
second half  of  the  19th century,  as  part  of  the  explicit  formulation  of 
Egyptian  nationalism.  Šaʿb does  not  appear  in  any  of  the  sources 
considered in this study until the 1890s; until then, it meant a large tribe 
(Lane 1968, s.v. šaʿb), and seems to have been a very rare word. Judging 
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by  evidence  considered  in  Chapter 3,  qawmiyya (from  qawm,  another 
very broad term for  tribe,  community  or  group)  probably appeared in 
about 1910, and was initially synonymous with  waṭaniyya.  The present 
division of labour between  waṭaniyya  and qawmiyya, and between  šaʿb 
and  umma,  seems to have gradually become conventional in a process 
that reached its completion shortly after World War II4. I will be drawing 
attention to the changing uses of these terms as they occur in the texts 
under consideration.
Primary Sources
This thesis focuses on the role of intellectuals in constructing and 
promoting nationalist concepts in Egypt, and on the effects of nationalist 
concepts  on  the  autonomy  of  those  same  intellectuals.  This  raises 
questions about the choice of authors and works. These choices have been 
guided  first  of  all  by  the  need  to  identify  the  earliest  appearance  of 
nationalism  in  Egypt.  Previous  scholarship  has  suggested  that  the 
religious scholar, translator, educator and essayist Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭāwī may 
have  introduced  nationalist  concepts  into  Arabic  in  the  19th century. 
Chapters 1 and 2 therefore offer a comparison of the nationalist concepts 
used  in  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  works  with  related  concepts  in  earlier  Arabic 
writings  going  back  to  the  9th century,  in  order  to  provide  detailed 
evidence  for  the  claim  that  al-Ṭahṭāwī  was  most  probably  the  first 
nationalist in Egypt. Here I have focused on those of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s works 
that  seem to  indicate  most  clearly  the  development  of  his  nationalist 
concepts  throughout  his  career.  The  selection  of  texts  from  earlier 
4 The process by which this change occurred merits a study in itself.
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historical periods has been guided by existing scholarship as well as by al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s own literary references, with the aim of looking for nationalist 
concepts  in  works  where  one  would  expect  to  find  them if  they  had 
existed in those eras.
In choosing influential authors who were active during the first half  
of the 20th century, and in identifying important works by those authors, I 
have taken  my cue,  first  of  all,  from Gershoni  and Jankowski’s  (1986; 
1995) comprehensive  studies  of  Egyptian  nationalist  intellectuals. 
Moreover,  I  have  tried  to  focus  on  thinkers  who  made  crucial 
contributions  to  the  core  set  of  nationalist  concepts  that  have  been 
dominant in Egypt ever since, and whose careers illustrate particularly 
clearly the issues of competition for symbolic capital that are a central 
part  of  the  thesis’s  argument.  Hence  Chapters  3  and  4  focus  on  key 
nationalist texts by the literary and political figure Muḥammad Ḥusayn 
Haykal and the writer Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm.
Chapter  4 completes  the presentation of  the key elements  of  the 
argument  of  the  thesis.  I  would  have  liked  to  include  several  more 
chapters on later  authors and secondary issues.  For example,  in recent 
years excellent research has been published on the relationship between 
women and nationalism in Egypt; Beth Baron’s Egypt as a Woman (2005) 
is a notable contribution. The question of whether nationalism has been 
useful  in  feminist  struggles  has  been  the  subject  of  some  debate 
(Kandiyoti 1991; Hatem 1992), and I envisaged exploring this question in a 
chapter  on  the  nationalist  feminist  Laṭīfa  al-Zayyāt.  The  relationship 
between  nationalism  and  Marxism  in  Egypt  is  also  particularly 
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interesting, and I intended to explore it in a chapter on the nationalist  
Marxist ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Šarqāwī. However, time and space limitations 
made it possible to include only one such supplementary chapter. I have 
therefore reluctantly left out feminism and Marxism; instead, Chapter 5 
deals  with  Iḥsān  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  and  the  concept  of  nationalist 
martyrdom. I chose ʿAbd al-Quddūs because he reached an exceptionally 
wide  audience,  through his  novels  and journalism as  well  as  through 
cinema, and because the concept of dying for one’s country is particularly 
relevant  to  the  concept  of  duty that  is  at  the  heart  of  the analysis  of 
nationalism  proposed  in  this  thesis.  Similarly,  I  do  not  explore  the 
differences  or  relationships  between  Egyptian  nationalism  and  Arab 
nationalism; instead, I focus on phenomena that are common to both. In 
my view, the primary conflict in the intellectual field in Egypt in the 20 th 
century  concerned  the  relationship  between  religion  and  nationalism, 
while  the  issue  of  the  relationship  between  Egyptian  nationalism and 
Arab nationalism was secondary.
The works considered in this thesis belong to many different genres: 
historiography,  lexicography,  geography,  essays,  poems,  novels, 
newspaper  editorials,  and  feature  films,  among  others.  How,  then,  to 
analyse this disparate array of sources in a coherent manner? The answer 
to this  question follows straightforwardly from the aims of this  thesis. 
When considering pre-nationalist texts, I attempt only to mine them for 
evidence of the presence or absence of nationalist concepts, as well as to 
identify related concepts that were either integrated into, or replaced by, 
the nationalist concepts constructed in the 19th century. When considering 
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nationalist texts, I consider them only as expressions of nationalist stances 
(i.e. what Bourdieu calls  prises de position), and as evidence of relations 
between nationalist concepts and the authors’ social interests, particularly 
the  accumulation  of  symbolic  capital  in  the  nationalist  field  and  the 
conversion of this capital into specific capital in other fields, such as the 
literary, intellectual, journalistic and political fields. This is quite a narrow 
focus, and naturally leaves aside many worthy topics of study, not least 
the literary qualities  of  these texts,  as  well  as  the authors’  stances on 
issues that are less relevant to nationalism. Since a writer’s decision to 
work in a particular genre is in itself an intellectual stance, the differences 
between genres merit more attention than I have been able to give them 
here,  but  I  have  attempted  to  explore  this  issue  to  some  extent  in 
comparing novels with their film adaptations.
The analysis links texts, nationalist concepts and social structures in 
the following way. First, I analyse texts in search of nationalist concepts,  
and I attempt to explain their presence as an effect of habitus. An author’s 
habitus can construct new concepts in response to a particular moment in 
his social trajectory, as well as to the state of play in the fields that he is 
involved in, by creatively blending entrenched concepts. Second, I trace 
the long-term effects of the author’s investment in these concepts on his 
career as an intellectual, and particularly on his autonomy from political 
power and social norms. These effects are once again to be found in the 
author’s own works as well as in biographical information.
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Chapter 1: Before al-Ṭahṭāwī
In the next chapter, I will be arguing that the 19th-century Egyptian 
writer  Rifāʿa  Rāfiʿ  al-Ṭahṭāwī  introduced  nationalist  concepts  into  the 
Arabic language by importing them from France and blending them with 
concepts that already existed in Arabic. In order to make it clear what 
was new in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s nationalism, we must first look at the concepts 
that were already available to him in Arabic. In particular, the key word 
in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s nationalist vocabulary was  waṭan (pl.  awṭān), which he 
used to translate the French word  patrie (‘national territory’). What did 
waṭan mean before  he  used  it  in  this  way?  More  generally,  how did 
Arabic speakers before al-Ṭahṭāwī conceptualise geographical areas such 
as Egypt, and the relationship between these areas and their inhabitants? 
This chapter attempts to answer these questions by surveying a selection 
of Arabic texts, from the 9th century to the early 19th century, in which 
such concepts play a prominent role.
The  chapter  proceeds  as  follows.  First,  I  consider  the  concept  of 
waṭan as  used in the texts  presented by al-Ǧāḥiẓ (776 – c.  868) in an 
anthology of writings on the theme of homesickness. I then analyse the 
definition of  waṭan given in the 13th-century dictionary  Lisān al-ʿArab. 
Next I turn to a 15th-century book devoted to praising Egypt, called  Al-
Faḍāʾil al-Bāhira fī Maḥāsin Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira (Dazzling Virtues in the 
Good Qualities of Egypt and Cairo), by one Ibn Ẓahīra. Finally, I analyse 
the concepts of Egypt and its inhabitants found in the chronicles of the 
French occupation of Egypt (1798-1801) written by the Egyptian historian 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ǧabartī (1754 – c. 1824).
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Al-Ḥanīn ilā al-Awṭān: Missing One’s First Home
 Abū ʿUṯmān ʿUmar ibn Baḥr al-Ǧāḥiẓ (776 – c. 868), an illustrious 
writer who spent most of his career in Baghdad (Pellat 2010a), compiled a 
text called ‘Risālat al-Ḥanīn ilā al-Awṭān’ (al-Ǧāḥiẓ 9c/1964, 2:380-412), in 
effect an anthology of many short quotations and excerpts from literary 
works, on the topic of longing for awṭān5. In many of the texts he quotes, 
the  implicit  frame  of  reference  is  the  lifestyle  of  nomadic  desert 
pastoralists  (Bedouin),  who  did  not  have  permanent  settlements,  but 
instead roamed continually from one temporary campsite to another (cf. 
Barakat 1993, 48-54).
Al-Ǧāḥiẓ  says that  he  got  the  idea  to  compile  the  text  from  a 
conversation with a king who had left his  balad and moved to another 
one;  when the king recalled ‘the soil  [turba] and the waṭan’,  he ‘longed 
for it as a camel longs for its resting-place near a waterhole [aʿṭān]’, even 
though his  new home was in  various respects  better  than his  old one 
(9c/1964, 2:383-384). In this passage, balad (pl. bilād) and waṭan seem to be 
synonymous,  but that does not help us much, since  balad is a generic 
term for a place or geographical area of nearly any size6. However, the 
king’s statement is an apt summary of the rest of the anthology, in which 
text after text expresses homesickness. Al-Ǧāḥiẓ (9c/1964, 2:385) sums up 
the idea by stating that ‘one of the signs of good sense is that the soul 
longs for its birthplace [masqaṭ raʾsihā]’. The expression masqaṭ al-raʾs, 
literally ‘the place where one’s head falls (at birth)’, evokes a small place, 
5 For a fuller discussion of this literary genre, see Antrim (2011).
6 Lane  (1968, s.v. balad) defines it as ‘a country, land, province, district, or territory: 
and a city, town or village: or any portion of the earth, or of land, comprehended 
within certain limits’.
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and indeed,  the  places  that  the  authors  in  the  anthology  long for  are 
villages, towns and even small patches of desert; no reference is made to 
any larger geographical areas. Though this expression indicates that what 
al-Ǧāḥiẓ has in mind are birthplaces, it seems possible, given the mobility 
of the Bedouin, that at least some of the texts he quotes might instead be 
concerned with the place where a person’s first emotional attachments 
were formed.  To be on the safe  side,  we can translate  waṭan as  ‘first 
home’ in this sense.
Al-Ǧāḥiẓ  quotes  a  poem according  to  which  ‘the  most  gracious 
people  [qawm], in the eyes of a young man, are the inhabitants of his 
own land [ahl arḍihi]’  (al-Ǧāḥiẓ 9c/1964, 2:384).  Qawm is a very broad 
term; it can refer to any group of people, to a kin group, tribe or other 
community, or to the followers of a prophet (Lane 1968, s.v. qawm). We 
will return later in this chapter to the various senses of the word ahl. Al-
Ǧāḥiẓ quotes an author who says that being deprived of your home town 
(balad) is like being deprived of your parents, for they nourished you and 
it  nourished them  (al-Ǧāḥiẓ 9c/1964,  2:385). Another author concurs:  a 
stranger  (ġarīb)  is  like  an  orphan  (al-Ǧāḥiẓ  9c/1964,  2:391). We  can 
represent the common structure of these metaphors as a conceptual blend, 
outlined in Figure 2.
Animal  metaphors  are  also  common  in  the  texts  quoted;  for 
example,  ‘the stranger who is far from his home town, who has gone 
away from his family, is like a bull that has strayed from its waṭan, a prey 
for any hunter’ (al-Ǧāḥiẓ 9c/1964, 2:385). Here it seems fitting to translate 
waṭan as  ‘pasture’.  Just as a bird longs for its  nests (awkār),  a  person 
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longs for his  awṭān (al-Ǧāḥiẓ 9c/1964, 386). (Note that the plural  awṭān 
can  be  used  as  a  synonym  of  the  singular  waṭan7.)  Another  animal 
metaphor: ‘the most valuable camels are the ones that miss their  awṭān 
the  most’  (al-Ǧāḥiẓ  9c/1964,  2:389).  There  is  also  a  plant  metaphor:  a 
stranger is like a sprout that has been removed from its soil; it wilts and 
does not bear fruit. (We will return to the significance of these metaphors 
later in this chapter and in the next.) Among the signs of a reasonable 
person (ʿāqil) is ‘his longing for ‘his  awṭān’. Not only do people benefit 
from living in their awṭān, but love for awṭān also has a positive effect on 
places;  al-Ǧāḥiẓ quotes  ʿUmar ibn al-Ḫaṭṭāb,  the second caliph,  saying 
7 The same phenomenon occurs with other terms for places, such as balad (pl.  bilād), 
dār (pl. diyār) and mamlaka (pl. mamālik). In such cases, the singular and the plural 
are  used  synonymously,  and  the  choice  of  singular  or  plural  form seems  to  be 
dictated either by convention or by the metrical demands of rhymed prose, with no 
apparent difference in meaning (Zayde Antrim, personal communication).
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Figure 2: First home as parent
that ‘God populates places [or makes them prosperous] through love of 
waṭan [ʿAmmar Allāh  al-buldān bi-ḥubb al-waṭan]’  (al-Ǧāḥiẓ  9c/1964, 
2:389). The idea here may be that since people are attached to their home 
town, they tend to stay there rather than migrating; hence the population 
of the town increases, enabling it to flourish.
Al-Ǧāḥiẓ  argues  that  people  love  their  awṭān more  than  their 
livelihood (arzāq), and gives a number of examples to illustrate this claim. 
Bedouin, he says, dislike spending time in the countryside, and miss their 
desert; he quotes accounts of Bedouin declaring how happy they are to 
live in their waṭan and eat snakes and lizards, as well as a poem in which 
a Bedouin complains of the discomforts, diseases and pests of the city. 
The waṭan of one of these Bedouin is identified as a small place (mawḍiʿ) 
called al-Tasrīr (now in Saudi Arabia). Similarly, says al-Ǧāḥiẓ, the city 
dweller who travels to a more pleasant place than his city will still miss 
his waṭan (al-Ǧāḥiẓ 9c/1964, 2:387, 2:392-398) .
One of the examples of longing for  awṭān that al-Ǧāḥiẓ cites is a 
line by the 9th-century poet Abū Tammām Ḥabīb ibn Aws, about longing 
for a  manzil, literally a place where nomads descend from their camels, 
i.e. where they camp in the desert  (cf. Lane 1968, s.v. manzil): ‘Many a 
camp [manzil]  does a youth get accustomed to /  While his  longing is 
always for the first camp’ (al-Ǧāḥiẓ 9c/1964, 2:401). Thus a person’s waṭan 
can be a manzil. Finally, al-Ǧāḥiẓ quotes a number of poems about how 
one’s first home is the best place to be, several stories about people who 
fall ill while away from home and use a bit of soil from their first home as 
medicine,  and  examples  of  rulers  such  as  Alexander  the  Great,  and 
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biblical figures such as Joseph, who wanted to be buried in their home 
towns when they died (al-Ǧāḥiẓ 9c/1964, 2:401-410).
Hence in the examples collected by al-Ǧāḥiẓ, a waṭan is a person’s 
first home, and in no case is it bigger than a town. It can even be a camp 
in the desert,  or  an animal’s  pasture.  The concept seems to be mainly 
connected with a frame of travel, in which leaving home is thought to 
make one feel  homesick.  What  is  conspicuously  absent  from all  these 
texts, in comparison with the nationalist writings that we will begin to 
consider in the next chapter, is any concept of moral obligation towards 
one’s  waṭan. God populates places by means of love for  awṭān, but this 
seems to be purely God’s affair; human beings are not expected to play 
any intentional role in it. These texts also lack the notion that people from 
the same waṭan form a distinct group capable of having a collective will. 
A  young  man  prefers  the  inhabitants  of  his  first  home  to  people 
elsewhere, but those inhabitants, in this conception, are simply the objects 
of his preference. For al-Ǧāḥiẓ, it is individuals, rather than groups, that 
have active relationships with  awṭān.  In other  words,  there is  nothing 
here  like  the  concept  of  ‘nation’.  The  actions  that  individuals  take  in 
relation to their waṭan are limited to seeking to return to it when they are 
far from it, or to obtaining a substitute for this return, e.g. a bit of soil  
from one’s waṭan, to be used as medicine. Moreover, the modern words 
for ‘nation’, umma and šaʿb, do not occur in these texts.
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A 13th-Century Definition of Waṭan
The famous dictionary  Lisān al-ʿArab,  by Ibn Manẓūr (1233 – c. 
1311)  (Fück 2010a),  provides  a  useful  definition of  waṭan (Ibn Manẓūr 
13c/1997, s.v. waṭan) for the period in which it was compiled. As in most 
Arabic dictionaries, definitions in Lisān al-ʿArab are arranged by root; all 
the  words  derived  from a  given  root  are  presented  under  a  common 
heading. There are usually illuminating relationships between words that 
share a root, so here we will consider the entry for the root  w-ṭ-n as a 
whole.  What  follows  is  a  guided  tour  of  the  entry,  rather  than  a 
translation,  which  would  be  unnecessarily  tedious.  (Note  that  Ibn 
Manẓūr’s definitions of different words are often interwoven.)
The entry begins by defining a waṭan as a manzil (i.e. a dwelling, a 
house, a stopping place or a place of settlement), adding that it is a place 
that one stays in (tuqīm bihi),  a person’s place of residence (mawṭin al-
insān wa-maḥalluhu). Ibn Manẓūr then quotes a few lines of a poem by 
the 8th-century poet Ruʾba ibn al-ʿAǧǧāǧ al-Tamīmī8, who grew up in the 
desert  and  eventually  settled  in  Basra  (Heinrichs  2010);  the  poem  in 
question is a  panegyric to a prince of Basra, and says, in passing: ‘Until 
the inhabitants of Iraq saw that I had settled on a piece of land that was 
not part of my waṭan [ḥattā raʾā ahl al-ʿIrāq annanī / awṭantu arḍan lam  
8 Ibn  Manẓūr’s  reason  for  quoting  the  poem  is  to  note  that  Ruʾba  used  the 
pronunciation waṭn in one line: awṭantu waṭnan lam yakun min waṭanī. In Ruʾba’s 
Dīwān, the same line does not contain this peculiarity, and instead reads  awṭantu 
arḍan lam takun min waṭanī. If we follow the principle lectio difficilior potior from 
textual criticism, and assume that Ibn Manẓūr’s reading is the earlier one, amended 
by a later editor, this would suggest that the editor saw waṭan as a synonym of arḍ 
in this context. The idea that a waṭan could be part of another waṭan, just as an arḍ 
can be part of another arḍ, seems compatible with this interpretation. In any case, in 
the context of panegyric, the line seems simply to emphasise that the poet left home 
and  went  to  live  in  another  place  just  to  be  where  the  addressee  was,  without  
specifying the sort of place that he left.
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takun min waṭanī]’ (Ibn al-ʿAǧǧāǧ, 163). It is remarkable that, unlike al-
Ǧāḥiẓ, Ibn Manẓūr does not say that one’s  waṭan is one’s  birthplace or 
first home. If we were to read waṭan in this sense in this line of Ruʾba’s 
poem, we would probably conclude that he was referring to a small place 
in the desert, like the Bedouin waṭan that we encountered in the previous 
section. However, nothing  in Ibn  Manẓūr’s definition suggests  that we 
should do so; instead, according to this definition, Ruʾba might simply be 
referring to his previous place of residence.
Ibn Manẓūr notes that the plural of  waṭan is  awṭān, and says that 
the awṭān of sheep and cattle are the places where they lie down to rest 
(marābiḍuhā) and take shelter. He quotes the 7th-century poet al-Aḫṭal: 
‘Return to your two stony areas [ḥarrataykum] to dwell in them, / As 
cattle return to their awṭān’.
Next,  Ibn  Manẓūr  turns  to  the  noun  mawṭin (pl.  mawāṭin).  The 
mawāṭin of  Mecca,  he  says,  are  the  places  where  people  stop  there 
(mawāqifuhā).  He  then  defines  the  verb  waṭana,  giving  awṭana as  a 
synonym: to stay (aqāma) in a place, to take it for oneself as a waṭan, e.g.: 
So-and-so awṭana such-and-such land (arḍ kaḏā wa-kaḏā), i.e. took it for 
himself  as  a  place  of  residence  (maḥallan  wa-maskanan)  to  stay  in 
(yuqīm fīhā).  Then he defines the noun  mīṭān as the starting line in a 
horse race,  and gives details  that need not concern us here.  Returning 
briefly  to  the  verb  awṭana,  he  notes  that  among  the  qualities  of  the 
Prophet  Muḥammad  are  that  he  did  not  awṭana places,  i.e.  did  not 
habitually sit in any particular place. Returning to mawṭin, he notes that 
it can mean ‘battlefield’ (mašhad min mašāhid al-ḥarb), citing evidence 
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from the Qurʾān (Q 9:25) as well as poetry. Turning back to  awṭana, he 
says that ‘awṭana land [arḍan]’ (or waṭṭana, or istawṭana) is to use it as a 
waṭan.  Returning once again to  mawṭin,  he emphasises that any place 
(maqām) in which a person stays (qāma), for any purpose, is a mawṭin for 
him; for example: ‘If you come and stop in those  mawāṭin, pray for me 
and for my brothers.’
Turning back to awṭana, he cites a hadith (a quote attributed to the 
Prophet Muḥammad) according to which the Prophet forbade ‘pecking 
like a crow’ while praying (i.e. bobbing up and down hastily), as well as 
choosing a waṭan for oneself (yūṭin al-raǧul fī makān) in the mosque, i.e. 
getting  accustomed  to  praying  in  a  particular  spot,  as  a  camel  gets 
accustomed  to  sitting  in  a  particular  place.  The  ensuing  discussion 
explains that in this hadith, the movement of a camel, as it kneels down 
on a  munāḫ (a  place where  camels  lie  on their  breasts)  which it  has 
chosen as its  waṭan,  is being used as a metaphor for a person kneeling 
down to pray in his favourite spot in the mosque.
Ibn Manẓūr then says that the verb  wāṭana can mean to secretly 
decide to do something with someone. The verb  waṭṭana,  he adds, can 
mean to make up one’s mind to do something, and he cites a poem as 
evidence.
To sum up,  this  definition indicates  that  waṭan could  mean any 
place where a person stays, for any reason, such as a campsite, and could 
also mean a pasture, or a spot where a person or animal habitually sits. 
The conception of waṭan described in this dictionary entry thus seems to 
be even further from ‘national territory’ than al-Ǧāḥiẓ’s conception was 
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four centuries earlier, since it lacks even the notion of ‘first home’, as well 
as the element of longing. The only kind of attachment that is mentioned 
in  this  definition  is  the  kind  that  arises  from  sheer  habit  (sitting 
repeatedly in the same place), and it is viewed as something undesirable9.
Egypt’s Good Qualities
Haarmann (1980, 55) argues that there is ‘an unadulterable Egyptian 
regional or even national identity’ that ‘emerges from Arabic medieval 
sources’. He observes that there was a literary genre, ‘stretching from Ibn 
ʿAbd al-Ḥakam in the ninth century to the Ottoman period’, consisting of 
texts on the faḍāʾil (virtues) of various regions, including treatises on the 
virtues of Egypt, the virtues of Syria, and so on. He contends that the texts 
‘on the  faḍāʾil  Miṣr prove an important  source for  the constituents  of 
Egyptian  national  pride  and  sentiment  in  medieval  Islam’  (Haarmann 
1980, 57). In his view, ‘one of the most provocative’ of these texts is a 15 th-
century book entitled  Al-Faḍāʾil al-Bāhira fī Maḥāsin Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira 
(Dazzling Virtues in the Good Qualities of Egypt and Cairo), by one Ibn 
Ẓahīra10 (Haarmann 1980, 58). In this section, I will examine Ibn Ẓahīra’s 
book to see whether it indeed contains any trace of ‘national identity’, i.e. 
nationalist conceptualisation.
Ibn Ẓahīra begins the introduction to his book by thanking God for 
making places (bilād) different from one another, and giving advantages 
9 Antrim  (2010) gives  examples of  12th-  and 13th-century Arabic texts  in which the 
word waṭan is used in expressions of political loyalty. However, it seems to me that 
in these cases,  a  waṭan is  not  actually represented as  an object  of  duty;  instead, 
attachment to waṭan is used as a metaphor for attachment to a ruler’s will, or to a 
religious duty. Moreover, Antrim’s examples concern the political allegiance of an 
individual, not of a group; there is nothing like the concept of ‘nation’.
10 It  is  not  known with certainty  which  Ibn Ẓahīra  wrote  the  book.  See  Kāmil  al-
Muhandis’s introduction to Ibn Ẓahīra (15c/1969) for a discussion.
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to  each one,  so  that  people  would not  all  agree on one place  (balda), 
neglecting its sisters. Therefore, he says, God placed in their hearts ‘love 
of  awṭān’  so  that  the  latter  would  prosper,  and  God  (al-šāriʿ,  ‘the 
Legislator’) made this love part of religious faith, so they would be well 
cared-for (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 1). This is undoubtedly a reference to the 
hadith,  ‘Love  of  waṭan is  part  of  faith [ḥubb al-waṭan min al-īmān]’. 
Modern scholars consider this hadith to be spurious11 (al-Ǧarrāḥī 1932, no. 
1102;  al-Albānī 1992,  1:no.  110).  As we will  see in the next chapter,  it 
became a key element in the legitimation of nationalist concepts in Egypt 
in  the  19th  century.  Ibn  Ẓahīra’s introduction  concludes  with  a  short 
series of quotes on the theme of love of  waṭan, which present the same 
concepts that we encountered in al-Ǧāḥiẓ’s anthology; most of the quotes 
are identical to ones included in al-Ǧāḥiẓ’s text.
The bulk of Ibn Ẓahīra’s claims about Egypt can be divided into a 
few categories. First, he associates Egypt with the prestige of important 
religious figures, events and places. He presents a legendary account of 
Egypt’s early history, claiming that sons of Noah were the first to settle in 
Egypt after  the Flood  (Ibn Ẓahīra  15c/1969,  6);  the significance of  this 
claim is no doubt that it associates Egypt with a prestigious figure in the 
Qurʾān. He provides a brief and largely fanciful historical overview of the 
pre-Islamic rulers of Egypt (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 14-16). The main concern 
here  seems  to  be  a  religious  one:  to  explain  who  the  Pharaoh  in  the 
Qurʾān was. In his discussion of the Muslim conquest of Egypt in the 7 th 
century, he attributes an exaggerated role to Egyptians in the overthrow 
11 Antrim (2010) notes that it appears as an unattributed proverb in the 12th century, and 
as a hadith in the 15th century.
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of the third caliph ʿUṯmān ibn ʿAffān (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 20-22; cf. Della 
Vida 2010a),  no doubt  to emphasise Egypt’s  significance in connection 
with an important event in the early history of Islam. He claims that the 
prophet Joseph lived in al-Fayyūm and that Jesus Christ was born in a 
village in Upper Egypt called Ahnās (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 60-61). He lists 
Qurʾānic verses and hadith that mention Egypt, or can be interpreted as 
referring to Egypt. One such hadith says that Egypt’s non-Arabs are the 
most noble of the non-Arabs (ʿaǧamuhā akram al-ʿaǧam). ʿAbd Allāh ibn 
ʿUmar,  the  son  of  the  second  caliph,  is  quoted  as  saying  that  the 
inhabitants of Egypt (ahl Miṣr) are not only the most noble non-Arabs, 
but also the nearest in lineage to the Arabs, and to the tribe of Qurayš (the 
Prophet  Muḥammad’s  tribe)  in  particular  (Ibn  Ẓahīra  15c/1969,  71-77). 
Continuing in this vein, Ibn Ẓahīra claims various links between Egypt 
and the prophets. Adam saw that the land of Egypt (arḍ Miṣr) was like 
Paradise, and asked God to increase its agricultural productivity and make 
the milk of its udder flow, and Noah is quoted as describing Egypt as ‘the 
mother of the lands [umm al-bilād]’  (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 78). (We will 
discuss these parental metaphors later in this chapter and in the next.) A 
hadith is quoted: ‘The Copts of Egypt are the Qurayš of the non-Arabs’ 
(Ibn  Ẓahīra  15c/1969,  79).  According  to  Ibn  Ẓahīra,  the  Prophet 
Muḥammad sent a messenger to the Greek ruler of Egypt inviting him to 
convert to Islam; the latter sent back gifts from Egypt (garments, honey, 
etc.),  and  Muḥammad  was  impressed.  Then  the  ruler  of  Egypt  sent 
Muḥammad  two  beautiful  Coptic  sisters  to  marry,  and  Muḥammad 
married one of  them and gave the other  to  someone else  (Ibn Ẓahīra 
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15c/1969, 93-94). The point, once again, is that Egypt found favour with 
the Prophet. Ibn Ẓahīra asserts that Egypt provides for Mecca and Medina 
as well  as the rest  of the world;  if  it  were not for  Egypt,  it  would be  
impossible to live in those two holy cities, nor would the pilgrimage be 
possible (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 101). Moreover, Egypt has the best mosques 
found  anywhere  except  in  Mecca,  Medina  and  Jerusalem  (Ibn  Ẓahīra 
15c/1969, 102-107). Ibn Ẓahīra lists various holy places (al-biqāʿ al-šarīfa) 
in Egypt, such as Mount Sinai, the place where the Red Sea parted, places 
associated with the stay of Mary, Joseph and Jesus in Egypt, and so on 
(Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 107-109). One of the wonders of Egypt is the ‘barrier 
[barzaḫ]’ between the fresh water of the Nile and the salt water of the 
Mediterranean, which is mentioned in the Qurʾān12 (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 
154). The source of the Nile is said to be in Paradise (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 
157, 173). Egypt has become the seat of the imamate and the caliphate (Ibn 
Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 145, 185). Ibn Ẓahīra gives a brief history of the caliphs 
that have reigned in Egypt, and mentions the maḥmal, Egypt’s yearly gift 
of the cloth (kiswa) that covered the kaʿba in Mecca (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 
194-199).
Second, Ibn Ẓahīra stresses the fertility of Egypt’s land and the high 
quality of its goods, particularly clothing and agricultural products, which 
fetch a high price, are prized by kings, and are exported far and wide (Ibn 
Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 53-70, 101-102, 110-117, 131, 133-137, 145). Much of this 
material  consists  of  long  lists  of  these  products,  and  reads  like  an 
investment  brochure.  One  chapter (Ibn  Ẓahīra  15c/1969,  121-130) is 
12 Ibn  Ẓahīra  cites  Q  27:61,  which  describes  the  same  phenomenon,  but  the  word 
barzaḫ appears in Q 25:53.
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devoted mainly to a long list of tax figures, clearly to show that Egypt has 
been a huge source of wealth for its rulers, as well as to gently suggest 
that  they  should  avoid  overtaxing  the  population.  The  third  caliph, 
ʿUṯmān ibn ʿAffān, and the first Muslim governor of Egypt, ʿAmr ibn al-
ʿĀṣ, are quoted discussing taxation, using a conceptual blend in which a 
female camel represents Egypt, the camel’s milk represents its agricultural 
production,  and  its  young  represent  its  inhabitants,  who  are  hungry 
because they did not receive enough of the milk produced; the inference is 
that taxes are too high (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 123). The early caliphs called 
Egypt ‘the bread basket [sallat al-ḫubz]’; it is  the richest country in the 
world (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 128-129),  and supplies the whole world with 
provisions, including Baghdad (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 145). There are more 
boats on the Nile than on any other river  (a sign of productivity) (Ibn 
Ẓahīra  15c/1969,  135-137),  and  Egypt  is  the  only  economically  self-
sufficient country. Continuing on the theme of fertility, Ibn Ẓahīra claims 
that the water of the Nile increases men’s sexual potency, while the water 
of  the  Tigris  decreases  it  (Ibn  Ẓahīra  15c/1969,  143);  the  inference  is 
clearly that  water that makes men fertile must make the land fertile as 
well.
Third, Ibn  Ẓahīra  says  that  Egypt  deserves  praise  because  many 
scholars, writers and other illustrious people have lived and studied there. 
Aswān has produced many scholars and writers (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 67-
68). Ibn Ẓahīra gives an admiring portrait of Alexander the Great  (Ibn 
Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 84-85), who conquered Egypt in the 4th century BC, and 
mentions  a  number  of  philosophers,  scientists  and  mathematicians, 
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including Plato and Aristotle, emphasising that many people have come 
to study in Egypt  (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 85-87). Among the evidence for 
Cairo’s greatness is that so many notable individuals have grown up or 
settled there (istawṭanahā) (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 185). Note that this verb, 
istawṭana, which we encountered above in our discussion of al-Ǧāḥiẓ, is 
from the same root as waṭan and means ‘to take (a place) as one’s waṭan’, 
i.e. ‘to settle in (a place)’. Thus Cairo – not Egypt – was the waṭan of the 
people that Ibn Ẓahīra is referring to here.
At the end of his book,  Ibn Ẓahīra cites panegyrics in poetry and 
prose that  praise  Egypt  and liken it  to  Paradise;  most  of  the praise  is  
directed specifically at the Nile (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 205-217). One poem, 
by the 15th-century poet Ibrāhīm Ḥāyik al-Miʿmār,  says: ‘Egypt is but a 
pleasant stopping-place [manzil], so camp there [istawṭinūhu], in both its 
eastern and western parts,  /  if  you are travelling through it,  and wipe 
yourselves with its clean sand’ (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 206). Note again the 
use  of  the  verb  istawṭana.  This  is  the  earliest  occurrence  we  have 
encountered of a conceptual blend implying that Egypt could be seen as a 
waṭan, in some sense of that word. However, let us note that the frame in 
this blend is clearly that of travel through Egypt, rather than settlement. 
The reference to wiping oneself with clean sand is an allusion to a verse 
of  the  Qurʾān  (4:43),  which  instructs  Muslims  that  if  they  are  on  a 
journey,  and  cannot  find  water  for  their  ablutions,  they  can  wipe 
themselves with clean sand instead. In keeping with this frame, Ibrāhīm 
Ḥāyik  al-Miʿmār’s  poem  explicitly  blends  Egypt  with  a  manzil,  a 
stopping-place on a journey. Since this was the main sense of  waṭan at 
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that time (as we saw above, in the dictionary definition from  Lisān al-
ʿArab), the use of the word  manzil motivates the use of the imperative 
verb  istawṭinūhu (‘camp there’). Ibn Ẓahīra also cites a poem by Kamāl 
al-Dīn al-Adfawī in which, he says, the poet is longing for his waṭan; the 
poem makes it clear that he is longing specifically for Upper Egypt (arḍ 
al-ṣaʿīd) (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 210); the sense of waṭan that Ibn Ẓahīra has 
in mind is no doubt ‘first home’.
What does Ibn Ẓahīra’s book tell us about the concepts that were in 
current  use  in  his  day  to  conceptualise  Egypt  and its  inhabitants?  He 
periodically refers to Egypt as a ‘region’ (iqlīm) (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 1, 2, 
10, 57, 181, 185, 201), e.g. in the expression  iqlīm Miṣr; he also uses the 
equivalent expressions  diyār Miṣr and  al-diyār al-Miṣriyya (Ibn Ẓahīra 
15c/1969, 69, 101, 180, 189, 194, 195, 201, 209). What of the word waṭan? 
Interestingly, Ibn Ẓahīra’s book contains only one instance in which this 
word is explicitly used to refer to any part of Egypt; the place in question 
is Upper Egypt, and the sense of  waṭan is ‘first home’ (that one misses 
when  one  is  away).  Other  senses  of  waṭan appear  indirectly  in  two 
instances, via the verb  istawṭana, to conceptualise Cairo as a place that 
people  have  settled  in,  and  Egypt  as  a  pleasant  stopping-place  for 
travellers. All this is very different from the nationalist use of waṭan that 
we will encounter starting in the 19th century with al-Ṭahṭāwī.
As for Egyptians in general, Ibn Ẓahīra does not have a great deal to 
say about them. He asserts that they are quick to understand Islamic and 
other sciences, have a natural aptitude for eloquence, and have a good 
character. Egyptian women are the most beautiful women in the world, 
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especially those who have one Turkish parent and one Egyptian parent. 
Egyptians are polite, friendly and helpful, they like foreigners, and they 
mind their own business (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 204).
Ibn Ẓahīra consistently refers to Egyptians as ahl Miṣr (Ibn Ẓahīra 
15c/1969, 2, 17, 20, 77, 89, 98, 103, 110, 114, 122, 124, 125, 129, 135, 136, 138,  
143, 167, 174). It seems to me that this expression can best be translated as 
‘the inhabitants of Egypt’, perhaps more specifically those who have been 
settled there for some time.  When  discussing the early years of Muslim 
rule in Egypt, Ibn Ẓahīra uses the expression  ahl Miṣr  to refer only to 
Egypt’s Coptic Christian population, not to its Muslim conquerors (Ibn 
Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 125, 174-175); thus the Muslims, who had only recently 
arrived,  were  not  yet  part  of  ahl  Miṣr.  He  makes  a  clear  distinction 
between the words ahl and umma. For example, he says that in times of 
old, the inhabitants of Egypt (ahl Miṣr)  were ‘mixtures of  communities 
[aḫlāṭan  min  al-umam]’,  including  Copts  (Ibn  Ẓahīra  15c/1969,  89). 
Likewise, he recounts a story told by the 10th-century Baghdadi author al-
Masʿūdī  (on  whom see Pellat 2010b), in which an anonymous old wise 
man says that ‘the inhabitants of Egypt have passed from one umma to 
another [tadāwala ahl Miṣr al-umam]’ (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 166-167).
The word ahl has a number of senses. One early sense is ‘members 
of a household’, i.e. anyone sharing a dwelling, such as a family and its 
servants;  this  is  the  first  sense  given  by  Lane  (1968,  s.v.  ahl).  When 
followed by a noun designating a person, ahl means the members of that 
person’s family, regardless of whether they live together; thus Ibn Ẓahīra 
cites  a  poet  who  longs  to  return  to  ‘my  family  [ahlī]’  (Ibn  Ẓahīra 
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15c/1969, 210). When followed by a noun designating a place, ahl means 
the inhabitants of that place; thus every village has its  ahl (Ibn Ẓahīra 
15c/1969, 125). Ahl al-balad means ‘the settled, or constant, inhabitants of 
the country or town’, and one can refer to ‘the inhabitants of Paradise 
[ahl al-ǧanna]’, i.e. the blessed, and ‘the inhabitants of the Fire [ahl al-
nār]’, i.e. the damned  (Lane 1968, s.v. ahl). As we will see later in this 
chapter,  ahl can also refer  to people who are temporarily located in a 
certain place (e.g. on boats), but do not dwell there. A further extension is 
‘those who practise a certain activity’, as in ‘the people of learning [ahl 
al-ʿilm]’  (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 67), i.e. scholars, and ‘the people of virtue 
and of admirable crafts [ahl al-faḍāʾil wa-l-ṣināʿāt al-badīʿa]’ (Ibn Ẓahīra 
15c/1969, 185), i.e. virtuous people and skilled craftsmen.
I  will  propose a more detailed account  of  ahl at  the end of this 
chapter, after citing other examples of its usage. For now, let us note that 
the inhabitants of Egypt, in Ibn Ẓahīra’s text, are not conceptualised as a 
nation, nor are they shown behaving as if they considered themselves to 
be a nation. In particular, there is no sign of any individual or collective 
moral obligation towards the land of Egypt. No one is depicted as taking 
any action for the sake of Egypt itself. The inhabitants of Egypt, ahl Miṣr, 
are not personified collectively as an entity possessing its own emotions, 
desires or will. Ibn Ẓahīra also seems to be indifferent to the question of 
who rules Egypt, as long as the rulers are Muslims and the taxes are not  
too onerous. The Arabic words that have meant ‘nation’ in modern times 
(umma and  šaʿb) are not used to refer to Egyptians collectively in Ibn 
Ẓahīra’s text.  Šaʿb does not occur at all in Ibn Ẓahīra’s text.  The word 
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qawm, which would be used to form a word for ‘nationalism’ (qawmiyya) 
in the 20th century, is used only in the most general sense of ‘group’, e.g. 
to refer to a group of scholars (Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 98).
In  sum,  Haarmann’s  (1980) claims  about  ‘national  identity’  and 
‘national  pride’  in  Ibn  Ẓahīra’s  book  are  not  supported  by  a  careful 
reading of the text; in reality, there is nothing ‘national’ in it, because it  
lacks a concept of ‘nation’.
Al-Ǧabartī and the French Occupation of Egypt
If nationalist beliefs exist in a given population, there is one type of 
event  that  should  be  expected  to  elicit  forceful  expressions  of  those 
beliefs: an invasion and occupation by a foreign power. In particular, if 
people feel that they have some moral obligation towards the territory 
that they live in, foreign occupation should provoke urgent discussion of 
how best  to  fulfil  that  obligation.  Napoleon Bonaparte’s  occupation  of 
Egypt from 1798 to 1801 therefore provides an ideal opportunity to look 
for  nationalist  beliefs  in  Egypt  at  that  time  (only  25  years  before  al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s  fateful  encounter  with  nationalism  in  France),  particularly 
because it  was an extremely violent and destructive occupation, which 
brutally suppressed two mass rebellions, and because we have a detailed 
eyewitness account of it, written by an Egyptian, the historian ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān al-Ǧabartī (1754-1824). As André Raymond notes, al-Ǧabartī is 
the best source, and on most topics the only source, for an appreciation of 
Egyptians’ perceptions of the occupation.
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A very wealthy member of Cairo’s bourgeoisie and of the milieu of 
Azhar scholars (ʿulamāʾ) . . . [al-Ǧabartī] lived apart from the lower 
strata of the population, had little knowledge of them and judged 
them  haughtily.  He  is  therefore  not  as  representative  of  the 
Egyptian population as has generally been thought. Moreover, his 
work requires careful interpretation. Circumstances led him to write 
three  successive  versions  of  the  events  that  he  had  lived 
through.  . . .  These texts  naturally  contain significant differences, 
because they were intended for different audiences and because of 
the evolution of the shaykh’s views over time. . . . But despite the 
nuances and variants, the work is basically the same. . . . While the 
elite (particularly that of the shaykhs) is well represented, the mass 
of the population only appears occasionally, as a unit, in times of 
crisis, and its actions are often judged harshly. We lack the account 
of the occupation that a less cultivated Egyptian, less wealthy and 
less prejudiced, could have written (Raymond 2004, 3-5).
Despite these reservations, al-Ǧabartī’s three accounts of the French 
occupation  contain  many  revealing  glimpses  of  the  ways  in  which 
Egyptians,  including  those  in  the  dominated  class,  conceptualised  and 
responded to  the  occupation.  Notwithstanding the  differences  between 
the  three  accounts,  a  careful  comparison  shows  that  they  consistently 
present  the same conceptions  of  the inhabitants  of  Egypt and of their 
relations with the French occupation, using the same vocabulary; in what 
follows, I will therefore interleave citations from all three texts. I will not 
attempt to give an complete overview of the French occupation, since that 
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has already been ably done by others (e.g. Dykstra 1998; Raymond 2004; 
Cole 2007). Instead, I will focus on testing the following hypotheses: (a) 
Egyptian Muslims, who refused to be ruled by persons that they perceived 
as Christians or infidels, conceptualised resistance to French rule not as a 
duty towards Egypt, but as a religious duty; (b) Egyptian Christians saw 
the  French  as  Christians,  and  therefore  welcomed  French  rule;  (c) 
Egyptians did not understand what Napoleon meant when he claimed to 
be  invading  Egypt  for  the  benefit  of  the  Egyptian  nation,  since  this 
concept  was unknown at  the time; and (d)  Egyptians  did  not  refer  to 
Egypt as a waṭan during this period.
Al-Ǧabartī  begins  his  first  account  of  the  French  occupation  by 
identifying who was ‘the Sultan of Islam’ (i.e. the Ottoman Sultan) in the 
year of Napoleon’s arrival (al-Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 15). In June 1798, English 
ships reached the port of Alexandria, and a landing party told people on 
the seashore that they had come looking for Frenchmen. The people on 
the seashore replied: ‘There are none among us, except those who have 
settled in the port [al-mustawṭinīn bi-l-ṯaġr]’  (al-Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 19-
20).  Thus  Alexandria  was  the  waṭan of  the  Frenchmen,  no  doubt 
merchants, who lived there13.  The British were also told: ‘these are the 
lands [bilād] of the Sultan, and are not at risk from the French or from 
anyone else’  (al-Ǧabartī  1806/1997, 4:58). The British left,  and ten days 
later, the French arrived and conquered Alexandria (al-Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 
20-21).  When news of this reached Cairo, the Mamluk beys, the princes 
13 Similarly,  later  in his  chronicle,  al-Ǧabartī  mentions  two Mamluk beys  who had 
‘settled in [istawṭana]’ the town of Asyūṭ, and notes that thanks to one of them, 
Asyūṭ became a safe place where many people settled (istawṭana) for protection (al-
Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 224, 227; al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:606, 612); thus Asyūṭ 
became their waṭan.
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and the Muslim clergy met to discuss ‘this matter which took the Muslims 
unawares’. The shaykhs blamed the beys’ negligence in the defence of the 
port, which allowed the enemy to take ‘the port of Islam [ṯaġr al-Islām]’ 
(al-Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 23-24). (Note that they did not say ‘Egypt’s port’.)
Bonaparte,  having  secured  Alexandria,  issued  a  proclamation 
setting forth to the Egyptians the reasons for the invasion and what 
the French government expected from them. The French Orientalist 
Jean Michel de Venture de Paradis, perhaps with the help of Maltese 
aides,  translated  the  document  into  very  strange  and  very  bad 
Arabic (Cole 2007, 30).
Al-Ǧabartī reproduces the Arabic text of the proclamation in full 
(al-Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  28-33). In  language  that  clumsily  and 
unconvincingly  attempts  to  mimic the conventions  of  Islamic  religious 
discourse, Napoleon claims that he has come as a friend of the Ottoman 
Empire, to free Egypt from Mamluk rule, and that he reveres the Prophet 
Muḥammad and the Qurʾān. He complains that the Mamluks have shown 
contempt  for  ‘the  French  community  [al-milla  al-Faransāwiyya]’14, 
treating French merchants in Egypt unjustly. He asserts that ‘all people 
[ǧamīʿ  al-nās]’  are  equal  in  God’s  eyes  (al-Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  29). No 
Egyptian,  he  says,  will  henceforth  be  excluded from positions  of  high 
rank,  and  ‘the  intelligent,  the  virtuous  and  the  learned  will  regulate 
affairs; thus the state of the whole nation [al-umma kullihā] will be set 
right’. He exorts his readers to tell ‘your nation [umma]’ that ‘the French 
are  also  faithful  Muslims  [inn  al-Faransāwiyya  hum ayḍan  Muslimīn  
14 Milla was  the  standard  term for  non-Muslim minorities  in  the  Ottoman  Empire 
(Wendell 1972, 90-91).
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ḫāliṣīn]’  (al-Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 30). He boasts that his army has sacked 
Rome  and  destroyed  the  Papal  See  (al-Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  30-31). The 
proclamation concludes: ‘May God perpetuate the glory of the Ottoman 
Sultan. . . . May God curse the Mamluks and improve the condition of the 
Egyptian nation [al-umma al-Miṣriyya]’ (al-Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 33).
We  do  not  know  how  Egyptians  interpreted  the  expression  al-
umma al-Miṣriyya.  Wendell  (1972, 91) surmises that  it must have been 
incomprehensible to them. In any case, it had almost certainly never been 
used before.  Napoleon’s audience would have been familiar with several 
different senses of the word umma. In the Qurʾān,  an  umma could be a 
group of persons, however small15, as well as category used to classify any 
sort of living creature16.
Far  more  often,  however,  an  umma in  the  Qurʾān  is  a  human 
society, usually of considerable size, viewed chiefly in light of its 
peculiar religious institutions. . . . During the late Medinese period, 
umma is  almost  entirely  restricted  to  the  specific  type  of 
grouping . . . [defined as] those who have been, or are being, tested 
by God through the agency of a prophet and a divine revelation. . . . 
(Wendell 1972, 25-27).
Hence the prototypical  umma was undoubtedly the community of 
all the world’s Muslims. ‘It seems safe to say that after the Prophetic Age 
(570-632), the conceptualization of the  umma . . . suffered no changes in 
essence until the nineteenth century’  (Wendell 1972, x).  As we will see, 
15 Cf. Q 28:23: ‘When he arrived at Midian’s waters, he found a group of men [umma 
min  al-nās]  watering  [their  flocks]’.  When quoting  the  Qurʾān,  I  have  used  the 
translation by M. A. S. Abdel Haleem (2004) throughout.
16 See Wendell (1972, 25) and Q 6:38.
61
al-umma al-Miṣriyya would later become the standard way of saying ‘the 
Egyptian  nation’  among  Egyptian  nationalists.  Its  appearance  in 
Napoleon’s  proclamation  is  undoubtedly  a  reflection of  the  nationalist 
beliefs  of  Napoleon and his colleagues,  beliefs  that had recently found 
forceful expression in the French revolution.
[T]he  word ‘Nation’  . . .  must,  in  a  French context,  be  classified 
amongst the category of . . . words central to political discourse in 
France whose sense has changed significantly with the passage of 
time. Of indeterminate meaning in the eighteenth century . . . it was 
out  of  the  Revolution  of  1789  that  was  born  the  concept  of  the 
sovereignty of the nation and with that the related concept of the 
right  of  peoples  to  self-determination  and  the  claim  that  the 
boundaries of France  were to be set  by its ‘frontières naturelles’. 
Equally nationalism (the word itself first appeared in 1798 . . .) was 
always something of an ambivalent creed, humanitarian sentiment 
frequently giving way to jingoistic chauvinism. . . . and to displays 
of military prowess (Jennings 1991, 498-499).
Indeed,  the  word  nationalisme was  coined  ‘precisely  as 
overwhelmed observers  were  struggling to  make sense  of  the  political 
deluge they had just witnessed in France’ (Bell 2001, 6). I will discuss the 
French nationalism of this period in greater depth in the next chapter. It 
seems likely that nationalism was already so deeply entrenched in the 
habitus of the French occupiers of Egypt that they could not conceive of 
Egyptians as anything but a nation, and initially assumed that Egyptians 
saw themselves  in  the  same  way.  As  we  will  see,  French  nationalist 
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concepts were explicitly modelled on, and designed to replace, religious 
concepts.  The  French translators  who chose  umma as  a  translation  of 
‘nation’, a concept that as yet had no equivalent in Arabic, were perhaps 
searching for  a  term that  would  convey  a  similar  sense of  sacredness 
regarding a community of human beings.
Al-Ǧabartī’s response to Napoleon’s proclamation shows that this 
innovative use of  the word  umma failed to  prompt for  the nationalist 
concept that the French had in mind.  Al-Ǧabartī penned a scathing and 
witty  critique of  the proclamation  (al-Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  33-41),  in  the 
style of a schoolmaster correcting a student’s mediocre essay, pointing out 
its blatant hypocrisy and its many grammatical errors17. He observes that 
in  reality,  the  French  disagree  with  ‘all  religions  [milal]’  (al-Ǧabartī 
1798/1999, 33; cf. Cole 2007, 32-34); they are guilty of ‘unbelief [kufr]’ (al-
Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  36).  If  Napoleon really  respected Muḥammad as  he 
says he does, ‘he would believe in him, accept his truth, and respect his 
community [umma]’; if he really respected the Qurʾān as he says he does, 
he  would  believe  in  what  it  contains,  and  he  would  believe  that  the 
Prophet’s  community  (umma)  is  the  most  noble  of  communities  (al-
Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 37). On the idea that everyone is equal in God’s eyes, 
this is ‘a lie and stupidity’; God has made some superior to others 18 (al-
Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 38). Al-Ǧabartī condemns Napoleon’s appointment of 
‘low and vulgar people’ to positions of authority, and agrees that the state 
of the  umma would be set  right if  it  were administered by intelligent, 
17 Strangely,  though,  al-Ǧabartī  makes  many  of  the  same  grammatical  errors, 
particularly in the Mudda.
18 Al-Ǧabartī perhaps has Q 43:32 in mind: ‘We have raised some of them above others 
in rank, so that some may take others into service’.
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virtuous and learned men, but objects that Napoleon has not appointed 
such men.  Al-Ǧabartī  makes  no  comment on the  phrase  al-umma al-
Miṣriyya;  perhaps  he  interpreted  the  word  umma in  this  phrase,  and 
elsewhere the proclamation, as referring to the Islamic umma that Egypt 
was a part of, rather than ‘the Egyptian nation’, as Napoleon’s translators 
intended.  Disregarding  the  proclamation’s  nationalist  terminology,  he 
refers  to  French  collectively  as  a  qawm (al-Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  40),  an 
extremely broad term that (as we have seen above) could refer to almost 
any group of people (Lane 1968, s.v. qawm); he also calls them hāʾulāʾ al-
aqwām (‘those people’), using the plural of the same word (al-Ǧabartī and 
al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 25). Perhaps the French subsequently realised that the 
meaning of al-umma al-Miṣriyya was unclear to their audience; they did 
not  use  it  again  in  any  of  their  proclamations,  and  instead  used  the 
standard  expression,  ahl  Miṣr (e.g.  al-Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998, 
113).
Al-Ǧabartī says that there was a general call to arms to repel the 
French  invasion;  many  in  Cairo  responded,  but  most  people  in  the 
countryside, and most peasants, did not, since they believed Napoleon’s 
assertion that he was a friend of the Sultan, and therefore assumed that 
the  Sultan  must  have  told  Napoleon  to  invade  Egypt  (al-Ǧabartī 
1798/1999, 43). This is one of many indications that we will encounter of 
Egyptians’ support of Ottoman rule.
From the very beginning of the occupation, there is clear evidence 
that Egyptian Muslims understood it in religious terms. As the French 
were on their way from Alexandria to Cairo, the ʿulamāʾ gathered at al-
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Azhar and elsewhere to support the Mamluks in their impending battle 
with  the  French,  by  praying  and  by  reading  hadith;  the  Sufi  orders 
gathered for dhikrs. The head of the descendants of the Prophet (naqīb al-
ašrāf)  took a flag known as ‘the Prophet’s  flag [al-bayraq al-nabawī]’ 
down from the Citadel, and carried it to Būlāq, as thousands of people 
responded to this call by gathering around him with makeshift weapons, 
chanting the  Islamic  phrases  ‘There  is  no  god  but  God [Lā  ilāha  illā  
Allāh]’ and ‘God is great [Allāhu akbar]’ (al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:70-72). 
The houses of Copts and Syrian Christians in Cairo were searched for 
weapons.  Al-Ǧabartī  says  that  the  common  people  (al-ʿāmma)  would 
have been satisfied with nothing less than killing the Christians and Jews, 
but that the rulers forbade this (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 29; al-
Ǧabartī  1806/1997,  4:73;  cf.  Wendell  1972,  94).  Note  that  al-Ǧabartī 
implicitly does not consider Egyptian Christians and Jews to be part of al-
ʿāmma. The common people (again al-ʿāmma) chanted Islamic slogans to 
support  the  Mamluk  troops  during  the  Battle  of  the  Pyramids,  while 
‘reasonable  people  [al-ʿuqalāʾ]’  scolded  them  for  this,  saying  that  the 
Prophet Muḥammad and his companions carried out jihad with swords, 
not with shouting; but no one listened (al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:75).
In July, shortly after the French established their authority in Cairo, 
rumours  spread that  they  intended to  kill  all  the  Muslims  during the 
Friday prayer (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 37); this, too, suggests a 
perception of the occupation as a war of religion. In August, the French 
attempted to organise the traditional annual celebration of the Nile flood, 
but no Egyptians attended except Christians  (al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:92-
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93). The French tried to get a group of prominent shaykhs to wear the 
tricolour sash, symbol of the French republic, but the shaykhs refused, not 
on  the  grounds  that  they  would  be  betraying  Egypt  by  displaying 
allegiance to a foreign power, but rather on the grounds that ‘it would 
demean us in the eyes of God and our fellow Muslims’. Similarly, when 
the  French  attempted  to  require  the  inhabitants  of  Cairo  to  wear  the 
tricolour cockade, ordinary people debated whether this was acceptable, 
but  only  in  religious  terms  (al-Ǧabartī  and al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  44;  al-
Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:98-99).
In September 1798, the peasants in the villages surrounding Dimyāṭ 
(Damietta) in the Delta, boasted openly of how they were going to 
massacre all the Christians and French in that city, and ravage their 
women. The native Christians appealed to General Vial, as he was 
about to leave for the village of al-Šuʿarāʾ, where the insurgents had 
gathered, saying: ‘General, they said to him, you intend going back 
to Cairo, and you are throwing us into the hands of these devils 
who have neither mercy nor reason. They are convinced that we are 
of your kind [minkum wa-naḥnu min ǧinsikum], because you are 
Christians like us’ (Wendell 1972, 95).
In the same month, the French celebrated their national holiday in 
honour  of  the  founding  of  the  French  republic;  prominent  Egyptian 
Christians were delighted to attend  (al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:103-104). A 
messenger from the Sultan arrived, and al-Ǧabartī says that ‘people [al-
nās]’  hoped  eagerly  that  this  was  a  sign  of  an  impending  Ottoman 
military intervention to overthrow the French  (al-Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 94-
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95). It seems safe to assume that the Christians who were delighted to 
associate themselves with French rule were not hoping that the Ottomans 
would overthrow it; again, al-Ǧabartī clearly uses general terms such as 
‘people [al-nās]’ to mean Muslims in particular. At around the same time, 
Napoleon visited a prominent shaykh at his home near the mosque of al-
Ḥusayn,  and ‘the rabble  [ġawġāʾ  al-ʿāmma]’  gathered round to heckle 
Napoleon, saying that he had come to convert to Islam, fearing for his life. 
As he left, they again heckled him by chanting the Fātiḥa, the first sūra of 
the  Qurʾān (al-Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  95,  al-Ǧabartī  1806/1997,  4:103).  The 
hecklers were thus undoubtedly Muslims.
In October, the French issued a proclamation describing Egypt as 
the most fertile country, and asserting that science, industry and written 
language originally came from the earliest ancestors of the inhabitants of 
Egypt. Hence, according to the proclamation, the nations (umam) coveted 
Egypt, and one nation after another invaded it, the worst of them being 
the Turks; the French have come to save Egypt from misrule. A hundred 
years later, these claims (apart from the one about France) would become 
standard  fare  in  Egyptian  nationalist  historiography  (Gershoni  and 
Jankowski  1986,  143-163).  But  they  made  no  positive  impression 
whatsoever  on  al-Ǧabartī;  he  dismisses  the  entire  proclamation  as 
‘corrupt [muḥarraf]’ and ‘twisted [muʿawwaǧ]’, and does not dignify it 
with  any  further  comment  (al-Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  113-114,  al-Ǧabartī 
1806/1997, 4:116-117).
In the same month, the first major uprising against French rule took 
place in Cairo, sparked by the imposition of property taxes, even though 
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the  taxes  were lower  than those that  had been customary.  Al-Ǧabartī 
notes that some shaykhs stirred up rebellion (iṯārat  al-fitna);  the word 
fitna (‘revolt’, ‘disturbances’, ‘civil war’) has strong negative connotations 
dating  from  the  early  history  of  Islam  (Gardet  2010). These  shaykhs 
delivered sermons in which they said: ‘Muslims, you must carry out a 
jihad. How can you, who are free persons, accept paying poll tax [ǧizya]19 
to  the  infidels  [al-kuffār]?’  (al-Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  124-125) In  André 
Raymond’s view,
The feeling that Islam had been scorned . . . [and] the impression 
that  the  occupiers  relied  on Christians  to  humiliate  Muslims . . . 
clearly  played  a  decisive  role,  as  can  be  seen,  from  the  very 
beginning  of  the  movement,  in  its  religious  and  anti-Christian 
character. . . . Ottoman propaganda also played a role in preparing 
minds for revolt. Letters from Istanbul . . . incited Egyptians to rise 
up against the occupier and join a holy war (jihad) that had been 
proclaimed  in  the  [Ottoman]  capital.  . . .  A  certain  number  of 
middle-ranking shaykhs were active in the movement. They were 
all  Azhar-trained  shaykhs,  probably  rather  young  and  at  the 
beginning of their careers. . . . A prominent role was played in these 
events by a well-known personality,  the  šārīf [descendant of  the 
Prophet]  Badr  al-Dīn al-Maqdisī.  . . .  It  is  incontestably  Badr  al-
Maqdisī and the five shaykhs that played the most important role in 
organising the revolt. . . . The Cairo Revolt may have begun with 
calls of a religious character. . . . Nicolas Turc mentions an Azhar 
19 Ǧizya was the tax that, according to Islamic law, non-Muslim subjects were required 
to pay in Islamic states (Cahen, İnalcık, and Hardy 2010).
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shaykh  who  is  said  to  have  run  through  the  streets,  calling  on 
Muslims to rise up: ‘Let all those who believe in the unity of God go 
to  the  Azhar  mosque.  Today  is  the  day  to  fight  the  infidels’ 
(Raymond 2004, 124-132).
The rebels chanted ‘May God give victory to the Muslims [Naṣara 
Allāh al-Muslimīn]’ and ‘May God give victory to Islam [Naṣara Allāh 
dīn  al-Islām]’.  Many  parts  of  Cairo  remained  calm,  but  the  rebels 
mistakenly believed that ‘all Muslims were in agreement’. They pillaged 
Christians’ houses, determined to carry out a jihad. As for al-Ǧabartī, he 
was categorically and consistently opposed to all insurrections. He refers 
to  the  rebels  as  ‘riffraff’  (al-ġawġāʾ,  al-sūqa,  etc.)  and  says  that 
‘reasonable  people  [al-ʿuqalāʾ]’  saw rebellion  as  pointless,  because  the 
rebels  were  in  no  position  to  defeat  the  French  army  (al-Ǧabartī 
1798/1999, 124-133; al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 58-59; al-Ǧabartī 
1806/1997, 4:122-127).
Despite  al-Ǧabartī’s  condemnation  of  the  rebellion  and  his 
contempt for the rebels, he clearly shared their perception of the conflict 
as  a  religious  one.  He repeatedly  refers  to  them as  ‘the  Muslims’  (al-
Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  134,  136;  al-Ǧabartī  and al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  58;  al-
Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:130), describes the French troops as ‘like devils or the 
soldiers of  Satan’,  says that  they ‘incurred God's  wrath’,  and refers to 
them as  ‘the  enemies  of  religion’  and ‘the  army of  Satan’  (al-Ǧabartī 
1798/1999, 138). The French executed many people in retaliation for the 
uprising; Gabarti says that ‘innumerable people [umam kaṯīra lā yuḥṣā 
ʿadaduhā] died during these two days and those that followed’ (note the 
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use of umma in its older sense to mean ‘a number of persons’). He makes 
it  clear  that  he  means  Muslims:  ‘the  desire  and  stubbornness  of  the 
infidels [al-kafara] lasted a long time, and they inflicted as much harm on 
the Muslims as they wished’ (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 61-62; al-
Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:131). Similarly,  Wendell  (1972, 113) notes a striking 
example of at least some Egyptian Christians’ perceptions of the situation 
a few months later:
In January 1799, General Andréossy visited the Coptic monasteries 
of Wādī al-Naṭrūn. . . . The leading question asked by the monks 
may  have  jolted  even  an  eighteenth-century  revolutionary.  ‘Our 
travelers,  having  been  welcomed  by  them with  kindliness,  were 
favored with a most unusual disclosure on this subject: “When are 
you going to kill all the Muslims?” they asked General Andréossy.’
The  month  of  Ramadan  began  in  February  1799.  The  French 
dispatched  heralds  in  the  streets  of  Cairo  to  order  the  Christian 
inhabitants of the city (naṣārā al-balad) to maintain the custom of not 
eating in public during the Ramadan fast. A Muslim jurist (faqīh) saw a 
Christian smoking in public and scolded him, the Christian replied with 
an insult, and the jurist struck the Christian. The case was brought before 
the French authorities, who punished the Christian and let the jurist go. 
Al-Ǧabartī regarded all this as an attempt by the French to win over the 
sympathy  of  ‘the  subjects  [al-raʿiyya]’  (of  the  Ottoman  Sultan)  (al-
Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 85; al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:196-197). This 
implies that in his view, only Muslims were subjects. In the same month, 
Bonaparte’s troops took the Mediterranean town of  al-ʿArīš, captured a 
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group of Mamluks there and brought them to Cairo; ‘this saddened the 
Muslims’.  The  French  celebrated  their  victory,  and  the  Christian 
inhabitants of Cairo celebrated as well, much to al-Ǧabartī’s disgust  (al-
Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 85-86).
On  his  way  to  Syria,  Napoleon  sent  proclamations  to  the 
inhabitants of the region, telling them to stay in their towns, urging those 
who had fled to return home; these proclamations use the word waṭan in 
the  sense  of  ‘place  of  residence’,  as  well  as  the  synonym  maḥall (al-
Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  87,  90-93;  al-Ǧabartī  1806/1997,  4:201-
202). Napoleon and his troops camped en route at an unnamed location in 
north-eastern Egypt; al-Ǧabartī refers to this camp as Napoleon’s waṭan: 
‘When the General reached his camp [fa-lamma waṣala Sārī ʿAskar ilā  
waṭanihi] . . .’ (al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:216).
In May 1799, a Moroccan shaykh arrived in the town of Damanhūr, 
accompanied by about 80 men and claiming to be the Mahdī20, and called 
people to jihad. Some of the locals joined him and fought the French with 
him,  without  success  (al-Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  102-103;  al-
Ǧabartī  1806/1997,  4:229).  A young Mamluk ran through the streets  of 
Cairo  with  a  drawn sword,  also  calling  people  to  jihad,  before  being 
caught  and  executed  (al-Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  103-104;  al-
Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:231-232). In the same month, Napoleon’s forces were 
defeated at  Acre;  al-Ǧabartī  quotes  a  poem that  celebrates  this  defeat, 
portraying it entirely as a victory for God and the Muslims against the 
infidels (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 108-111). In his obituaries, al-
20 The Mahdī,  ‘“the rightly guided one” is  the name of the restorer  of  religion and 
justice who, according to a widely held Muslim belief, will rule before the end of the 
world’ (Madelung 2009).
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Ǧabartī  mentions  several  individuals  who,  he  says,  were  ‘among  the 
martyrs  killed  [qutila  maʿa  man  qutila  šaḥīdan]’  by  the  French  (al-
Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:238, 240, 249-252).
In an amazing display of transparently deceitful bluster, a French 
proclamation asserted that Napoleon had converted to Islam  (al-Ǧabartī 
and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  115);  no  one  seems  to  have  taken  this  claim 
seriously,  and  al-Ǧabartī  does  not  bother  to  comment  on  it.  Another 
French proclamation mentioned in passing that the French had abolished 
Ottoman rule in Egypt  (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 116-117). Al-
Ǧabartī includes a short text by his friend Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār21 in which the 
latter responds to this proclamation; launching into a stream of invective, 
al-ʿAṭṭār heaps contempt on the very idea of ending Ottoman rule, and 
condemns Napoleon, ‘the accursed infidel [kāfir]’, who ‘does not wish to 
become one of the sons and men of Egypt [abnāʾ Miṣr wa-riǧālihā]’ (al-
Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  117-118).  This  is  a  very  revealing 
statement, because it implies that Napoleon, if he had wished, could have 
become a ‘son of Egypt’, presumably by converting sincerely to Islam and 
embracing Ottoman rule.
In July, a group of Mamluk fugitives were betrayed to the French by 
Egyptian peasants (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 119). News arrived 
that  Ottoman  troops  had  arrived  in  Alexandria;  ‘people  [al-nās]’  (i.e. 
Muslims) rejoiced and ‘cursed Christians openly’; one was arrested for 
telling a Christian that ‘in four days we’ll be rid of you all’  (al-Ǧabartī 
and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  121;  al-Ǧabartī  1806/1997,  4:276-277).  Reports 
21 On al-ʿAṭṭār, see Appendix 2.
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arrived  that  ‘the  Muslims’  (i.e.  the  Ottoman  army)  had  retaken 
Alexandria;  ‘people  [al-nās]  rejoiced  and  congratulated  each  other’  in 
Cairo,  but  the  reports  turned out  to  be  false  (al-Ǧabartī  and al-ʿAṭṭār 
1801/1998, 122-123).
Bonaparte ‘secretly slipped out of the country in August,  leaving 
behind a note for the surprised General Kléber informing him that he was 
henceforth  in  charge  of  Egypt’  (Cole  2007,  244).  The  French  and  the 
Ottomans signed a treaty, stipulating that the French would leave Egypt, 
returning control of the province to the Ottoman Empire. An Ottoman 
delegation arrived in Cairo and was greeted enthusiastically by throngs of 
overjoyed  Egyptians.  The  Ottomans  immediately  imposed  a  tax  on 
merchants to raise the money required for the evacuation of the French, 
and the merchants gladly paid up, delighted that ‘the infidel  dogs [al-
kilāb al-kafara]’ would soon be leaving Egypt  (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 
1801/1998,  138;  al-Ǧabartī  1806/1997,  4:316-317).  As for  the masses (al-
raʿāyā wa-hamaǧ al-nās), they started openly cursing the French as well 
as Christians, and acclaiming the Sultan (al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:317-318). 
(Here again, al-nās can only refer to Muslims.)
The  French  attacked  the  Ottomans,  breaking  the  treaty.  The 
Ottoman representative, Naṣūḥ Pasha, then entered Cairo, accompanied 
by  Mamluk  princes  and  Mamluk  and  Ottoman  troops,  and  told  the 
population  to  launch  a  jihad  against  Christians.  When  ‘the  common 
people [al-ʿāmma]’ (i.e. the Muslims) heard this, they went into a fury 
and ran around attacking any Christians they found. Muslims went to 
Christian  neighbourhoods,  killed  any  Christians  they  encountered  and 
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pillaged  their  homes.  The  Christians,  who  had  armed  themselves  in 
preparation for  just  such an eventuality,  fought  back.  The next day, a 
battle took place between the French and ‘the Islamic troops [al-ʿasākir  
al-Islāmiyya]’. Anyone who captured ‘a Christian, a Jew or a Frenchman’ 
took him to an Ottoman official in exchange for a reward; some of those 
captured  were  imprisoned and  others  were  killed.  Some Muslims  also 
killed  non-Muslims,  decapitated  them,  and  brought  their  heads  to  the 
authorities  in  exchange  for  the  reward.  This  was  ‘a  war  against  the 
infidels’; there were constant calls to jihad in the streets  (al-Ǧabartī and 
al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 143-151; al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:325-341).
Finally,  the  Muslim forces  surrendered and a  treaty  was  signed, 
with  the  shaykhs  acting  as  intermediaries.  When  word  spread  of  the 
treaty,  ‘people  [al-nās]’  were  angry  and  said:  ‘Those  shaykhs  have 
become apostates  from Islam [hāʾulāʾ  al-mašāyiḫ  irtaddū]’  (al-Ǧabartī 
and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  151).  Note  that  they  did  not  accuse  them  of 
betraying Egypt. The Moroccan mentioned above was especially active in 
stirring up this  sort  of  opposition.  In al-Ǧabartī’s  view,  this  Morrocan 
provoked strife (fitna) for his own material gain; his desire for jihad was 
not pure, unlike those who had been sacrificing themselves to please God 
during the fighting. The Moroccan should not, in his view, have meddled 
in the conflict, which men like Naṣūḥ Pasha had well in hand (al-Ǧabartī 
and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 152-153).
The  Muslim  forces,  and  ‘the  common  people  [al-ʿāmma]’  (i.e. 
Muslim commoners), refused to accept the treaty, apparently preferring to 
fight to the death. They insulted the shaykhs and beat them for handing 
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victory  to  ‘the  accursed  infidels’.  Fighting  continued,  and  the  French 
retook  Cairo,  burning,  massacring  and  pillaging.  Al-Ǧabartī  repatedly 
describes the two opposing forces as ‘the French’ and ‘the Muslims’  (al-
Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 153-155; al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:346-351). 
‘The local Christians [al-naṣārā al-baladiyya]’ took the opportunity of the 
French victory to gloat and abuse Muslims, to mock Islam and to declare 
that  the  days  of  the  Muslims  were  finished  (al-Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār 
1801/1998,  162-163;  al-Ǧabartī  1806/1997,  4:366).  As  for  al-Ǧabartī,  he 
condemns the second Cairo uprising, saying that it brought ‘people [al-
nās]’ nothing but ruin (al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:354).
Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār fled to Upper Egypt and stayed there for 11 months, 
until the French had left. During that time, he often wrote to al-Ǧabartī, 
stressing how much he missed Cairo. In one of these letters, he complains 
about being separated from his waṭan (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 
163-164; al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:367-369); clearly Cairo, not Egypt, was his 
waṭan. Note that it does not seem to have occurred to him that perhaps he 
should have stayed in Cairo to fight the French; his relationship to his 
waṭan was one of emotional attachment but not duty. This is consistent 
with the senses of waṭan that we saw in the previous chapter.
Summarising the events of the year 1214 AH (1799-1800 AD), al-
Ǧabartī mentions that an Ottoman butcher went to visit the shrine of a 
saint in Ṭanṭā with a few companions. There were a few Frenchmen in 
the  town.  The  inhabitants  of  the  town  mistook  the  butcher  and  his 
companions for Ottoman soldiers sent to drive out the French; they cried 
‘May God give victory to  Islam [Naṣara  Allāh al-Islām]’,  cheered the 
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Ottomans wildly, and attacked the Frenchmen  (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 
1801/1998, 166; al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:372). Al-Ǧabartī reports that in July 
1800,  Frenchmen  and  local  Christians  were  subjecting  Muslims  to 
widespread humiliation (al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:521).
In June 1801,  a British-Ottoman military alliance finally defeated 
the French army in Egypt. Al-Ǧabartī describes the atmosphere in Cairo 
as the Ottoman forces re-established their authority:
People were delighted and congratulated one another, and displayed 
joy and happiness at the arrival of the Muslims [i.e. the Ottoman 
troops] and the departure of the infidels. They went out to greet 
them and to invoke blessings on their arrival. Women let out trills 
of  joy,  in  the  markets  and from their  windows,  when they  saw 
them. People made a great din, and children and youths gathered in 
the usual way, lifting their voices to cry: ‘May God give victory to 
the Sultan’ and the like (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 235-244; 
al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:649-651).
It seems safe to assume, given what we have seen thus far, that by 
‘people’ he means Muslims. The arrival of the Ottoman vizier was the 
occasion  for  further  rejoicing  (al-Ǧabartī  1806/1997,  4:656-657).  Two 
Ottoman edicts  were  issued,  forbidding attacks  against  Christians  and 
Jews, for the latter were among the subjects (raʿāyā) of the Sultan  (al-
Ǧabartī  1806/1997,  4:657-666);  this  suggests  that  such attacks  were still 
taking  place.  According  to  al-Ǧabartī,  within  a  few  months,  the 
depredations  of  the  Ottoman  soldiers  stationed  in  Egypt  made  most 
people, especially peasants, wish for the return of French rule (al-Ǧabartī 
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1806/1997,  4:824-825).  Yet this  was a purely material  grievance; no one 
objected  to  Ottoman  rule  on  the  grounds  that  the  Ottomans  were 
foreigners.  Moreover,  no  mass  uprisings  against  Ottoman rule  ensued. 
Religious affiliation seems to have trumped material grievances.
Let  us  now  take  stock  of  al-Ǧabartī’s  terms  for  Egypt  and  its 
inhabitants, as we did above for Ibn Ẓahīra.  Like Ibn Ẓahīra, to refer to 
Egypt as a whole, he uses the words  iqlīm (‘region’)  (al-Ǧabartī and al-
ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 14, 219, 220; al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:246, 596, 598, 600) 
and  diyār  (‘lands’)  (al-Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  83;  al-Ǧabartī 
1806/1997,  4:583,  602,  655).  He  also  calls  Egypt  a  quṭr (another  word 
meaning ‘region’) (al-Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 113, 114; al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 
1801/1998,  29,  218;  al-Ǧabartī  1806/1997,  4:253,  583) and  a  mamlaka 
(‘realm’)  (al-Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  154;  al-Ǧabartī  and al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998, 
188, 220; al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:246, 545, 602). The terms  arḍ Miṣr (‘the 
land  of  Egypt’)  (al-Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  250;  al-Ǧabartī 
1806/1997, 4:658) and al-mamālik al-Miṣriyya (‘the realms of Egypt’) (al-
Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  76) also occur.  Each of  the regions within Egypt  is 
likewise  called  an  iqlīm (al-Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  153-155,  al-Ǧabartī 
1806/1997,  4:375,  658).  Al-Ǧabartī  often uses  the term  al-bilād to  refer 
specifically  to  the settled areas  of  Egypt  outside Cairo  (e.g.  al-Ǧabartī 
1798/1999,  83,  113,  134,  145,  151,  153,  158;  al-Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār 
1801/1998, 56). Hence the term ahl al-bilād means ‘the settled inhabitants 
of Egypt outside Cairo’  (al-Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 79). While for Ibn Ẓahīra, 
the name Miṣr usually meant Egypt, for al-Ǧabartī it nearly always means 
Cairo (e.g. al-Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 27, 28, 50, 55, 59, 61, 69, 71, 73, 74, 84, 85, 
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86,  88,  122,  166,  171,  172);  he  rarely  uses  the  name  al-Qāhira  (e.g.  al-
Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  128,  173).  Thus ahl  Miṣr means  ‘the  inhabitants  of 
Cairo’; this term is explicitly contrasted with ahl al-aryāf (‘the inhabitants 
of the countryside’)  (al-Ǧabartī  1798/1999, 151; al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 
1801/1998,  27,  31,  145;  al-Ǧabartī  1806/1997,  4:328,  331).  Al-Ǧabartī 
occasionally  uses  the  word  awlād (‘children’)  to  mean  people  who 
normally inhabit a particular place; thus awlād al-balad (‘the children of 
the city’) are people who live in Cairo (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 
180; al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:533, 823), and awlād al-Qarāfa are the living 
inhabitants of the Qarāfa necropolis22 (al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:328). In one 
French proclamation  written  by  shaykhs,  the  inhabitants  of  Egypt  are 
called  al-maḫlūqāt, a term that could be translated as ‘God’s creatures’ 
(al-Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 153).
In stark contrast to 20th-century Arab nationalists, al-Ǧabartī uses 
the  words  ʿarab and  ʿurbān (‘Arabs’)  only  to  mean  Bedouin  (e.g.  al-
Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 22, 44, 45, 55, 72, 73, 94, 101, 112, 134, 135, 151, 153, 158,  
171, 172), i.e. desert nomads. When they appear in his narrative, they are 
usually plundering the inhabitants of settled areas. He describes them as 
‘the worst sort of people [aqbaḥ al-aǧnās]’, notes that they were loyal to 
neither  side in  the  conflict  between the French and the  Muslims,  and 
contrasts  them  explicitly  with  ahl  al-bilād,  using  the  latter  term 
interchangeably with  ahl  al-qurā (‘the inhabitants of  the villages’)  (al-
Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 165). An Ottoman edict notes that each 
Bedouin tribe in Egypt has a traditional stopping-place in the desert; the 
22 The Qarāfa cemetery has been inhabited since the Arab conquest of Egypt in the 7 th 
century (Di Marco 2009).
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edict uses the word  waṭan to refer to each of these stopping-places  (al-
Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 260). There can hardly be any doubt that 
the Arab nationalist expression  al-waṭan al-ʿarabī,  which designates an 
Arab national territory stretching from Morocco to Iraq, would have been 
incomprehensible to those Arabs.
It  seems  that  the  word  ahl was,  in  al-Ǧabartī’s  accounts  of  the 
French occupation as well as Ibn Ẓahīra’s text on the good qualities of 
Egypt, the most common way of associating a group of human beings 
with a place. Let us pause here to consider the range of meanings of the 
word ahl in these texts. We have already noted the senses ‘members of a 
household’ and ‘members of a person’s family’. We often have seen the 
meaning  ‘inhabitants’,  e.g.  ‘the  inhabitants  of  the  Ḥusayniyya  district 
[ahl  al-Ḥusayniyya]’  (al-Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  60) and  ‘the 
inhabitants of Suez [ahl al-Suways]’  (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 
74). A slight extension is ‘people located in a certain place’, who do not 
necessary live there, e.g. ‘the people on the boats [ahl al-marākib]’  (al-
Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  167).  A  further  extension,  which  we 
encountered  in  Ibn  Ẓahīra’s  text,  is  ‘people  who  practise  a  certain 
activity’,  as  in  ‘the  unbelievers  [ahl  al-kufr]’  (al-Ǧabartī  and al-ʿAṭṭār 
1801/1998,  53),  ‘the members of  the council  [ahl al-dīwān]’  (al-Ǧabartī 
and al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  57),  ‘scholars  [ahl  al-maʿrifa  wa-l-ʿulūm]’  (al-
Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 71), ‘those who practise lowly trades [ahl  
al-ḥiraf al-sāfila]’  (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 77) and ‘wanton, 
licentious  people  [ahl  al-ḫalāʿa  wa-l-muǧūn]’  (al-Ǧabartī  and al-ʿAṭṭār 
1801/1998, 254). These senses form a network; a plausible structure for this 
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network is  suggested in  Figure 3,  following the notational  conventions 
used  in  (Langacker  2008,  37):  ‘The  arrows  represent  categorizing 
relationships: solid arrows for the elaboration of a schema, and dashed 
arrows for extension from a more central meaning.’
As for the Arabic words that have meant ‘nation’ in modern times 
(umma and šaʿb), al-Ǧabartī, like Ibn Ẓahīra, does not use them to refer to 
Egyptians  collectively.  Only  Napoleon’s  first  proclamation  in  Arabic, 
discussed above, uses  umma to mean ‘nation’. The word  šaʿb does not 
occur  at  all  in  al-Ǧabartī’s  accounts  of  the  French occupation.  As  for 
qawm, it appears rarely, and is used in the broad sense of ‘group’, to refer, 
for  example,  to  the  French  in  general  (al-Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  40),  the 
French  officers  in  particular  (al-Ǧabartī  1798/1999,  135),  a  part  of  the 
French army that was bombarding an area in Cairo (al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 
4:128),  the  group  of  Mamluks  who  were  defeated  by  the  French  (al-
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Figure 3: Network of senses of ahl
Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  3),  or  a  group of  shaykhs (al-Ǧabartī 
1798/1999, 133).
In  these texts,  al-Ǧabartī  rarely refers  to  Egypt  as  a  whole.  One 
exception is his second account of this period, whose introduction consists 
largely of a panegyric to the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan and the Sultan’s 
vizier.  Here,  al-Ǧabartī  echoes  some of  the claims about  Egypt’s  good 
qualities that we found in Ibn Ẓahīra’s text, and also focuses on the issue 
of the defence of the province. The French, he says, coveted the fertility 
and gardens  of  ‘the  region  of  Egypt  [iqlīm Miṣr]’.  Ever  since  Egypt’s 
creation, it has been a light in the darkness of the regions (al-aqṭār), and 
has been protected from the wicked. ‘The soldiers of Cairo’, led by the 
Mamluk ruler Sayf al-Dīn Quṭuz, repelled the Mongols in 1260 (cf. Little 
2010); in those days, ‘the soldiers of the inhabitants of this region [ǧund 
ahl hāḏā al-quṭr] were awake to the defence of the ports’. God established 
the Ottoman Empire and made it great, and the Empire put Egypt’s affairs 
in the hands of  rulers whose courage and protection was well-known, 
until  the  complacent,  decadent  Mamluks  took  over  and  neglected  its 
defence (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 2).
Al-Ǧabartī then personifies the province, saying that Egypt became 
worried because of the Mamluks, called for their rule to be abrogated, and 
complained to the Ottoman Empire. The heedless Mamluks allowed ‘this 
great  region  [quṭr]’  to  come  to  harm;  its  ‘good  qualities’  or  ‘charms’ 
(maḥāsin,  the  same  word  used  in  the  title  of  Ibn  Ẓahīra's  text)  were 
‘disfigured  [mušawwaha]’.  Rich  people  became  poor  because  the 
Mamluks confiscated their wealth, and ignorance and nonsense became 
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widespread. Egypt had been a gathering-place for the virtuous, the noble 
and the eloquent, it had united the good qualities that were dispersed in 
other regions, and marvellous arts had been invented there. But because 
of the Mamluks’ neglect of defence, when the French arrived, it was easy 
for them to conquer the region (iqlīm) (al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 
3). Hence ‘the rule of the infidels [dawlat al-kuffār]’ oppressed ‘this great 
region’, and Egypt’s unique charms (maḥāsin) were obliterated. Like Ibn 
Ẓahīra, al-Ǧabartī notes that God mentioned Egypt in many verses of the 
Quran, that the Prophet recommended it to his Companions, and that its 
virtues, particularly the Nile, have been praised far and wide (al-Ǧabartī 
and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 4).
The disaster of the French occupation might have turned out like 
the  one  in  al-Andalus  (i.e.  Islam  nearly  lost  Egypt  as  it  had  lost  al-
Andalus), had it not been for the great Ottoman Sultan, ‘may God prolong 
his reign and give him possession of the whole world’; he saved Egypt 
from  those  wicked  people  (al-Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  5).  Al-
Ǧabartī lavishes similar praise on the Sultan’s vizier, rescuer of Islamic 
law and of the Islamic community (umma), who saved the Muslims from 
the infidels, and returned security to their homes (awṭān) (al-Ǧabartī and 
al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 6-7).  The vizier eliminated ‘the rule of the infidels’ 
and returned Egypt to its former beauty. Drawing an analogy, al-Ǧabartī  
praises Saladin for saving Egypt from the Fatimids and for renewing the 
praiseworthy ‘rule of the Kurds’ (cf. Richards 2010). A poem by Ḥasan al-
ʿAṭṭār emphasises the point, and praises the Ottoman vizier for getting rid 
of  the  French,  ‘who  emptied  the  lands  [diyār]  and  humiliated  their 
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children  [abnāʾ]’  (al-Ǧabartī  and  al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  8).  The  vizier 
removed the darkness of unbelief from Egypt, raised up the pride of the 
Muslims and restored them to their rightful position; hence they rejoiced 
(al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 8-9).
It is striking that, for al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār, the responsibility for 
defending Egypt and protecting its charms lies not with the inhabitants of 
Egypt collectively, but instead falls solely on the shoulders of its rulers 
and military  elite,  whoever  they  may be.  The  ordinary  inhabitants  of 
Egypt seem to be assigned no moral responsibility towards the province 
whatsoever.  If  Egypt  flourishes,  the  rulers  are  to  be  praised;  if  it  is 
harmed, the rulers are to be blamed. One can almost detect a metaphor: 
Egypt is like a beautiful slave girl, whose owner is solely responsible for 
protecting her and ensuring that her charms are not disfigured. Like the 
texts of al-Ǧāḥiẓ and Ibn Ẓahīra, al-Ǧabartī’s text also uses conceptual 
blends  involving  the  frame  of  parenthood  in  order  to  represent  the 
relationship between a place and the human beings who live there; this is 
particularly clear in the use of the words  awlād and  abnāʾ (‘children’). 
From  these  expressions,  we  can  infer  the  existence  of  an  abstract 
conceptual blend, illustrated in Figure 4.
Yet in al-Ǧabartī’s text, as we have seen, it is not necessary to have 
been born in Egypt to be considered one of its ‘children’; a foreigner can 
become a ‘child of Egypt’.  More importantly, the moral aspects  of the 
relationship  between  parents  and  children  are  not  projected  into  the 
blend, as they are in the 19th-century nationalist discourse that we will see 
in the next chapter. In the 18th century, the ‘children’ of Cairo, or of the 
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lands of Egypt, are not conceptualised as having any moral duties towards 
their ‘parent’. All the evidence we have seen suggests that al-Ǧabartī, and 
the Muslim inhabitants  of  Egypt  that  appear in his  narrative,  saw the 
moral obligation to oppose the French occupation as a religious duty, on 
the grounds that Muslims should not be ruled by non-Muslims, rather 
than  as  a  duty  towards  Egypt  itself.  Similarly,  his  narrative  provides 
ample evidence that the Christian inhabitants of Egypt welcomed French 
rule. A phrase such as ‘for the sake of Egypt’ (min aǧl Miṣr), which would 
later become a standard part of nationalist discourse, is completely absent 
from al-Ǧabartī’s accounts of the French occupation.
In sum, the evidence we have considered here is consistent with the 
four hypotheses given above. Not only does no Egyptian refer to Egypt as 
a  waṭan in al-Ǧabartī’s accounts of the occupation, but the concepts of 
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Figure 4: Place as parent
‘nation’  and ‘national  territory’,  as  defined in  the  introduction  to  this 
thesis, appear to be absent from his conceptual world and that of the other 
Egyptians  he  wrote  about.  Faced  with  this  evidence,  but  apparently 
reluctant to accept the idea that human beings might once have existed 
without nationalism, Delanoue (1982, 1:74-75) writes:
It is noticeable that, in [al-Ǧabartī’s] accounts of popular resistance 
movements and insurrections against the French – movements that 
he does not seem to approve of, considering them more dangerous 
than  useful  –  there  is  no  trace  of  expressions  or  battle  cries 
suggesting  nationalist  or  patriotic  feelings  in  the  modern  sense. 
Everything  is  Islamic:  slogans,  symbols  of  struggle,  figures  in 
command. But this does not necessarily mean that such feelings did 
not exist among Egyptians; it could be that the Islamic appearance 
of  all  these  movements  is  largely  due  to  the  way  in  which  al-
Ǧabartī, an ʿālim, sees and reports events. Moreover, the ideological 
expression of  new feelings  is  not  necessarily  found immediately. 
Perhaps  Egyptians,  driven  by  something  other  than  religious 
feeling, expressed themselves in religious terms because they had no 
other language.
Similarly, in his otherwise superb study of Egyptian perceptions of 
the French occupation, André Raymond refers to the fervour of resistance 
to the occupation as both ‘patriotic’ and ‘religious’  (Raymond 2004, 92, 
193). He provides abundant evidence of religious fervour, but no evidence 
of patriotic fervour. Discussing the two revolts in Cairo, he writes:
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Religion appears to be the common element in these movements. 
The  inhabitants  of  Cairo  rose  up  to  defend  Islam,  which  was 
threatened  by  a  Christian  occupation.  . . .  But  this  is  probably 
because  religion  was  the  natural  means  of  expression  of  an 
opposition that was, in reality, many-sided, and which involved the 
equivalent of the patriotic and nationalist  feelings of the modern 
era. . . . However, Islam was inevitably the catalyst of these various 
emotions  and reactions;  as  Gilbert  Delanoue observes,  Egyptians 
expressed themselves ‘in religious terms because they had no other 
language’ (Raymond 2004, 341).
Yet neither Delanoue nor Raymond gives any evidence to support 
this claim. Following Wierzbicka  (1992), I assume that emotions have a 
cognitive basis, and that different feelings are based on different concepts, 
which are reflected in language. Thus in order to have nationalist feelings, 
one  must  have  nationalist  concepts.  In  the  absence  of  evidence  of 
nationalist  concepts,  instead  of  assuming  that  Cairenes  used  religious 
language to express nationalist feelings, we should apply Occam’s Razor, 
and assume that they used religious language to express religious feelings. 
Moreover,  it  seems  difficult  to  reconcile  Delanoue’s  and  Raymond’s 
speculative view with Egyptian Christians’ enthusiastic embrace of the 
French occupation, and with Egyptian Muslims’ enthusiastic embrace of 
Ottoman  rule.  The  explanation  proposed  here  is  preferable  because  it 
avoids  speculation  unsupported  by  evidence,  and  fits  the  available 
evidence  in  a  straightforward,  plausible  manner:  Egyptians  had  no 
86
nationalist (or ‘patriotic’) feelings, because they lacked both a concept of 
‘national territory’ and a concept of ‘nation’.
Conclusion
On the evidence considered here, it appears that the word  waṭan, 
which would come to mean ‘national territory’ in the 19th century, did not 
have this meaning in pre-19th-century Arabic. Instead, it had a network of 
other senses. Leaving aside the senses that relate to non-human animals, 
we  can  plausibly  sum  up  the  main  senses,  as  reflected  in  the  texts 
considered  in  this  chapter,  in  Figure 5.  The  diagram  includes  a 
hypothetical schema, ‘place where a person remains for a certain length 
of time’, to reflect the main commonalities between the senses we have 
seen in actual usage,  which the diagram shows as elaborations of  this 
schema. The word ‘place’ in the diagram should be taken to refer to a 
place of indeterminate size, at least as large as a campsite or a village,  
usually no larger than a city, rarely as large as a ‘region’ (iqlīm or quṭr). 
In the texts examined here, there is only one instance in which the word 
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Figure 5: Senses of waṭan before the 19th century
waṭan is used to refer to something that would have been considered a 
‘region’, specifically Upper Egypt. A single instance of the verb istawṭana 
(‘to  settle’),  in  a  line  of  poetry,  suggests  that  it  was  possible  to 
conceptualise Egypt as a waṭan, but only as a highly unusual conceptual 
blend.
Judging  by  the  texts  I  have  considered  in  this  chapter,  Arabic 
speakers  before  the  19th century  normally  conceptualised  Egypt  as  a 
‘region’ (iqlīm or quṭr). Those who lived there were its ‘inhabitants’ (ahl); 
the Arabic words that have meant ‘nation’ in modern times (umma and 
šaʿb) were not used to refer to Egyptians collectively. Egypt’s inhabitants 
were  not  seen  as  having a  collective moral  responsibility  towards  the 
region;  this  responsibility  belonged to  its  rulers  alone.  When ordinary 
Egyptian Muslims rebelled against the French occupation, they did so on 
religious grounds,  because ‘[m]edieval Islamic law and traditions taught 
Muslims that they should attempt to avoid living under the rule of non-
Muslims if at all possible’ (Cole 2007, 112); there is no evidence that they 
believed they were acting out of a duty towards Egypt itself. Moreover, 
there  is  no  evidence  that  Egyptians  objected  to  being  ruled  by  non-
Egyptians during this  period.  Instead, their  religious beliefs shaped the 
way they conceptualised grievances, and thereby determined their choice 
of rulers: Egyptian Muslims were strongly attached to Ottoman rule and 
opposed to French rule, while Egyptian Christians welcomed French rule. 
More generally, in the texts considered here, we have not encountered the 
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idea that human beings have moral duties towards the places they inhabit 
or the places where they were born23.
In short, in the texts considered thus far, we have not encountered 
the concepts  of  ‘nation’  and  ‘national  territory’,  as  defined  in  the 
introduction to this thesis. With this background in mind, we are now in a 
position to understand the novelty of Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭāwī’s translation of 
these concepts from French into Arabic in the 19th century.
23 It  is  not  possible  to  conclude,  from  the  limited  selection  of  evidence  we  have 
presented, that this idea never appeared in Arabic before the 19th century. However, it 
seems  fair  to  assume  that,  at  the  very  least,  it  cannot  have  been  common  or 
widespread.
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Chapter 2: The First Priest of Nationalism in 
Egypt
Rifāʿa  Rāfiʿ  al-Ṭahṭāwī  (1801-1873),  an  Azhar-trained  religious 
scholar who studied in France, is best known as the author of Taḫlīṣ al-
Ibrīz  fī  Talḫīṣ  Bārīz (Purifying  Gold  in  Summarising  Paris [1834], 
hereafter the Taḫlīṣ), the first description in Arabic of French society (al-
Ṭahṭāwī  1834/2002,  23),  and  as  a  prominent  teacher  and  translator. 
Scholars have tended to agree that al-Ṭahṭāwī introduced nationalism into 
Egypt  and  chose  the  word  waṭan to  express  the  concept  of  ‘national 
territory’ in Arabic (Louca 1970, 69-70; Delanoue 1982, 451, 456; Gershoni 
and Jankowski 1986, 11; Powell 2003, 48; Hourani 1983, 68-69). However, 
there has not been a detailed study of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s nationalist concepts, 
showing how they relate to nationalist concepts that he is known to have 
encountered in France as well as to earlier Arabic concepts of lands and 
their inhabitants. In this chapter, I examine the nationalist concepts he 
articulated in the  Taḫlīṣ, in his principal works on contemporary Egypt 
and in his nationalist poetry, and identify the French and Arabic sources 
of  these concepts,  as  well  as  the precise  manner  in which he blended 
together elements from these sources. Finally, I attempt to explain why he 
did this, considering his social trajectory and his influence in Egypt.
The Origins and Development of French  
Nationalism to the Early 19th Century
It  will  be  useful  to  begin  with some  historical  background  on 
nationalism in Europe generally, and France specifically.
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In  a  celebrated  article,  Ernst  Kantorowicz  (1951) surveyed  the 
evolution of the concept of dying for one’s country in medieval Europe. 
He notes that this concept had its origins in Greek and Roman antiquity. 
‘It is sweet and fitting to die for one’s patria’, wrote Horace in his second 
‘Roman Ode’, and Cicero said, ‘The patria is dearer to me than my life’ 
(Kantorowicz  1951,  474,  490). However,  at  the  time,  the  word  patria 
‘referred  chiefly,  if  not  exclusively,  to  the  city.  . . .  [T]he  Roman 
Empire . . . would not have been referred to as a patria . . .’ (Kantorowicz 
1951, 474). With the arrival of Christianity, the  patria was moved from 
Earth to Heaven; thus for Augustine, Paradise is the ‘eternal patria’, and 
Christian liturgy contained prayers for souls to be received ‘in the patria 
of Paradise’ (Kantorowicz 1951, 475-476).
During  the  period  of  European  feudalism,  patria ceased  to  be 
conceptualised as an object of service or sacrifice; ‘its meaning . . . was 
practically always “native town or village”, the home (Heimat) of a man’ 
(Kantorowicz 1951, 476), much like waṭan in the texts we considered from 
al-Ǧāḥiẓ’s anthology in the previous chapter. In the 12th and 13th centuries, 
however,  patria came  to  mean  ‘kingdom’,  particularly  in  France,  and 
kings began to  levy taxes ‘for  the defence of  the  patria’  (Kantorowicz 
1951,  477-479).  Kantorowicz  describes  what  I would  call  a  conceptual 
blend of France, the Holy Land and Heaven. The Crusaders believed that, 
if they died fighting for the Holy Land, they would be admitted directly 
into Paradise as martyrs. ‘By the middle of the thirteenth century . . . the 
crusader idea of a holy war was all but completely secularized, and its 
place was taken by a quasi-holy war for the defence of the realm or of the 
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nation symbolized by the “crown” of France’ (Kantorowicz 1951, 479-482). 
The  state  began  to  be  conceptualised  as  a  sacred,  ‘mystical  body’ 
(Kantorowicz 1951,  484-487),  which was explicitly compared to  God: a 
14th-century  Florentine  wrote  that  one  should  love  one’s  patria 
‘immediately after God “for the similitude which the city has with God”’ 
(Kantorowicz 1951, 488-489). In the 15th century, a future pope wrote that 
a prince may require citizens to sacrifice their lives to defend the state, on 
the grounds that a foot or hand of the ‘mystical body’ may be amputated 
to save the head, i.e. the prince (Kantorowicz 1951, 490).
The word patrie itself first appeared in French in the 16th century. 
‘A poet depicted his “poor  patrie” as a mother whose children must, by 
virtue  of  a  natural  feeling,  offer  her  all  the  assistance  they  can’,  and 
another wrote: ‘Whoever dies for his country lives eternally’ (Contamine 
1997, 1684-1685). In 1683, a Jansenist gave a sermon in Paris in which he 
argued that all  good Christians must cherish their  patrie:  ‘A Christian, 
motivated only by the desire to do his duty, feels that he lives only to 
sacrifice his life to his God and his patrie’ (Contamine 1997, 1686-1688).
In  general,  the  French  Enlightenment  philosophers  of  the  18th 
century  had  the  highest  praise  for  ‘the  patriotic  ideal’,  which  they 
identified  with  Greco-Roman  antiquity.  Thus  Montesquieu  (whose 
influence on al-Ṭahṭāwī we will consider below) asserted that ‘it is the 
love of patrie that gave to Greek and Roman history that nobility that our 
own history lacks’ (Contamine 1997, 1688-1689).
The French revolution of 1789 simultaneously brought with it two 
momentous  developments.  First,  as  noted  in  Chapter 1,  it linked  the 
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concept  of  nation with  that  of  patrie to  form  the  conceptual  pairing 
discussed in the introduction to this thesis. Second, the French Revolution 
unleashed  a  militant  atheism  that  regarded  religion  as  harmful 
superstition  and  crushed  the  Catholic  Church,  its  clergy  and  its 
institutions with overwhelming violence. During the ‘dechristianisation’ 
campaign of 1793, churches across France were closed or destroyed, and 
many priests were executed or lynched  (McPhee 2002, 98, 114, 120, 127-
128, 133-134).
At  the  same  time,  the  nationalism  of  the  French  revolution 
borrowed heavily from Catholicism. In a ground-breaking study, David 
Bell (2001) traces the ways in which it did so. He notes that in 18 th-century 
France,  ‘descriptions of the  patrie as  a “God”,  “divinity”,  or something 
“sacred”,  and  of  patriotism  as  “a  vast  chain  linked  to  Divinity”  or  a 
“sacred  love”,  were  utterly  commonplace’.  Going  even  further,  the 
spokesman of the revolutionary demonstrators who stormed the National 
Assembly on 20 June 1792 declared that ‘the image of the patrie is the sole 
divinity it is permissible to worship’24 (Bell 2001, 38).
If the patrie is a god, it follows that reverence for it should motivate 
the sorts of  social practices that are motivated by reverence for gods.  In 
1792, a  member  of  the  National  Convention  called  for  a  national 
educational programme to ‘make of the French a new people’. The model 
he proposed was that of ‘the priests,  who, with their  catechisms, their 
processions . . . their ceremonies, sermons, hymns, missions, pilgrimages, 
patron  saints,  paintings,  and  all  that  nature  placed  at  their  disposal, 
24 The French text of this quote can be found in Kerverseau (1797, 8:385): ‘l’image de la 
patrie est la seule divinité qu’il soit permis d’adorer’.
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infallibly  led  men  to  the  goal  they  designated’.  Thus  there  would  be 
‘National Temples’,  along with national  ‘hymns’  and ‘catechisms’  (Bell 
2001, 1-3). A cult of ‘great men’ was created to take the place of the cult of 
the Christian saints (Bell 2001, 107-139). Religious festivals were replaced 
by nationalist ones. These festivals involved a ‘“vertigo of imitation” of 
Christian  practices’,  such  as  ‘hymns,  processions,  sermons,  altars,  the 
Declaration of Rights taking the place of the Bible, the obsessive use of 
words  such  as  “holy”,  “temple”,  “catechism”,  and  “gospel”’,  and 
revolutionary leader Maximilien Robespierre descending from a mountain 
‘in the manner of Moses, bearing a torch, applauded by ranks of patriots 
dressed in red, white, and blue and singing the Marseillaise  [the French 
national anthem]’ (Bell 2001, 167). The patrie was symbolised as a goddess 
called  Marianne  (McPhee  2002,  120).  In  1831,  the  year  in  which  al-
Ṭahṭāwī returned to Egypt after  his  stay in France,  a French historian 
wrote:  ‘My  noble  country,  you  must  take  the  place  of  the  God  who 
escapes us,  that you may fill  within us the immeasurable abyss which 
extinct Christianity has left there’  (Bell 2001, 23).  At the same time, the 
patrie was still conceptualised as a parent. The Marseillaise – a hymn to 
war  composed in 1792,  at the height of the French Revolution (McPhee 
2002, 101) – addresses its listeners as  ‘children of the country’, and  its 
refrain begins, ‘To arms, citizens’.
There  was  a  paradox  in  French  nationalism,  one  that  we  will 
encounter in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s nationalism as well:
It was a rare speech, newspaper, pamphlet, or book published in the 
years after 1789 that did not invoke the icons of nation and patrie. 
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Yet . . . many writers made the sudden and singular discovery that, 
contrary  to  previous  assumptions,  France  was  actually  not a 
nation. . . . [T]he great orator Mirabeau called France ‘nothing but 
an  unconstituted  aggregate  of  disunited  peoples’.  . . .  Thus  was 
posed the great nationalist paradox: political leaders making wholly 
unprecedented  demands  on  behalf  of  ‘the  nation’  and  justifying 
their  actions  by  reference  to  its  sovereignty,  but  simultaneously 
acknowledging that the nation did not yet exist. . . .  (Bell 2001, 14-
15).
In sum, the patrie was conceptualised as both a parent and as a god. 
Gods  have  often  been  represented  as  parents.  DesCamp and  Sweetser 
(2005) have  analysed  the  conventional  Christian  concept  of  ‘God  the 
Father’ as a conceptual blend. I would add that this blend serves a social  
function: it generates inferences about duties. In particular, the concept of 
filial duty is projected onto the blend, producing the concept of duties 
towards  God,  as  illustrated  in  Figure 6.  It  is  no  doubt  very  easy  for 
children to learn, at an early age, that God is like a big father in the sky.  
Perhaps  this  blend  is  so  widespread  precisely  because  it  tends  to  be 
internalised in childhood, and therefore remains entrenched throughout 
adulthood.
In Figure 7, the blend in Figure 6 is used as an input to a further 
blend,  enabling  patrie to  be  conceptualised  as  a  god.  This  blend  also 
serves a social function: to generate inferences about duties of service to 
the state, such as military service. The result is, once again, a blend that 
can be taught to children: the  patrie is like God, and thus is also like a 
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parent; hence one has duties towards the  patrie as well.  Naturally, the 
relevant duties are not quite the same in each case, and this follows from 
the differences between the inputs to the blends. God is intangible and is 
conceptualised  as  residing  in  Heaven,  a  place  that  is  inaccessible  to 
humans during life on Earth; hence there is no need to defend God from 
attackers. However, these aspects of God are not projected onto the God-
patrie blend in Figure 7.  Instead,  the  patrie is  located on Earth and is 
identified  with  a  particular  territory.  Territories  can  be  attacked  and 
defended.  Hence  it  is  straightforward to  infer  that  one  has  a  duty  to 
defend the  patrie in warfare, just as one would have a duty to defend 
one’s parents if they were attacked. Straightforward but not inevitable: 
crucially,  this  was  not  the  case  in  the  blends  we  considered  in  the 
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Figure 6: God the Father
previous  chapter.  In  those  blends,  parenthood  was  an  input,  but  the 
concept of filial duty was not projected onto the blend as it is here.
In the God-patrie blend, religious duties are also projected from the 
God-parent input. Hence one can also worship the patrie as a god, build 
temples to it, and so on, as we have seen above. Finally, it is worth noting 
that  while  God is  specifically  a  father,  a  more  abstract  parenthood  is 
projected onto the concept of patrie, enabling it to be conceptualised as a 
mother as well.
Education and Knowledge Production in Egypt at  
the Beginning of the 19th Century
Since  the  argument  of  this  chapter  rests  on  the  premise  that 
education in Egypt underwent radical  changes in the 19th century, and 
that al-Ṭahṭāwī was at the forefront of these changes, it will be worth 
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Figure 7: Patrie as a god
outlining the state of education in Egypt just before al-Ṭahṭāwī began his 
career.
There  were  two  types  of  formal  educational  institutions  in  18th-
century Egypt: the kuttāb and the madrasa. At the kuttāb, children learnt 
the  elements  of  Arabic  orthography  and  memorised  the  Qurʾān.  ‘The 
meaning  of  the  text  and  its  grammatical  analysis  were  definitely  not 
included in the syllabus’ (Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 2, 5)25. Higher education 
was  reserved  for  the  class  of  shaykhs,  whose  sons  continued  their 
education  at  a  madrasa once  they  reached  puberty  (Heyworth-Dunne 
1939,  6-7,  36).  Most  of  these  madrasas  had fallen into ruins  and their 
libraries had gradually disappeared (Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 15-16).  The 
most  prestigious  madrasa in  Egypt  was  al-Azhar  mosque  in  Cairo 
(Heyworth-Dunne 1939,  15),  which had perhaps  50  teachers  and 1,500 
students at the beginning of the 19th century (Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 27-
29).  Two  types  of  subjects  were  taught.  The  first  type,  al-ʿulūm  al-
naqliyya, consisted of purely religious subjects such as theology, Qurʾānic 
exegesis  and  Islamic  jurisprudence.  The  second  group,  al-ʿulūm  al-
ʿaqliyya,  included  the  Arabic  language  (grammar,  morphology,  etc.), 
logic, arithmetic, algebra, calculation of the lunar calendar and of prayer 
times, astronomy, philosophy and debating skills (Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 
41-42). One can readily see what all the subjects in the second group have 
in  common:  they  were  all  useful  for  religious  purposes.  Arabic  was 
necessary  to  understand  the  Qurʾān  and  hadith;  logic  was  needed  to 
evaluate  arguments  in  Islamic  jurisprudence;  arithmetic,  algebra  and 
25 Heyworth-Dunne’s huge, detailed survey of education in Egypt in the 19 th century 
remains the most comprehensive work on its subject, and has aged remarkably well.
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astronomy were essential for determining the lunar calendar (on which 
the  timing  of  religious  holidays  depended)  as  well  as  prayer  times; 
philosophy was useful for understanding medieval theology (which had 
borrowed heavily  from ancient  Greek philosophy);  and  debating skills 
were useful for training teachers. A list of the textbooks used to teach this 
second group of subjects reveals a preponderance of texts written in the 
13th-15th centuries,  many  that  were  considerably  older,  and  only  two 
whose authors lived in the 18th century (Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 57-65). It 
seems clear that al-Azhar did not encourage original scientific research or 
the study of topics that served no religious purpose. The Azharite bias 
against  non-religious  studies  was  to  be  long-lived.  In  about  1880,  an 
Azharite scholar remarked:
What is decreed in the law of the Muslims is that the branches of 
knowledge which are to be sought are the theological sciences and 
their tools, i.e. the sciences of the Arabic language; other knowledge 
is not to be sought, indeed is to be proscribed  (quoted in Cachia 
1956, 86).
The clergy of al-Azhar would, in general, maintain this contempt 
for non-religious studies well into the 20 th century  (Costet-Tardieu 2005, 
71).  It  is  true that  a  few 18th-century  ʿulamāʾ were interested in  other 
sciences for their own sake or for non-religious practical purposes, and 
studied them as a hobby. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ǧabartī mentions over thirty 
such  scholars  in  his  chronicles.  Chief  among  their  interests  was 
astronomy;  some  were  also  interested  in  geometry,  medicine  and 
geography. Yet, once again, the texts that these men relied on dated from 
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the  10th-15th centuries,  and  among  their  own  writings,  one  finds  that 
‘nearly all that was produced was in the shape of some commentary or 
gloss on a previous work’  (Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 77-84). Moreover, the 
fact that these pursuits were not taught at al-Azhar, the most prestigious 
educational  institution  in  Egypt,  is  a  clear  sign  that  they  held  little 
prestige.  No  wonder  al-Ǧabartī,  after  visiting  the  French  scientists  in 
Cairo many times  during Napoleon’s  occupation  of  Egypt,  and seeing 
demonstrations of modern chemistry and electrical technology, remarked: 
‘They  had  strange  things  in  [the  Institute],  devices  and  apparatus 
achieving results which minds like ours cannot comprehend [la yasaʿuhā 
ʿuqūl  amṯālinā]’  (al-Ǧabartī  1806/1997,  4:160;  Rogan  2009,  64).  There 
seems to be no evidence, however, that al-Ǧabartī or any of his Egyptian 
contemporaries attempted to study modern European science or to learn a 
European  language.  Non-religious  studies were  thus  dominated  and 
marginalised  in  relation  to religious  ones.  This,  I  will  argue,  would 
become  a  crucial  factor  motivating  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  use  of  nationalist 
concepts.
Mehmed Ali
Mehmed Ali  Pasha (1769-1849),  known in  Arabic  as  Muḥammad 
ʿAlī26,  was the second-in-command of a contingent of Albanian soldiers 
that arrived in Egypt as part of the Ottoman forces sent in 1801 to expel  
the French. In the political  chaos  that  followed the end of the French 
26 I  am following Fahmy  (1997) in using the  Turkish spelling  of  the  Pasha’s  name, 
which is undoubtedly closer to the way he himself would have pronounced it; he 
‘was Turkish-speaking and as far as is known he never spoke Arabic’  (Fahmy 1997, 
72).
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occupation of Egypt, the Mamluks (Egypt’s ruling caste until the arrival of 
the French) were in disarray. The Albanian troops successfully rebelled 
against  the  newly  appointed  Ottoman  governor  over  unpaid  wages, 
driving him out of Cairo. Their own commander was then assassinated. 
Mehmed Ali thus found himself ‘in charge of the most powerful military 
force in Egypt’. With the assistance of leading ʿulamāʾ and notables, who 
were exasperated with the high taxation that the Mamluks had imposed, 
he defeated the Mamluks and established himself as the de facto ruler of 
Egypt. He was then recognised as wālī (governor) by the Ottoman Sultan 
in 1805 (Fahmy 1998, 143-144).
Egyptian  nationalist  historiography  since  al-Ṭahṭāwī  has 
represented Mehmed Ali  as ‘the founder of  modern Egypt’,  a  national 
saviour who sought to modernise the country by promoting science and 
industry, for the sake of the Egyptian nation (Fahmy 1997, 12-16). Khaled 
Fahmy’s groundbreaking study,  All the Pasha’s  Men: Mehmed Ali,  His  
Army and the Making of Modern Egypt (Fahmy 1997), based on extensive 
archival  research,  decisively  refuted  this  view.  Fahmy  shows  that 
Mehmed Ali ‘despised the fellahin [peasants] and could not respect them 
except as a source of cheap and hardworking manpower’  (Fahmy 1997, 
282),  and  that  his  sole  aim was  to  found  a  dynastic  empire  ruled  by 
himself and his descendants. To this end, his overriding concern was to 
create an army capable of expanding his realm by conquest:
[T]he  army occupied central  stage  among the  Pasha’s  numerous 
institutions and was the  raison d’être of various other impressive 
institutions.  For  example,  the  many  factories  that  were  founded 
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were intended mainly to produce commodities for the use of the 
army, which was their most important market. Similarly, most of 
the schools that were opened were aiming at graduating officers for 
the  army.  Likewise,  the  earliest  modern  hospitals  to  be  built  in 
Egypt were essentially military hospitals that were constructed near 
camps with high troop concentration. . . . Moreover, using this army 
Mehmed Ali managed, albeit for a short period of time, to extend 
his control over wide areas of the Middle East including the Hijaz, 
the Sudan, Syria and parts of southern Anatolia. . . .  (Fahmy 1997, 
12)
While  nationalist  historiography  has  portrayed  this  army  as  a 
national institution in which Egyptian peasants learned to love serving 
their country (Fahmy 1997, 18-19), it was in reality an army of unwilling 
Arabic-speaking  peasant  conscripts  commanded  by  a  Turkish-speaking 
elite. Mehmed Ali invaded Sudan in 1820, mainly in order to enslave large 
numbers  of  its  inhabitants  to  serve  as  his  soldiers.  By  1822  he  had 
completed  the  conquest  of  Sudan,  but  had  realised  that  the  idea  of 
conscripting its population was unworkable, since many of the slaves had 
died while being shipped back to Egypt. Hence, as a last resort, he turned 
to  the  conscription of  peasants,  which began on a  large  scale  in  1823 
(Fahmy 1997, 86-93). The peasants expressed their unwillingness to serve 
in unequivocal terms. In 1824, for example,
A  big  revolt  erupted  in  Upper  Egypt  against  the  Pasha’s 
conscription and tax policies. Over 30,000 men and women joined 
this rebellion which was headed by a certain Shaykh Raḍwān who 
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claimed himself to be the mahdī and declared Mehmed Ali to be an 
infidel (Fahmy 1997, 95).
Peasants  often  deserted  their  villages  or  maimed  themselves  in 
order to avoid conscription (Fahmy 1997, 100-102). Moreover:
The soldiers  fighting in Mehmed Ali’s  army deserted when they 
were given the slightest opportunity. . . . [F]or every two conscripts, 
one soldier managed to desert. . . . Ultimately . . . a new method of 
resistance developed which reflected the Egyptians’ utter despair: 
they simply refused to marry and have children (Fahmy 1997, 256-
261).
Nor did Mehmed Ali claim to carry out any actions for the sake of 
Egypt or the Egyptian nation. On the contrary, he treated Egypt as an 
Ottoman  province  that  he  nevertheless  considered  to  be  his  personal 
possession. Hence, for example, when his troops went to war, ‘the flags 
and banners carried during the actual fighting as well as the medals cast 
to commemorate the subsequent victories were decorated with Mehmed 
Ali’s name and nothing else’ (Fahmy 1997, 241).
[Mehmed Ali] once told a distinguished French visitor, ‘I have not 
done in Egypt except what the British are doing in India; they have 
an army composed of Indians and ruled by British officers, and I 
have an army composed of Arabs ruled by Turkish officers.’ . . . The 
officers, rather than thinking of themselves as serving in a national 
army, were behaving as mercenary officers who moved from one 
patron  to  the  other  depending  on  who  paid  better.  Joining  the 
‘Egyptian’ army for them meant joining the force of an Ottoman 
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pasha who had a better organized and better paid army than the 
Sultan.  . . .  [H]ow then  did  the  soldiers  themselves  think  of  the 
army at large and their role in it in particular? None of the battles 
that these men were about to fight in were ever portrayed to them 
as national battles, i.e. battles in which the word ‘Egypt’ as meaning 
a nation-state was referred to. Instead, to incite them to fight or to 
encourage them to excel in training, reference was made either to 
religion or to their superior training and better organization. . . . Not 
only did the idea of the army as being a national one never cross 
anyone’s  mind  from the  Pasha  all  the  way  down to  any  of  his 
soldiers, there was not even a pretense at portraying the wars that 
the men were dying in as national wars waged to defend ‘Egypt’ or 
to deliver her from foreign tyranny (Fahmy 1997, 246, 251-252, 313).
Even  if  Mehmed  Ali  had  tried  to  use  nationalist  concepts  to 
persuade peasants to accept conscription, it is doubtful that the peasants 
would have been receptive:
As far as the fellah-soldiers were concerned, the allegation that this 
was their  army, and that  they were fighting for  their  own sake, 
would have been the most ludicrous claim they would have heard. 
For them, nothing could be further from the truth (Fahmy 1997, 276-
277).
Instead, Mehmed Ali hired Muslim preachers to tell peasants that 
serving in the army was a religious duty. However, these messages
fell on completely deaf ears. . . . It is here that we come to the nub 
of the problem facing Mehmed Ali and his military authorities: the 
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Pasha never succeeded in inducing the fellahin to join the colors out 
of their free will by employing ideological or religious arguments 
(Fahmy 1997, 98-99).
Moreover,  it  was  impossible  to  justify  conscription  in  religious 
terms when Mehmed Ali went to war against the Ottoman Sultan, who 
was recognised throughout the Ottoman Empire as the Caliph of Islam. 
After losing his fleet reluctantly fighting European forces in 1827 at the 
Sultan’s  demand,  in  order  to  keep  Greece  in  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
Mehmed Ali  resolved to confront the Sultan militarily, and in 1829 he 
started building a new navy in preparation for invading Syria. Hostilities  
began  in  1831,  the  year  in  which  al-Ṭahṭāwī  returned  to  Egypt,  and 
continued  until  1840,  when  the  Ottomans  and  the  British  expelled 
Mehmed Ali’s forces from Syria (Fahmy 1997, 51-67, 74, 197, 253, 310-311, 
Fahmy 1998, 175).
Most telling is the answer he gave to [his son] Ibrāhīm when the 
latter  had  reached  Kütahia,  a  day’s  marching  distance  from 
Istanbul,  and when his  victorious son was pleading with him to 
press  for  independence.  In  response to  these  repeated pleas,  and 
finding no plausible excuses to legitimate his rebellion against the 
Sultan,  Mehmed  Ali  replied  saying,  ‘My  Mehmed  Ali-ness  is 
enough for me’ (Fahmy 1997, 283-284).
Later  in  this  chapter,  I  will  show  that  Rifāʿa  al-Ṭahṭāwī  used 
nationalist concepts to claim that Egyptians had a national duty to serve 
in the army; the strength of peasant resistance to conscription can help us 
understand his reasons for making this argument. As we will  see, it  is 
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likely  that  al-Ṭahṭāwī  tried  to  promote  this  idea  among army officers 
during Mehmed Ali’s lifetime. However, Mehmed Ali failed to perceive 
its potential, and perhaps never even noticed it.
[T]he Pasha’s world was an Ottoman world; he understood things 
within that context and it made sense to him to view matters from 
that perspective. . . .  [H]is culture, his manners, and his language 
were all ‘Ottoman’ in the sense that they were more connected to, 
and influenced by, the Turkish centre of the Empire than its Arabic 
speaking provinces, of one of which he was governor (Fahmy 1997, 
73, 279).
Al-Ṭahṭāwī Before and During His Stay in France
Al-Ṭahṭāwī came from a wealthy family of rural  notables in the 
town of Ṭahṭā. The family claimed descent from the prophet Muḥammad, 
and had included many religious scholars and judges, as well as some Sufi 
saints. In 1813, when Mehmed Ali confiscated all the farmland that had 
been subject to the tax farming system (iltizām), al-Ṭahṭāwī’s family was 
ruined and impoverished. His father became an itinerant small tradesman; 
overwork took its toll on his health, and he soon returned to die in Ṭahṭā. 
Before his death, he decided that Rifāʿa, now the family’s last hope, would 
dedicate himself to scholarship. Al-Ṭahṭāwī memorised the Qurʾān during 
his teens, then studied Arabic grammar with his Azhar-educated maternal 
uncles. In 1817 he enrolled at al-Azhar (Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 265; Louca 
1970, 55; Delanoue 1982, 384-385; Newman 2004, 29-31). Thus he was well 
prepared to succeed in his studies thanks to the cultural capital he had 
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acquired from his relatives, while his family’s descent into poverty gave 
him a strong motivation to become a diligent student.
At al-Azhar, al-Ṭahṭāwī became a disciple of Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār. He 
was an excellent student, became especially well-versed in literature, and 
soon began teaching at al-Azhar (probably in 1822), but the teachers there 
were poorly and irregularly paid. In 1824 he took a slightly more lucrative 
but still mediocre job as a preacher and prayer leader in one of Mehmed 
Ali’s new European-style military regiments (Louca 1970, 55-56; Delanoue 
1982, 386-387; Newman 2004, 33-34). This job offered not only a better 
salary;  it  also  brought  al-Ṭahṭāwī  into  direct  contact  with  the  army, 
which would become the driving force behind the transformation of the 
cultural field in Egypt during Mehmed Ali’s reign.
As we saw above, Mehmed Ali’s efforts to build a modern army led 
him to establish a range of new economic and governmental institutions. 
This  project  involved substantial  educational  reforms,  since it  required 
technical  knowledge that  was not  yet  available  in Egypt.  To this  end, 
Mehmed Ali  began sending  students  to  study  in  Europe  in  1809,  and 
started creating state-run schools in Cairo in 1816. Students in these new 
schools  were  trained  almost  exclusively  in  military  technology  and 
tactics,  as well  as a wide variety of other technical  subjects  that were 
deemed useful for the military or for the state bureaucracy; in nearly all 
of  these  schools,  there  was  no  religious  instruction  whatsoever 
(Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 104-159).
Thus Mehmed Ali’s military project had the side effect of creating a 
new  type  of  audience  for  cultural  products.  Bourdieu  (1996a,  252-
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253) observes that in any field, the appearance of new sorts of consumers 
creates opportunities for new categories of producers, and can thus upset 
the balance of power within the field. As we will see, al-Ṭahṭāwī became 
a heterodox cultural producer,  and the students and graduates of  state 
schools were most probably his main audience.
Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s break with the norms of the Azhar-dominated field of 
knowledge production in Egypt did not occur until after his stay in France 
(1826-1831). Available information about his earlier writings – a didactic 
poem on theology (now lost),  a  supplement to  a classical  grammatical 
treatise,  a  didactic  poem on  geometry  (now lost  except  for  two  lines 
quoted in the Taḫlīṣ), and a didactic poem on the methodology of hadith 
scholarship  (Delanoue 1982, 618-619; Newman 2004, 32-33) – suggests a 
type of knowledge production very much in keeping with the prevailing 
norms at al-Azhar.
In 1826, Mehmed Ali sent 44 students to study in France, where a 
special school, the Ecole Egyptienne de Paris, was created for them under 
the  direction  of  the  French  Orientalist  Edmé-François  Jomard  (Silvera 
1980).  Mehmed Ali  intended  these  students  ‘merely  to  acquire  certain 
qualifications so that they could aid him in his work of military conquest’  
(Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 157-159). Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār recommended that al-
Ṭahṭāwī  should  be  sent  along  with  the  group  as  prayer  leader  and 
spiritual guide  (Louca 1970, 33, 56). For al-Ṭahṭāwī, then 25 years old, it 
was the opportunity of a lifetime, and he embraced it with extraordinary 
zeal. Though he had not been sent to France as a student, he immediately 
began studying French along with the others, and soon specialised in the 
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study of translation. He became, by far, the most successful student in the 
group. There was, in any case, little competition. Most of the others had 
been chosen simply because they belonged to the ruling military caste. 
Lacking an adequate elementary education in any language, they barely 
had time to learn French before returning to Egypt, and were ill-prepared 
to absorb whole fields of science and technology, as Mehmed Ali expected 
them to  do.  Moreover,  they  lacked al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  intense  motivation  to 
learn (Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 167; Louca 1970, 50-53; Newman 2004, 27). 
While  other  students  spent  their  evenings  in  the cabarets  of  Paris,  al-
Ṭahṭāwī  stayed  up  late  at  night  reading,  against  the  orders  of  an 
ophthalmologist,  and  spent  his  allowance  on  books  and  extra  private 
lessons (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 217). Upon his return, he had a draft of the 
Taḫlīṣ nearly ready for publication. It was published by order of Mehmed 
Ali  in  1834,  and  free  copies  were  distributed  to  civil  servants  and  to 
students in the new schools. In 1839, it was translated into Turkish, and 
copies were sent to Istanbul  (Delanoue 1982, 387-388). The  Taḫlīṣ is our 
main source of information about al-Ṭahṭāwī’s activities in France and his 
perception of the nationalist concepts that he encountered there.
Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Exposure to Nationalism in France
Al-Ṭahṭāwī  gives  us  considerable  information  that  can  help  us 
identify  the  sources  in  which  he  encountered  nationalist  concepts  in 
France. In the Taḫlīṣ, he lists his readings in the classics of Enlightenment 
philosophy (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 210-211), including Montesquieu’s The 
Spirit  of  the  Laws (1758).  Albert  Hourani  (1983,  70) suggests  that  al-
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Ṭahṭāwī may have derived his concept of waṭan from Montesquieu; let us 
therefore consider the latter’s concepts of nation and patrie.
For Montesquieu, a  nation has a ‘spirit’,  as well as ‘customs and 
manners’  (Montesquieu  1758/2002,  3:95,  3:98,  3:107,  3:112);  it  can  be 
civilised (policée)27 or barbarian (Montesquieu 1758/2002, 2:107, 3:39, 3:80, 
4:27,  4:43,  4:78,  6:128,  6:141,  6:148),  free  or  subjugated  (Montesquieu 
1758/2002, 2:71, 3:32, 3:42, 3:113, 3:118, 4:26, 6:140); and, most importantly 
from a political standpoint, its members can be assembled (Montesquieu 
1758/2002, 2:56, 3:94, 6:41, 6:142, 6:143, 6:146, 6:152, 6:162), it can deliberate 
(Montesquieu  1758/2002,  2:56),  it  has  a  voice  (Montesquieu  1758/2002, 
2:49), and it can choose its leaders  (Montesquieu 1758/2002, 5:54, 6:148, 
6:150-153). In short, it is a personified entity conceptualised as having a 
collective will.  In contrast,  for  Montesquieu,  a  patrie is  almost  always 
something  passive,  something  that  one  loves  (Montesquieu  1758/2002, 
1:22, 1:47, 1:64, 1:99, 1:136) or serves (Montesquieu 1758/2002, 1:37, 1:126, 
2:86; cf. Bell 2001, 60).
The Spirit  of the Laws also articulates a  theory of environmental 
determinism. As Gourou (1963) observes, the overall import of this theory 
is that ‘northern people are taller, calmer, more industrious, more honest,  
more  enterprising,  more  trustworthy  and  more  disinterested  than 
southern people’, because ‘climate and terrain create major differences in 
the “character  of  the mind” and the “passions of the heart”’.  Bourdieu 
(2001, 331-342) adds that the notion that climate shapes character goes 
back to  antiquity,  and argues  that  Montesquieu’s theory is  basically  a 
27 The word civilisé did not appear in its modern sense until 1791 (Anon. 2009).
110
mythological belief system covered with  a veneer of scholarly language. 
We will return to environmental determinism later in this chapter and in 
the next.
Al-Ṭahṭāwī  also  tells  us  that  he  was  an  avid  reader  of  French 
newspapers (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 211). These, too, may have played an 
important role in familiarising him with prevailing nationalist concepts in 
France.  His  stay  in  Paris  coincided  with  a  period  of  intense  conflict 
between  the  liberal  press  and  the  monarchy  (Hatin  1864,  8:443-444; 
Bellanger  et  al.  1969,  2:53-110).  The  revolution of  July  1830,  which he 
describes in detail and with great sympathy  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 219-
242), was triggered by a struggle over freedom of the press (Agulhon 1988, 
37).  The  leading  opposition  newspaper  of  the  July  revolution  was  Le 
National,  edited  by  the  nationalist  firebrand  Armand  Carrel  (Pilbeam 
1995, 18; Jennings 1991). It is thus very likely that al-Ṭahṭāwī read some of 
Carrel’s  articles.  More generally,  Carrel’s  nationalism may be taken as 
representative of an influential current of thought that al-Ṭahṭāwī must 
have encountered. It is therefore worth our attention here.
Carrel’s nationalism included resounding calls for the improvement 
of the material well-being of society: the sciences, arts and industry, he 
said, should become a ‘national Pantheon’ (Carrel 1857, 5:32; cf. Jennings 
1991, 502). This theme, which would become central for al-Ṭahṭāwī, was 
also dear to other prominent opposition journalists of the day, such as 
Benjamin  Constant,  who  wrote:  ‘The  sole  goal  of  modern  nations  is 
repose, and with repose ease and as the source of ease industry’ (quoted in 
Jennings 1991, 503).
111
Carrel’s  personification  of  nation went  much  further  than 
Montesquieu’s. His nation not only exercises its sovereignty (Carrel 1857, 
5:74) by means of elected representatives (Carrel 1857, 1:216); it also reads 
newspapers,  engages  in political  debate,  commands industry and owns 
property (Carrel 1857, 1:131). It has desires (Carrel 1857, 1:251, 1:390) and 
rights  (Carrel 1857, 1:392, 1:464), is heroic  (Carrel 1857, 1:142), and can 
punish an unjust regime (Carrel 1857, 1:240).
As for patrie, in Carrel’s writings, it is nearly always something that 
must be saved  (Carrel  1857,  1:154-155,  1:158,  1:226,  1:251,  1:273,  1:348). 
Every citizen has a duty to defend it by taking up arms (Carrel 1857, 5:74; 
Ledré 1960, 112), and those who die for its sake are heroes  (Carrel 1857, 
1:348). Moreover, Carrel was a staunch advocate of wars of aggression 
(Carrel  1857,  1:393;  cf.  Jennings  1991),  and  his  belief  that  France  had 
‘natural borders’  (Carrel 1857, 5:137) reflects an irredentist  view of the 
patrie.
The  theme  of  conquest  was  connected  to  that  of  the  national 
prophet who leads his nation to glory. During al-Ṭahṭāwī’s stay in Paris,  
this role was commonly associated with Napoleon Bonaparte. At the time 
of Napoleon’s exile to St. Helena in 1815, he had seemed destined to be 
remembered as a despot, an ‘illustrious villain’, yet he soon became the 
object  of  a  widespread  cult  (Hazareesingh  2004,  3).  The  image  of 
Napoleon as a national prophet gained a major boost from the publication 
by  Emmanuel  Las  Cases,  in  1823,  of  a  hugely  successful  collection  of 
Napoleon’s  reminiscences  in exile  (Tulard 1971,  16;  Hazareesingh 2004, 
164-165). Las Cases described Napoleon as the ‘martyr and messiah’ of the 
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French Revolution  (Las Cases 1823, 1:86),  and other prominent writers, 
such as Balzac and Nerval, followed suit  (Tulard 1971, 85-92). Napoleon 
was  transformed  into  ‘a  synthetic  emblem  of  national  unity’ 
(Hazareesingh 2006, 81). The information that would have been available 
to al-Ṭahṭāwī about Napoleon would thus have reflected this dominant 
view, and it is unlikely that he would have come across information that 
might have challenged it. He tells that he read a biography of Napoleon 
while in France (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1979, 209); it was probably Léonard Gallois’s 
Histoire  de  Napoléon  d'après  lui-même (Gallois  1825),  a  work  of 
hagiography  composed  almost  entirely  of  Napoleon’s  own  self-
aggrandising statements, which was later translated into Arabic under al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s supervision  (Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 319). Thus in the  Taḫlīṣ, 
al-Ṭahṭāwī  is  under  the  impression  that  the  French  loved  Napoleon 
during his reign, and that the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 
1815 took place against their will (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 222). As we will 
see below, in later works, he constructed a Napoleon-like myth around 
Mehmed Ali. The Pasha liked being compared to Napoleon (Fahmy 1997, 
79), and later generations of Egyptian nationalists would develop a legend 
of Mehmed Ali that bears striking similarities to the legend of Napoleon, 
and indeed portrays the Pasha as a sort of saviour (Fahmy 1997, 14-18, 77).
Finally,  al-Ṭahṭāwī  encountered  nationalist  concepts  in  the 
discourse of the French authorities who oversaw his education in Paris. At 
a ceremony to distribute prizes to the best students of the Egyptian School 
in Paris, a French general made a speech in which he told the students  
113
that they were called upon to regenerate their patrie (Egypt) (Louca 1970, 
45).
Nationalist Concepts in the Taḫlīṣ
To  understand  how  al-Ṭahṭāwī  constructed  a  nationalism  that 
would be intelligible in Arabic, we must examine his efforts to translate 
nation and patrie.  In other cases where he needed to discuss a French 
concept that had no equivalent in Arabic, e.g.  spectacle and  théâtre, he 
took  the  reader  explicitly  through  the  process  of  translation,  first 
transliterating the French term, then comparing it with the Arabic terms 
that were nearest to it in meaning, and finally explaining the reasons for 
his choice of translation (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 141). In contrast, he never 
acknowledged that nation and patrie did not yet have Arabic equivalents, 
and that, by rendering nation as umma and milla (among other words, as 
we will see below) and patrie as waṭan, he was giving these Arabic words 
new meanings. Instead, he devoted considerable space in his writings to a 
paradoxical  endeavour:  explaining  these  unfamiliar  concepts  to  his 
readers while simultaneously insisting, no doubt sincerely, that they have 
always been familiar.
Let us consider waṭan first. The first occurrence of this word in the 
Taḫlīṣ is in the introduction, in the midst of a section in which al-Ṭahṭāwī 
is justifying his trip  to France  by explaining the benefits of travel: ‘It is 
well known that pearls and musk become precious only when they have 
left their waṭan and place of origin. However, none of this contradicts the 
fact that love of one’s waṭan is one of the branches of faith’ (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
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1834/2002,  41).  This  is  no  doubt  an  allusion  to  the  apocryphal  hadith, 
‘Love of  waṭan is part of faith’, which we encountered in Chapter 1. As 
we will see, it would later become an important element in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s 
legitimation  of  nationalist  concepts.  Here,  al-Ṭahṭāwī  adds  that 
attachment to one’s waṭan and birthplace (masqaṭ raʾs) is instinctive, and 
quotes  a  few lines  of  poetry by  the 9th-century poet  al-ʿAbbās  ibn al-
Aḥnaf28 (on  whom  see  Blachère  2010) from  the  homesickness  genre 
discussed  in  Chapter 1.  At  this  stage,  there  is  nothing  to  suggest  a 
departure from the literary traditions we surveyed there.
Later, in a section of the book on ‘the inhabitants [ahl] of Paris’, al-
Ṭahṭāwī connects the word  waṭan,  for the first  time, with concepts of 
service and sacrifice. Here he is talking about Parisians’ attitudes towards 
their  country,  and  he  writes  as  a  detached  observer,  as  if  describing 
something strange and unfamiliar:
Despite their great attachment to their  awṭān, they love to travel. 
Sometimes they travel around the world for years and years, from 
east to west, and may even hurl themselves into peril for the benefit 
of their  awṭān. It is as if they confirm the words of al-Ḥāǧarī  (al-
Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 92).
He then quotes quotes two lines of verse by the 13th-century poet 
Ḥusām al-Dīn ʿĪsā ibn Sanǧar ibn Bahrām al-Ḥāǧarī, in which the poet 
simply says that all places are dear to him, but his native land (mawāṭinī  
wa-bilādī) is dearest. This is followed by a fragment of poetry by the 9th-
century poet Abū Tammām (on whom see Ritter 2010), also quoted by al-
28 Al-Ṭahṭāwī usually quotes poetry without attribution. In this and other cases, I have 
attempted to ascertain the source of the quotation.
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Ǧāḥiẓ (9c/1964, 401), about homesickness for one’s first campsite (manzil) 
(al-Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 93). It is important to stress that these quotations 
do  not  express  any notion  of  service  or  sacrifice;  hence  al-Ṭahṭāwī is 
mistaken  in  claiming that  the  attitudes  and  behaviour  of  the  French 
confirm the sentiments expressed in this poetry. This is an example of al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s use of a literary tradition to lend an aura of conventionality to 
a nationalist concept that was, in Arabic, utterly unconventional.
Al-Ṭahṭāwī  is not quite as consistent in translating nation.  In the 
Taḫlīṣ, he renders it as umma on a number of occasions. Towards the end 
of  the  book, he quotes  a  long passage  (al-Ṭahṭāwī  1834/2002,  266-268) 
from  a  text  called  ‘A  Historical  Discourse  on  Egypt’,  by  Joseph-Elie 
Agoub  (1835). The author had been born in Cairo in 1795 of Christian 
(Armenian  and  Syrian)  parents;  his family  had  fled  Egypt  with  the 
departing French troops in 1801, and settled in Marseille. He had worked 
as  an  interpreter  for  the  Ecole  Egyptienne  de  Paris,  and  had  a  brief 
moment of recognition in French literary circles before his death in 1832 
(Newman 2004, 70-71;  Silvera 1980).  In the Taḫlīṣ,  al-Ṭahṭāwī  refers to 
Agoub as a French author.  The original French version  of  Agoub’s text 
begins:  ‘History  is  a  public  school  in  which  nations  [nations] are 
educated’;  al-Ṭahṭāwī  translates  nations as  umam.  When Agoub asserts 
that  a  person  who  studies  history  witnesses  a  spectacle  consisting  of 
‘peoples [peuples], eras and empires’, al-Ṭahṭāwī also translates peuples as 
umam.  Turning  to  ancient  Egypt,  Agoub  asks:  ‘what  people  [peuple] 
made a greater effort than the Egyptians to establish the edifice of their 
grandeur on durable foundations’? Again, al-Ṭahṭāwī translates peuple as 
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umma.  Echoing  the  paradox  in  French  nationalism  mentioned  above, 
Agoub writes: ‘Egyptians today are not even a nation [nation]. They are a 
heterogeneous assemblage of different races of Asia and Africa, a mixture 
without  unity,  diverse  traits  that  do  not  compose  a  distinct type 
[physionomie].’ Here al-Ṭahṭāwī translates ‘Egyptians’ as ahl Miṣr, nation 
as  ǧinsan min aǧnās al-umam, and  races as  ǧunūs (pl. of  ǧins); we will 
see below that he considered ǧins and umma to be synonymous29.
Elsewhere in the Taḫlīṣ,  al-Ṭahṭāwī clearly echoes Montesquieu in 
asserting that nations (ʿumam) can be ranked according to their degree of 
advancement;  he  puts  the  Europeans  and  the  Egyptians  in  the  most 
advanced category, and the Sudanese in the category of the barbarians 
(al-Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 26-27).  Similarly, he refers to the French as ‘the 
wisest of nations [aḥkam al-umam]’  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 147). In his 
discussion of the revolution of July 1830, he  says that the king should 
have given freedom to the French nation (umma) (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 
227).
Al-Ṭahṭāwī also uses the word milla to mean ‘nation’30; on several 
occasions, he refers to the French as al-milla al-Faransāwiyya (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1834/2002,  129,  222,  231,  234).  In  one  place  he  calls  them a  ṭāʾifa (al-
Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 221),  a word that can mean ‘faction’, ‘sect’ or simply 
‘group’.  On a number of occasions, he seems to render  the  phrase ‘the 
people’ (Fr.  le peuple) as  al-raʿiyya (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 221, 224, 227, 
234), i.e. ‘the subjects’ (of the king).
29 In the next sentence of Agoub’s text, which falls just outside the section quoted by al-
Ṭahṭāwī, Agoub refers to Egypt as the ‘patrie of the Pharaohs’.
30 On his use of this term, see the discussion of his definition of it below.
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Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Nationalist Poetry
In 1841 (Delanoue 1982, 624), al-Ṭahṭāwī published a translation of 
the French national anthem,  La Marseillaise,  translating ‘children of the 
country’  as  banī al-awṭān  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1979, 199). In 1856, he published 
‘four patriotic poems, to the glory of the Egyptian army, extolling military 
virtues’  (Delanoue  1982,  626).  One  of  these  (al-Ṭahṭāwī  1979,  97-102), 
which  is  clearly  modelled  partly  on  La  Marseillaise, begins:  ‘Come, 
brothers, let us swear to one another / With firm pledges and oaths / To 
strive sincerely for the sake of the awṭān’. The poem is in the form of a 
song with a refrain: ‘Let us go to war, brave ones / Love of awṭān is part 
of  faith’.  Another  verse  begins:  ‘Unite,  unite  /  Your  swords  assist  the 
nation [milla]’. Here, once again, we find the nation conceptualised as a 
family  (‘brothers’).  Fighting  in  war  is  presented  as  part  of  ‘love  of 
country’, which in turn is presented as part of religious faith, hence as a 
religious duty. In all likelihood, al-Ṭahṭāwī composed these songs for the 
use of the military officers in the state schools where he worked or that he 
directed31 (on these schools, see Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 266-271); he may 
well have suggested that they should use these songs to motivate their 
troops at war. In order to analyse the concepts involved, we must now 
turn  to  his  later  works,  in  which  he  discusses  these  concepts  in 
considerable detail.
31 Even at the School of Languages, ‘[a]ll students held military rank’  (Fahmy 1997, 
173n); ‘graduates were automatically awarded the rank of army lieutenant’ (Newman 
2004, 45).
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Manāhiǧ al-Albāb al-Miṣriyya
Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  book  Manāhiǧ al-Albāb al-Miṣriyya fī  Mabāhiǧ al-
Ādāb  al-ʿAṣriyya (The  Paths  of  Egyptian  Hearts  in  the  Joys  of  the 
Contemporary  Arts32),  published  in  1869  (hereafter  the  Manāhiǧ),  is  a 
wide-ranging work of economic and moral guidance, probably intended 
mainly for teachers and students in the state schools in which he served 
as  teacher  and  administrator.  Its  central  argument  concerns  the 
importance of what he sees as a vast project, begun by Mehmed Ali, for 
the economic and military development of Egypt, as well as the means by 
which this project should be pursued. Al-Ṭahṭāwī justifies this project on 
the grounds that its fulfilment is one of Egyptians’ duties towards their 
waṭan. The book thus provides considerable evidence of his conception of 
the proper relationship between nation and national territory. Along the 
way, it touches on a wide variety of moral, technical and political topics, 
many  of  which  will  not  detain  us  here;  we  will  focus  on  the  main 
elements  and  functions  of  the  nationalist  concepts  that  al-Ṭahṭāwī 
employs, particularly those concepts that went on to become dominant in 
Egyptian nationalist discourse.
The National Duty of Economic Activity
The  author’s  preface  begins  by  praising  Mehmed  Ali  and  his 
successors  for  restoring  Egypt’s  greatness  (al-Ṭahṭāwī  1869/2002,  2). 
Thanks  to  the  promotion  of  knowledge  (al-ʿulūm  wa-l-maʿārif)  and 
economic activity (al-manāfiʿ al-ʿumūmiyya33), Egypt has joined the ranks 
32 This loose but felicitous translation of the title is due to Albert Hourani (1983, 72).
33 I am following Hourani’s (1983, 72) translation of this term. Al-Ṭahṭāwī explains that 
al-manāfiʿ  al-ʿumūmiyya is a translation of  the French word  industrie,  which,  he 
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of  civilised  states  (al-mamālik  al-mutamaddina)  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 
3). Egyptians have been borrowing, for their waṭan, industry and science 
from  foreigners.  It is  to  be  praised  for  fulfilling  ‘its  national  duties 
[ḥuqūqihā al-waṭaniyya]’ and maintaining friendly relations with other 
states. The manners of Egyptians (ahl al-waṭan) towards foreigners have 
been  improving,  exercising  a  ‘magnetic’  pull  on  foreigners,  just  as 
foreigners’ manners towards Egyptians have been improving. Al-Ṭahṭāwī 
quotes a poem, attributed to the 14th-century Andalusi scholar al-Ruʿaynī 
(on whom see Bonebakker 2010) advising the reader not to offend people 
when visiting their awṭān. Turning to the purpose of the book, he asserts 
that ‘it is the duty [wāǧib] of every member of the waṭan to aid society 
[al-ǧamʿiyya]  as best  he can, and contribute  capital  [raʾs  māl] for  the 
material benefit of his waṭan’ (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 4). Similarly, the last 
part  of  the  book is  on  ‘the  duties  of  the  honourable  waṭan’s  children 
towards it’ (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 348).
The book’s introduction, entitled ‘On the Renown of this Waṭan and 
What  Perceptive  People  have  Said  about  It’,  sums  up  much  of  al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s  conceptualisation  of  the  waṭan.  He  begins  with  a  brief 
economic history of Egypt, asserting that Egypt got its name in Arabic 
(Miṣr) from the migration of people into it (maṣīr al-nās ilayhā) to enjoy 
its economic benefits, which are due to its good location. This quickened 
the widening of the realm of civilisation (dāʾirat al-tamaddun) there. The 
says, means ‘progress in skill’, and is ‘an art that enables a person to gain mastery  
over  raw  material’.  He  adds  that  the  term designates  the  advancement  of  trade 
(tiǧāra) and industry  (ṣināʿa),  and refers  more  generally to ‘the art of  work and 
activity  that  serves  to  increase  wealth  and human happiness’,  and thus  includes 
agriculture (zirāʿa), trade (tiǧāra) and industry (ṣināʿa)  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 129). 
Hence  I  think  Hourani’s  translation  of al-manāfiʿ  al-ʿumūmiyya as  ‘economic 
activity’ is accurate, while ‘industry’ can be reserved for ṣināʿa.
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morals of the people (ḫalāʾiq) who lived there became polished over time, 
their character became refined, and they clung to the fruits of knowledge. 
By mixing with  other  nations  (umam),  they enjoyed an abundance  of 
mutually beneficial relationships (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 7).
Two factors, he says, worked to improve Egyptian civilisation. The 
first is the improvement of Egyptians’ morals through religion, which is  
the strongest base for the well-being of this world (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 
7). The second is economic activity, which brings wealth and improved 
conditions to society (al-ǧamʿiyya), removing it from its primitive, natural 
state. The light of civilisation unites these two factors. God did not put the 
useful things of this world all in one land (arḍ); instead he spread them 
around, and made them dependent on one another, so that people would 
have to travel in order to find them (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 8).
In  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  view,  civilisation  (tamaddun)  has  two parts.  The 
first is moral (maʿnawī), and involves ethics, customs and manners, ‘i.e. 
civilisation  in  religion  and  Islamic  law’.  This  is  ‘the  foundation  of  a 
civilised religious community [al-milla al-mutamaddina], which is called 
by the name of its religion and its race [ǧinsihā]’.  (Here  milla seems to 
mean ‘religious community’ in the Ottoman sense.) The second part of 
civilisation is economic progress, such as agriculture, trade and industry 
(al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 9). Similarly, he later says that there are two kinds 
of manfaʿa (‘benefit’,  ‘useful  service’,  ‘advantage’):  the  religious  kind, 
which includes religious obligations such as charity, and a second kind 
that  includes  ‘what  is  done  in  the  interest  of  a  town,  city,  or  realm 
[mamlaka], for the comfort of its inhabitants and the organisation of their 
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condition  . . .  by  means  of  which  the  waṭan progresses’  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1869/2002, 23-24).
Economic development, he says,  is necessary  for the  advancement 
of prosperity. He acknowledges that some refined people fear the power 
of the progress of technicians and manufacturers as well as these groups’ 
rising status.  Some see industry as a despicable profession, and feel that 
industrialists go too far in expanding  economic activity and in making 
profits for themselves. Having acknowledged these concerns, al-Ṭahṭāwī 
seeks  to  defuse  them by  attributing  an  ethical  basis  to  the  desire  for 
economic progress. Only love of one’s waṭan, he says, can make one wish 
to civilise it (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 10).
He then quotes a great deal of literature from the classical genre of 
writings on homesickness, which we considered in the previous chapter. 
None of these quotations, however,  actually support his argument, since 
they do not express the idea that one could have a desire (still less a duty) 
to seek economic progress for the sake of one’s waṭan. In this section, al-
Ṭahṭāwī  quotes  two  sayings  that  we  we  encountered  in  the  previous 
chapter:  the apocryphal hadith  ‘Love of  waṭan is part of faith’,  and the 
aphorism ‘God made towns prosperous through love of  awṭān’.  He tells 
an  anecdote,  whose  source  is  the  9th-century  philologist al-Aṣmaʿī  (on 
whom see Lewin 2010), about a Bedouin who asserts that if you want to 
know whether a man has a good character, consider his longing for his 
awṭān.  Al-Ṭahṭāwī  then  quotes  poetry  by  Ibn  al-Rūmī  (on  whom see 
Boustany  2010) saying  that  when  people  remember  their  awṭān,  they 
remember  their  youth  (al-Ṭahṭāwī  1869/2002,  10-11).  A  fragment  of  a 
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poem by the 10th-century philologist Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī  (on whom see 
Fück 2010b) expresses the poet’s longing for the land of his clan and his 
first  campsite.  Al-Ṭahṭāwī says  that  even uncivilised  people  love their 
waṭan; the mountain Bedouin is attached to the mountains of his  awṭān 
(al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 11). (This recalls al-Ǧāḥiẓ’s anecdotes, discussed in 
the previous chapter.) A poem by Maysūn, wife of the caliph Muʿāwiya, 
expresses  her  homesickness  for  her  birthplace  (masqaṭ  raʾsihā)  (al-
Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 11-12). A line of poetry by Ibn al-Rūmī illustrates the 
idea that Bedouin pride themselves on living in the desert.  Al-Ṭahṭāwī 
cites Q 4:66 (‘if We had ordered, “Lay down your lives” or “Leave your 
homes”,  they  would  not  have  done so,  except  for  a  few’)  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1869/2002, 13-14), which al-Ǧāḥiẓ  (9c/1964, 389) also cites as evidence of 
the tendency of human beings to be attached to their homes. A fragment 
of  poetry  by  Ibn Ḥamdīs  (on  whom see  Rizzitano  2010) expresses  the 
poet’s  homesickness for  Sicily.  Similarly,  a fragment of poetry by Abū 
Tammām  (also  quoted  in  the  Taḫlīṣ,  as  mentioned  above)  is  about 
homesickness for one’s first campsite (manzil), and a fragment by Abū 
Firās al-Ḥamdānī  (on whom see Gibb 2010), is about longing for one’s 
lands (diyār) (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 14). In an unidentified fragment, the 
poet,  standing  in  the  desert,  refers  to  it  as  his  beloved  (ḥabīb).  The 
Prophet  Muḥammad  was  reluctant  to  leave  Mecca  because  of  his 
attachment  to  the  place,  which  al-Ṭahṭāwī  refers  to  as  the  Prophet’s 
waṭan (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 14-15). Al-Ṭahṭāwī concludes this section by 
characterising love of awṭān as a great virtue, which is only truly fulfilled 
by those who have the most noble qualities.
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Next he turns to love of Egypt in particular. Egypt is, he says, the 
dearest waṭan to its children (banīhā), and deserves their filial piety (birr); 
it is a mother to its inhabitants, and filial piety is a duty (wāǧib) for every 
human being.  Here  al-Ṭahṭāwī  develops  the  classical  conceptual  blend 
between land and parent by adding the elements of filial piety and duty 
towards parents, which were not projected onto the blends we saw in the 
previous  chapter.  This  filial  piety,  he  says,  also  benefits  Egypt’s 
inhabitants (ahālīhā) by increasing the good things that Egypt produces 
for them. Although foreigners are not deprived of Egypt’s fruits, he adds, 
it is more appropriate for its relatives (aqārib) to enjoy them (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1869/2002, 15).
Then he describes the good qualities of Egypt, in the style of the 
faḍāʾil literature that we considered in the previous chapter. He quotes 
three sayings of the Prophet in which Egypt is praised; all three are also 
quoted by Ibn Ẓahīra (15c/1969, 76-77). He cites a work from the faḍāʾil 
genre, called Al-Mufāḫara bayn Miṣr wa-l-Šām (Boasting Between Egypt 
and Syria)34, whose author’s waṭan was Damascus, but who nevertheless 
praises  Egypt,  in  the  manner  of  Ibn  Ẓahīra.  Al-Ṭahṭāwī  quotes  the 
laudatory comment about Egyptians (asserting that they are close to the 
Prophet’s tribe, Qurayš) that is attributed to ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar, the 
son of the second caliph, and that we encountered in Ibn Ẓahīra’s text 
(15c/1969, 77), and interprets it in the same way that Ibn Ẓahīra did (as a 
reference to the idea that Hāǧar, the mother of Ismāʿīl, and Mārya, the 
mother of Abraham, were from Egypt). He quotes two more sayings of 
34 I have found no other information about this work.
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the  Prophet,  which  are  also  similar  to  ones  that  Ibn  Ẓahīra  quotes 
(15c/1969, 74, 76), and mentions an account according to which Egypt got 
its name because it was settled by a grandson of Noah called Miṣrīm (al-
Ṭahṭāwī  1869/2002,  16);  this  is  similar  to  Ibn  Ẓahīra’s  explanation 
(15c/1969, 6). He refers to Egypt as ‘the mother of this world [umm al-
dunyā]’ (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 16), now a common saying.
Other  claims  similar  to  Ibn  Ẓahīra’s  follow.  An  unidentified 
fragment  of  poetry  portrays  Egypt  as  a  land  of  plenty.  Al-Ṭahṭāwī 
mentions various figures from Islamic history who showed a preference 
for Egypt. He says that Egypt has been the land of learning since times of 
old, and has produced many great scholars. Students still travel there to 
study. He emphasises the idea that Egypt was ‘the world’s storehouse’, 
and that it enriched those who came to it; he cites a poem to this effect by 
the  12th-century  writer  Al-Faqīh  al-ʿImāra  al-Yamānī  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1869/2002, 17). As evidence that Egypt was already civilised in times of 
old, he quotes Q 10:88 and Q 43:51 on the wealth of the Egyptian Pharaoh, 
as well as interpretations claiming that Egypt was then the greatest realm 
(mulk) in the world, and that all other lands depended on it. In those days, 
Egypt’s rivers had fine bridges (i.e. engineering), to the point that there 
was running water under houses and courtyards. This, he says, is the very 
essence of civilisation, since it can be accomplished only with advanced 
technology  (bi-taqaddum  al-ṣanāʾiʿ  wa-l-funūn).  Ancient  Egyptian 
monuments are evidence of this technology (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 17-18).
Egypt is the world’s  port,  whose goods are exported all  over the 
world, especially now, thanks to the Suez Canal (opened in 1869, the same 
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year the book was published). For the same reason, Egyptians increasingly 
mix with other  nations  (umam).  Therefore it  is  not  surprising that  its 
civilisation is  becoming firmly established.  Different  civilisations  shine 
brightly at different times, by turns; thus each country (mamlaka) takes 
its  share  of  the  light  of  civilisation  for  a  few centuries,  thanks  to  its 
inhabitants’  enthusiasm  in  their  love  for  their  awṭān (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1869/2002, 18).
Some, he says, have compared true love of  waṭan to ‘a new heat 
[ḥarāra ǧadīda]’ that comes over people’s bodies, vanquishing the heat of 
primitive  instinct.  If  nationalist  enthusiasm (al-ḥamiyya  al-waṭaniyya) 
were  ignited  amongst  the  children  of  Egypt,  people  would  make  the 
necessary strenuous efforts so that the waṭan could attain the heights of 
civilisation (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 18-19). Here the use of the words ‘new’ 
and  ‘if’  seems  to  acknowledge  implicitly  that  nationalism  is  not  the 
ancient  phenomenon that  he has made it  out  to be,  and that  it  is  not 
widespread in Egypt.
Militarism, Conquest and Education
Al-Ṭahṭāwī devotes a chapter to the duties of the military class (al-
Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 407-432).  It is  full of standard Islamic quotations on 
jihad; however, he also gives soldiers a nationalist role, describing them as 
‘protectors of the waṭan and of religion’ (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 407, 409). 
A soldier who lacks self-control ‘forgets to serve the awṭān’  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1869/2002, 423).
He asserts that in ancient Greece and Rome, all those who respected 
their  awṭān would  willingly  give  the  government  whatever  ‘patriotic 
126
assistance [al-iʿāna al-waṭaniyya]’ it needed to prepare its armies. During 
the Punic Wars, he says, some Roman landowners objected to paying a 
war tax, complaining that the state had conscripted their peasants and 
that agriculture had suffered. The Roman senators then set an example by 
paying the tax first themselves, inspiring everyone else to join them, and 
so Rome won the war thanks to the sacrifices, in money and lives, that its 
inhabitants  made for  their  awṭān (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002,  137-140).  This 
could  easily  be  an  allusion  to  Egyptian  peasants’  widespread,  fierce 
resistance to conscription and taxation during al-Ṭahṭāwī’s lifetime, and 
an implicit suggestion that nationalism could solve this problem.
As a shining example of how wealth is produced, al-Ṭahṭāwī paints 
a  glowing  portrait  of the  British  Empire  along  with  other  European 
empires,  which  ‘conquered  extensive  lands’  throughout  the  world,  ‘in 
order to advance their industry and trade.  . . .  This type of progress is 
called  colonial  industry  [andūstriyā  qūluniyya],  which  means  foreign 
trade [yaʿnī tiǧāra ḫāriǧiyya]’  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 134).  Similarly, he 
praises Louis XIV of France, including that king’s many wars, which were 
aimed  at  conquering  additional  territory  for  his  kingdom.  Al-Ṭahṭāwī 
describes these as ‘magnificent conquests that widened the realm of the 
waṭan for its inhabitants’ (he refers to France as a waṭan several times in 
this passage) (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 217-221).
Mixing  with  foreigners,  he  asserts,  greatly  improves  economic 
activity, even if it takes place via conquest and coercion (al-taġallub wa-l-
iġtiṣāb). To support this contention, he asserts that ‘one sickness can cure 
another’.  Consider,  he  says,  the  example  of  Alexander  the  Great’s 
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conquest of Egypt; it restored Egypt’s splendour, and he ruled Egyptians 
in the best possible way (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 194). Al-Ṭahṭāwī devotes 
an entire chapter to demonstrating that Alexander’s conquest of Egypt 
improved civilisation and economic activity there (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 
194-206). Moreover, he claims that Alexander united the inhabitants of all 
the regions he conquered as one nation (umma) around a central  waṭan 
(i.e. an empire with a centre and a periphery) (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 195-
196).
A large part of the book is devoted to praise for Mehmed Ali, who, 
in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s view, saved Egypt from the Mamluks, restored its glory, 
and drew Egyptians’ hearts towards loyalty to the waṭan; hence everyone 
gladly  helped  the  government  to  the  best  of  their  ability  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1869/2002,  206).  He  claims  that  Mehmed  Ali  tirelessly  promoted 
civilisation  (tamaddun),  and  spared  no  expense  ‘in  his  zeal  for  the 
advancement of his exalted waṭan and for the elevation of his subjects out 
of the plight of their uncouth ways’  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 248). As we 
have  seen  above,  there  is  ample  historical  evidence  to  contradict  this 
portrayal. If the reader is inclined to suspect that al-Ṭahṭāwī’s praise for 
Mehmed Ali might have been insincere, it is worth recalling that Mehmed 
Ali had been dead for 20 years. Here as elsewhere, as I suggested in the 
introduction,  misrecognition  is  a  more  plausible  explanation  than 
insincerity.
Al-Ṭahṭāwī extols Mehmed Ali’s wars of conquest, on the grounds 
that  he always had good intentions.  The proof of  Mehmed Ali’s  good 
intentions is that they resulted in the founding of a dynasty in Egypt that 
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‘lightened burdens’. (No doubt the conscripted Egyptian peasants would 
have disagreed.) Al-Ṭahṭāwī asserts that Mehmed Ali went to Sudan both 
to  look for  gold  and to  promote  ‘civilisation  and progress’  there.  The 
conquest of Sudan ‘widened the realm of national benefits [al-manāfiʿ al-
waṭaniyya]’35. If Mehmed Ali had not remained in the Ottoman Empire 
(al-dawla al-ʿaliyya), he would have conquered as much as Alexander the 
Great, thus improving civilisation and prosperity. Hence Macedonia can 
pride  itself  on  being  the  birthplace  (mawṭin)  of  two  great  princes: 
Alexander  the Great  and Mehmed Ali  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002,  211-212). 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī is enthusiastic about the size of ‘the land of Egypt [arḍ miṣr]’, 
including ‘the Sudanese lands [bilād] that have been annexed to it’  (al-
Ṭahṭāwī  1869/2002,  283);  he refers  to  these territories  as  ‘the  Egyptian 
lands of Sudan [bilād al-Sūdān al-Miṣriyya]’ (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 313).
In  a  discussion  of  agriculture,  he  asserts  that  Mehmed  Ali’s 
intended improvements to irrigation, which are of utmost importance to 
the population (al-ahālī), were delayed because it was more important to 
Mehmed Ali to enlarge the military in order to establish his rule, and to 
protect himself and the  waṭan. Moreover, al-Ṭahṭāwī  acknowledges that 
in Mehmed Ali’s view, the purpose of all economic activity was to serve 
the  army;  therefore  he  attended  to  agriculture  only  secondarily  (al-
Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 228).
When al-Ṭahṭāwī describes the establishment of modern schools in 
Egypt, a development that he is clearly very proud of, he uses, for the first 
35 Note that al-manāfiʿ al-waṭaniyya here seems to be synonymous with the term al-
manāfiʿ  al-ʿumūmiyya,  discussed  above.  For  al-Ṭahṭāwī,  there  is  clearly  a  close 
association between the concept of waṭan and the concept of economic activity; I will 
analyse the reason for this association at the end of the chapter.
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time  in  this  book,  the  expression  ‘the  Egyptian  nation  [al-ʿumma al-
miṣriyya]’: God, he says, helped Mehmed Ali create, from the Egyptian 
nation, doctors, engineers, translators, administrators, army officers and 
businessmen, and this  was all  thanks to schools  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 
243).  He  mentions  the  educational  missions  (irsāliyyāt)  to  France,  and 
asserts  that  the  Language  School  produced  many  civil  servants  who 
greatly benefited the country (al-bilād)  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 243-244). 
Similarly,  he argues  elsewhere that  it  is  important to  teach ‘all  useful 
sciences’ (i.e. not just the religious ones), and stresses that ‘all sciences are 
honourable’ (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 49-50). If a child is inclined towards a 
trade that is ‘useful for the inhabitants of his  waṭan’, he should learn it, 
after his basic schooling, which should be given to all members of society. 
This  elementary  education  should  include,  for  boys,  ‘horsemanship, 
marksmanship, and the use of spears, swords, and other instruments of 
war,  to  train  them in  the  defence  and  protection  of  their  waṭan’  (al-
Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 65-66).
In his view, ‘the principles of political and administrative affairs’ 
should be taught to all boys at an early age, after they learn the Qurʾān, 
becasue this is the key to ‘understanding the secrets of economic activity’. 
The  teacher  of  these  lessons  would  explain  ‘the  reasons  why  the 
government  obliges  the  population  [al-ahālī]  to  serve  their  waṭan 
personally in the army, and why they are obliged to pay a portion of their 
wealth in taxes’ (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 350). Thus they would learn ‘their 
rights and duties concerning their material possessions’. (Al-Ṭahṭāwī does 
not  specify  what  these  rights  are.)  The  desired  effect  of  these  lessons 
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would be ‘a moral influence’; the population would understand that ‘their 
personal interests can be fulfilled only through the fulfilment of the public 
interest  [al-maṣlaḥa  al-ʿumūmiyya],  which  is  the  interest  of  the 
government, which is the interest of the waṭan; hence their souls would 
yield’  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 351). In other words, these would be civics 
lessons  that  would  use  nationalism  to  legitimise  conscription  and 
taxation.  It  seems  highly  likely  that  al-Ṭahṭāwī  is  here  describing 
something that he had been doing, at least informally, for many years in 
his work as a teacher.
In his chapter on the clergy, al-Ṭahṭāwī says that respect should be 
given to scholars (ʿulamāʾ) who are involved in ‘honourable sciences’ that 
are  beneficial  in  ‘the  state  and  the  waṭan’,  such  as  medicine, 
engineering/geometry  (handasa),  astronomy,  natural  science  (al-
ṭabīʿiyyāt),  geography,  history,  administration  and  finance  (ʿulūm  al-
idāra  wa-l-iqtiṣād  fi-l-maṣārīf),  military  technology  (al-funūn  al-
ʿaskariyya),  and  anything  else  connected  with  technology  (fann)  or 
industry (ṣināʿa). People involved in these activities, as well as those who 
teach ‘literary knowledge and Arabic eloquence’, must be respected by 
‘the inhabitants  [ahl]  of  the state  [dawla]  and the  waṭan’  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1869/2002,  371).  Mehmed Ali,  he says,  raised up ‘the lighthouse of  the 
waṭan’  and  renewed  education  and  scholarship  in  Egypt,  but  did  not 
manage to introduce these various sciences into the Azhar. This should 
now  be  done,  for  both  nationalist  and  religious  reasons:  these 
‘philosophical,  scientific  sciences  [hāḏihi  al-ʿulūm  al-ḥikmiyya  al-
ʿilmiyya]’ will benefit the waṭan, and they should be taught by the Islamic 
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ʿulamāʾ because they were originally Islamic sciences, although they now 
seem foreign (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 372-373). Al-Ṭahṭāwī concludes that 
the  Azharite  scholars  should  devote  themselves  the  study  of  ‘the 
contemporary  sciences  [al-ʿulūm al-ʿaṣriyya]’.  He  adds  that  they  may 
make excuses, alleging that they need help from the government, but in 
his view, the government has done a great deal already, and it is up to the 
clergy to take the initiative now (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 376).
Political Philosophy
Al-Ṭahṭāwī praises the Khedive Ismāʿīl for founding the Council of 
Delegates  (Maǧlis  Šūrā al-Nuwwāb)  in  1866.  In  reality,  the  Council  of 
Delegates provided only the appearance of political participation:
Viceregal  Egypt under  Ismāʿīl  was developing a modern form of 
autocracy  comparable  to  that  of  eighteenth-century  France  or 
nineteenth-century Russia. The viceroy increasingly depended on a 
council of ministers, but before 1878 yielded no privileges to it that 
would  detract  from  his  absolute  power.  . . .  [The  Council  of 
Delegates], made up of village headmen and a few guild officials 
appointed by the khedive (and thus only indirectly ‘selected by the 
people’),  could  only  forward  requests  to  the  viceroy  for  his 
approval, lacking any actual authority. One might compare Ismāʿīl’s 
new chamber of deputies to the ‘parliaments’ of fourteenth-century 
Britain, which had a largely  ceremonial purpose within a society 
dominated by the nobles (Cole 1993, 30).
In al-Ṭahṭāwī’s view, the Council of Delegates is important because 
‘a  free  nation [al-umma al-ḥurra]’  should  be  consulted  on  matters  of 
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administration and organisation whose reform is seen as desirable. One of 
the benefits of this consultation is that it enables the ruler to be certain of 
his  ‘moral  domination  [al-tasalṭun  al-maʿnawī]’ of  the  souls  of  his 
subjects, and to obtain their assistance in his efforts to ‘please their waṭan 
[isʿādihi  li-waṭanihim]’  (al-Ṭahṭāwī  1869/2002,  323).  This  ‘moral 
domination’ that al-Ṭahṭāwī envisages is unmistakably a type of symbolic 
power. As we will see in later chapters of this thesis, this concept was to 
have an illustrious future in Egyptian nationalist thought and practice.
Without kings, says  al-Ṭahṭāwī, there would be chaos. The king is 
to  his  subjects  as  the  soul  is  to  the  body  (al-Ṭahṭāwī  1869/2002,  348). 
Borrowing from Montesquieu, he observes that government (al-quwwa 
al-ḥākima) is divided into three branches: the legislative, the judicial and 
the executive. However, he undermines the democratic potential of the 
separation of powers by asserting that all these branches are under the 
authority of the monarch, who simply delegates these matters to them (al-
Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 349-350). In al-Ṭahṭāwī’s thought, as Delanoue (1982, 
469-470) observes,
There are no institutional restrictions on the prince’s authority; no 
established body shares power with him in taking final decisions. 
Rifāʿa proposes only moral limitations on the prince’s power. . . . As 
for the prince’s subjects, they owe him total obedience, by virtue of 
the Qurʾānic verse that is constantly cited in this regard: ‘You who 
believe, obey God and the Messenger, and those in authority among 
you  [ulū  al-amr]’  (Q  4:59).  This  verse,  notes  Rifāʿa  in  a  very 
traditional  manner,  closely  links  obedience  to  the  prince  with 
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obedience to God and the Prophet. The subjects must therefore aid 
their prince if he is attacked, by supplying him with soldiers and 
money. In no case do they have the right to rebel. If the prince is 
unjust, they have no recourse but prayer36.
Al-Ṭahṭāwī says that government requires a king and subjects, and 
he defines the term ‘ruler [walī al-amr]’ as ‘leader of the nation [raʾīs al-
umma]’  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 353). In most realms (mamālik), he says, 
kings were originally elected by the nation (umma), but elections caused 
all  sorts  of  corruption,  conflict,  war  and  disagreement,  so  monarchy 
became hereditary; this policy has guaranteed the maintenance of order. 
Kings have rights and duties, but the king is ‘God’s successor on earth 
[ḫalīfat  Allāh  fī  arḍihi]’  and  is  accountable  only  to  God,  not  to  his 
subjects. His advisors merely remind him of things that may have escaped 
his attention. If he does something that is not in accord with his nation 
(umma), his conscience will punish him. The function of councils such as 
the Council of Delegates is merely advisory  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 354-
357). As Cole (1993, 42) observes,
In  rejecting  the  effective,  modern  constraints  on  absolutism 
developed in Europe, al-Ṭahṭāwī reveals a thoroughly late-Ottoman 
mindset. One of Egypt’s great landlords, he demonstrated a strong 
loyalty to Ismāʿīl, and he wished to socialize the public to the values 
of the viceregal elite, of which he formed a part.
Thus  for  al-Ṭahṭāwī,  the  nation  is  not  sovereign;  sovereignty 
belongs only to the monarch.
36 Cf. al-Ṭahṭāwī (1869/2002, 368-369).
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Similarities between Nationalism and Religion
Al-Ṭahṭāwī makes a number of analogies between nationalism and 
religion.  First,  he  says,  that  whenever  someone  serves  his  waṭan,  the 
waṭan feels  sympathy for  him and improves his  condition  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1869/2002, 4). The parallel with divine mercy here is plain.
After citing several hadith to the effect that all Muslims are brothers 
(and thus have duties towards one another), he argues that this principle 
can be generalised to ‘the members of the waṭan’, who therefore have the 
very  same  duties  towards  one  another,  by  virtue  of  the  ‘national 
brotherhood  [al-uḫuwwa al-waṭaniyya]’  that  exists  between  them  (al-
Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 99).
Finally,  al-Ṭahṭāwī  asserts  that  the  duty  of  ‘the  children  of  the 
waṭan’, regardless of their social class, is to serve the  waṭan,  the realm 
(mamlaka), the nation (milla) and the state (dawla); if they do this, the 
waṭan will thank them (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 433). Anyone who refuses 
to do useful work for the waṭan is thereby guilty of ‘sins [āṯām]’ and has 
betrayed  his  era  (ʿaṣrahu)  (al-Ṭahṭāwī  1869/2002,  436).  Note  that  the 
refusal to serve one’s country is a sin, just like the refusal to serve God.
We will see in a moment how al-Ṭahṭāwī developed these parallels 
even further.
Al-Muršid al-Amīn li-l-Banāt wa-l-Banīn
Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  treatise  on education,  Al-Muršid al-Amīn li-l-Banāt  
wa-l-Banīn (The  Trustworthy  Guide  for  Girls  and  Boys),  published  in 
1872, also contains considerable material that clarifies the structure of his 
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nationalist  concepts  and the inferences that he drew from them. Once 
again, we will concentrate our attention on the relevant passages of the 
book.
Education in the Service of the Waṭan
In the first few pages of the book, al-Ṭahṭāwī says that the good 
education  (tarbiya)  of  individuals  (al-āḥād)  is  the  basis  of  the  good 
education  of  ‘society,  i.e.  the  nation  [al-hayʾa  al-muǧtamiʿa  yaʿni  al-
umma]’.  The nation (umma)  whose children (abnāʾ)  are  well-educated 
and ready to serve their  awṭān is a happy and praiseworthy nation and 
does not fear to entrust to its children the happiness of the  waṭan (al-
Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 6).  No doubt this is exactly what al-Ṭahṭāwī told the 
young students in the schools he directed: that they should study hard in 
order  to  be  ready  to  serve  their  country.  It  is  also  worth  noting  the 
personification of both nation and national territory here. This passage 
seems compatible with a conceptualisation in which the  umma and the 
waṭan are  seen as the two parents of  Egypt’s  inhabitants.  Perhaps the 
umma is conceptualised as the mother, raising her children in a way that 
would please the  waṭan,  her  husband. (Also note  that  al-Ṭahṭāwī uses 
umma and milla synonymously.)
Education, he says, should be appropriate for the condition of the 
nation  (umma) and the  principles  that  are  accepted  in  its  awṭān.  For 
example, if the character of the country (balad) is military, education for 
boys should be military as well, and education for girls should teach them 
to love brave, heroic fighters, to encourage their sons to go to war, and to 
respect their sons’ service to the waṭan. The same goes for nations whose 
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character  is  agricultural,  commercial,  seafaring,  etc.  This  is  in  keeping 
with natural law (al-nāmūs al-ṭabīʿī), whose course has been determined 
by God. Thus God made some people to be scholars, and others to do 
manual  labour,  and  gave  them  characteristics  appropriate  to  the 
profession that they are destined for (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 6-7). Thus al-
Ṭahṭāwī  invokes  both  God  and  nation  in  order  to  naturalise  socially 
produced  realities,  including  war,  economic  structures  and  social 
inequalities.
An  umma in  which  education  progresses  will  also  ‘advance  in 
progress  and  civilisation’  and  thus  be  qualified  to  gain  its  freedom. 
(Considering al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  views  on  imperialism,  considered above,  we 
can  deduce  that  this  need  not  mean  freedom  from  colonial  rule.) 
Education is the basis of putting the ‘children of the waṭan’ to good use 
(al-Ṭahṭāwī  1872/2008,  7).  Love  for  one’s  brothers  and  the  inhabitants 
(ahl) of one’s  awṭān is a sign of faith  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 10). Once 
again, it is a happy nation (umma) that refines the morals of its children; 
the  education of  the  nation’s  children (awlād al-umma wa-ṣubyān al-
milla wa-aṭfāl al-mamlaka) is one of the most pressing duties. (Note once 
again  that  al-Ṭahṭāwī  uses  umma and milla as  synonyms.) In  ancient 
times, the nation (umma) of the Greeks gave the children of its kings the 
best education  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 16). Education in military courage 
among  the  ancient  Greeks  and  the  modern  Europeans  is  nothing 
compared to the education that the Arabs gave their children in times of 
old, including the encouragement that Arab mothers gave their sons to 
fight in battle (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 18).
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Environmental  determinism, which we encountered above in  the 
work of Montesquieu, appears in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s remark that ‘the names of 
races [asmāʾ aǧnās al-umam]’ reflect ‘the adaptation of each race [ǧins] 
adaptation to the nature of the lands [arāḍī] in which it was born’. Hence, 
he says, there is a white/Caucasian race, a yellow/Mongolian race and a 
brown race, to which are sometimes added an Indian race, an American 
race, an Arab race, etc. (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 28).
Secondary education is the means for achieving ‘the civilisation of 
the  society  of  the  nation  [tamdīn  ǧumhūr  al-umma]’,  and  includes 
‘foreign languages that are useful to the  waṭan’  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 
63). Competition (tanāfus) is beneficial and springs from ‘love of the good 
of the country [ḥubb al-ḫayr li-l-waṭaniyya]’ (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 82). 
A  competitive  person  should  aim  to  serve  his  waṭan (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1872/2008, 84). Once again, a ruler should base his arguments on love of 
the waṭan (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 88-89). It is useful to leave one’s waṭan 
in search of knowledge; whoever does not find a teacher to teach him in 
his waṭan should find one elsewhere (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 89).
Nation and National Territory
The topic of Part 4 of the book (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 90-134) is the 
ways in which education can contribute to civilising the waṭan. Here al-
Ṭahṭāwī tries to define explicitly what he means by waṭan. It is, he says, a 
person’s nest (ʿušš al-insān), in which he grows up. It is the place where 
his  family  gathers  (maǧmaʿ  usratihi)  and  the  place  where  he  is  born 
(maqṭaʿ surratihi). It is the place (balad) whose soil, food and air raised 
him (naššaʾathu). Here al-Ṭahṭāwī quotes a saying from the homesickness 
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genre that we considered in the previous chapter, according to which one 
of the signs of a man’s good character is ‘his longing for his  awṭān’  (al-
Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 90). This is very similar to the quote we saw above, 
attributed  to  al-Aṣmaʿī,  in  Manāhiǧ (al-Ṭahṭāwī  1869/2002,  10).  Al-
Ṭahṭāwī quotes a saying, ‘A sensible man longs for his  waṭan as a fine 
camel longs for its usual resting place [ʿaṭan]’, which is also quoted by al-
Ǧāḥiẓ (9c/1964, 2:391). He quotes a fragment of poetry in which the poet 
nostalgically recalls the first land (arḍ) whose soil (turāb) touched his skin 
(al-Ṭahṭāwī  1872/2008,  90);  al-Ǧāḥiẓ  (9c/1964,  2:399-400) attributes  the 
poem to the 9th-century musician Isḥāq ibn Ibrāhīm al-Mawṣilī (on whom 
see Fück 2010c). Al-Ṭahṭāwī quotes fragments of similar poetry that he 
had already quoted in  Manāhiǧ (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1869/2002, 10-11) and that I 
have discussed  above.  Another  fragment  of  poetry,  from  the  poem 
Lāmiyyat  al-ʿAǧam by  the  12th-century  writer  Muʾayyad  al-Dīn  al-
Ṭuġrāʾī,  says  that  it  is  honourable  to stay in one place rather  than to 
travel.  Another  fragment  mentions  longing  for  awṭān (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1872/2008, 91).
Al-Ṭahṭāwī goes on to say that it is customary for people who travel 
to miss their waṭan. He again refers to Egypt as ‘the mother of this world 
[umm al-dunyā]’, and adds that it, in his view, it is ‘the first waṭan in the 
world that deserves to have its children’s hearts incline towards it’. No 
one  doubts,  he  says,  that  Egypt  is  an  ‘honourable  waṭan’  (note  the 
personification). It is ‘the land [arḍ] of glory in former times as well as 
recent ones’. In language that recalls Ibn Ẓahīra, he says that Egypt is like 
‘the picture of Paradise’; the hand of God has gathered in it ‘the good 
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things  of  this world’.  Like  Ibn  Ẓahīra,  al-Ṭahṭāwī  praises  Egypt’s  soil 
(turāb), and notes that Egypt has produced many kings, sultans, wise men 
and other distinguished people, as well as sciences. Its nation (umma) is 
the  first  nation  in  glory  and  high-minded  endeavours  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1872/2008, 91). Al-Ṭahṭāwī then quotes two lines of poetry by the Abbasid 
poet Marwān ibn Abī Ḥafṣa, praising a qawm (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 91-
92), which seems to mean ‘tribe’ in this context (the poem has nothing to 
do with Egypt); this juxtaposition prompts for the inference that a qawm 
is something like a nation. This is the first occurrence of this inference in 
the texts considered in this thesis.
Continuing in this vein, al-Ṭahṭāwī lists the virtues of the Egyptian 
nation:  courage  (šaǧāʿa),  enthusiasm  (ḥamāsa),  sagacity  (kiyāsa), 
leadership (riʾāsa), intelligence (ḏakāʾ), perspicacity (fiṭna) and kindness 
(laṭāfat  al-ʿawāʾid wa-l-aḫlāq).  Egypt  deserves respect from all  nations 
(al-umam wa-l-milal), kings and states,  for they have borrowed a great 
deal  of  science  and  knowledge  from  it.  It  is  highly  civilised.  An 
unidentified  fragment  of  poetry  consisting  of  a  panegyric  to  Egypt, 
similar to the ones quoted by Ibn Ẓahīra,  praises the Nile.  Al-Ṭahṭāwī 
says that Egypt possesses great weath and enriches those who go there 
(cf. Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 129). He quotes a poem that claims that Baghdad 
(which  no  doubt  stands  metonymically  for  Iraq)  is  more  fertile  than 
Egypt; al-Ṭahṭāwī says that this is false (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 92). Egypt 
is  a wellspring of happiness,  the ornament of the Islamic world (zīnat  
bilād al-islām)  (cf. Ibn Ẓahīra 15c/1969, 82). It inhabitants are people of 
dignity (ahluhā ahl karāma wa-taʿzīz). (In a later chapter, we will find the 
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same concept in Gamal Abdel Nasser’s slogan, al-ʿizza wa-l-karāma.) It is 
loved  by  the  children  of  the  awṭān,  and  attached  to  the  (apocryphal) 
hadith, ‘Love of waṭan is part of faith’ (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 93).
God, he says,  has ordained that the  waṭan’s  children are always 
united in language, ruled by a single king (malik), and subject to the same 
laws. God has prepared them to cooperate in improving their waṭan, and 
to  be  like  members  of  one  family  (ʿāʾila),  as  if  their  waṭan was  their 
parents’ house (manzil) and the place where they grew up  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1872/2008, 93). The nation, says al-Ṭahṭāwī, should not split into factions 
(aḥzāb), because this would cause conflicts and threaten national security 
(amniyyat al-waṭan).  Instead, they should be like the heart  of a single 
man.  Their  only  enemies  should  be  those  who  seek  to  subvert  their 
system of government (niẓām mulkihim)  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 93-94). 
Later he repeats that internal conflicts (al-fitan and  al-iḫtilāf al-dāḫilī) 
must be avoided so that the nation (umma) can be strong and defend the 
waṭan (al-Ṭahṭāwī  1872/2008,  130).  As  we  will  see,  these  were  to  be 
important elements of Nasser’s anti-democratic nationalist discourse.
Al-Ṭahṭāwī emphasises that the nationalist who sincerely loves his 
country sacrifices everything for  it,  serves it  with all  he possesses and 
sacrifices his life for it (yafdīhi bi-rūḥihi)  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 94). He 
defends it from anyone who would harm it, just as a father defends his 
son from harm. The children of the waṭan must always have virtuous and 
honourable  intentions  towards  it,  and  never  do  anything  that  would 
violate its rights or those of their brothers. Similarly, the  waṭan defends 
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its children (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 94). These notions of familial duty and 
honour will be central to our analysis of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s nationalist concepts.
Moreover, says al-Ṭahṭāwī, a person who defends his waṭan, even if 
he is  harmed in doing so,  is  happy. Nationalism (waṭaniyya)  does not 
means simply that people ask their waṭan for their rights; they must also 
fulfil their obligations towards it. Any children of the waṭan who fail to 
do  so  lose  their  civil  rights.  The  ancient  Roman  nation  (umma)  was 
attached to the love of its waṭan; hence it was able to dominate the world. 
(Clearly al-Ṭahṭāwī sees world domination as an admirable goal, as we 
saw above when considering his view of the British Empire.) When the 
Roman  nation  (milla)  lost  its  nationalism  (waṭaniyya),  he  says,  its 
members  failed  to  work  together,  and  it  fragmented  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1872/2008,  95).  (Note  once  again  that  Tahtawi  uses  umma and  milla 
interchangeably to mean ‘nation’.)
Here al-Ṭahṭāwī gives a definition of  milla (‘nation’):  like a race 
(ǧins), he says, it is a group of people who live in the same place, speak 
the same language, have the same morals and customs, and are usually 
governed by the same laws in a single state (dawla). Such a group, he 
adds, is also called  al-ahālī (‘the inhabitants’),  al-raʿiyya (‘the subjects’), 
al-ǧins (‘the race’) and abnāʾ al-waṭan (‘the children of the country’) (al-
Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 95). Let us emphasise here that al-Ṭahṭāwī is clearly 
not interested in any possible distinctions between these terms (though he 
is no doubt aware that they can be distinguished), and that he presents 
them  as  interchangeable  for  his  purposes.  Moreover,  in  the  following 
sentence, he refers to such a group of people as an umma, and this seems 
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to  be  his  preferred  term  for  this  concept.  An  umma that  has  these 
attributes, he says, should be noble-minded, courageous, intelligent and 
inclined to love glory, pride and honour (šaraf al-ʿirḍ). It should love its 
freedom, be passionately fond of the power of its head of state (tatawallaʿ  
bi-quwwat raʾīs dawlatihā), and obey the laws of its realm  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1872/2008, 95). (We will see this conception of love for the leader’s power 
become a reality when considering the career of Gamal Abdel Nasser in a 
later chapter.) A nation (umma),  says al-Ṭahṭāwī, cannot do without a 
leader (raʾīs) who governs it well and looks after its interests; otherwise it 
cannot enjoy its civil rights (ḥuqūqihā al-madaniyya), nor protect itself, 
its wealth and its honour (ʿirḍ) (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 96).
Freedom
Al-Ṭahṭāwī devotes several pages to a discussion of freedom and 
rights, but only in very vague terms. Once again, he does not propose any 
real limitation of the power of absolute monarchy. In his view, a native 
son of the country (ibn al-waṭan al-mutaʾaṣṣil bihi) or an immigrant (al-
muntaǧiʿ  ilayhi allaḏī tawaṭṭana bihi)  enjoys the rights of  his  country 
(yatamattaʿ  bi-ḥuqūq baladihi).  The  most  important  of  these  rights  is 
complete freedom (al-ḥurriyya al-tāmma). An inhabitant of the waṭan is 
free  only  if  he  obeys  the  laws  of  the  waṭan;  this  implies  the  waṭan’s 
guarantee of his civil rights (al-ḥuqūq al-madaniyya) and privileges (al-
mazāyā al-baladiyya). Thus he is a member of the society of his country 
(ʿuḍwan min aʿḍāʾ al-madina)37, as an organ is part of a body (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
37 I take madina here to be a calque of the French cité in the sense of ‘state, society’.
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1872/2008, 94). (Note the similarity with the concept of the ‘mystical body’ 
discussed above.)
This, says al-Ṭahṭāwī, is the greatest privilege in civilised nations 
(umam). In the past, most nations were deprived of this privilege, because 
rulers (wulāt al-umūr) ruled according to their whims. The governed had 
no way to oppose their rulers, had no role in governing, and could not 
express their opinions. They were like foreigners (aǧānib) as far as the 
affairs of government were concerned. Now, ideas have changed, and the 
waṭan’s children  are  safe  from  these  dangers.  The  heart  of  a  true 
nationalist  (al-waṭanī  al-ḥaqīqī)  is  full  of  love  for  his  country  (ḥubb 
waṭanihi)  because  he  has  become  one  of  its  members  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1872/2008, 94).
Al-Ṭahṭāwī  defines  freedom  (ḥurriyya)  as  ‘authorisation  to  do 
permitted  work,  without  forbidden  restrictions’  (al-Ṭahṭāwī  1872/2008, 
127). (This is a tautology: permission to do what is permitted.) He adds 
that freedom includes freedom of movement, the freedom to dispose of 
oneself, one’s time and one’s work as one pleases, subject to restrictions 
established by law. One is free not to be exiled, to be punished except 
according to the law, or to be limited in how one spends one’s money. 
One is free to express one’s opinion as long as it does not violate the law. 
(This allows the king to restrict freedoms arbitrarily.) There are five types 
of freedom: natural (ṭabʿiyya) freedom, behavioural (sulūkiyya) freedom, 
religious  (dīniyya)  freedom,  civil  (madaniyya)  freedom  and  political 
(siyāsiyya)  freedom.  Natural  freedom,  which  includes  eating,  drinking 
and walking, is part of human nature and cannot be suppressed except 
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unjustly. Behavioural freedom is good behaviour and good morals. (Here 
again,  the freedom to do only what is already regarded as good is no 
freedom at all. Without the freedom to challenge existing conceptions of 
the good, one’s only option is conformity.) Freedom of religion is freedom 
of belief, as long as it is not heretical  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 127). (The 
added restriction renders the concept meaningless.) Similarly, there is also 
freedom of political schools of thought, which means the freedom is the 
freedom to espouse different political opinions (but not, as we have seen, 
to exercise power), and freedom for different kings and ministers to take 
different approaches in governing (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 127-128).
Political freedom, al-Ṭahṭāwī explains, means that the state protects 
people’s  property  and  natural  freedom.  Freedom  is  thus  a  means  for 
making people love their country. It is, he adds, is basically the right to do 
what is permitted and not to be forced to do what is forbidden. A free 
person should honour his waṭan, his brothers and the head of state (raʾīs  
dawlatihi).  If  a person is attached to benefiting his  waṭan,  he will  not 
consider it a violation of his rights when the government tells him to fight 
in war or to pay taxes, for these are among his duties (wāǧibāt) to his 
waṭan; when an enemy attacks a country, its inhabitants (ahl) must fight 
the enemy  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 128). A free nation (umma), he adds, 
rejoices in the freedom of other nations and does not like to see them 
enslaved  (al-Ṭahṭāwī  1872/2008,  128-129).  (Considering  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s 
enthusiasm for imperialism, and his tautological concept of freedom, this 
assertion does not seem to amount to much.)
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No doubt  the  vagueness  of  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  political  thinking partly 
reflects  his  much  greater  preoccupation  with  economic  development. 
Indeed, he asserts that the most important freedom in a civilised realm is 
freedom of agriculture, trade and industry (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 129).
Nationalism, Civilisation and Religion
Al-Ṭahṭāwī  defines  civilisation  (tamaddun)  as  follows:  ‘The 
civilisation of a waṭan means the acquisition of the tools that prosperous 
people  need to  improve their  physical  and moral  condition;  it  is  their 
superiority in the improvement of morals and customs, the perfection of 
education,  the  promotion  of  praiseworthy  qualities,  the  attainment  of 
civilisational virtues (al-kamālāt al-madaniyya), and progress in material 
prosperity (rafāhiyya). This is the civilisation of the nation that lives in 
the  country  (al-umma  al-muqīma  fī  al-waṭan)  (al-Ṭahṭāwī  1872/2008, 
124).
Islam, he says, brought civilisation through its principles and laws. 
The principles on which civilisation is based in the other civilised nations 
(umam) are similar to the principles of Islam. (Note that here,  umma is 
used  both  in  the  sense  of  ‘nation’  and  in  the  sense  of  ‘religious 
community’;  al-Ṭahṭāwī  is  comparing  the  Islamic  umma with  the 
European  nations.) What  Muslims  call  the  principles  of  Islamic 
jurisprudence (ʾuṣūl al-fiqh), he says, is called natural law (al-ḥuqūq al-
ṭabīʿiyya wa-l-nawāmīs al-fiṭriyya) elsewhere (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008, 124). 
Then, in a particularly revealing passage,  al-Ṭahṭāwī equates  Muslims’ 
religious  faith  with  Europeans’  nationalism,  adding  that  for  Muslims, 
nationalism is part of religious faith:
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This attachment that Muslims have for their religion, and their zeal 
to defend it, which enables them to surpass other nations [umam] 
in strength, is known to non-Muslims as love of  waṭan. However, 
among us Muslims, love of  waṭan is one of the branches of faith 
[min šuʿab al-īmān], while the defence of religion is a principle that 
unites all obligations [wa-ḥimāyat al-dīn maǧmaʿ al-arkān]. Hence 
any Muslim realm [mamlaka] is a  waṭan for all the Muslims who 
live there; it unites religion and nationalism [fa-hiya ǧāmiʿa li-l-dīn  
wa-l-waṭaniyya], and its children thus have a duty to defend it in 
both  respects.  We  are  in  the  habit  of  mentioning  only  religion, 
because  of  its  great  importance,  but  we  also  mean  the  waṭan 
[ānamā  ǧarat  al-ʿāda  bi-l-iqtiṣār  ʿalā  al-dīn  li-quwwat  
ahamiyyatihā,  maʿ  irādat  al-waṭan]38 (al-Ṭahṭāwī 1872/2008,  124-
125).
Al-Ṭahṭāwī has clearly understood that religion and nationalism are 
profoundly  similar.  At  the  same  time,  he  is  keen  to  argue  that,  for 
Muslims at least, nationalism is part of religion, rather than a competitor 
to it.  Hence he tells his fellow Muslims that, in effect, they have been 
nationalists all along without realising it.
Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Nationalist Vocabulary and  
Concepts
As  we  have  seen,  the  key  term  in  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  nationalist 
vocabulary is  waṭan, which clearly means ‘national territory’ as defined 
in the introduction to this thesis. Crucially, unlike all the earlier senses of 
38 My translation roughly follows that of Delanoue (1982, 433).
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waṭan that we considered in the previous chapter, al-Ṭahṭāwī’s concept of 
waṭan is morally linked to a concept of ‘nation’: in his view, the members 
of a nation have a moral duty to serve their  waṭan.  Thus he embraces 
what I have described as the schematic concept of nationalism.
In his earlier work, his most common term for ‘nation’ seems to be 
abnāʾ al-waṭan (‘children of the country’); later he increasingly seems to 
prefer  umma.  He  also  uses  a  number  of  other  terms,  including milla  
(‘community’),  ahālī  (‘people’  or  ‘inhabitants’),  raʿiyya (‘subjects’)  and 
ǧins (‘race’), and makes it clear that for him, these are all synonyms. To 
refer to the relationship between ‘nation’ and ‘national territory’, he uses 
the terms waṭaniyya (‘nationalism’) and ḥubb al-waṭan (‘love of country’) 
interchangeably.
There are no occurrences of the words  šaʿb (‘people’, ‘nation’) or 
qawmiyya (‘nationalism’), two nationalist terms that would later become 
common, in those of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s works that we have considered here. As 
we saw above,  he quotes a poem in which the word  qawm occurs; the 
context  suggests  that  he  is  drawing  an  analogy  between  qawm and 
‘nation’,  but  he does  not  actually  use the word  qawm to  refer  to  any 
nation.
Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  nationalism was  Egyptian,  not  Arab.  He repeatedly 
refers  to  the Arabs  as  an  umma,  and praises  them highly  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1869/2002,  94,  150;  al-Ṭahṭāwī  1872/2008,  101,  256) –  though  without 
specifying where their  waṭan might be, unless it is Mecca, which, as we 
saw above, he identifies as the Prophet Muḥammad’s waṭan – but never 
refers to Egyptians generally as Arabs, or gives the impression that he 
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considers himself an Arab. He notes  that in Egypt, in the area called al-
Buḥayra, there are ‘groups of Arabs [ṭawāʾif min al-ʿArab]’  (al-Ṭahṭāwī 
1869/2002, 440). We can infer that for him, as for al-Ǧabartī before him, 
not all Egyptians are Arabs; only the Bedouin are.
We can analyse the basic elements of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s nationalism as a 
conceptual blend, whose inputs are (a) concepts drawn from the Arabic 
literary  traditions  that  we  considered  in  the  previous  chapter  and  (b) 
concepts  drawn  from  French  nationalism.  This  blend  is  illustrated  in 
Figure 8. It includes a generic mental space, which contains an abstract 
concept common to all  the input spaces: a place is conceptualised as a 
parent, and its inhabitants are conceptualised as its children. The generic 
space thus captures a commonality that would have made it easier for al-
Ṭahṭāwī to conceptualise the three inputs as equivalent. As we have seen, 
this concept generates an inference about duty in French nationalism, but 
not in Arabic literature before al-Ṭahṭāwī. Hence in the generic space, this 
inference is absent. It is present in the blended space because it has been 
projected from the input space of French nationalist concepts. This input 
space also provides the concept of nation as defined in the introduction to 
this thesis.
The Influence of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Work in Egypt
Gilbert  Delanoue  argues  that  most  of  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  readers  were 
probably ‘advanced students and graduates of the government schools . . . 
hence,  above  all,  the  new  class  of  bureaucrats,  officers,  doctors,  and 
engineers,  a  class  that  was  in  the  process  of  taking  shape,  and  that 
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represented  a  very  small  part  of  the  overall  population’  in  Egypt 
(Delanoue 1982,  416-417).  Al-Ṭahṭāwī  himself  directed several  of  these 
schools during his long career. As a result of the reorganisation of state 
schools in 1836,
Three types of schools were to be organised: primary, preparatory 
and special.  .  .  . [In the primary schools], the students had to be 
between the ages of  seven and twelve years.  . . .  The subjects  of 
study were to be: (1) reading and writing, (2) Arabic, (3) elementary 
rules  of  arithmetic,  and  (4)  religious  instruction.  . . .  [In  the 
Preparatory Schools], the following subjects were to be taught: (a) 
Arabic,  (b)  Turkish,  (c)  Persian,  (d)  arithmetic,  (e)  elementary 
algebra, (f) elementary geometry, (g) general notions of history, (h) 
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Figure 8: Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s nationalism
general  notions  of  geography,  (i)  calligraphy,  (j)  drawing (linear, 
figure and landscape) (Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 195-196).
The seven ‘special schools’, which students could enter after leaving 
the Preparatory Schools, were the School of Languages, the Polytechnic 
School,  the  School  of  Artillery,  the  School  of  Cavalry,  the  School  of 
Infantry and the Veterinary School; in these schools, the topics studied 
were  purely  technical  (Heyworth-Dunne  1939,  197-202).  This  was  a 
radical departure from the type of education that had been available in 
18th-century Egypt. In the new schools, religious instruction disappeared 
completely  after  primary  school,  and  even  there,  it  occupied  a  much 
smaller place than in the kuttāb and madrasa system. More importantly, 
non-religious subjects were no longer subordinated to religious purposes; 
instead, they were subordinated to military aims.
The  programme of  reorganisation  was,  indeed,  a  very  ambitious 
one, the military character of which cannot be disguised. . . . Most 
of the schools were essentially military establishments; if one or two 
of them were not called military, they were either recruiting depots 
for the military services or else they were destined to provide for 
the  technical  needs  of  the  army  as  in  the  case  of  the  Medical, 
Veterinary,  and Polytechnic Schools  (Heyworth-Dunne 1939,  202-
203).
The  School  of  Languages  was  created  in  1836  on  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s 
suggestion; the following year, he became its director. It was primarily a 
translation school, intended ‘to form translators from French into Arabic 
and Turkish and to  provide students  knowing these  languages  for  the 
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other special schools’  (Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 197). From the outset, in 
addition to Arabic, Turkish and European languages, it offered courses in 
mathematics,  history and geography,  in  the  interest  of  training future 
administrators.  In 1841,  a Translation Bureau (Qalam al-Tarǧama)  was 
created under al-Ṭahṭāwī’s direction and staffed with about 50 employees, 
most  of  whom  he  selected  from  among  the  advanced  students  and 
graduates  of  the  School  of  Languages39.  In  1842,  following  another 
reorganisation,  departments of  accountancy,  agricultural  administration 
and European administrative law were added to the School of Languages, 
as well as a department of Islamic law, staffed by some of the best-known 
Azhar scholars. Having started with 50 students, the School of Languages 
had  320  by  1849.  Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  students  are  reported  to  have  been 
intensely devoted to him and proud to have studied under him, and many 
went on to successful careers in various branches of the state (Heyworth-
Dunne 1939,  266-268;  Delanoue 1982,  399-402; Newman 2004,  48-49).  It 
seems  likely  that,  in  one  way  or  another,  many  of  these  young  men 
received a  nationalist  habitus  from al-Ṭahṭāwī.  In  order  to  verify  this 
hypothesis, our best source is perhaps the earliest biography of al-Ṭahṭāwī 
in Arabic, apparently written immediately after his death in 1873 by one 
of his students, Ṣāliḥ Maǧdī.
According to Ǧamāl al-Dīn al-Šayyāl, the biography’s 20th-century 
editor, Maǧdī was one of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s best students and closest disciples.  
He  was  born  in  1242  or  1243  AH (1826-28  CE),  received  his  primary 
education  in  a  state  school  in  Ḥilwān  (a  suburb  of  Cairo),  and  was 
39 ‘In  total,  the  school  would  produce  2,000  translations  of  foreign  (European  and 
Turkish) works’ (Newman 2004, 46).
152
selected by al-Ṭahṭāwī to enrol in the School of Languages in 1252 AH 
(1836-37 CE); this means that he was no more than eleven years old when 
he became a pupil of al-Ṭahṭāwī. He excelled in both Arabic and French, 
and when the Translation Bureau was created in 1841, he was appointed 
assistant  director  (wakīl)  of  its  department  for  the  translation  of 
mathematical  texts,  though  he  was  only  about  15  years  old  (Maǧdī 
1873/1958, 6). In 1260 AH (1844-45 CE), not yet twenty, he was transferred 
to the Muhandisḫāna, an engineering school, where he worked for about 
ten years, teaching Arabic, French and translation, and translating many 
books. Two years after his appointment there, he was given the military 
rank  of  yūzbāšī (captain).  He  was  close  to  ʿAlī  Mubārak,  another 
important figure in the Egyptian state school system, and worked for him 
during the latter’s tenure as director of the Muhandisḫāna. During the 
reigns  of  Saʿīd  Pasha  (ruled  1854-1863)  and  Ismāʿīl  Pasha  (ruled  1863-
1879),  Maǧdī  again  worked  for  al-Ṭahṭāwī  at  the  Translation  Bureau, 
where he helped edit the magazine Rawḍat al-Madāris (The Garden of the 
Schools) and translate the Napoleonic Code into Arabic. In 1292 AH (1875 
CE) he was appointed a judge in the civil court system, and remained in 
this post until  his death in 1298 AH (1881 CE)  (Maǧdī 1873/1958, 7-8). 
Maǧdī was thus a product of the state school system through and through, 
and he owed his very successful career to that system and to al-Ṭahṭāwī’s 
guidance.
At the time when Maǧdī wrote his biography of al-Ṭahṭāwī, there 
was  not  yet  a  tradition  of  introspective  autobiographical  narrative  in 
Arabic. It would be very useful to have a first-person account of Maǧdī’s  
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childhood memories of his studies with al-Ṭahṭāwī, but Maǧdī does not 
provide this. However, his biography of al-Ṭahṭāwī contains many clues 
that can, to some extent, substitute for such an account. The title of the 
work,  Ḥilyat  al-Zaman  fī  Manāqib  Ḫādim  al-Waṭan,  which  could  be 
translated  as  The  Ornament  of  the  Age  in  the  Glorious  Deeds  of  the  
Servant of the Country, clearly  shows the importance of the concept of 
service to the country (waṭan) in the author’s  conception of  al-Ṭahṭāwī, 
and  no  doubt  (considering  the  close  relationship  between  master  and 
disciple)  also  reflects  the  way  al-Ṭahṭāwī  would  have  wanted  to  be 
portrayed. Introducing his subject, Maǧdī writes:
It is well-known that this master, this prince, this famous scholar, 
was unparalleled in his knowledge, whose generous shade sheltered 
his  waṭan. This was thanks to his firm footing in Arabic sciences, 
and  the  elevation  of  his  outstretched  flag  in  the  advantages  of 
foreign, European knowledge . . . (Maǧdī 1873/1958, 19).
Discussing  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  early  life,  Maǧdī  says  that  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s 
father, having moved from place to place, returned to  Ṭahṭā because of 
‘homesickness  [al-ḥanīn  ilā  al-awṭān]’  (Maǧdī  1873/1958,  20-21).  (This 
shows that a town could still be a  waṭan.)  Later,  Maǧdī  asserts that  al-
Ṭahṭāwī was a very popular teacher at al-Azhar, because his explanations 
were  clear  and  useful;  he was  good  at  explaining  the  same  thing  in 
different ways, so that both young and old could understand easily. Many 
fine Egyptian teachers studied with him (Maǧdī 1873/1958, 26-27). Again, 
Maǧdī  emphasises that  al-Ṭahṭāwī blended Azhari learning with foreign 
sciences, and thus benefited his awṭān, i.e. Egypt (Maǧdī 1873/1958, 28).
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In his explanation of Mehmed Ali’s educational missions to Europe, 
Maǧdī gives the standard narrative that has been adopted by nationalist 
historiography; he also claims that  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s decision to go to France 
was motivated by a desire to serve his country:
At that time, the  wālī [Mehmed Ali] saw that the needs of Egypt, 
whose advantages are magnificent, required progress in this  land 
[bilād]  and the civilising [tamaddun]  of  its  inhabitants,  and that 
this aim, to which he was wholly devoted, could not be achieved 
unless he sent some of Egypt’s children [abnāʾ] to Europe, which in 
our  time has  become a  source of  the  advantages  of  progress,  in 
order to learn sciences and technology [al-ʿulūm wa-l-funūn] that 
would benefit Egypt in the present and in the future. . . . [Therefore] 
he selected a few superior individuals from among the sons of the 
notables  of  his  state  . . .  and  sent  them  to  France  to  acquire 
knowledge,  then  return  to  their  waṭan to  raise  the  banners  of 
agreeable  arts.  The  noble  soul  of  the  departed  subject  of  this 
biography . . . chose to travel far from his awṭān . . . only because he 
knew  that  . . .  if  he  worked  hard  to  learn  French,  and  became 
proficient at translating great books into Arabic, this would provide 
long-lasting benefit to his awṭān. . . . When his test results reached 
Egypt,  and were shown to the  wālī,  the latter  was all  the  more 
pleased,  and  expected  him  to  be  among  those  who  benefit  the 
awṭān . . . (Maǧdī 1873/1958, 30-32).
As we have seen, this nationalist view of Mehmed Ali’s motivations 
is false. As for Maǧdī’s account of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s decision to go to France, 
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he is writing about events that he did not witness, and that had occurred 
nearly  fifty  years  earlier.  Considering  his long  acquaintance  with  al-
Ṭahṭāwī, this could well be the account that al-Ṭahṭāwī himself gave his 
students, as an example of the type of national service that he saw as their 
duty.  However,  in  the  Taḫlīṣ,  al-Ṭahṭāwī  did not  say that  he went  to 
France in order to benefit his  waṭan;  instead, he drew attention to the 
inherent benefits  of  seeking knowledge wherever it  may be found  (al-
Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 29-30, 36, 41), and provided a religious justification by 
quoting the  well-known  hadith  ‘Seek knowledge,  even in  China’40 (al-
Ṭahṭāwī 1834/2002, 30). In the Taḫlīṣ, it is only the French who serve their 
waṭan. Perhaps al-Ṭahṭāwī’s own memory of his experiences in 1826 was 
coloured  by  his  subsequent  adoption  of  nationalist  beliefs.  Projecting 
those beliefs backwards onto his own past, he may well have thought that 
his  must  have  been  the  reason  why  he  had  gone  to  France.  Maǧdī’s 
account would then reflect this anachronistic view.
Maǧdī mentions one student who studied under  al-Ṭahṭāwī at  the 
medical school in Cairo, went to study medicine in Paris, then returned to 
his awṭān and was appointed to a high post. The student remained full of 
gratitude  towards  al-Ṭahṭāwī.  This,  says  Maǧdī, is  an  example  of  al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s fame as a teacher in his waṭan and elsewhere. Indeed, he says, 
al-Ṭahṭāwī  was  widely  praised  by  his  students,  and  he  deserves  this 
praise, for the achievements that he gave to Egypt.  Maǧdī lists some of 
these:  al-Ṭahṭāwī was  the  first  of  the  ‘sons  of  Egypt’  to  become  a 
translator, he was the first person to found a newspaper (ṣaḥīfat aḫbār) in 
40 Al-Albānī (1992, 1:no. 416) argues that this hadith is spurious.
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Egypt (here Maǧdī is mistaken41), and he was the first person to succeed in 
teaching the ‘children of the waṭan’ foreign languages (Maǧdī 1873/1958, 
33-34).
Describing the founding of the School of Languages (madrasat al-
alsun) in 1836, Maǧdī notes that al-Ṭahṭāwī selected the pupils from the 
kuttāb schools discussed earlier in this chapter42 (Maǧdī 1873/1958, 36-37). 
This confirms that al-Ṭahṭāwī taught his pupils from a very young age43; 
hence he had ample opportunity to make a decisive contribution to their 
habitus.
Listing  the  government  jobs  that  al-Ṭahṭāwī  held  during  his 
lifetime, Maǧdī makes a point of mentioning al-Ṭahṭāwī’s ever-increasing 
salary – which rose by a factor of ten between his  job at the medical 
school  and his  highest-paid appointment – as  well  as  the increasingly 
prestigious military ranks that he received, up to the aristocratic title of 
bey. Once again, he emphasises al-Ṭahṭāwī’s many benefits to his waṭan 
(Maǧdī 1873/1958, 40-43).  He then provides a list of 69 of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s 
former students at the School of Languages (no doubt selected for their 
prestige), along with their titles and occupations. Of these, 58 had the title 
of afandī (discussed below and in the next chapter), and eight had the title 
of bey. He specifically praises several of these students for service to their 
waṭan,  adding  that  there  are  other  students  he  has  not  listed,  whose 
41 The first newspaper in Egypt was ‘a Turkish-Arabic court bulletin for official use 
only . . . entitled Ǧurnāl al-Ḫidiww’, created in 1821 (Newman 2004, 22-23). The first 
newspaper that al-Ṭahṭāwī edited, another official bureaucratic bulletin called  Al-
Waqāʾi  al-Miṣriyya,  was  founded  in  1828;  its  first  editor  was  Ḥasan  al-ʿAṭṭār 
(Delanoue 1982, 346-347). 
42 He adds that the total number of pupils in kuttāb schools at that time was 15,000.
43 This  contradicts  Delanoue’s  (1982,  400) Newman’s  (2004,  45) assertion  that  new 
students in the School of Languages were recruited from the preparatory schools at 
ages ranging from 14 to 18. In any case, a preparatory school was annexed to the 
School of Languages in 1841 (Delanoue 1982, 400).
157
‘accomplishment of their duties [wāǧibāt] towards their country [awṭān]’ 
is beyond description, and that all the students in Egypt’s state schools 
(al-madāris  al-mīriyya)  could  trace  their  learning  back  to  al-Ṭahṭāwī 
(Maǧdī 1873/1958, 43-54).  This is a clear sign that these very students, 
particularly those listed by name, were the book’s principal audience, and 
hence that it expressed an ethos that they would have recognised as their 
own.
Maǧdī notes that initially, al-Ṭahṭāwī employed some Frenchmen to 
teach French, but soon these were replaced by capable Egyptian teachers 
(who, we may note, included Maǧdī himself); thanks to them, the waṭan 
achieved its aim (Maǧdī 1873/1958, 58). He mentions that many students 
in the state  schools  (al-madāris  al-malakiyya wa-l-makātib al-ahliyya) 
attended al-Ṭahṭāwī’s funeral  (Maǧdī 1873/1958, 59). Finally, Maǧdī has 
high  praise  for  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  character,  generosity,  humility,  pleasant 
conversation,  lack  of  concern  for  material  things,  and devotion  to  his 
work (Maǧdī 1873/1958, 65-66).
In  short,  this  brief  biography  seems  to  confirm  that  al-Ṭahṭāwī 
made a deep impression on generations of students who spent childhood 
and adolescence in the state schools. It seems safe to assume that Ṣāliḥ 
Maǧdī was representative of this generation. He clearly internalised al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s concept of  waṭan, particularly the idea that Egyptians have a 
duty  to  serve  their  waṭan by  bringing  it  practical  benefits.  It  is  not 
difficult to imagine how this happened. We may suppose that al-Ṭahṭāwī 
told his pupils, again and again, that it was their duty to study diligently, 
to master French, mathematics, and so on, in order to serve their waṭan.
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Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Strategy of Symbolic Power and the  
Ethos of the State-School Graduates
Why did  al-Ṭahṭāwī  embrace  nationalism?  As  we have seen,  he 
used  it  primarily  to  legitimise  Mehmed  Ali’s  military  and  economic 
projects.  Hence  we  must  answer  two  questions:  First,  why  did  he 
legitimise these projects, in stark contrast to the other ʿulamāʾ, who were 
hostile to them, with the notable exception of Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār  (Newman 
2004, 34)? And second, why did he do so using nationalism rather than 
simply using Islam, or some other belief system? Any answers to these 
questions must necessarily involve a measure of speculation, because we 
do not have sufficient evidence to settle them with certainty. However, if 
we consider the circumstances in which al-Ṭahṭāwī found himself,  the 
challenges  he faced,  and the options available  to  him for  facing those 
challenges, we can make the case that his course of action was a plausible 
and reasonable one.
In order to explain al-Ṭahṭāwī’s support for Mehmed Ali, we can 
draw an analogy between al-Ṭahṭāwī and one of the categories of French 
academics studied by Bourdieu in Homo Academicus: those whose careers 
led them to high administrative positions in academic institutions. ‘It is  
logical’, argues Bourdieu, that these positions
should be occupied by agents who, being produced by and for the 
academic institution, have only to follow their natural dispositions 
in order to produce ad infinitum the conditions of reproduction of 
the institution. . . . The ‘oblates’ are always most inclined to think 
that without the church there is no salvation – especially when they 
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become  the  high  priests  of  an  institution  of  cultural 
reproduction. . . . They offer to the academic institution which they 
have chosen because it chose them, and vice versa, a support which, 
being  so  totally  conditioned,  has  something  total,  absolute, 
unconditional about it (Bourdieu 1988, 99-101).
In an analogous fashion, al-Ṭahṭāwī was, to an extent, an ‘oblate’, a 
product  of  the  institutions  that  Mehmed Ali  had  created  to  serve  his 
army, institutions that saved al-Ṭahṭāwī from a poorly-paid career as a 
teacher  at  al-Azhar.  Ever  since  his  employment  as  a  preacher  for  a 
military regiment in 1824, his entire career was directly subordinated to 
the needs of the army. As we have seen, the Ecole Égyptienne de Paris, 
where he studied for five years, was designed with military aims in mind, 
as  were  the  schools  in  which  he  subsequently  taught  and  which  he 
directed in Egypt. Moreover, within this highly militarised state cultural 
apparatus, he rose from poverty, had a very successful career, was granted 
land and titles  of  nobility,  and ‘bequeathed his  family a  large fortune 
when he died’ (Colla 2007, 124). Since his livelihood and prestige were an 
integral  part  of  an  institutional  structure  whose  raison d’être was  the 
ruler’s military ambitions, it was in his interest to see both that structure 
and those ambitions as legitimate.
At the same time, he clearly could not assume that everyone else 
would  take  for  granted  the  legitimacy  of  Mehmed  Ali’s  military  and 
economic  projects.  As  we  have  seen,  the  legitimacy  of  military 
conscription  was  violently  contested  by  the  peasants  who  were  its 
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victims. Moreover, Mehmed Ali lacked a convincing way to legitimise his 
war against the Ottoman Sultan, the Caliph of Islam.
The  legitimacy  of  the  types  of  education  and  translation  that 
supported  these  projects  could  not  be  taken  for  granted,  either.  The 
dominant version of  Islam in Egypt,  disseminated at al-Azhar,  viewed 
non-religious sciences as marginal at best, accepting them only insofar as 
they  facilitated  the  study  of  religious  subjects  or  were  necessary  for 
carrying out ritual duties. The importation and translation of knowledge 
produced  outside  the  Islamic  world  was  no  longer  regarded  as  a 
legitimate activity.
Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  students  would  not  have  been  immune  to  the 
influence  of  these  attitudes,  which  could  have  undermined  their 
motivation to study. Like any teacher or school administrator, he needed 
his students to believe in the value of what they were studying in order to 
get the best possible results. Thus he had little choice but to instill in them 
a heterodox habitus  that  could inspire enthusiastic  dedication to  these 
unusual subjects.
Why, then, did he adopt nationalism for this purpose, rather than 
simply proposing a new, non-nationalist interpretation of Islam? There 
are a number of reasons why a purely religious approach would not have 
been practical. Al-Ṭahṭāwī found practically nothing in the Qurʾān or in 
Islamic  tradition  that  readily  lent  itself  to  the  advocacy  of  industrial 
production, still less a planned economy under the control of a centralised 
state. Moreover, industrial production for the military depended on the 
expansion of the army, which in turn depended on the conscription of 
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peasants  on  a  large  scale.  But  the  traditional  Islamic  concept  of 
submission to the prince, which we encountered above in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s 
political  writing,  did  not  include  the  conscription  of  free  individuals. 
Worse  yet,  conscription  was  particularly  difficult  to  justify  when  the 
army  was  being  sent  to  fight  the  Caliph.  Some  additional  belief  was 
needed in order to create the kind of loyalty towards the state that would 
persuade people to embrace conscription.
Any new interpretation of religion would fall  directly within the 
remit  of  his  fellow  ʿulamāʾ,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  were  extremely 
conservative.  Al-Ṭahṭāwī  had,  on  his  return  from  France,  a  unique 
educational background; without like-minded peers, he would not have 
been able to form a heterodox sect capable of challenging the orthodoxy 
of al-Azhar. As noted above, he did suggest that modern sciences should 
be taught at al-Azhar, but this proposal was ignored  (Livingston 1996). 
Perhaps  the  addition  of  a  department  of  Islamic  law to  the  School  of 
Languages  was  a  strategy  for  drawing  Azhar  scholars  into  the  new 
educational institution that was taking shape under his direction, and in 
order to win them over to his views on education. Though some accepted 
the invitation (perhaps simply in search of higher pay), it seems that this 
attempt largely failed: ‘Delatre, who visited the school administered by 
Rifāʿa under Saʿīd, states that his colleagues, the  ʿulamāʾ,  detested him’ 
(Heyworth-Dunne 1939, 297).
For all  these reasons, it  was safer for al-Ṭahṭāwī to adopt a new 
system of symbolic power, one in which he would have no rivals. His 
concept of  waṭan,  which he connected to Islamic tradition only by the 
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most tenuous  thread  (the  apocryphal  hadith  ‘Love of  waṭan is  part  of 
faith’), fell almost completely outside the realm of the ʿulamāʾ’s interests; 
hence there was little risk that they would see it as heretical or as a threat 
to their authority. Thus he carved out a safe space for himself in the field 
of cultural production. In this space, he could be left alone with with his 
students.
Why not  make the case  for  industrial  production merely  on the 
grounds that it benefited the individual human being, al-insān, a concept 
found in  the  Qurʾān?  Here  again,  he  would  have  found himself  on  a 
terrain that fell within the remit of the  ʿulamāʾ. Moreover, if you make 
claims about individuals’  interests, individuals might reply and diagree 
with you, on the grounds that they know their own interests. The waṭan, 
in  contrast,  is  silent;  no  matter  what  you  say  about  it,  it  will  not 
contradict you.
Finally,  and  perhaps  most  importantly,  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  religious 
habitus  no doubt  predisposed him to  conceive of  legitimation itself  in 
terms of the sorts of concepts used in religion. When creating a new belief 
system, one is more likely to construct it using familiar concepts than to 
start from scratch. As we have seen, al-Ṭahṭāwī himself correctly viewed 
religion and nationalism as basically similar. In working with nationalist 
concepts, he could feel that he was, to an extent, on familiar ground.
Ṣāliḥ Maǧdī’s biographical eulogy to al-Ṭahṭāwī is evidence that, in 
transmitting  a  nationalist  ethos  to  his  students,  al-Ṭahṭāwī  became  a 
shining example  of  that  ethos  in  their  eyes.  Bourdieu  observes  that  a 
eulogy, ‘[t]he last judgement that the group makes of one of its members 
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through a duly mandated spokesperson . . .  is  always the product of  a 
collective effort’  (Bourdieu 1996b, 399n). In such discourses, groups ‘sing 
their  own  praises  in  singing  the  praises  of  one  of  their  members’ 
(Bourdieu 1996b, 44). In any group, an individual who is recognised as 
embodying the group’s shared ideals thereby possesses symbolic capital. 
How had al-Ṭahṭāwī gained this capital? Upon his return from France, he 
possessed a great deal of  cultural capital: the skills he had gained at al-
Azhar and in Paris. This combination of skills was unique in Egypt at the 
time. Mehmed Ali’s creation of new educational institutions had created a 
gap  in  the  field  of  cultural  production  in  Egypt:  a  reason  and  an 
opportunity  to  inculcate  a  new  belief  system  in  a  new  category  of 
students.  Only  someone  with  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  skills,  who  had  already 
mastered a suitable belief system, could fill this gap.
[T]he  structural  lacunae  of  a  system  of  possibles,  which  is 
undoubtedly  never  given  as  such to  the  subjective experience  of 
agents (contrary to what the  ex post reconstruction might have us 
believe), cannot be filled by the magic virtue of a sort of tendency of 
the system to complete itself. The summons contained in these gaps 
is only understood by those who, as a result of their position in the 
field and their  habitus,  and of the (often discordant) relationship 
between the two, are free enough from the constraints inscribed in 
the structure to be able to recognize as applying to them a virtuality 
which, in a sense, exists only for them (Bourdieu 1996a, 239).
By teaching his students that it was their duty to serve their country 
by contributing to economic development, and that this in turn required 
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the importation, translation and transmission of knowledge from France, 
al-Ṭahṭāwī implicitly taught  them to conceptualise him as a particular 
type  of  exemplar  of  nationalism.  Only  someone  who  possessed  the 
specific types of competence that he in fact possessed – in particular, the 
ability to translate technical books from French into Arabic – could have 
been that type of exemplar. Thus his acquisition of symbolic capital (i.e. 
the admiration and devotion of the children in his classes) depended not 
only on nationalism, but also on his initial acquisition of cultural capital. 
In other words, he converted his cultural capital into symbolic capital  in 
the classroom, by means of nationalism. Thus he was the first person in 
Egypt  to  employ  the  strategy  of  the  priesthood,  outlined in  the 
introduction to this thesis, using nationalism. He was, in short, the first 
priest of nationalism in Egypt.
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Chapter 3: Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal and 
the Emergence of a Priesthood of Nationalism
In this chapter, I show that by the beginning of the 20 th century, the 
main producers and consumers of nationalist concepts in Egypt belonged 
to the afandiyya, the new social category of graduates of the state schools, 
whose  role  in  transmitting  nationalist  beliefs  was  introduced  in  the 
previous  chapter.  I  suggest  that  nationalism  mainly  served  the 
afandiyya’s own social interests rather than those of Egyptians in general, 
and  I  focus on  several ways  in  which  this  occurred.  First,  afandī 
intellectuals used nationalism to justify educational policies that favoured 
the afandiyya’s reproduction as a fraction of the dominant class. Second, 
they  embraced a  theory  of  environmental  determinism that  tended to 
naturalise a class hierarchy in which they occupied dominant positions. 
Third, they used nationalism to legitimise forms of prose fiction that they 
had  imported  from Europe,  and  thus  to  broaden  the  market  for  their 
writings.  Fourth and most importantly for our purposes here, influential 
afandī intellectuals  such as  Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal  promoted the 
idea that a group of ‘great men’ should emerge, composed of writers like 
themselves, whose  knowledge and skills made them  ideally qualified to 
guide the nation. Thus they envisaged themselves as what Bourdieu calls 
a priesthood, a group that seeks a ‘monopoly of the legitimate exercise of 
power to modify, in a deep and lasting fashion, the practice and world-
view  of  lay  people’  (Bourdieu  1987a,  126),  on  the  grounds  that  the 
members of this group possess the requisite knowledge and skills. On this 
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basis,  they began to  compete with the Muslim clergy for  prestige and 
influence.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First I outline the appearance of 
the  afandiyya as  a  social  category  in  Egypt  in  the  late  19th century. 
Turning to struggles over educational policy in the early 20 th century, I 
show how the  afandiyya used nationalism to promote their own social 
interests  in  these  struggles,  at  the  expense  of  the  interests  of  other 
categories  of  Egyptians.  Next  I  analyse  examples  of  the  nationalist 
discourse  of  a  leading nationalist  thinker,  Aḥmad  Luṭfī  al-Sayyid, 
showing that he used nationalism to attack the authority of the clergy, to 
promote  the  interests  of  his  social  class  and  to  legitimise Egyptian 
imperial rule of Sudan.
The  remainder  of  the  chapter  focuses  on  Muḥammad  Ḥusayn 
Haykal  (1888-1956),  one  of  the  most  influential  Egyptian  nationalist 
thinkers  of  the  early  20th century.  First,  I  examine  two  of  Haykal’s 
influential  essays,  ‘Qāsim Amīn’  and ‘National  Literature’.  In  the first 
essay, he formulates a theory of environmental determinism based on the 
ideas  of  the  19th-century  French literary  critic  and historian Hippolyte 
Taine, and uses it to attribute God-like powers to the waṭan, which, in his 
view,  creates  Egyptians  in  its  own  image,  giving  them  a  national 
character  marked by tranquility,  passivity and submissiveness.  He also 
argues that this  national character  reshapes religion in its  own image; 
hence, in effect, the waṭan’s influence on its children is greater than the 
influence of God. For Haykal, contact with ideas from Europe seems to be 
the only way for  Egyptians to  escape the limitations  of  their  national 
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character. In the second essay, Haykal adapts the concept of ‘great men’, 
popularised  by  the  19th-century  Scottish  writer  Thomas  Carlyle,  to 
articulate a vision of a priesthood-like cadre of ‘national writers’ whose 
expertise  would  make  them  ideally  suited  to  lead  the  nation.  I  then 
consider how Haykal’s nationalist stances are reflected in his celebrated 
novel Zaynab (1913), which has been called the first Arabic novel, as well 
as in its two film adaptations. Finally, I show how these stances shaped 
the  competition  between  the  Muslim  clergy  and  the  priesthood  of 
nationalism in the 1920s and 30s, focusing on some of the key struggles in 
Haykal’s own political career. I suggest that in the 1920s, the priesthood of 
nationalism  promoted  Pharaonist  nationalism  as  a  belief  system  that 
could compete with Islam for Egyptians’ loyalty. In the 1930s, the clergy 
fought back by accusing nationalist intellectuals like Haykal of atheism, 
as well as by reappropriating nationalism and subordinating it to religion 
(as al-Ṭahṭāwī had done in the 19th century). I argue that the genre of 
religious  writings  by  afandī nationalist  intellectuals,  known  as  the 
Islāmiyyāt,  which  included  Haykal’s  biography  of  the  Prophet 
Muḥammad,  was a tactical  response to  this  counterattack,  designed to 
delegitimise the ʿulamāʾ and enable afandī intellectuals to take their place 
as the legitimate interpreters of religious truth. However, this tactic was 
unsuccessful, and its failure paved the way for the success of the strategy 
discussed in the next chapter: the call for a prophet of nationalism.
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The Afandiyya
The  state  schools  directed  by  al-Ṭahṭāwī  and  his  successors44 
developed by fits and starts, and their enrollments soared during the reign 
(1863-1879)  of  Ismāʿīl  Pasha  (Heyworth-Dunne  1939,  342-423).  The 
graduates of these schools became recognised as a distinct social category, 
called afandī (often spelled effendi). Ryzova (2005, 125-126) notes:
The usage of the term effendi changes considerably over time. It 
was first an honorific title, which, in the nineteenth century, came 
to  signify  a  category  of  western  educated  bureaucrats  from 
privileged backgrounds who were sent to khedivial  schools or  to 
Europe. Around the turn of the century the effendis assumed the 
role of the nation’s liberators. . . . The concept effendi is not a class 
situation  but  a  cultural  term.  . . .  Functionally  and  conceptually, 
‘effendi’ is linked to modernity. The purpose of making effendis is  
first informed by the state’s will to modernize.
What distinguished the  afandiyya as a group was above all their 
education, their professional qualifications,  i.e. their cultural capital. As 
Hunter (1984, 113-114) observes:
During Muḥammad ʿAlī’s reign, a cadre of ‘new men’ — physicians, 
engineers, geographers, metallurgists, printers — began to emerge. 
Employed  by  Muḥammad  ʿAlī  in  various  jobs,  from  translating 
French  law  codes  to  managing  medical  dispensaries  in  the 
countryside, these young men worked their way through the ranks 
of  the bureaucracy until  by the 1860s  many had become part  of 
44 The best-known of these successors was ʿAlī Mubārak (Brugman 1984, 65-68).
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Egypt’s administrative elite. Although they appear in our tables and 
elsewhere as ‘technicians’, they became the cutting edge of a new 
society. 
Thus the afandiyya were not a social class in the narrow economic 
sense;  instead, they were a distinct fraction of the dominant class in the 
Bourdieusian sense.  We will  now  see that, at the beginning of the 20th 
century, they became the vanguard of nationalism, which they used not 
only  to  challenge  British  imperialism,  but  also  to  advance  their  own 
interests as a class fraction.
Nationalism and Educational Policy
As  the  afandiyya’s cultural  capital  increasingly  became  a 
requirement for access to the highest positions in the state bureaucracy, 
there was an increasing demand for  afandī status within the dominant 
class as a whole.
By  the  late  nineteenth  century,  well-to-do  families  were 
abandoning al-Azhar  because of  contracting career  opportunities. 
The  ʿulamāʾ had lost their near-monopoly on the legal profession 
and teaching and had to compete for posts with graduates of the 
new schools. European-inspired law codes and courts and new state 
schools demanded judges, lawyers, and teachers with qualifications 
Azharis did not have (Reid 1990, 14; cf. Costet-Tardieu 2005, 57-58).
In particular, the path to titles of nobility increasingly began with 
the title of afandī:
Starting with the new century a pattern was gradually established, 
in which the road to bey and pasha – and thus to the social and 
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increasingly  also  the  political  elite  –  led  through  the  effendi, 
through graduation from one of the governmental higher institutes 
(Ryzova 2005, 129).
At  the  same  time,  the afandiyya were  increasingly  coming  to 
dominate  the  nationalist  field.  By  the  beginning  of  the  20th century, 
nationalism’s main  champions  were  no  longer  religious  scholars  with 
some non-religious  training, such as al-Ṭahṭāwī;  most were now  state-
school  graduates  whose  cultural  capital  was mainly non-religious45 
(Gershoni and Jankowski 1986, 91-92).  It is not difficult to see how this 
happened: the state-school graduates who had learned nationalism from 
al-Ṭahṭāwī,  and  had  gone  on  to  become  teachers  themselves,  had 
naturally taken up teaching positions in the state schools rather than at al-
Azhar.  In  these  positions,  they  in  turn  had  transmitted  the  same 
nationalist habitus to their own students, for the same reasons. Hence the 
state  schools  had become a means for  reproducing nationalist  habitus, 
while al-Azhar had not.
The increasing demand for afandī status within the dominant class 
created a demand for the expansion of the state educational system (Hafez 
1993, 66). However, when the British occupied Egypt, they reduced the 
educational budget. Lord Cromer, the British representative in Egypt, was 
opposed to the expansion of European-style education because his ‘Indian 
experience  had convinced him that  Westernized schools  manufactured 
45 In the state schools in the first decade of the 20th century, there were elementary 
courses on Islam (covering the basics of the Qurʾān, Islamic worship, and so on) in 
the early years of the primary curriculum, but they took up a very small proportion 
of the overall class time, whereas Islamic subjects took up almost all of students’ time  
in religious schools (Kalmbach 2011).
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nationalist malcontents, particularly among those who failed to obtain the 
government posts to which they aspired’ (Reid 1990, 18-19).
After the lion’s share of the budget had been spent on education for 
decades, the amount spent on education during Cromer’s time [1883 
to 1907] did not exceed 1 per cent of gross revenue. . . . [The British 
authorities]  transformed  the  well-developed  machinery  of 
indigenous  education  into  a  mere  training  system  which  was 
intended to  produce  only  clerical  automata  and subservient  civil 
servants to meet the demands of the ‘British heads and Egyptian 
hands’ theory of government put forward by the colonizers (Hafez 
1993, 66-67).
Hafez  argues  that  this  policy  had  the  effect  of  ‘stimulating  the 
Egyptians  to  challenge  the  occupation’;  the  ‘Egyptian  reaction  to 
Cromer’s policy of education was strong’, he says, and ‘the Egyptians’ 
countered this policy by establishing private schools  (Hafez 1993, 66-67). 
Here,  as  is  common  in  nationalist  historiography,  Hafez  designates  a 
particular  category of  Egyptians – the  afandiyya – as ‘the Egyptians’. 
Which Egyptians, precisely, reacted in this way to Cromer’s educational 
policy?  Not Azharites or peasants.  Nor did their desire to extend what 
Hafez refers to simply as ‘education’ lead them to expand al-Azhar, or to 
found  a  new Islamic  university.  On  the  contrary,  those  who  led  the 
project to create the Egyptian University,  which was based on European 
models, were  afandiyya such as the lawyer Qāsim Amīn  (to whom we 
will return in a moment), and they ‘intended it to be a secular institution’ 
(Reid 1990, 31).
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Mitchell  (1988,  116-117) contends  that  the  main  concern  of  the 
dominant class in Egypt, immediately after the British occupation,
was  not  so  much  the  colonial  occupation,  from  which  as 
landowners, merchants and government officials their families were 
beginning to  benefit  even as  they  resented the  fact  of  European 
control,  but  the  crowd  that  threatened  in  the  streets  and  cafés 
outside.
For example, Saʿd Zaġlūl (c. 1857 – 1927), who was to become the 
hero of the nationalist uprising of 1919, was considered, at the beginning 
of the 20th century,  to be  ‘a friend of the British’,  and only ‘gradually 
changed his political attitude towards British rule in Egypt’ during World 
War I (Schulze 2009). We have already seen that nationalism, in Egypt as 
elsewhere, could  be  fully  compatible  with  support  for  imperialism.  It 
seems possible – but further research would be needed to verify this – 
that the afandiyya’s nationalism became anti-imperialist as they realised 
that imperialism threatened the expansion of the state educational system, 
on which their reproduction as a dominant class fraction depended46.  In 
any case,  as we will  see,  their  nationalism tended to favour their own 
interests above those of other Egyptians. Their nationalist discourse
established a strong bond between the intellectual project and the 
national one, and demonstrated beyond doubt that education had 
46 Though it is outside the scope of this thesis, the reader may well wonder when the  
masses of Egyptian peasants began to embrace nationalism. Unfortunately, there is 
hardly any research on this question. The only relevant study that I am aware of is  
Reinhard  Schulze’s  (1981) analysis  of  rural  rebellion  at  the  time  of  the  1919 
nationalist  uprising  in  Cairo.  In  this  book,  which  has  yet  to  be  translated  from 
German into English, Schulze ‘concluded that the main thrust of peasant activism 
was directed toward local autonomy or was even anti-statist in nature’  (Gershoni 
and Jankowski 1986, 48),  and that while Saʿd Zaġlūl, the leader of the  nationalist 
Wafd party, was a national hero in the eyes of the afandiyya, peasants probably saw 
him instead as a mahdī.
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become a national  aim and a  means of  resisting the occupation. 
It  . . .  created a unity of  purpose that  made intellectual  activities 
analogous to nationalistic ones (Hafez 1993, 67).
In practice, they successfully pushed for the establishment of a two-
track educational system, in which nearly all of the educational budget 
was devoted to a ‘Europeanized . . . primary-secondary-university ladder’, 
which was accessible mainly to the children of the wealthy, while the 
‘elementary schools’, which were accessible to the children of the poor 
and did not lead to higher education, were neglected. It is important to 
note that this policy was not imposed by the colonial administration; on 
the  contrary,  the  afandiyya implemented  it  against  the  wishes  of  the 
British authorities, who expressed a clear preference for spending most of 
the  educational  budget  on  elementary  schools,  for  the  equally  self-
interested  reasons  mentioned  above.  The  inequalities  of  the  Egyptian 
educational system increased throughout the first half of the 20 th century, 
as well as during the Nasser years. ‘The top of the pyramid grew faster 
than its base. . . . One consequence of concentrating resources on the elite 
ladder  was  persistent  high  illiteracy.  . . .’   This  policy  suited  ‘big 
landowners, who wanted to keep labor down on the farm while educating 
their own children as the “natural leaders” of the future’ (Reid 1990, 109-
114, 176-180).
Nor  did  the  afandiyya expand  al-Azhar;  on  the  contrary,  they 
created two institutions, Dār al-ʿUlūm (a teacher training college) and the 
School for Judges, which competed with it for students and teachers while 
offering a curriculum less focused on religion  (Reid 1990, 12, 34-35, 146-
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148; Costet-Tardieu 2005, 57). In 1928,  Muḥammad al-Marāġī, Shaykh of 
al-Azhar (who we will encounter again below), would complain of this 
competition in a memorandum to King Fuʾād and to the government, and 
demanded  the  reinstatement  of  al-Azhar’s  former  prerogatives  in  the 
training of judges, lawyers and Arabic professors  (Costet-Tardieu 2005, 
72-73).
The Egyptian University, which took shape in the first two decades 
of the twentieth century, avoided hiring Azharis as professors (Reid 1990, 
34).  When  planning  to  transform  the  private  university  into  a  state 
university in 1917, ‘as usual the ministry of education by-passed al-Azhar 
and  ignored  its  interests’  (Reid  1990,  76).  Clearly  the  purpose  of  the 
university  was  to  enable  families  in  the  dominant  class  to  produce 
afandiyya; yet the afandiyya perceived it and presented it as a project in 
the national interest. Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid (1872-1963), who became the 
first rector of the Egyptian University and was a prominent exponent of 
Egyptian  nationalism,  wrote  on  25  March  1907:  ‘We  repeat  that  the 
college is what the country unquestionably wants, and that its purpose is 
to raise the intellectual level of the nation47’ (Wendell 1972, 258).
The  afandiyya,  who were ‘known as the  muṭarbašūn,  “tarboosh-
wearers”’,  increasingly  found  themselves  in  a  struggle  with  the 
‘muʿammamūn,  “turban-wearers”  (ʿimma:  turban),  usually  Azhari 
curricula graduates, over issues of career’ (Ryzova 2005, 129).
47 The use of ‘we’ to implicitly claim authority to speak for a group, and particularly 
the shift from ‘I’  to ‘we’ to disguise individual interests as collective ones, merits 
more attention than I have been able to give it in this study. ‘When an apparatchik 
wants to make a symbolic takeover by force, he shifts from saying “I” to saying “we”’ 
(Bourdieu 1991, 213). Billig (1995, 93-127) offers an insightful discussion of nationalist 
uses of ‘we’, and suggests a number of avenues for further research.
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Egyptians keenly felt the shaykh-effendi distinction, which dress as 
well as title proclaimed. . . .  [S]haykhs . . .  had had no chance to 
learn Western languages. . . . The effendis at the state schools and 
the  university  were  generally  from  wealthier  and  more  urban 
families than the Azharis and had far better career prospects (Reid 
1990, 46-51).
Both  material  interests  (job  opportunities  and  access  to  state 
resources) and symbolic interests (prestige and influence) were at stake in 
this struggle. It was ‘a clash of two knowledge hierarchies, one religious 
and  one  secular,  over  the  question  of  inclusion  and  exclusion,  which 
developed around what would be perceived as the interests of the new 
society’ (Ryzova 2005, 129-130). More precisely, it was a conflict over the 
relative value of religious and non-religious types of cultural capital in a 
number of different social spheres. As we will see in this chapter and the 
next, the afandiyya used nationalism to claim, implicitly or explicitly, that 
their  knowledge  and  expertise  made  them  more  qualified  than  their 
religiously-trained  rivals  to  give  moral,  political,  intellectual  and  even 
religious guidance to Egyptian society. In this competition between two 
kinds of knowledge producers, the clergy were a formidable opponent. As 
Mondal (2003, 147) observes:
Unsurprisingly,  if  in  pre-modern  Egypt  political  power  was 
exercised and sought after by a warrior-aristocracy in control of the 
state,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  wider  society  controlled  by  the 
religious  authorities  based  in  the  Azhar,  on  the  other,  then  this 
remained the case in modern Egypt. . . . [I]n so far as parliamentary 
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democracy had at least instituted some channels of representation 
between the political field and wider society, those channels were 
weak compared with those controlled by the ʿulamāʾ who possessed 
the greater mobilizational power based on their symbolic authority 
among the masses.  It  became,  therefore,  impossible  to  engage in 
political  activity,  and  in  so  doing  to  establish  new principles  of 
authority and legitimacy, without consideration of the power of the 
ʿulamāʾ in society at large.
The struggle to determine who was most qualified to guide Egyptian 
society was inevitably a struggle to  define Egyptian society.  Was Egypt 
basically a distinct nation, including followers of different religions,  or 
was it basically just one part of the wider Muslim community? Was it 
better to conceptualise the victims of imperialism in Egypt as members of 
the Egyptian nation, or as Muslims? As De Leon, Desai and Tuğal (2009) 
have argued, grievances (e.g. those directed against British rule) are not 
given; they are always constructed by political discourses:
Politics (re)defines what the grievance is and who the sufferers (and 
thus  the  people  who should  be  mobilizing)  are.  Most  important, 
competing  parties  can  interpellate  the  same person  (or  group of 
people) as an oppressed Muslim, an unemployed individual, or as 
(sub-)proletarian, which would all produce very different results.
A struggle to determine the legitimate way of categorising human 
beings,  which Bourdieu calls a ‘conflict over definitions’  (1998, 365),  is 
inherently  a  struggle  for  symbolic  power  (Bourdieu 2001,  281-286).  By 
defining a group, one implicitly defines the characteristics that its leaders 
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should have; different principles of division (nationalist, religious, class-
based,  etc.)  imply the need for  different sorts  of  representatives.  Anti-
colonial  nationalism  enabled  the  afandiyya to  define  British  rule  as 
domination of Egyptians rather than of Muslims, and to implicitly define 
themselves, rather than the clergy, as the sort of people who knew best 
how to combat this domination.
Nationalist Shaykhs and Street Protests
In their struggle to increase the value of their cultural capital, the 
afandiyya were, in the short term, successful at increasing the exchange 
rate at which it could be converted into economic capital. The career of 
Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid, discussed below, reflects this process. Yet the rate 
of conversion from non-religious cultural capital into symbolic capital was 
still low, compared to the rate of conversion of religious cultural capital 
into symbolic capital. Religious habitus, which was predominant among 
most  of  the  population of  Egypt,  favoured the  symbolic  power  of  the 
shaykhs.  Hence  we  will  see,  in  this  chapter  and  the  next,  that  the 
afandiyya were vulnerable to attacks on religious grounds, and that they 
struggled, initially without much success, to gain symbolic power over 
broader segments of Egyptian society.
For this very reason, it was perhaps still easier to be influential as a 
nationalist thinker if one was also, like al-Ṭahṭāwī, a shaykh. During the 
ʿUrābī revolt of 1881-82, in which Arabic-speaking army officers rebelled 
against their Turkish-speaking superiors  (Cole 1993), two such shaykhs 
gained recognition for helping express the rebellion’s demands to a wider 
urban audience:  ʿAbd Allāh al-Nadīm (on whom see Appendix 3),  and 
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Muḥammad  ʿAbduh  (1849-1905),  who  went  on  to  have  an  illustrious 
career  as  a  religious  reformer,  and  became  Mufti  of  Egypt  in  1899 
(Hourani 1983, 130–160).
In  particular,  al-Nadīm  ‘emerged  as  the  leading  journalist  and 
orator of the revolution’ (Reid 1998, 227). Cole (1993, 164–212) argues that 
urban  guilds  supported  the  ʿUrābī  revolt  partly  because  the  officers’ 
‘Egyptian nativism’ resonated with Egyptian workers’ and artisans’ recent 
experience  of  competition  with  Europeans,  whose  numbers  had  been 
increasing in Egypt in the 1860s and 70s, and whose privileged position in 
the labour and financial markets, and immunity from Egyptian law and 
taxation,  caused  resentment  among  Egyptians,  sometimes  leading  to 
street protests and violent conflicts. At the same time, Egyptian protesters 
‘often adopted a rhetoric of defending Muslim honor against Christian 
encroachments’,  and native Christians were sometimes encompassed in 
hostility towards European Christians  (Cole 1993, 194–195), reproducing 
the pattern noted in Chapter 1 in the context of the French occupation. To 
the  extent  that  protesters’  grievances  were  expressed  in  specifically 
nationalist terms, rather than religious or other terms, I would argue that 
this was probably the result of the efforts of nationalist cultural producers 
like al-Nadīm, who was himself from an artisanal family (Cole 1993, 148). 
Moreover,  students in state schools,  who were likely to have absorbed 
nationalist concepts from their teachers and parents, also participated in 
urban protests against Europeans. As Cole (1993, 206) notes:
The  students’  anti-imperialist  fervor  undoubtedly  reflected  the 
sentiments of at least some of their teachers, and very possibly their 
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parents  as  well.  This  literate  new  middle  class  often  felt  most 
strongly  against  the  hiring  of  large  numbers  of  foreigners  as 
engineers or bureaucrats, since they felt themselves undervalued in 
contrast.
This ‘new literate middle class’ was, of course, the afandiyya; here 
again,  it  seems  that  they  were  using  nationalism  to  strengthen  their 
position in the competition for state employment.
While neither Muḥammad ʿAbduh nor his main disciple, Rašīd Riḍā 
(1865-1935), were among  the most influential nationalist thinkers of the 
early  20th century  –  Gershoni  and  Jankowski’s  (1986) survey  of  these 
thinkers mentions ʿAbduh and Riḍā only in passing and does not discuss 
their views on nationalism – some of ʿAbduh’s afandī disciples, including 
Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid, became very influential nationalists. The work of 
ʿAbduh and Riḍā, which attempted to reconcile Islam with concepts of 
reason and science that  were  dear  to  the  afandiyya,  ‘was  intended to 
convince  Muslims  with  a  modern  education  that  they  could  still  be 
Muslims’ (Hourani 1963, 128). As we have seen, this ‘modern education’ 
included nationalism, and was viewed by the  afandiyya as a nationalist 
project in itself.  It  is  therefore not surprising to find  ʿAbduh and Riḍā 
presenting nationalism and Islam as compatible.
Like al-Ṭahṭāwī, ʿAbduh was trained first as a religious scholar. ‘At 
some time in the second half of his life he learnt to read French, and read 
widely in the European thought of his age’  (Hourani 1983, 135); he also 
lived in France for a few years. In an article called ‘Nationality and the 
Religion of Islam’, published in Paris in 1884 after the defeat of the ʿUrābī 
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revolt, he rejected the idea of nationalism (waṭaniyya), and warned that it 
was a source of disunity among Muslims  (Vatikiotis 1957, 62–64). In his 
later  writings,  he espouses an Egyptian nationalism very similar to al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s. In his definition of the term waṭan (Haim 1955, 132–133), he 
wrote that ‘both right and duty’ are ‘the motto of all the waṭans to which 
lives and possessions are sacrificed’, adding that
to  belong  to  a  certain  waṭan means  that  a  connexion  links  the 
waṭan to  the  person  who  dwells  in  it,  a  connexion  based  on 
personal honour; so that he will be jealous for it and will defend it 
as he defends his father after whom he is called, even if he is a bad-
tempered and strict father.
Here  again,  the  country-as-parent  blend  that  we  encountered  in 
Chapter 2 generates an inference about duty to one’s country. Although 
in the 1880s ʿAbduh vehemently opposed British rule,  he later  became 
almost as indifferent to issues of sovereignty as al-Ṭahṭāwī had been; he 
argued that, as Hourani (1983, 157–158) puts it:
What  Egypt needed was a  period of  genuine national  education; 
every political and social problem should be seen in the light of this 
need. If constitutional government hindered the process it was bad 
or at least premature; if autocratic rule, or even foreign rule, helped 
it, it was to be tolerated.
Since  he  saw himself  primarily  as  ‘a  scholar,  a  teacher,  and  an 
organizer  of  schools’,  and  was  indeed  deeply  involved  in  educational 
projects  that  can  be  considered  a  continuation  of  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  project 
(Hourani 1983, 132–135), this amounted, in effect, to saying that national 
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education should be entrusted to people like himself (i.e. religious scholars 
who  also  had  some  non-religious  cultural  capital),  and that  he  would 
support any political system that would achieve this.
Riḍā, ‘ʿAbduh’s liege man’ and editor of the periodical  Al-Manār 
from  1898  until  his  death  (Hourani  1983,  226),  makes  an  interesting 
contrast with ʿAbduh. He, too, was trained as a religious scholar (in his 
home town of Tripoli, in Syria), and he studied ‘the natural sciences of 
modern  Europe’  at  a  ‘National  Islamic  School’,  but  only  in  Arabic 
(Hourani  1983,  223–224;  Tauber  1989,  102);  he  learned  no  European 
language well enough to read books in it (Hourani 1983, 235). The works 
he read by European intellectuals  were only  those available  in Arabic 
translation  (Shahin  1989,  113–114).  While  he  sought  to  convince 
traditional  religious  scholars  of  the  need  for  natural  science,  he  also 
sharply criticised European-style schooling in Egypt, on the grounds that 
it gave students an insufficient grounding in their own cultural traditions 
(Haddad 1997,  254;  Shahin  1989,  118).  In  other  words,  his  educational 
ideals would have tended to increase the value of the mainly religious 
education that he himself had received, as well as the value of schooling 
in Arabic. It is thus not surprising that he advocated an Arab renaissance. 
Nor is it surprising that he saw this renaissance not as an end in itself, but 
merely as a prerequisite for a renaissance of Islam. He rejected Egyptian 
nationalism; in 1911, he wrote in his periodical, al-Manār, that waṭaniyya 
‘weakened  the  Islamic  brotherhood  . . .  and  this  mistaken  and  false 
waṭaniyya even stood against religion itself’  (Tauber 1989, 103–104). His 
was thus an ‘Arab religious nationalism’, restricted to the religious and 
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cultural sphere, and indeed committed to Turkish political and military 
dominance within the Ottoman Empire; what unified the Arabs, in his 
view,  was  Islam  (Haddad  1997,  257–273).  These  views  favoured  ‘the 
political independence of Islam’  (Haddad 1997, 277), but they could also 
serve  to  convert  his  particular  mixture  of  religious  and  non-religious 
cultural capital into symbolic capital for the readers of al-Manār.
Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid
The  career  of  Aḥmad Luṭfī  al-Sayyid  reflects  the  social  changes 
discussed thus far. Luṭfī’s father, the wealthy mayor of a village in the 
Nile Delta, initially planned to send him to al-Azhar, but was persuaded 
by a family friend that the state schools offered better job prospects. He 
switched Luṭfī to the primary-secondary-university track, and Luṭfī went 
on to law school, where his colleagues ‘included future nationalist leader 
Muṣṭafā Kāmil . . . and three future prime ministers . . .’  (Reid 1990, 15). 
Luṭfī later became the editor-in-chief of  al-Ǧarīda (The Newspaper), the 
official paper of the Umma party, from 1907-1914 (Wendell 1972, 215-216). 
As editor, he carried on
a seldom interrupted campaign of propaganda to . . . instill the idea 
of  nationhood  in  a  mass  of  ‘dwellers  in  Egypt’  who  could  still 
regard  themselves  in  many  different  lights,  none  necessarily 
conforming to the ideology of the Umma party. The very name was 
as  much  a  hope  as  a  rallying  cry.  Luṭfī never  doubted  the  real 
existence of an Egyptian  umma:  he viewed its present and future 
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with optimism, but recognized the dire need for an unspecifiable 
period of tutelage (Wendell 1972, 222).
Here  again  we  find  the  same  paradox  that  we  encountered  in 
French revolutionary nationalism and in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  Taḫlīṣ.  The nation 
is presumed to exist, but at the same time it must be created:
[E]ven he had to confess that the ‘common people’  (ʿāmma)  were 
still  more  attracted  to  the  medieval  ideal  of  the  Umma 
Muhammadiyya than they were to  that  of  their  own ‘nation’,  if 
indeed they were aware that such a thing existed. Circumstances 
placed Lutfi in the curious position of a liberal nationalist who had 
to  defend  the  idea  of  Egyptian  nationhood,  not  merely  against 
Western critics, but also against fellow-Egyptians who rejected the 
concept  in  favor  of  other  loyalties.  Therefore  his  less  obvious 
mission in journalism was to assist in the creation of the nation that 
he was simultaneously addressing (Wendell 1972, 231).
In  Luṭfī’s  articles,  he strove to  define his  audience in  nationalist 
terms as opposed to religious ones. On 23 August 1908, he wrote:
Those who set out to arouse the religious sensibilities of either the 
Copts  or  the  Muslims  by  way  of  speeches  or  articles,  however 
praiseworthy their purpose or  however honorable their aim, reap 
from  the  whirlwind  they  stir  up  only  the  destruction  of  the 
[existing] solidarity among the individuals of the nation, and widen 
the distance between the two brothers. The Muslims and the Copts 
are far enough apart as it is – considering that they comprise the 
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body of a single nation  [wa-hum ǧism umma wāḥida]  – neither 
praying together nor intermarrying (Wendell 1972, 239-240).
This  suggests  strong  disapproval  of  the authority  of  religious 
figures,  who  surely  cannot  play  any  role  as  religious  leaders without 
making ‘speeches or articles’ to ‘arouse the religious sensibilities’ of their 
coreligionists. Moreover, the reference to intermarriage invites the reader 
to  envisage  a  social  transformation that  would  undermine the  very 
categories of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Christian’. Endogamy is one of the main ways 
in which social divisions are maintained  (Bourdieu and Lamaison 1985; 
Bourdieu  1996b,  275); when previously  distinct  groups  intermarry,  the 
distinctions between them begin to disappear (cf. Reinkowski and Saadeh 
2006).  The  metaphor  of  the  ‘body  of  a  single  nation’  implies that  the 
category  of  Egyptian  nationality  is more  fundamental  and more  valid 
than religious categories. Similarly, on 8 December 1912, Luṭfī referred to 
the  Egyptian  nation  as  ‘an  undivided  and indivisible  whole’  (Wendell 
1972, 237). On 4 May 1913, he rejected the idea that there is such a thing 
as a community of Muslims; he wrote: ‘We are not among the partisans of 
this impossible [Pan-Islamic] community insofar as it is a religious one, 
since we are convinced that the basis for political activity is patriotism 
[waṭaniyya]  and  the  bonds  of  [common]  interest  [al-manfaʿa],  and 
nothing more’  (Wendell 1972, 229). On 2 March 1913, he ridiculed both 
Pan-Islamism (al-Bān Islāmiyya) and Pan-Arabism (al-Ittiḥād al-ʿArabī) 
as ‘delusions’ (Wendell 1972, 230).
In 1907 and 1908, Luṭfī used the adjective ummī to mean ‘national’ 
or  ‘nationalist’  in  several  articles,  e.g.  ‘nationalist  demonstrations  [al-
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muẓāharāt al-ummiyya]’ (5 July  1908), ‘national life  [ḥayāh ummiyya]’ 
(23 March 1907)  and ‘national existence  [al-wuǧūd al-ummī]’ (18 May 
1907)  (Wendell  1972,  277-278n). This  was  highly  unconventional, and 
undoubtedly awkward,  because  this  adjective  already  had  the  well-
established sense of ‘illiterate’.  A few years later,  Luṭfī had abandoned 
ummī and  was  instead  using  a  new  adjective,  qawmī,  and  the 
corresponding  noun,  qawmiyya (‘nationalism’,  ‘nationhood’).  On  2 
September 1911,  he referred to Egypt as  having  an ‘ancient nationhood 
[qawmiyya ʿatīqa]’  (Wendell 1972, 236). On 1 September 1912, he again 
referred to ‘Egyptian nationhood [al-qawmiyya al-Miṣriyya], or Egyptian 
nationality [al-ǧinsiyya al-Miṣriyya]’ (Wendell 1972, 232). This change in 
his vocabulary probably gives  a good indication of  the time period in 
which qawmī appeared in Arabic in this sense. Further research would be 
needed to determine who coined this term.
 Luṭfī’s nationalism, like several of the other nationalisms we have 
considered thus far (starting with Napoleon Bonaparte’s), was imperialist. 
On 24 July 1910, he wrote:
The Sudan belongs to Egypt by right of conquest. It is a part [of 
Egypt] which cannot be severed from her and which is necessary to 
her existence. . . . the colonization of the Sudan is the exclusive right 
of the Egyptians. . . . For all the Egyptians regard the Sudanese as 
brothers and as a part of their people, and so it is their duty to work 
for their happiness (Wendell 1972, 261).
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Naturally, this meant that he could not consider the Mahdist revolt 
to be a legitimate expression of Sudanese opposition to Egyptian rule. He 
continues:
What happened was that some Sudanese [baʿḍ al-Sūdāniyyīn] rose 
against  the  Egyptian  community  [al-ǧāmiʿa  al-Miṣriyya].  So  the 
rebels  were  chastised  and the  rebellion  ended [uddiba al-ṯāʾirūn 
wa-ntahat al-fitna]. After that, things should have reverted to their 
former condition before the Mahdī’s revolt (Wendell 1972, 262-263).
Denying that Egyptian rule of Sudan is imperialist, he justifies it in 
terms that  are  strikingly  reminiscent of  French colonial  rhetoric about 
Algeria:
It would be a mistake to think that the Sudan is an Egyptian colony. 
Rather the Sudan is a part  of Egypt’s  [territorial]  being,  and the 
finishing  touch  to  it  [mutmim  lahā].  Egypt  is,  as  it  were,  the 
northern section, and the Sudan, the southern. Every Sudanese has 
substantially  the  same  patriotic  duties  to  Egypt  [al-wāǧibāt  al-
waṭaniyya al-Miṣriyya] that all Egyptians have (Wendell 1972, 262-
263).
In Luṭfī’s nationalism, we find once again the conceptual blend of 
nation-as-family. On 2 January 1913, he wrote:
The family [al-ʿāʾila] is the [basic] unit in the composition of the 
nation.  And  the  family  does  not  maintain  itself  without  group 
solidarity  [al-ʿaṣabiyya].  The  group  solidarity  within  the  family 
corresponds  to  national  identity  [al-ǧinsiyya]  within  the  nation. 
One’s closest brother is one’s brother-german, and after him, one’s 
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brother in nationality [al-aḫ fi-l-qawmiyya]. Therefore this family 
pattern must be the model for the national pattern  (Wendell 1972, 
269-270).
Luṭfī argued that literature played an important role in in creating 
national unity. On 4 March 1912, he wote:
Literature  is  not,  as  superficial  thinkers  imagine,  merely  an 
instrument to amuse littérateurs. Nor are its tales merely a beautiful 
way of killing precious time. The fact is that literature and a literary 
history  are  among the  strongest  identifying marks  of  an  umma; 
serving to link its past generations with the present one, defining its 
particular character,  and rendering it distinct from all others. And 
so  its  personality  is  perpetuated  through  time,  the  area  of 
similarities among its individual members becomes broader, and the 
bonds of solidarity among them grow stronger (Wendell 1972, 275).
More generally, he argued that the members of the dominant class 
are the nation’s natural leaders. On 18 May 1907, he described the elites 
(al-ḫawāṣṣ) in the following terms:
To  be  sure,  in  Egypt  there  is  an  enlightened  class  [ṭabaqa 
mustanīra]  composed  of  government  officials,  members  of  the 
liberal professions an the gentry [al-aʿyān], who are conscious of 
the country’s  need for  a  public  opinion made up of sound ideas 
(Wendell 1972, 283).
On 3 October 1909, he defined ‘public opinion’ as the opinion of 
these same elites:
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Speaking  of  the  evening  gatherings  of  intellectuals  during  the 
month  of  Ramadan,  Luṭfī says  of  them  that  they  are  ‘those 
gatherings which occur spontaneously, comprising the class of men 
of sound judgment who come from [the ranks of] the thinkers, the 
educated  and  the  representatives  of  long-established  wealth  and 
position. They [i.e., the meetings] may on these grounds be said to 
represent public opinion’ (Wendell 1972, 284-285).
In  the  work of  Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal,  one of  Luṭfī’s  most 
influential disciples, we will find these ideas used as the basis for a more 
clearly articulated view of the wealthy literati as the category of ‘great 
men’ who should guide the nation.
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal
Muḥammad  Ḥusayn  Haykal  came  from  a  family  of  wealthy 
landowners in the Delta. He ‘attended secular schools in Cairo from the 
age of seven’ (CD Smith 1979), studied law, and received a doctorate from 
the Sorbonne in Paris in 1912. He worked as a lawyer in Egypt, had a 
successful  political  career,  and  was  a  prominent  journalist  and  writer 
(Selim 2004, 79-80). His writings during World War I
were  especially  important  in  relation  to  the  development  of  the 
Egyptian  territorial  nationalist  perspective.  In  1916,  Haykal 
published  a  series  of  articles  on  the  Egyptian  modernist  Qāsim 
Amīn48 in  al-Sufūr.  Formally a biographical tribute to  Amīn, at a 
deeper level the articles offered a powerful new interpretation of the 
48 On Amīn (1865-1908), see Hourani (1983, 164-170).
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basis and nature of the Egyptian collective. Using the life of Amīn 
as his starting point, Haykal developed a theory of the relationship 
between the environment of Egypt and the Egyptian nation which 
profoundly  influenced  later  Egyptian  territorial  nationalism 
(Gershoni and Jankowski 1986, 34).
These essays will therefore be worth our careful consideration here.
Qāsim Amīn
In  Part  I  of  the  series (25  February  1916), Haykal  begins  by 
observing that there is more to the life of a nation (ḥayāt umma) than the 
deeds of its kings;  indeed, these deeds are simply a manifestation of the 
nation’s life,  especially once democracy has taken over the business of 
‘forbidding and commanding [al-nahy wa-l-amr]’  (Haykal 1968, 91).  In 
this  context,  the  use  of  this  phrase,  which  has  strong  religious 
connotations and inevitably recalls a number of verses in the Qurʾān on 
‘ordering what is right and forbidding what is wrong’ (3:104, 3:110, 3:114, 
7:157, 9:71, 9:112, 22:41), suggests that religious authority is to be replaced 
by  the  authority  of  elections,  in  which  voters  are  free  to  make  their 
choices according to non-religious criteria.
The life of nations, says Haykal, is based on their morals, customs, 
beliefs and hopes, which are the basis of governments, kings and wars. 
Hence European historians study all manifestations of a nation’s life in 
order to understand the links between its past and present, and the paths 
to the best possible future. Among these manifestations are books written 
by  thinkers  (mufakkirīn)  and the  literati  (kuttāb  al-ādāb);  these  are  a 
lantern (nibrās) that guides historians to a nation’s customs, morals, ways 
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of  thinking  and  way  of  life.  Historians  consider  these  works  ‘social 
artefacts  [āṯār  iǧtimāʿiyya]’  and  not  simply  forms  of  individual 
expression (Haykal 1968, 91-92).
Here Haykal cites a work called History of English Literature, by the 
French  literary  critic  and  historian  Hippolyte  Taine  (1828-1893) (on 
Haykal’s  use  of  Taine,  see  also  Gershoni  and  Jankowski  1986,  35-36; 
Mondal 2003, 156-158). In that work, Taine had argued that the mental 
and  social  life  of  human  beings  is  fully  determined  by  three  natural 
forces,  which  he  called  race,  milieu and  moment (Taine  1866,  1:xxiii-
xxxiv).  Race,  for  Taine,  meant  a  set  of  hereditary  dispositions  and 
physical characteristics,  and he specifically refers to Egyptians as a race. 
Milieu refers to the physical and social environment found in a particular 
region; it shapes the character and social order of the race that lives there. 
This  theory  is  clearly  a  descendant  of  Montesquieu’s  environmental 
determinism,  which  we  considered  in  the  previous  chapter.  We  will 
shortly see precisely how Haykal uses Taine’s theory.
Haykal  asserts that when a historian has a complete grasp of the 
traces (āṯār) left by a nation (umma), then he can form a clear picture of 
the  people (šaʿb) that  he is studying. (Note that Haykal uses the words 
umma and šaʿb interchangeably.) Such a picture, he says, makes it easy to 
see the reforms that are needed to bring about a better future; without it, 
different individuals formulate incompatible proposals, each one based on 
a limited view of the present. This makes progress (taqaddum) impossible, 
and any living creature (ḥayy) must progress in order to survive (Haykal 
1968, 93).
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His  argument  here  has  logical  implications  for  the  role  of  the 
literati. We will see below how he explicitly articulates these implications, 
but for now it is clear that he personifies the nation, and sees books by 
thinkers and the literati as direct manifestations of its character rather 
than expressions of the limited point of view of an individual author. It 
follows that, in order to produce such works, writers must possess some 
sort of privileged insight into ‘the life of the nation’.
 Unfortunately, he adds, such a study of ‘our life’ has not yet been 
carried out. ‘We’ are ignorant of the life of ‘this valley’ in which ‘we’ live 
(i.e.  the  Nile  valley)49.  No  Egyptian  has  written  such  a  study  on  ‘our 
national life [ḥayātinā al-qawmiyya]’, and in particular, no Egyptian has 
written an interpretation of one of ‘our authors’, tracing his ideas back to 
their  sources50 (Haykal  1968,  94).  After  mentioning  some  recently 
published  biographies  of  Egyptians  and  finding them  wanting,  he 
emphasises that writers such as Qāsim Amīn merit this sort of attention, 
because  they  have  had  a  considerable  effect  on  the  life  of  the  nation 
(umma), and are  also among the manifestations of its life (Haykal 1968, 
94-95). Such studies are necessary for an understanding of the nation’s 
past, without which it cannot reform its future. Hence he has decided to 
analyse the link between Qāsim Amīn’s intellectual output and ‘the life of 
the nation’ as a whole (Haykal 1968, 96-97).
In Part II (3 March, 14 April and 19 May 1916), Haykal begins by 
saying  that  to  understand  a  philosopher,  writer  or  poet,  one  must 
understand the  milieu in which he lived. Haykal translates Taine’s term 
49 Note again the use of ‘we’.
50 I assume that kitāb min kuttābinā is a printer’s error for kātib min kuttābinā.
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milieu as  wasaṭ (pl.  awsāṭ).  He notes that  Amīn  spent his life in Egypt, 
except for  a few years in France.  Turning first to the Egyptian  wasaṭ, 
Haykal proposes to consider it from two angles: the natural environment 
and the social environment. The natural wasaṭ, he says, has a major effect 
on people’s character (ḫulq), while the social wasaṭ shapes their thoughts 
(Haykal 1968, 97-98).
First he discusses the natural wasaṭ in Egypt. He asserts that ‘Egypt 
is clearly the partition [barzaḫ] that connects [yaṣil] the East with the 
West’,  and that  its  geographical  nature isolates it  from the rest  of  the 
world. It is surrounded by desert on three sides, and the Mediterranean 
Sea separates it (yaḥǧubuhā) from countries further north  (Haykal 1968, 
99). Haykal’s argument here seems arbitrary and self-contradictory; as the 
word ‘connects’ implies, the Mediterranean can be seen as a link between 
Egypt and Europe, one that has facilitated trade and the exchange of ideas 
for  millennia.  But  he wants  to  present  Egypt  as  a  naturally  distinct 
national territory capable of  shaping a distinct national character; hence 
he represents the Mediterranean as a barrier.
In the Nile Valley, he says, the sky is always clear and the weather 
is always mild and tranquil. You can walk from one end of the valley to 
the other without encountering any major obstacles, strong winds, storms 
or rain. The landscape is monotonous. In the fields, you rarely see any 
animals other than tranquil oxen and donkeys. The few wild animals are 
small,  submissive  (mustaslima)  and  harmless.  Everything  exudes 
tranquility  (hadʾat  al-sukūn).  The  changing  seasons  bring  no  major 
differences in temperature to disturb the creatures that live there.  There 
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are no natural barriers that might arouse curiosity or require efforts to 
surmount them. Nor is this the desolate tranquility of the desert; the Nile 
Valley is a perpetually verdant, fertile garden, thanks to the generous Nile 
floods. Indeed, in times of old, people said that the source of the Nile is in 
Paradise (Haykal 1968, 99-101). (Recall that in Chapter 1, we found this 
assertion in Ibn Ẓahīra’s text.)
At  the  same  time,  he  says,  this  unchanging,  tranquil  natural 
environment is cruel.  Its villagers live in abject poverty in dark, tawdry, 
filthy,  windowless huts  that  resemble the  dens  of  small,  submissive 
animals. Those who are a bit better off might have windows, but they do 
not  seek  luxuries  of  the  sort  that  would  ‘rebel  [yaṯūr]  against  the 
contented,  submissive  natural  environment  [al-ṭabīʿa  al-qāniʿa  al-
mustaslima]’  (Haykal 1968, 102). Here Haykal  naturalises the peasants’ 
poverty by attributing it to the natural environment, rather than to the 
feudal economic order. Thus he implies that any hypothetical attempts by 
peasants to rise out of poverty would be a rebellion against nature rather 
than  against  a  class  hierarchy  established  and  maintained  by  human 
efforts.
All anyone asks of the Nile Valley, he adds, is that it should not be 
excessively harmful and not disturb the tranquillity of its inhabitants. The 
crocodile in the Nile is content to live on what comes to it in the water, 
and does not disturb boats or venture onto the shore to attack people or 
animals. ‘The gods, of which Nature is the greatest [al-āliha wa akbaruha 
al-ṭabīʿa]’, protect the Nile Valley’s inhabitants from anything that might 
disturb this  tranquillity (Haykal 1968, 102-103). This  sentence implicitly 
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contradicts the Islamic affirmation that ‘God is greatest [Allāhu akbar]’; a 
pious Muslim would surely reject it as a profession of polytheism (širk). 
Moreover,  Haykal adds that this wasaṭ is what ‘created [ḫalaqa] all the 
living things and the people that have lived in it’  (Haykal 1968, 104). In 
this  description  of  an  eternal, tranquil  physical  environment  that  has 
created eternally tranquil people, there is an echo of the Biblical account 
of creation, in which God creates human beings in his own image (Gen 
1:27)51. Like al-Ṭahṭāwī, Haykal thus likens the national territory to a god.
Turning to the social wasaṭ in Egypt, he asserts that the inhabitants 
of  the  Nile  Valley  have  had  certain  physical,  moral  and  mental 
characteristics since time immemorial,  and that all  these characteristics 
are the creation (ḫalq) of the natural wasaṭ in which they live. Just as the 
weather  in  their  country  is  perpetually  calm and  tranquil,  their  faces 
express the same calm tranquillity, and their morals are characterised by 
submissiveness (istislām). The past continues eternally for them and they 
feel no inclination towards change  (Haykal 1968, 104); hence  they never 
think of rebelling against their rulers. He adds that they have always been 
content to be ruled by foreigners such as the dynasties of the Pharaohs; in 
his view, none of these dynasties included any of the ‘genuine inhabitants 
of the valley’  (Haykal 1968, 105). This assertion seems to be an essential 
component of his argument. He has to assume that the Pharaohs were 
foreign;  otherwise,  he  would  have  to  explain  why  the  ‘submissive’ 
Egyptian natural environment, which supposedly makes all its inhabitants 
51 This idea is not found in the Qurʾān, but it is attested in the hadith: ‘fa-inn Allāh 
ḫalaqa Ādam ʿalā ṣūratihi [God created Adam in his own image]’ (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 
2612 <http://hadith.al-islam.com/Page.aspx?pageid=192&BookID=25&PID=4803>). Of 
course, nothing would have prevented Haykal from taking the idea from a Christian 
source.
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submissive, did not have the same effect on its rulers, and thus prevent 
them from overthrowing one another and seizing power by force, as he 
acknowledges they did.
Thus,  he says, the ‘force [quwwa]  of  the natural  wasaṭ’  subjects 
those who live in it to its power (sulṭa)  (Haykal 1968, 105). Here again, 
Haykal  naturalises  the  class  hierarchy by  attributing  it  to  natural 
phenomena. As in his novel Zaynab, he ignores ‘the peasant protests and 
uprisings which dotted the nineteenth-century landscape’  (Shalan 2006, 
225), and expresses the type of stance that Bourdieu (1991, 132) describes 
as
the  admiration  that  all  conservatisms  display for  ‘decent  people’ 
(most often personified by the peasant), whose essential property is 
designated  clearly  by  the  euphemisms  (‘simple  folk’,  ‘working 
people’) which feature in orthodox discourse: their submission to 
the established order.
These  factors,  says  Haykal,  have  increased  the  ‘natural 
submissiveness [istislām]’ of the ‘Egyptian soul [nafs]’. Thus all morals 
and beliefs that have entered the Egyptian soul have taken on the same 
character, and all the religions that have passed through Egypt have come 
to be based on ‘fatalism [ǧabriyya]’ and ‘trust in fate [al-sukūn ilā ḥukm 
al-qaḍāʾ]’.  As it has not been in the interest of Egypt’s rulers to change 
this state of affairs, it has become deeply rooted, and reached the point of 
‘rigidity [ǧumūd]’  (Haykal 1968, 106).  Haykal does not mention Islam at 
all in  his  account  of  the  social  wasaṭ in  Egypt;  it  is  merely  included 
implicitly  in  this  reference  to the  various  religions  that  have  passed 
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through.  Moreover,  in  his account,  it  is  as  if  Islam  had  no  effect  on 
Egyptians, since the Egyptian national character simply remade Islam into 
yet  another  expression  of  itself.  Considering the  conceptualisation  of 
Egypt  as  a  god,  it  is  not  difficult  to  interpret this  as  an account  of  a 
struggle  between  two  gods,  Egypt  and  Allāh,  with  Egypt  emerging 
triumphant.  It  is as if, for Haykal,  Egypt created its inhabitants single-
handedly, and when Allāh sent them Islam, Egypt transformed Islam into 
an instrument of Egypt’s own ‘power’, thus effectively neutralising it.
Therefore,  adds  Haykal,  the  ‘duty  [wāǧib]  of  the  reformers’  has 
been extremely difficult.  In  particular,  the  reform movement  has  been 
unable  to  reach  ‘the  heart  of  the  country  [ǧawf  al-bilād]’,  and  has 
remained  concentrated  in  the  capital.  Hence,  all  its  aims  have  been 
responses to conditions in the capital. Reform movements in capital cities 
tend to blame everything on the government, and to focus on politics. But 
the characteristics of the Egyptian people (šaʿb) as he has just described 
them,  combined  with  the  impossibility  of  overthrowing  the  political 
system under conditions of foreign domination since 1882, led reformers 
to  think about  starting with social  reform rather than political  reform 
(Haykal  1968,  106-108).  These  social  reformers  faced  resistance  from 
political reformers52 who supported ‘the rigid principles that the nation 
[umma]  has  passed  down  from  generation  to  generation  and  that  it 
approves of’, while the social reform movement aimed to shake the nation 
(umma) out of its rigidity and introduce free thinking (al-tafkīr al-ḥurr) 
into  its  soul  (nafs).  In  particular,  they  were  opposed  to  the  nation’s 
52 Haykal is perhaps thinking of Muṣṭafā Kāmil; we will return to his opinion of Kāmil  
below.
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adherence to ‘old interpretations’ of religion, which they saw as unsuited 
to  the  ‘spirit  of  the  age’  as  well  as  unnecessary  in  religious  terms. 
Foremost among these social reformers was Muḥammad ʿAbduh (Haykal 
1968, 108-109).
This type of social reform, in Haykal’s opinion, was the foundation 
on which all later reform was built, since at that time, ‘religious thinking 
alone  exercised  absolute  power  over  people’s  beliefs  and  morals,  over 
their behaviour and the order of their lives’  (Haykal 1968, 109-110). We 
could rephrase this  in the terms of our theoretical framework by saying 
that  the  symbolic  power  of  the clergy was  immense.  Haykal’s  remark 
suggests that, in his view, nationalism had won few converts in Egypt by 
the  end of  the  19th century.  Like  Luther  and Calvin,  he  says, ʿAbduh 
‘made reason the measure of religion’, and viewed beliefs and practices 
that were not in accord with reason as ‘alien to faith in the gods [daḫīl  
ʿalā al-īmān bi-l-āliha]’  (Haykal 1968, 110). Note again that Haykal uses 
‘gods’ in the plural, suggesting a polytheism that is considered heretical in 
Islam and that  ʿAbduh would have condemned.  Here Haykal  has subtly 
enlisted  ʿAbduh’s authority to  consecrate his own rather different  views 
on religion, to which we will return below.
Nevertheless,  says Haykal,  only a few Egyptians supported social 
reform;  most  were  ‘partisans of  the  old’,  of  ‘trusting  in  the  past, 
surrendering to  the  present  and not  inclining towards  the  new’;  even 
among the minority that supported  ʿAbduh,  many did so hypocritically, 
for personal gain rather than because they agreed with  his ideas.  Wider 
acceptance of these ideas  by the nation (umma) only came ‘much later 
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[baʿd zaman ṭawīl]’53, ‘in circumstances other than those in which Qāsim 
Amīn  had  lived’,  after  a  renaissance  (nahḍa)  that  was  not  based  on 
religion; Amīn preceded this renaissance and did not benefit from it. Had 
it  not  been for  his  experience in  France,  his  ideas  would simply have 
taken on the character of the social wasaṭ in which he lived (Haykal 1968, 
111-112).
The ‘young Eastern man’ who visits the French wasaṭ, which had a 
profound effect on Amīn, is bewitched by all sorts of striking beauty and 
variety not  found  in  Egypt,  in  its natural  landscapes, gardens, 
architecture, museums, theatres  and concerts, as well as in the elegance 
and  manners  of  its  inhabitants.  He  hears  music  that  is completely 
different from ‘our plaintive, submissive music [mūsīqānā al-mustaslima 
al-šākiya]’;  it expresses ‘the movement of modern civilisation [ḥarakat  
al-madaniyya al-ḥāḍira]’. He sees the bustling activity of commerce and 
industry.  Instead of  being submissive  and  tranquil,  everyone seems to 
love life and strive to make the most of it (Haykal 1968, 112-115).
If  the  Eastern  visitor  delves  more  deeply  into  the  affairs  of  the 
French, their ways of life and their thought, says Haykal, what he finds is  
even more impressive. The family is not simply ‘this human herd that is  
held  together  by  no  more  than  the  natural  bonds  of  fatherhood  and 
brotherhood,  under  the father’s  authority’;  it  is  a  ‘human partnership’ 
based  on  pure  feelings,  aimed  at  increasing  individual  happiness  and 
producing  free  men  and  women.  The  visitor  finds  powerful,  subtle 
emotions that are the source of the vibrant, free music, amazing art and 
53 Writing only eight years after Amīn’s death, Haykal seems to exaggerate the amount 
of time that had passed.
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profound,  poetic  literature  that  the  French  produce.  He  finds  precise, 
polished thought, which is the source of a long, extensive philosophical 
tradition that has meticulously analysed all morals, beliefs and religions. 
This is not a philosophy of ‘submission and indifference [istislām wa-
tawākul]’. It is a humanistic philosophy that ‘does not sanctify or submit 
to  the  past’;  instead,  it  critically  analyses  and  evaluates  the  past  and 
discards anything that does not accord with reason. Hence it has criticised 
religions  and their  foundations,  and to  a  large extent  destroyed them. 
Thus,  by the time  Qāsim Amīn arrived in France,  ‘the  matter of  non-
religiosity  [masʾalat  ʿadam  al-tadayyun]’  was  already ‘a  foregone 
conclusion [mafrūġ minhā]’. ‘This atheistic philosophy [hāḏihi al-falsafa 
al-lā dīniyya]’ had inspired in people a new understanding of ethics and a 
new way of looking at things.  France had set about ‘building its social 
prosperity’ on the basis of reason and science,  and seeking happiness ‘in 
this  life’.  They  promoted  these  principles  just  as  forcefully  as  their 
predecessors in earlier times had promoted religion, as if purely scientific 
ideas had become ‘a new faith [īmān ǧadīd] that took the place of the old 
one’.  But this faith had not yet reached the French people (šaʿb);  it  was 
not yet widespread enough to become ‘a new religion [dīnan ǧadīdan] 
that could take the place of the religion that Voltaire, Renan, Taine and 
their contemporaries had destroyed’ (Haykal 1968, 115-118).
All this – natural environment, art and enthusiasm for science – is 
‘the basis of Western civilisation [madaniyyat al-ġarb]’. This wasaṭ had a 
profound effect on Qāsim Amīn, to the point of blotting out some of the 
effects  of  the  ‘calm,  submissive  Egyptian  wasaṭ’  (Haykal  1968,  118). 
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Haykal describes Amīn’s personality as energetic and irritable (in contrast 
to the allegedly submissive Egyptian national character outlined above), 
and inspired  by  intense  nationalism.  At  the  funeral  of  the  nationalist 
leader  Muṣṭafā  Kāmil54,  Amīn  took  the  sight  of  large  crowds  as  an 
expression  of  a  feeling  of  national  unity,  ‘the  new  feeling’  that  had 
emerged like a newborn baby from ‘the bowels of the nation [umma]’: a 
sign of hope for the future.  Amīn wrote of seeing a ten-year-old boy in 
the street in Paris take off his hat in a long salute to the French flag as a 
regiment of soldiers passed by; Amīn was full of admiration for the boy’s 
upbringing, which had taught him to love his waṭan.  Amīn was not one 
of those who seek merely to get through life in the least unpleasant way 
possible; he believed in striving for happiness (Haykal 1968, 118-126).
Haykal’s view of the physical and social environment is somewhat 
different  from Taine’s.  While  Taine had viewed social  environment  as 
partly  independent  of  physical  environment, and  thus  specifically 
mentions Christianity as one aspect of  milieu that had a major effect on 
society around the Mediterranean (Taine 1866, 1:xxviii), Haykal seems to 
consider  the  social  environment  a  mere  product  of  national  character, 
which  is  fully determined by  the physical environment.  His opinion of 
this  national  character  seems  deeply  paradoxical.  On  one  hand,  the 
characteristics he assigns it appear to  be, in his view, entirely negative: 
passivity, submissiveness, backwardness, stasis. He contrasts it with what 
he sees as the energetic, bold, ambitious, imaginative national character of 
the French,  which produced an atheism that  he clearly admires.  Thus, 
54 Haykal does not refer to him by name, and instead calls him ‘ṣāḥib al-liwāʾ’ (Kāmil’s 
newspaper was called al-Liwāʾ).
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within his theoretical framework, all the qualities he admires in Qāsim 
Amīn can only be effects of the French  wasaṭ rather than the Egyptian 
one.
The dilemma confronting Egyptian intellectuals like Haykal was an 
almost insoluble one. In fine, the same Egyptian national character 
that Haykal was excited to discover and analyze in order to prove 
its  uniqueness  was  blocking  the  path  to  the  revival  and  the 
modernization of Egyptian society  (Gershoni and Jankowski 1986, 
39).
On the other hand, the class hierarchy in which Haykal occupied a 
privileged position depended on peasants’ (socially maintained and never 
guaranteed)  submission  to  the  dominant  class;  any  rebellion  would 
threaten this hierarchy. We will return below to the relationship between 
his nationalism and his view of peasants.
Haykal’s conception of a national character determined by Egypt’s 
natural  environment would become immensely influential  in the 1920s 
(Gershoni and Jankowski 1986, 39, 131). Nationalist historiography, which 
Haykal did much to promote, took Egypt’s presumed eternal, unchanging 
essence to be the main cause of all historical events in Egypt  (Gershoni 
and Jankowski 1986, 143-163). Haykal’s theory exercised a major influence 
in ‘nationalism education’ classes (al-tarbiyya al-waṭaniyya) in Egyptian 
schools. The textbooks used in these classes in the second half of the 1920s 
presented an ‘environmentally grounded concept of nationalism’ in which 
‘the Arabic language and Islam . . . are assigned no role whatsoever in the 
formation  of  the  Egyptian  nation  and  the  definition  of  its  national 
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personality. They are simply omitted as possible elements creating either 
nations in general or Egypt in particular’ (Gershoni and Jankowski 1986, 
136-138).
National Literature
For a clearer understanding of Haykal’s view of the role of writers 
as leaders of the nation, we must  turn to his  influential  essay, ‘National 
Literature [Al-Adab al-Qawmī]’. It was published on 18 March 1925 in al-
Siyāsa,  the  newspaper  of  the  Liberal  Constitutionalist  party,  which 
Haykal edited,  and ‘proved to be a milestone in the development of the 
theory of an Egyptian national literature’ (Gershoni and Jankowski 1986, 
193).
Haykal  begins  his  essay  by  noting  that  there  have  been  fierce 
debates between partisans of ‘the old’ and ‘the new’ in literary language. 
He  attributes  the  intensity  of  this  debate  in  part  to  an  unfortunate 
tendency for writers to be concerned more with form than with content; 
in his view, the latter is far more important. Only the ‘mighty souls [al-
nufūs  al-quwiyya]’ that represent a particular era or environment (bīʾa), 
and  whose  works  are  immortalised, can  be  said  to  have  produced 
‘national  literature  [al-adab  al-qawmī]’.  Homer,  Virgil,  Shakespeare, 
Voltaire  and  Goethe  have  been  immortalised,  despite  the  progress  of 
civilisation, because  their  souls represented a particular  nation (umma) 
and era,  having been stamped with  the ‘eternal characteristics  of  their 
nations  [umam]’.  They were  signposts  (aʿlām) in  history,  guiding  the 
people (ahl) of their eras (Haykal 1968, 344-347).
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Such writers, who produce national literature, are ‘the masters of 
literature and the rulers of language [sādat al-adab wa-l-ḥākimūn ʿalā al-
luġa]’.  It is they who breathe life into words and give them their force. 
Dictionaries  submit  to  their  rule (taḫḍaʿ  li-ḥukmihim)  and  linguists 
acknowledge their  authority  (sulṭān).  When one is  in  doubt  about  the 
meaning  of  a  word,  the  works  of  poets  and  writers  are  the  ultimate 
authority.  When  two  words  are  roughly  synonymous  but  differ  in 
connotation,  this  difference  is  always  due  to  the  work  of  a  ‘national 
writer  [kātiban  qawmiyyan]’,  who  established  a  precedent.  Art  and 
literature are the flower (zahra)  of every civilisation (ḥaḍāra),  and the 
literary luminaries (aʿlām) of a civilisation must have authority (ḥukm) 
over literary language55 (Haykal 1968, 348-349).
Hence, says Haykal, research must be focused on national literature. 
Does it currently exist ‘in the nations (umam) that speak Arabic’?  Is it 
something  they  share,  or  does  each  of  them  have  its  own  national 
literature? In Haykal’s opinion, although ‘the Arab East’ has good writers, 
they unfortunately ‘do not represent any particular civilisation [ḥaḍāra]’; 
instead they combine very different and even contradictory civilisations. 
Hence none of them has produced national literature, ‘which stamps its 
character on an era because it is the flower of that era, and the image and 
voice of all  its perfection and  vigour’.  Some are admired, but none are 
regarded with ‘veneration [taqdīs]’, and their works are not immortalised. 
This  is  not  because  ‘the  Arab  East  lacks  a  civilisation  [ḥaḍāra]’,  but 
because  the  features  of  its  civilisation  have  been  erased  under  the 
55 Similarly, Haykal wrote elsewhere that ‘literature and its course constitute the most 
authentic hallmark of a nation’s civilization’ (Gershoni and Jankowski 1986, 88).
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domination of  the  nations  (umam)  that  have  ruled  over  it;  they  have 
deliberately made it forget its past  and submit to the civilisation of the 
victors.  When  this  happens,  people’s  national  identity (qawmiyya)  is 
weakened,  and they  cease to have a national literature with a distinct 
personality (ḏātiyya) (Haykal 1968, 350-352).
What is strange, says Haykal, is that those who have been involved 
in the renaissances of the East have not given any thought to this problem 
and have not sought to remedy it.  It  is astonishing that ‘our Egyptian 
University’  offers  courses  on  ancient  and  modern  literature,  both 
European  and  Arab,  but  not  a  single  course  on  ancient  or  modern 
Egyptian literature or on the development of thought in Egypt, on how 
this development reflects the Eastern and Western civilisations that it has 
absorbed, and on whether it has clothed these civilisations in Egyptian 
nationality  (al-qawmiyya  al-miṣriyya),  with  ‘its  ancient  history,  its 
harmonious nature, its clear skies, and the gracious character, elegance 
and civility in which its  people  [ahl]  excel’,  or  whether each of these 
civilisations  has  remained  ‘undigested’  until  it  moved  on  and  was 
replaced by its  successor  (Haykal  1968,  352).  Haykal’s  argument might 
seem illogical at first sight. He has just posited the existence of a single 
original  civilisation  encompassing  the  Arab  East,  whose  features  have 
been erased by the nations that have ruled over it – nations that would 
seem to  include  Egypt  –  and he  has  lamented  the  lack  of  a  national 
literature reflecting this civilisation. Yet the remedy he proposes is a study 
of  Egyptian literature,  to  determine  whether  Egyptian nationality  has 
assimilated Eastern civilisations as well as Western ones. As we will see 
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below, it seems that what Haykal has in mind is a single Arab, Eastern 
civilisation  composed  of  different  nations,  each  with  its  own  distinct 
character. Thus Egypt has its own nationality (qawmiyya) but not its own 
civilisation (ḥaḍāra).
Continuing,  Haykal presents American  nationalism  as  an  ideal 
example that Egyptians should follow:
For such a study is considered in all civilized nations [umam] as one 
of  the  foundations  of  nationalism  [usus  al-qawmiyya],  which 
should fill the souls of the country’s children [abnāʾ al-waṭan], so 
that  their  bonds  of  loyalty  to  their  country  will  increase.  The 
Americans, although they have known civilised life for only a short 
time,  and although they are a people  [qawm]  whose history has 
acquired none of the sacredness [qadāsa] that surrounds the history 
of all the ancient nations [umam], have used nationalist education 
[al-taʿlīm  al-qawmī]  as  a  powerful  means  to  create  American 
nationalism  [al-qawmiyya  al-Amrikiyya].  They  have  been  so 
successful that they have made immigrants feel more attached to 
America than to the countries [awṭān] that produced them (Haykal 
1968, 352).
How, precisely, have Americans done this? Haykal makes it clear 
that they have done it by producing  literature and teaching it to their 
children:
At  first,  they  were  dependent  on  Europe,  and  particularly  on 
English literature,  but thanks  to this  national genesis  [hāḏihi  al-
našʾa  al-qawmiyya],  they  soon  had  writers  and  poets  like 
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Longfellow  and  Emerson,  who  embodied  American  national  life 
[al-ḥayāh  al-qawmiyya al-Amrīkiyya]  . . .  The  Americans  take  a 
keen interest in this nationalist [qawmī] aspect, and in implanting it 
in  the  souls  of  their  youth,  although they have acquired  it  only 
belatedly, after all  other nations [umam]56. Thus they have created 
it from scratch and made Americans proud of it. As for us in Egypt, 
we have neglected it, judging by what I have seen in the Egyptian 
University,  in  government  schools,  at  al-Azhar  and in  the  other 
religious institutes (Haykal 1968, 352-353).
As  we  have  seen,  for  Egyptian  nationalists  as  for  French  and 
American ones, the problem was indeed how to persuade the masses to 
accept this new belief system.  Haykal’s argument suggests that this was 
still a challenge for Egyptian nationalists in 1925. Hence he advocates the 
solution that had already been universally adopted in Europe and in the 
US: indoctrination  in schools.  More specifically, he wants children to be 
taught to venerate Egyptian national literature.
But first, Egyptian national literature has to be written. Few writers, 
he says,  take their  inspiration from Egyptian literature  or  anything in 
Egypt. When on occasion a writer does so,
what he writes does not give one the feeling that it should give. One 
does  not  sense  that  his  whole  soul,  heart  and mind,  and all  his 
energies  and  feelings,  have  been  concentrated  in  his  pen,  in  an 
abundant spiritual torrent that represents a whole nation [umma] in 
a particular era (Haykal 1968, 353).
56 In reality, American nationalism, which became a prominent part of public life in the 
United  States in  the  late  18th century  (Waldstreicher  1997), predated Egyptian 
nationalism by a few decades.
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Clearly Haykal believes that a writer can represent ‘a whole nation’; 
so far, this seems to be purely a matter of intuition and feeling. But we 
will see in a moment that the writer must have other qualifications in 
order to accomplish this task.
Clarifying  to  some  extent  his  view  of  the  relationship  between 
Egypt and the other ‘nations of the Arab East’, Haykal says that  these 
other  nations  (umam) are no better off than Egypt  in terms of national 
literature. Among the writers of ‘our neighbours and sisters’ in Syria (al-
Šām), Iraq, Tunisia, Algeria and Marrakesh, one rarely finds a ‘national 
[qawmī] writer or poet’ who is to his nation (umma) what Homer was to 
Greece,  Goethe  to Germany,  or  al-Farazdaq  (on  whom  see  Blachère 
2011a), Abū Nuwās (on whom see Wagner 2011) and al-Mutanabbī ‘in the 
lands [bilād] of the Arabs’ (on whom see Blachère 2011b). Haykal repeats 
that he attributes this lack to the rule of other civilisations (madaniyyāt), 
which  oppressed  these  nations  (umam)  and  strove  to  erase  their 
civilisation (ḥaḍāra). Thus the civilisation (ḫaḍāra) of the Ottomans tried 
to  Turkify  the  Arab  realms  (mamālik)  that  submitted  to  its  rule;  the 
British and French have been even worse in this respect. The civilisation 
(ḥaḍāra) of the vanquished nations (umam) remained hidden, finding no 
outlet, nor any writer who embodied what the past had stored up in it.  
Yet,  he  says, these  Arab  nations  (umam),  which  are  linked  by 
geographical proximity, have an old, deep-rooted civilisation, which they 
share in many respects. At the same time, each one has its own distinctive 
character (ṭābiʿ), which is due to its natural environment and to ‘the types 
of activity found in it’ (Haykal 1968, 354).
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It  is  true,  he  adds,  that  in  these  nations  (umam),  there  are 
commoners (ʿāmmat al-nās) who produce colloquial literature (al-adab 
al-ʿāmmī) that reflects the character of the lands in which they live, but 
this literature is uncouth and does not deserve to survive, though it may 
be of use to historians and writers who are interested in the past of these 
nations (umam), during which oppression erased the sublime aspects of 
their  civilisation  (Haykal  1968,  354-355). This  makes  it  clear  that  for 
Haykal, a writer needs more than intuition and feeling to represent his 
nation: he also needs to master literary language. Colloquial language will 
not do. Moreover, we will now see that the national writer must possess 
another type of cultural capital as well.
Haykal asks: is it possible for a sublime national (qawmī) literature 
to return, one that distinguishes each of these nations and distinguishes 
them collectively as well?  Can they have  their own civilisation, whose 
flower would  be  art  and  literature,  and  ‘some  of  whose  great  men 
[kubarāʾ]’ would be considered ‘the ideal expression  [al-maṯal al-nāṭiq] 
of  its  meanings’57?  Yes,  says  Haykal,  but  only  if  each  nation  (umma) 
undertakes the full assimilation  (tamaṯṯul) of  the civilizations that have 
come to it, so that they ‘become part of its life, and people feel that these 
civilisations belong to them and are not something foreign’.  Then ‘the 
national [qawmī] artist and the national writer’ would surely appear. ‘The 
Arab East in general,  and each nation (umma) within it in particular’, 
would have a literature that was distinct from ancient literature as well as 
57 Because of a syntactic ambiguity, it is not clear whether this sentence is referring to 
the great men of the civilisation or the great men of art and literature. Considering 
Haykal’s  argument  as  a  whole,  though,  it  seems  that  these  two  categories  were 
identical in his view.
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from  ‘that  modern  literature  that  is  indebted,  for  the  most  part,  to 
Western civilisation [madaniyya], whose power dominates the East and 
its  nations’  (Haykal  1968,  355-356).  What  does  Haykal  mean  by 
assimilating the civilisations that have come to Egypt? As we will  see 
below, he does not mean writing novels about  the  Alexander the Great, 
the Roman Empire, the Arab conquests or the Ottoman sultans, or writing 
in Ottoman Turkish instead of Arabic, though such projects would follow 
logically from his argument.  Instead, this seemingly vague prescription 
serves to legitimate a very specific literary project: the assimilation of the 
European literary models that Haykal himself had studied in France.
Concluding his essay, Haykal says that when all this happens,  the 
national writer  will be in control of language,  will dictate to language 
academies what they should put in their dictionaries, and will determine 
the style that second-rate writers  will imitate. Sterile debates about ‘the 
old’ and ‘the new’ will disappear, and the language will be rejuvenated. 
The writers who are currently struggling to unite the Arab East’s hidden 
civilisation with the civilisations that have dominated it will be seen as 
heroes whose steadfastness and strength saved their country (awṭān), and 
the national writer will bestow on them the greatest glory (Haykal 1968, 
356). No doubt Haykal hoped that he himself would later be seen as one of 
these heroes. His essay on national literature was a manifesto for writers 
to follow; it is only logical that he would aim to follow his own proposal 
and become an exemplar of the kind of writer he was calling for, thus 
indirectly consecrating himself.
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From ‘Great Men’ to the Priesthood of National Writers
What did Haykal mean by ‘great men’? In order to clarify this, we 
must briefly consider the history of this concept as well as the particular  
way in which Haykal developed it.
In reformist intellectual circles, people were very interested in what 
were called either ‘great men’ (al-riǧāl al-aʿẓam,  aʿẓam al-riǧāl) or 
‘illustrious men’ (al-mašāhīr). . . . Illustrious men and great men, of 
all  times,  nationalities  and  types,  had  pride  of  place  in  Arabic 
publications at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 
20th. . . .  The theme of the great man in the Arabic press and in 
Arabic historical literature was a Western import. . . . Drenched in 
the various sources of Enlightenment thought, romanticism, English 
liberalism  and  racial  anthropology,  Arab  intellectuals  thus 
maintained the idea that the strength of nations depended both on 
their great men and on the worship of those great men, a worship 
that made it possible to shape the character of the middle strata by 
encouraging their activity and creative intelligence  (Dupont 2002, 
49, 53, 57).
In particular,  Haykal seems to have derived his concept of ‘great 
men’ from the ideas of the influential Scottish writer and essayist Thomas 
Carlyle  (1795-1881),  whose  book  Heroes  and  Hero  Worship (1869)  was 
translated into Arabic as Al-Abṭāl wa-ʿIbādat al-Buṭūla in 1911 (CD Smith 
1983, 17, 38, 41-42, 129, 205n). Carlyle argued that in the ideal social order, 
‘heroes’ or ‘great men’ with an innate capacity for leadership would wield 
absolute power:
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Great  men were the  prime movers  in  all  great  historical  events; 
hence  the  biographies  of  great  men  constituted  the  history  of 
mankind. . . . [Carlyle’s] hero was a sort of god who led a life apart 
from  the  people,  whom  he  ruled  as  master.  . . .  When  a  hero 
appeared,  the masses  instinctively  recognized his  superiority  and 
said to him: ‘We do not quite understand thee; we perceive thee to 
be nobler  and wiser  and bigger than we, and will  loyally follow 
thee.’  . . .  Whatever  he  said  and  whatever  he  did,  the  hero  was 
always  right  because  he  alone  saw the  real  and  true  causes  of 
events. Wise, brave, virtuous, and strong, the hero demanded and 
received unflinching obedience. He could rule only arbitrarily and 
would rule only justly. . . . The great event in the life of a nation 
was the appearance of the hero (Schapiro 1945, 100-101).
In  the  terms  of  our  theoretical  framework,  this  seems  to  be  a 
description  of  charisma,  the  strategy  of  the  prophets.  As  we  will  see 
below, Haykal placed the Prophet Muḥammad in this  category. Yet he 
also  extended  the  idea  of  ‘great  men’  to  encompass  not  only  the 
charismatic individual (who is seen by his followers as unique), but also 
the enlightened group:
Haykal wrote in his diary that in every age and society, ‘a group 
superior  to  the  rest  in  intelligence  and love  of  humanity’  would 
‘leave the living world for the inspiration of the spirit [where] they 
regained their  normal state  and rediscovered the realities  of  life, 
displayed in such an imaginative manner . . . that they denied it was 
their own discovery and said it was inspired by God. . . . Inspiration 
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is the attainment of greatness by the soul in its being freed from the 
material so that it can reach the truths residing in the interior of the 
world.  . . .’  These  were  the  men  who  ‘have  achieved  reality  as 
opposed to the masses who remain concerned with material matters 
and goals’ (CD Smith 1983, 41-42; cf. Selim 2004, 9-10).
This description of the activity of great men is remarkably similar to 
the description of the activity of the national writer that we saw above in 
Haykal’s  essay  ‘National  Literature’,  except  that  the  national  writer 
claims not that his work was inspired by God, but that it was inspired by 
the nation.  Yet as we have seen,  for Haykal,  the national writer’s work 
requires  not  only  inspiration,  but  also  a  mastery  of  Arabic  literary 
language, as well as a knowledge of one or more of the civilisations that 
have dominated Egypt.  In terms of our theoretical framework, Haykal’s 
concept of the ‘group’ of great men, who in his view are in fact ‘national 
writers’,  is thus a prescription for the strategy of priesthood:  thanks to 
their cultural capital,  they are to be recognised as having special insight 
into the ‘life of the nation’.
Zaynab
 Haykal’s first and best-known novel,  Zaynab,  has been called the 
first Arabic novel, and is certainly one of the earliest ones (Allen 1995, 32-
33). Haykal wrote it while  in Europe,  and published it  in Egypt in 1913, 
under the pen name Miṣrī Fallāḥ (A Peasant Egyptian). There is much in 
the novel  that is  not directly relevant to our purposes here,  but  if  we 
consider it as an expression of a literary stance – what Bourdieu  (1998, 
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378-384) called a prise de position – it is not difficult to see how it reflects 
the programme Haykal outlined in the essays considered above.
First, it puts into practice Haykal’s call to assimilate the civilisations 
that  have  dominated  Egypt,  by  imitating  the  conventions  of  the  19th-
century European Romantic novel.  Its plot revolves around the unhappy 
love lives of its mainly young characters58,  its heroine,  Zaynab, dies of a 
broken heart, and it is full of florid descriptions of natural landscapes. In 
one of the first reviews of the novel, the Egyptian critic Zakī Kūhīn (1913) 
quipped that  Zaynab’s interior monologue sounds as if she, an illiterate 
peasant  girl,  must  have  read  the  19th-century  French  Romantic  poet 
Alphonse de Lamartine.
Second, the novelist presents himself as the voice of the authentic 
Egyptian national character,  embodied by  Egyptian  peasants59.  He does 
this in two ways: by claiming to speak as an Egyptian peasant, on behalf 
of  all  Egyptian  peasants,  and  by  portraying the  Egyptian  natural 
environment, which, as we saw above,  he  regarded as the source of  the 
Egyptian national character.
Haykal dedicated the novel ‘to Egypt . . . the cradle of the revelation 
[mahbaṭ  waḥy] of  poetry  and wisdom at  the  beginning of  time’.  The 
phrase mahbaṭ al-waḥy is significant for our purposes. Literally ‘the place 
where revelation descended’, it normally means ‘the cradle of Islam’ (i.e. 
58 These are Ḥāmid, a Haykal-like upper-class character; Zaynab, a peasant girl; and 
Ibrāhīm, Zaynab’s true love. Ḥāmid has a brief flirtation with Zaynab but does not 
pursue it, since she is not of his class. Instead he falls in love with an upper-class girl,  
ʿAzīza, but her parents marry her to someone else. Zaynab’s parents, too, marry her 
to a man she does not love. As for Ibrāhīm, he is conscripted into the Egyptian army 
to serve in Sudan.
59 The notion of an authentic Egyptian character represented by peasants has been very 
durable; cf. Winegar (2006, 95-98).
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Mecca);  Haykal has transposed this  religious concept into  a  nationalist 
frame. He describes himself as tormented son of Egypt (Haykal 1913/1983, 
5), using the country-as-parent blend that we have encountered already. 
In the introduction to the third edition of the novel, he says that he chose 
the pseudonym Miṣrī Fallāḥ because he felt,
as  other  Egyptians  felt,  and  particularly  other  peasants,  that  the 
sons of notables [ʾabnāʾ al-ḏawāt], among others, who claimed the 
right to rule Egypt, viewed us Egyptians, and us peasants, with less 
respect than we60 deserved. So I wanted to display, on the cover of 
the novel that I presented to the public at that time . . .  that the 
peasant Egyptian has a deep feeling of prestige [makāna], and of 
the  respect  he  merits,  and  that  he  does  not  hesitate  to  make 
Egyptianness and peasanthood a  slogan with which to  introduce 
himself to the public, demanding that others venerate  [iǧlāl] and 
respect it (Haykal 1913/1983, 8).
In reality, Haykal was one of the ‘sons of notables’.  By identifying 
himself as a peasant,  i.e. as a member of a much lower social class,  and 
claiming that peasants have prestige and should be venerated, he prompts 
for a conceptual blend, which generates the inference that he himself has 
prestige  and should be venerated. It will  be worth keeping in mind, as 
well,  this  passage’s  tone  of  wounded  pride,  which  we  will  encounter 
again when discussing Gamal Abdel Nasser in Chapter 5.
The novel’s subtitle is Manāẓir wa-Aḫlāq Rīfiyya (Rural Landscapes 
and Morals).  Emphasising the importance of  its descriptions of Egyptian 
60 Note again the passage from ‘I’ to ‘we’.
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natural  landscapes,  Haykal says  in  the  introduction that  he  wrote  it 
mainly out of homesickness (which he refers to as al-ḥanīn li-l-waṭan, the 
name of the literary genre that we considered in Chapter 1), while he was 
in Europe, and also stresses that he was passionate about French literature 
at the time (Haykal 1913/1983, 9-11). He describes the stunning beauty of 
the Swiss countryside, only to assert that whenever he felt dazzled by it,  
he would reach for the notebook in which he was writing Zaynab, forget 
about  Switzerland,  and write  descriptions of  the Egyptian countryside, 
which was no less beautiful to him (Haykal 1913/1983, 11). If we keep in 
mind his theory of environmental determinism, this argument prompts 
for the inference that since the Egyptian natural environment is no less 
beautiful  than  the  Swiss  natural  environment,  the  Egyptian  national 
character is also no less beautiful than the Swiss national character. This 
argument may also be aimed at forestalling any suspicions that  Haykal 
had become too Europeanised to be  qualified to speak for his nation. In 
1881,  ʿAbd Allāh al-Nadīm had published, in his  newspaper  Al-Tankīt  
wa-l-Tabkīt,  a  withering  satirical  account  of  a  Europeanised  Egyptian 
who returns home from studies in France, having forgotten how to speak 
Arabic and acquired a distaste for Egyptian customs (Awad 1986, 84-86), 
i.e.  having  lost  the  ‘Egyptianness’  for  which Haykal  demands  respect. 
Finally, Haykal’s nationalist justification of his descriptions of Egyptian 
natural landscapes may be, in part, a response to critics, who reproached 
him for stuffing long, repetitive descriptions of nature into the narrative,  
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as if these passages were ends in themselves, with no relation to the plot61 
(Kūhīn 1913; ʿAllām 1982, 66).
A  nationalist  justification  of  Haykal’s  literary  stance  could  also 
serve another important purpose. In 1913, novels were widely considered 
morally suspect in Egypt (Brugman 1984, 205; Shalan 2006). Haykal notes 
that he initially hesitated to publish the novel, for fear that it would harm 
his reputation as a lawyer, and acknowledges that this is why he initially 
used a pseudonym (Haykal 1913/1983, 7). By presenting a certain type of 
prose fiction as an essential part of nationalism, Haykal legitimised it, and 
thus removed an obstacle that would have stood in the way of the sale of 
his books.
Finally,  Haykal’s environmental determinism served specific class 
interests. As Siddiq (2007, 91) observes, Haykal’s peasants are contented:
Social relations, especially class stratification, appear as immutable 
as  the  natural  order  they  mirror.  This  fundamental  structural 
correspondence precludes politics from the equation, and with it the 
idea of significant change. Moreover, in the process of consecrating 
the status quo and the class division inscribed therein it occludes 
class conflict altogether. No matter how dire their condition, or how 
arduous  their  work,  the  peasants  in  Haykal’s  novel  are  always 
content with their lot.  They are said to derive ample recompense 
from the serene beauty of the landscape, which, it so happens, they 
cultivate for the benefit of avaricious landowners.
61 Yaḥyā Ḥaqqī (1975/2008, 48) argued that nature is actually the main character in the 
story.
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In short, if the character of the physical environment determines the 
character of the social order, and if the physical environment is beautiful, 
it follows that the social order is beautiful. Thus Haykal naturalised his 
own dominant position in that social order. Bourdieu argues that this is 
one of  the functions of  religion:  to  provide the dominant  classes  with 
‘justifications of their existence in its specific form, that is, their existence 
as  occupants  of  a  determinate  social  position’  (1987a,  124).  Here 
nationalism serves the same purpose. While the novel critiques injustices 
inflicted  on  the  peasants,  as  Jeff  Shalan  observes,  Haykal’s  ‘persistent 
desire to romanticize peasant culture’  keeps this critique  within narrow 
limits:
Haykal  is  by no means advocating a  fundamental  change in  the 
relationship between the peasant and land-owning classes, but only 
a more humane maintenance of it through higher wages and better 
working conditions.  Indeed, a more radical argument for change, 
such  as  substantial  land  reform,  peasant  collectives,  or  a 
redistribution  of  income,  could  represent  a  potentially  serious 
disruption of that relationship and thus strike at the very core of the 
territorialist’s  image  of  the  Egyptian  nation  as  embodied  in  the 
eternally unchanging ways of the peasant (Shalan 2006, 223-224; cf. 
CD Smith 1983, 50, 56).
The Film Adaptations of Zaynab
Zaynab was the first novel to be made into an Egyptian film (Qāsim 
1996, 5). Muḥammad Karīm (1896-1972)  adapted it twice for the cinema, 
once in 1930 and  a second time in 1952,  just  before the  Free Officers’ 
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military coup.  The 1930 version has been lost  (Qāsim 1996, 6), and the 
1952  version  is  not  available  for  viewing,  but  Karīm’s  published 
recollections of  the making of these films provide valuable insights into 
the reception of the novel.
Karīm first read Zaynab when he was seventeen years old and was 
captivated by it, convinced that it ‘expressed the nature of our nation and 
country [šaʿbina wa bilādina]’, although he had never actually seen the 
Egyptian countryside, and had no knowledge of it other than what he had 
read in Zaynab (Karīm 1969, 42, 46). Before shooting the silent version of 
the  film,  he  visited  Haykal’s  family  in  the  Delta,  and  thus  saw  the 
Egyptian countryside for the first time. Karīm felt that the most important 
thing in the film would be the landscapes, which should show a positive 
image of the Egyptian countryside. Yet he did not film in Haykal’s village, 
because it lacked suitably ‘poetic’ landscapes. Moreover, he visited many 
other villages without finding anything he deemed worth filming. Finally, 
he constructed an imaginary village landscape, by combining shots filmed 
in many different parts of Egypt,  in order to obtain the desired effect. 
Similarly, when he saw how peasants really lived (in dirty, smoky houses, 
sharing rooms with farm animals), he was appalled, and decided that if he 
filmed peasant life as it  really was,  it  would be ‘negative propaganda’ 
about Egypt. Instead, he would have to film it ‘as it should be, not as it is 
now’. Thus, for example, before filming a street scene, he paid children to 
clean  the  street  thoroughly  (Karīm 1969,  50-54).  In  1951,  when Karīm 
suggested to a producer the idea of a remake of the film, the producer, 
who  had  not  seen  the  original  version,  was  concerned  at  first  that 
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Egyptian film audiences  would  not  appreciate  the  ‘atmosphere’  of  the 
Egyptian countryside. Karīm reassured him that he would again film the 
countryside ‘as it should be, not as it is’  (ʿĀlī 1969, 28). Haykal  praised 
both films; after seeing the second version, he told Karīm: ‘We62 want a 
countryside in Egypt like the one you created for us in the film’  (Karīm 
1969, 59; ʿĀlī 1969, 31).  In this type of nationalist discourse, ‘[p]easants 
and the urban poor can be tolerated only if patronized or romanticized’ 
(Saad 1998).  Thus nationalist  intellectuals  do  not  merely  invent  a  past 
populated with  invented traditions  (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992); they 
also invent the present.
During the shooting of the second film, Karīm hired peasant women 
for a scene in which they were to harvest cotton; when they arrived for 
the shooting,  they were wearing silk dresses and polished black shoes. 
They were disappointed when he told them to wear their ordinary clothes 
(‘as long as they were clean’)  (ʿĀlī 1969, 28).  The peasant women, who 
had probably never seen a film, but understood that they were going to 
meet important people from Cairo, seem to have judged that it would be 
appropriate  to  wear  formal  attire.  This  is  not  so  different  from what 
Karīm himself was doing by portraying the countryside ‘as it should be’, 
except that his vision of how the countryside ‘should be’ did not include 
peasant  women  in  silk  dresses.  Like  Haykal,  he  sought  to  portray  an 
idealised version of the countryside, but with its class hierarchy intact.
62 Note again the use of ‘we’.
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Competition Between Two Priesthoods
Haykal’s  nationalism,  which  involved  reverence  for  a  godlike 
waṭan which allegedly created Egyptians in its  own image, as well  as 
glorification  of  a  priesthood  of  ‘national  writers’  who  were  uniquely 
qualified to be the umma’s true leaders, lent itself to competition between 
‘national writers’  and the clergy for symbolic power.  This competition 
manifested itself in a variety of ways in Haykal’s writings as well as in his 
career.
According  to  Charles  Smith  (1983,  41), Haykal  had  reached  the 
conclusion, while studying in Europe, ‘that religions were not inspired by 
a divine being’; instead they were ‘social phenomena reflecting historical 
circumstances’, and ‘prophets such as Muḥammad were products of their 
time, self-inspired men despite their  sincere beliefs  that they had been 
chosen  by  God’.  Thus  in  Zaynab,  there  seems  to  be no  God  above 
Ḥāmid’s head; there is only sky:
Ḥāmid knelt before the sky and gazed up at it, as if he saw in it a  
refuge  from despair.  . . .  He knelt  with  a  humble  heart  . . .  then 
raised his hands, wishing . . . to turn to God in repentance. . . . But 
the  sky  remained blue,  oblivious  to  his  prayer,  unmoved by  his 
distress (Haykal 1913/1983, 240).
Throughout his career, Haykal consistently argued that the clergy’s 
influence in society should be nullified (CD Smith 1983, 39-40, 42-43, 53-
55, 95, 98-99, 103-106, 115, 136, 139). Charles Smith (1983, 43) summarises 
Haykal’s view of Islam in the following way:
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Egypt should cast off Islam and its culture in order to discover its 
Egyptianness  which  was  pre-Islamic.  A  great  deal  of  Haykal’s 
thought in the 1920s would be devoted to this issue, particularly in 
his support of the Pharaonic movement in literature. Discovery of 
Egypt’s  true,  unIslamic  nature  went  hand  in  hand  with  the 
inculcation of rationalistic values which would undermine Islam as 
a religious and social force.
In keeping with this view, Zaynab contains a scathing portrait of a 
man of religion. Towards the end the novel, Shaykh Masʿūd, the eminent 
leader of a Sufi order, visits the village, and a banquet is prepared for him. 
Haykal’s description of the shaykh is worth quoting at length:
Had there been a soul inside him, or a conscience capable of feeling, 
he would have been deeply ashamed to see himself – he who called 
people  to  God,  to  the  blessings  of  the  next  life  and  to  the 
renunciation of the pleasures of this ephemeral world – sitting on a 
comfortable chair eating delicious food, while those good-hearted 
workers sat on a hard mat eating vile kitchen scraps. He would have 
been even more ashamed to know that he was idle, with no work 
other than roaming about the land, for the sole purpose of eating, 
drinking  and  pronouncing  worthless  words,  while  the  workers 
exerted themselves day and night in order to feed people by means 
of their labour. But what conscience inhabited the heart of a lowly, 
ill-mannered  charlatan  who  lived  by  deception?  Was  Shaykh 
Masʿūd not that man who spent ten years between the walls of al-
Azhar without learning anything, and who, when he despaired of 
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succeeding, and his father could no  longer afford to support him, 
left  learning  to  those  who  understood it,  and  went  wandering 
aimlessly, wearing what looked like a monk’s frock, long-haired and 
alone? But that occupation brought him no reward, so he cleaned 
himself up a bit, put on a headband, and went about claiming to be 
a shaykh, making pacts with poor wretches who believed that ‘He 
who has no shaykh, his shaykh is the devil’ (Haykal 1913/1983, 242).
In  the  1920s,  Haykal  and  his  fellow  nationalists  shaped  their 
nationalism into a particular form that may have seemed, to them, as if it 
could win the kind of mass loyalty that Islam had won: Pharaonism, the 
nationalist revival of ancient Egypt.
Its  passionate tenor,  the Utopian visions embodied in it,  and the 
messianic expectation that it could and would be realized in post-
1919  Egypt  made  Pharaonicism  the  heart  and  soul  of  Egyptian 
territorial  nationalism.  . . .  Pharaonicist  intellectuals  were  not 
content with mere formulation of theoretical views about Egypt’s 
Pharaonic  nature  or  with  the  confinement  of  their  ideas  to 
intellectual  circles.  Rather,  they  constantly  strove  to  realize  and 
actualize the Pharaonic truths they were rediscovering. They gave a 
great deal of attention to disseminating the truths of Pharaonicism 
to the Egyptian public (Gershoni and Jankowski 1986, 164).
Like other prominent nationalists such as Salāmā Mūsā and Aḥmad 
Ḥusayn, Haykal argued that Pharaonism had a racial basis, that ‘a blood 
relationship linked ancient and modern Egyptians, creating both physical 
and  mental  similarities  between  them’;  thus  ‘biology  made  modern 
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Egyptians “Pharaonic”’  (Gershoni and Jankowski 1986, 165-166). Haykal 
exhorted  Egyptians  ‘to  realize  the  inherent  Pharaonicism of  Egypt  by 
reconstructing their links with their Pharaonic forefathers’ (Gershoni and 
Jankowski 1986, 167). The discovery of the tomb of Tutankhamun in 1922 
lent itself to this effort.  Prominent nationalists including Haykal, Aḥmad 
Ḥusayn and ʿAbbās Maḥmūd al-ʿAqqād made pilgrimages to Pharaonic 
monuments during the 1920s, and Haykal demanded ‘that every Egyptian 
make  a  similar  pilgrimage  in  order  to  experience  their  majesty  for 
himself’ (Gershoni and Jankowski 1986, 168-171). These pilgrimages were 
indeed called ḥaǧǧ, the same word used to refer to the Islamic pilgrimage 
to Mecca. Aḥmad Ḥusayn describes his pilgrimage to the Karnak temple 
in Luxor as if it were a religious conversion and a call to prophethood:
Everything  that  surrounded  us  filled  our  souls  with 
enchantment. . . . Suddenly, powerful feelings overcame me and I 
launched into some songs from  The Glory of Ramses63. I began to 
shout from the depths of my soul, while some of my companions 
who knew the words joined me: ‘Carry on in the face of passing 
time,  O  Egypt,  O  beautiful  homeland!  Destroy  your  enemy  on 
Judgment Day! Heed the call and sacrifice yourselves! . . . We stood 
next to these columns, when suddenly the place engulfed us and we 
almost  lost  consciousness  of  our  own existence  (quoted in  Colla 
2007, 157-158).
63 ‘The Pharaonic age was often set to music. Two popular productions of the 1920s 
were  The  Glory  of  Ramses (1923)  and  Tut-Ankh-Amon (1924),  both  written  by 
Maḥmūd Murād with music composed by Sayyid Darwīsh’ (Gershoni and Jankowski 
1986, 183).
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Husayn then ‘stood on a rock and, in a scene that prefigures his 
career as a public speaker, used the example of the antiquities to exhort 
his companions to (re)build the Egyptian nation’. ‘I was reborn, a new 
creature,’ wrote Husayn, in the language of religious conversion, adding, 
‘I stood there as if I were receiving orders and instructions’  (Colla 2007, 
158),  like  the  Prophet  Muḥammad  receiving  instructions  from  the 
Archangel Gabriel in the traditional account of the revelation of Islam. 
In 1929, statements such as these appeared in Egyptian newspapers: 
‘The [Egyptian] nation does not know any religion except the religion of 
patriotism’, and ‘the Egyptian national body contains, besides Muslims, 
the religious groups of the Christians and the Jews, and Egypt does not 
feel  today  and will  not  feel  in  the  future  anything except  its  distinct 
Egyptian nationalism’ (quoted in Gershoni and Jankowski 1986, 253-254). 
Such affirmations prompt for a conception in which religion belongs only 
to individuals within the nation, but not to the nation as a personified 
entity, which knows only ‘the religion of patriotism’. This conception can 
be understood in light of Haykal’s environmental determinism: the nation 
is loyal only to its creator, the waṭan.  As we saw above, for Haykal, the 
national character imposed by the  waṭan on its inhabitants nullified the 
differences between religions. In effect, the discourse we are considering 
here affirms that, while  the religious beliefs of individuals are tolerated, 
nationalism should be the nation’s official belief system and thus should 
take precedence over religion.
This view was not widely accepted in Egypt. ‘Quite simply, secular-
liberal nationalism was not a language which the majority of Egyptians 
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could understand’  (Mondal 2003, 155). The short story ‘Ḥadīṯ al-Qarya’ 
(Village  Small  Talk)64 (Lāšīn  1999,  231-240),  by  Maḥmūd  Ṭāhir  Lāšīn 
(1894-1954),  published in 1929,  vividly  and plausibly  portrays the stark 
contrast  between  the  habitus  of  a  Cairene  afandī and  that of of  the 
peasants in village he visits, suggesting that the clergy’s symbolic power 
among peasants remained  unassailable. Sitting with a group of peasants 
in  the  evening,  the  afandī tries  to  lecture  them  about  progress  and 
modernisation, but they understand nothing of what he says, and pay no 
attention to him. Then the shaykh that they revere arrives, and delivers a 
sermon full of Islamic formulas and references to the Qurʾān; its moral is 
that people should not try to rise above their social class. The peasants 
listen approvingly with rapt attention.
As we will see in the next chapter,  nationalist intellectuals would 
soon  find a  solution  to  this  dilemma:  to  call  for  the  appearance  of  a 
prophet of nationalism, who would rouse the masses and convert them to 
the afandiyya’s nationalist creed. As for Haykal, he was not prepared to 
accept  such a scenario. This  stance  is reflected in his opposition to  the 
most charismatic nationalist political leaders of his time, Muṣṭafā Kāmil 
and  Saʿd  Zaġlūl.  While  studying  law  in  Cairo  from 1905  to  1908,  he 
expressed his  criticism of  Kāmil  ‘in  elitist  terms . . .  declaring that  he 
“began to feel that the following of the masses was the easy way” which 
would usually lead to error’  (CD Smith 1983, 37). After the First World 
War,  he  and his  party,  the  Liberal  Constitutionalists,  fiercely  opposed 
Zaġlūl, on the same grounds (CD Smith 1983, 61-73; Reid 1990, 33):
64 For an analysis and English translation of the story, see Hafez (1993, 233-268).
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The intense antagonism which arose between Saʿd Zaġlūl’s Wafd 
and the Liberal Constitutionalist party to which Haykal belonged 
went beyond disagreement over nationalist priorities; it ultimately 
was founded, in Haykal’s view, on disagreement over the legitimate 
source  of  power,  popular  acclaim  as  opposed  to  intellectual 
qualifications . . . (CD Smith 1983, 61).
In terms of our theoretical framework, this was a conflict between 
the strategy of the prophets and the strategy of the priests. While it is not 
obvious why Haykal in particular should have taken this uncompromising 
stance,  the  existence of  such  a  stance  is  not  surprising  in  itself; as 
Bourdieu  (1971a,  6) explains, the strategies of  priests  and prophets put 
them in competition with each other for lay followers.
In  the  short  term,  however,  the  nationalist  priesthood’s  main 
competitors remained the  Muslim clergy,  who had considerable political 
support.  After  Turkey’s abolition of the Caliphate in 1924,  Egypt’s  King 
Fuʾād attempted to promote the idea that a restored Caliphate should be 
established  in  Egypt,  clearly  intending  to  become  Caliph  and  thus  to 
increase  his  symbolic  power  (Gershoni  and Jankowski  1986,  55-74).  In 
1925,  in  the  midst  of  this  controversy,  ʿAlī  ʿAbd  al-Rāziq  (1888-1966) 
published  a  book  called  Al-Islām  wa-Uṣūl  al-Ḥukm (Islam  and  the 
Principles of Government),  which argued that the Caliphate was not a 
legitimate Islamic institution, that the Prophet Muḥammad’s mission had 
been spiritual  rather than political,  and that Islam did not specify any 
particular type of political system; hence Muslims were free to choose a 
political system on non-religious grounds. This stance was a reasonable 
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one for ʿAbd al-Rāziq to take. His family ‘was prominent in the leadership 
of the Liberal Party’ (Gershoni and Jankowski 1986, 61; cf. Mondal 2003, 
164-165) and was ‘a main backer of  al-Siyāsa’  (CD Smith 1983, 78), the 
party’s  newspaper.  ʿAbd  al-Rāziq  had  graduated  from  al-Azhar,  then 
studied at Oxford (Hourani 1983, 183). Though formally a member of the 
ʿulamāʾ,  in  reality  ʿAbd  al-Rāziq,  like  al-Ṭahṭāwī, occupied  an 
intermediate  social  position  closer  to the  afandiyya.  He was  therefore 
well-positioned to launch a heterodox attack on the dominant positions in 
the religious field. Moreover, he could reasonably have expected support 
from those who, like the Liberal Party, opposed the King’s bid to become 
Caliph.  Many  in  Egypt  perceived  ʿAbd  al-Rāziq’s  book  ‘as  a  political 
attack  on  the  King  and  his  Caliphal  aspirations’;  ‘with  its  attacks  on 
individual and arbitrary rule,’ the book ‘was indeed part and parcel of the 
Liberal  political  outlook’  (Gershoni and Jankowski  1986,  62).  However, 
ʿAbd al-Rāziq’s challenge to religious orthodoxy was unsuccessful.  The 
Shaykh  of  al-Azhar  ‘arraigned  ʿAlī  ʿAbd  al-Rāziq  before  the  Grand 
Council of 'ʿUlamāʾ on charges that can be most cogently characterized as 
the  divergence  of  ʿAbd  al-Rāziq’s  views  from  the  traditional 
understandings adhered to by his peers’. He was ‘found guilty of holding 
the  impermissible  views  ascribed  to  him  in  the  indictment  and 
accordingly was dismissed from membership in the corps of ʿulamāʾ’; this 
also  resulted  in  his  dismissal  from his  post  in  the  state  sharia  courts 
(Gershoni and Jankowski 1986, 62-63). The clergy’s formidable symbolic 
power to excommunicate Muslims arguably explains why ‘[t]here seems 
to have been practically no one in Egypt in 1925 who cared to agree in 
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public with the Shaykh’s radical interpretation of Islam’, and why those 
who came to his defence did so almost exclusively on grounds of freedom 
of  expression,  rather  than  to  defend  the  views  expressed  in  the  book 
(Gershoni  and Jankowski  1986,  68).  ʿAlī  ʿAbd  al-Rāziq  then  became a 
political liability for those who had supported him.
al-Siyāsa had been ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq’s chief defender. . . . It now 
bore the brunt of attacks initiated by Azhari  ʿulamāʾ but taken up 
by Unionists and, finally, the Wafd. The paper’s argument that the 
constitution guaranteed freedom of opinion and religious abstention 
from state matters was ignored. The ʿulamāʾ accused al-Siyāsa and 
the Liberals of atheism and were hardly mollified by the paper’s 
response. It depicted the Azhar committee of  ʿulamāʾ as a ‘social 
committee’  which  resembled  ‘religious  courts  in  the  Middle 
Ages’.  . . .  The  Liberals  and  al-Siyāsa found  themselves  isolated 
from many sectors of Egyptian opinion (CD Smith 1983, 79).
Haykal’s  opponent  in  the  1926  parliamentary  election  campaign 
‘accused Haykal of atheism and of working to destroy Islam, defeating 
him by 1,899 votes to 697. . . .  Wafd and Azhar accusations of atheism 
continued following the appearance in 1926 of Ṭāhā Ḥusayn’s  Fī al-Šiʿr  
al-Ǧāhilī (On Pre-Islamic Poetry)’65 (CD Smith 1983, 80).
The  idea  that  nationalism  should  take  precedence  over religion 
faced even more serious challenges in the 1930s. Gershoni and Jankowski 
(1995,  xiii) argue  that  urbanisation  and  the  expansion  of  literacy 
broadened the  afandiyya category to include larger numbers of  people 
65 On the controversy surrounding Ṭāhā Ḥusayn’s book, see Berque (1966).
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from  less  privileged  classes,  who  were  ‘more  deeply  rooted  in  Arab-
Islamic modes of expression than the smaller and more Westernized elite 
of the previous generation’. The appearance of a new type of clientèle for 
cultural  products  transformed  the  market:  ‘this  growing  body  of 
consumers soon generated its own producers of ideas’, and ‘the growth of 
this population had a feedback effect, influencing the older generation’ to 
adapt their production to the demands of this new category of consumers 
(Gershoni  and  Jankowski  1995,  13-14). These  ‘new  afandiyya’  had  no 
interest  in  Pharaonism,  and  were  far  more  attached  to  ‘Arab-Islamic 
symbols and referents’ than  their predecessors had been  (Gershoni and 
Jankowski 1995, 14).  Thus ‘[t]he new conditions of the 1930s and 1940s 
created a suitable environment for the return of Islamic sentiments and 
concepts  to  the  center  of  Egyptian  thought’  (Gershoni  and  Jankowski 
1995, 54).
One reflection of this changed environment was the appearance of 
the  Muslim  Brotherhood.  Founded  in  1928  by  its  charismatic  leader, 
Ḥasan al-Bannā,  it  quickly  became one of  the largest  and most  active 
nationalist  organisations.  Al-Bannā  was  in  many  ways  a  highly 
representative example of the new afandiyya. He was the son of Shaykh 
Aḥmad  al-Bannā,  a  village  maʾḏūn (marriage  notary),  imām (prayer 
leader) and mosque teacher who was ‘widely respected for his religious 
learning and piety, though he had had only a limited formal education in 
Islamic sciences’,  and who ‘edited and wrote several  books on Islamic 
traditions in cooperation with other Islamic scholars’  (Lia 1998, 22–23). 
The family  ‘owned some landed property’  and ‘belonged to  the upper 
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echelons  of  the  merchant-artisan  class’,  but  they  were  not  wealthy; 
Shaykh  Aḥmad  ‘owned  a  shop  where  he  repaired  watches  and  sold 
gramophones  to  supplement  his  income’,  and  the  family  ‘faced  acute 
financial problems’ in the 1920s (Lia 1998, 23–24). In addition to absorbing 
Islamic  learning  from his  father,  and  taking  advantage  of  his  father’s 
‘extensive library  of  Islamic  literature’,  Ḥasan al-Bannā studied  at  the 
mosque  school  of  Shaykh  Muḥammad  Zahrān,  ‘an  Islamic  scholar  of 
considerable learning’ and editor of an Islamic journal (Lia 1998, 24–25). 
Shaykh Aḥmad wanted his  son  to  pursue  his  studies  at  al-Azhar,  but 
Ḥasan al-Bannā refused, and instead studied at a state middle school, then 
at the Primary Teachers’ Training School in the town of Damanhūr, and 
finally  in  Cairo at  Dār al-ʿUlūm, the teacher training school  discussed 
above. Photographs invariably show him wearing a fez and a European-
style suit and tie, the uniform of the  afandī. The nationalist uprising of 
1919 occurred when he was thirteen years old,  and in his memoirs he 
recalled ‘his role as one of the student activists leading demonstrations in 
Damanhūr, composing nationalistic poetry and even negotiating with the 
police who tried to disperse the crowd of demonstrators’  (Lia 1998, 27). 
With a habitus durably formed in a social class ‘among whom the virtues 
of religious piety and Islamic learning were highly cherished’  (Lia 1998, 
24), and a combination of religious and non-religious cultural capital, al-
Bannā was well-placed to straddle the categories of shaykh and  afandī, 
and thus to found a movement that would appeal to the ‘new afandiyya’. 
It is therefore not suprising to find that his nationalism, like that of Rašīd 
Riḍā, was clearly subordinated to religion.
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Al-Bannā’s account of  the statement of  a group of workers who 
asked him to become their  leader,  thus  encouraging him to found the 
Muslim Brotherhood, corresponds closely to Carlyle’s description of the 
masses’ attitude towards ‘great men’, and includes the concept of service 
to the waṭan alongside the concept of service to God:
We are unable to perceive the road to action as you perceive it, or to 
know the path to the service of the patria [waṭan], the religion, and 
the nation [umma] as you know it.  As that we desire now is to 
present you with all that we possess, to be acquitted by God of the 
responsibility, and for you to be responsible before Him for us and 
for what we must do (quoted in RP Mitchell 1993, 8).
Al-Bannā  rejected  Pharaonism,  and  argued  that  Egypt  deserved 
loyalty simply because it was a Muslim country.
He writes, ‘Egyptianism [Miṣriyya] . . . has its place in our mission, 
and its status and right in the struggle. . . . Egypt is a country of 
faith that has generously embraced Islam. How could we not strive 
for Egypt and for Egypt’s welfare? . . . We66 are proud that we are 
true to this beloved country [waṭan]. . . . But we resist with all our 
strength . . . the program that seeks to recreate [ancient] Egypt after 
God gave Egypt the teachings of Islam . . . and provided her with 
honor and glory beyond that of [the ancient past], and rescued her 
from  the  filth  of  paganism,  the  rubbish  of  polytheism,  and  the 
habits  of  the  Ǧāhiliyya.  . . .’  In  another  essay  on  nationalism in 
Egypt, Banna writes, ‘If what is meant by nationalism is: the revival 
66 Note again use of ‘we’ instead of ‘I’.
232
of the customs of a pagan age [ǧāhiliyya]  that  have been swept 
away; or the reconstitution of extinct mores that have disappeared; 
or the erasure of a benevolent civilization that has been established; 
or  the  dissolution  of  the  bonds  of  Islam  under  the  banner  of 
nationalism and racial pride (as some regimes have done, going so 
far as to destroy the traits of Islam and Arabism in names, script 
and expressions), so as to resurrect long-forgotten pagan customs; if 
this is the kind of nationalism that is meant, then it is despicable 
and harmful in its effects’ (Colla 2007, 247-248).
Clearly al-Bannā would never have gone on a pilgrimage to Karnak 
Temple.  For him, religion must take precedence over nationalism, rather 
than  the  reverse.  His  views  found  a  very  broad  audience.  Under  his 
leadership, the Muslim Brotherhood grew to have three hundred branches 
throughout Egypt in 1938, and two thousand by 1948; he claimed that the 
organisation  had  half  a  million  active  members  in  1945,  and  some 
estimates  put  its  membership  at  two  million  in  1948-1949  (Carré  and 
Michaud 1983, 21).
In  response  to  these  challenges,  a  number  of  afandī nationalist 
intellectuals,  including  Haykal, ‘turned  to  writing  about  Muḥammad, 
early  Islamic  history,  or  Islamic  civilization  after  1930.  This  included 
writers who had not addressed Islamic subjects in the past or who had 
previously treated Islam in a critical way’ (Gershoni and Jankowski 1995, 
55).  These  writings  are  known  as  the  Islāmiyyāt.  Haykal’s  Ḥayāt  
Muḥammad (The Life of Muḥammad, 1935) was an immensely successful 
example  of  this  genre  (Gershoni  and  Jankowski  1995,  56-57).  Haykal 
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claimed to have written the book as a response to Christian missionary 
activity  in Egypt,  in  order to  defend the Muslim faith  (Costet-Tardieu 
2005,  92).  However,  far  from contradicting  his efforts  to  decrease  the 
influence  of  the  clergy in Egypt,  Ḥayāt  Muḥammad was  in  reality  a 
continuation of those efforts.
Haykal makes every effort to explain all the events in Muḥammad’s 
life in terms that are compatible with modern science, allowing only the 
least possible divine intervention, the bare minimum that cannot possibly 
be denied without rejecting Islam altogether. Thus he acknowledges no 
miracles other than the revelation of the Qurʾān (Gershoni and Jankowski 
1995,  57).  For  example,  he  argues  that  in  al-isrāʾ  wa-l-miʿrāǧ,  which 
Islamic tradition describes as Muḥammad’s night journey to Jerusalem on 
a winged horse followed by his ascension to heaven, it was Muḥammad’s 
soul  that  travelled,  not  his  body.  Modern  science,  Haykal  says,  has 
discovered forces such as radio waves that can transmit images through 
space;  such  forces  might  explain  Muḥammad’s  impression  of  having 
made the night journey (Haykal 1935/2005, 162-167).
In the preface to the second edition, Haykal repeatedly emphasises 
that he has based the book on ‘the modern scientific method’, and written 
it in ‘the style of the age’, because ‘in the eyes of our contemporaries, this  
is the proper way to write history’  (Haykal 1935/2005, 53). He views the 
classical  biographies  of  Muḥammad  and  the  collections  of  hadith as 
unreliable sources containing fabricated material;  therefore, he says, he 
has relied mainly on the Qurʾān, which he considers to be the best source 
of  information  about  the  Prophet’s  life  (Haykal  1935/2005,  53-65).  In 
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reality, Haykal modelled Ḥayāt Muḥammad on La Vie de Mahomet (1929) 
by  the  French  Orientalist  Emile  Dermenghem.  In  his  memoirs,  ‘he 
describes how he first heard of  La Vie de Mahomet at a party when he 
asked for a European account of Muḥammad’s life which he could use in 
defending the Prophet against missionary attacks’;  he then published a 
review  of  Dermenghem’s  study  as  a  series  of  articles  in  his  party’s 
newspaper, al-Siyāsa.
It  was  only  when  Ḥayāt  Muḥammad was  published as  a  nearly 
verbatim replica of the al-Siyāsa articles that references to Muslim 
sources  appeared;  they  often  corroborated  Dermenghem’s 
arguments, with his name removed, by referring to Muslim texts 
which  supported  them.  Haykal  could  not  have  admitted  being 
inspired  by  Western  sources  at  the  time  he  wrote  Ḥayāt 
Muḥammad,  when  he  was  supposedly  defending  the  Prophet 
against Western denigrations of his reputation (CD Smith 1983, 113-
114).
Haykal  ‘attributed to Muḥammad and the Qurʾān support of  the 
idea of detached scientific examination of all materials’  (CD Smith 1983, 
115), arguing that ‘Muḥammad’s own methods of preaching and analysis 
were thoroughly rationalist’ and ‘resembled the scientific method of the 
modern era based on the unbiased and objective investigation of worldly 
phenomena’  (Gershoni  and  Jankowski  1995,  57).  Thus  he  invoked the 
Prophet’s authority to imply,  in effect,  that all of the ʿulamāʾ’s expertise 
was  worthless except  for  knowledge  of  the  Qurʾān,  and  that  only  a 
scholar  who was  well-versed in  modern scientific  methods,  as  Haykal 
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himself implicitly claimed to be, was qualified to write a biography of 
Muḥammad.  By  arguing  that  the  Qurʾān  ‘gave  an  accurate  picture  of 
God’s  and  Muḥammad’s  intentions,  later  subverted  by  the  ʿulamāʾ’, 
Haykal ‘could then extrapolate from it  principles  similar  to  the liberal 
secularism he had advocated previously. Now they would be sanctioned 
by  God  in  order  to  invalidate  the  power  of  religious  officials  in  the 
modern day’ (CD Smith 1983, 115).
Haykal includes Carlyle’s  Heroes and Hero Worship in  the book’s 
bibliography (Haykal 1935/2005, 9); in keeping with Carlyle’s theory, he 
presents Muḥammad as a ‘great man’ who, ‘like all great men, was above 
obedience  to  the  laws  of  society  [sumuww min al-ḫuḍūʿ  li-qānūn al-
muǧtamaʿ yusmaḥ bihi li-kull ʿaẓīm]’  (Haykal 1935/2005, 258-259). God, 
he writes, has given some people ‘talents for science and logic in order for 
them to be the heirs of the prophets [waraṯat al-anbiyāʾ], guiding us in 
doing what we should do and avoiding what we should not do’ (Haykal 
1935/2005, 444). This argument, which amounted to saying that ‘[h]istory 
had now evolved to the stage where scientists  replaced prophets’,  was 
consistent  with Haykal’s  stance of  twenty years  earlier,  and was ‘still 
intended to neutralize the influence of the ʿulamāʾ’ (CD Smith 1983, 123). 
‘Faith was now dependent  on knowledge,  with the type of  knowledge 
necessary  for  faith  being  the  scientific  productivity  of  the  West’  (CD 
Smith 1983, 128).
Simply by writing the book, Haykal implied that intellectuals with 
non-religious training, like himself, were better qualified than the ʿulamāʾ 
to write about Islam. Moreover, he ‘made no mention of the sharia in 
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Ḥayāt Muḥammad’  (CD Smith 1983, 187), thus implying that it, like  the 
hadith, was  a  superfluous  invention  of  the  ʿulamāʾ.  With  Islamic  law 
eliminated and Islamic doctrine reduced to the contents of the Qurʾān, 
which was to be studied by means of modern scientific methods rather 
than those of the  ʿulamāʾ,  no role remained for the clergy in Haykal’s 
version  of  Islam.  Indeed,  in  his  party’s  newspaper,  al-Siyāsa,  Haykal 
‘denied the  ʿulamāʾ the right to play a role in society, advising them to 
devote  themselves  entirely  to  the  service  of  God,  in  renunciation  and 
asceticism’ (Costet-Tardieu 2005, 63).
Haykal  took the same stance,  though  not entirely consistently, in 
his political career as well. His relationship with Muṣṭafā al-Marāġī (1881-
1945), who was appointed Shaykh of al-Azhar by King Fuʾād in 1928, is a 
case in point.  Al-Marāġī’s appointment took place in an atmosphere of 
intense conflict between al-Azhar and the Parliament.  At stake was the 
outcome of a prolonged struggle between nationalist intellectuals and the 
ʿulamāʾ for control  over  educational  institutions that granted access to 
jobs in the civil service. In 1926, a royal decree had transferred control of 
Dār al-ʿUlūm (the teacher training college) and the School for Judges from 
the Ministry of Education to al-Azhar; in 1927, the parliamentary majority 
of  Saʿd  Zaġlūl’s  nationalist  Wafd  party had  reversed  this  decision, 
provoking demonstrations of Azhar students who chanted ‘Down with 
Saʿd and the Parliament! Long live the King!’ (Temimi 2008, 151). Clearly 
the  Azhar  students’  commitment  to  their  religious interests  as  future 
members of the  ʿulamāʾ took precedence over any  nationalist allegiance 
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they may have felt towards Saʿd Zaġlūl,  the most venerated of Egypt’s 
nationalist leaders at the time.
In this struggle, both Haykal and al-Marāġī played ambiguous roles, 
mediating to some extent between the two sides. The ʿulamāʾ were hostile 
to al-Marāġī’s appointment; they considered him more a politician than a 
religious scholar, and disapproved of his views on the reform of al-Azhar. 
The reforms he advocated, which aimed to increase al-Azhar’s influence 
in society and to improve the job opportunities of its graduates, would 
have involved the reintegration of Dār al-ʿUlūm and the School for Judges 
into al-Azhar.  On the other hand, al-Azhar  would have had to offer  the 
same non-religious subjects that were taught in the state schools,  and it 
would have added a programme to train judges in positive law to serve in 
the  magistrature.  Al-Marāġī  even required  the  ʿulamāʾ to  take  science 
classes  themselves.  These  initiatives  recall  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  attempt to 
introduce  a  wider  variety  of  non-religious subjects  into  the  Azhar 
curriculum.  The  ʿulamāʾ’s  fierce  opposition  to  these  proposals  led  the 
King to withhold his approval, and al-Marāġī resigned from his post in 
1929  (Costet-Tardieu  2005,  66-79).  His  successor  proved  to  be  equally 
unpopular, and al-Marāġī was reappointed Shaykh of al-Azhar in 1935. It 
was at this time that he wrote the preface of Ḥayāt Muḥammad, praising 
the book highly.  Bourdieu  (1996a, 230) argues that prefaces are a means 
by  which  ‘consecrated  authors  consecrate  the  younger  ones,  who 
consecrate them in return as  masters or  heads of  schools’.  Perhaps al-
Marāġī  hoped to  use  the  book’s  arguments  about  the  compatibility  of 
Islam with  modern science to  strengthen  his  position at  al-Azhar  and 
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persuade the ʿulamāʾ to support his reform proposals, but if so, he was not 
successful; this time, he did very little to introduce non-religious subjects 
into the curriculum (Costet-Tardieu 2005, 96-116).
At  the  same  time,  al-Marāġī  was  gaining  considerable  political 
influence as an ally of King Fārūq against the Wafd party (Costet-Tardieu 
2005,  121-125).  The  Wafd  was  also  an  adversary  of  the  Liberal 
Constitutionalist  party,  in  which  Haykal  played  a  prominent  role. 
Throughout his career, al-Marāġī  was a staunch supporter of projects to 
restore the Islamic Caliphate in Egypt, and to appoint successive Egyptian 
kings as  Caliph  (Costet-Tardieu  2005,  27-35,  42-52).  When  this  issue 
surfaced once again in the late 1930s, the Wafdist newspapers opposed the 
restoration  of  the Caliphate  on the  grounds  that  (in  the  words  of  the 
report of France’s minister in Egypt, M. de Witasse) it would be ‘harmful 
to  the  country’s  nationalism’  and  would  ‘foment  discord  between 
Muslims  and  Christians’  (quoted  in  Costet-Tardieu  2005,  127). 
Paradoxically,  during  the  1938  parliamentary  election  campaign,  the 
Liberal Constitutionalist party expressed support for the restoration of the 
Caliphate  in  its  newspaper, al-Siyāsa,  which  Haykal  edited (Costet-
Tardieu  2005,  127-128).  Meanwhile,  al-Marāġī  embarked  on  a  fierce 
polemic  against  the  Wafd,  which  he  accused  of  aiming  ‘to  separate 
religion  and  social  life’  in  Egypt,  calling  them ‘the  enemies  of  Islam’ 
(Costet-Tardieu 2005, 129-130). He also argued strenuously for the unity 
of Islam and politics and for the application of Islamic law. Al-Marāġī’s 
statements provoked consternation among Christians in Egypt, and the 
Wafd condemned the idea of mixing religion and politics. At this point, 
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Liberal Constitutionalists sought to reassure Christians.  Reaffirming the 
view that  nationalism must  take  precedence  over  religion,  the  Liberal 
politician Muḥammad Maḥmūd stated: ‘There are no Muslims or Copts in 
Egypt.  All  are  Egyptians,  all  are  brothers  united  by  the  bond  of  the 
country’. Haykal also distanced himself from al-Marāġī’s views  (Costet-
Tardieu 2005, 130-134). He had ‘used al-Marāġī for propaganda purposes 
to gain Muslim support against the Wafd’  (CD Smith 1973, 408), despite 
the gap between their views in reality, and he ‘privately assured alarmed 
foreign journalists and representatives of Christian religious institutions 
that “nothing further would be heard from the shaykh after the elections”’ 
(CD Smith 1983, 149). The Wafd were indeed defeated in the elections, 
and the Liberals formed a cabinet. Later that same year, al-Marāġī sought 
the support of Haykal, who was now Minister of Education, for a renewed 
attempt to incorporate Dār al-ʿUlūm into al-Azhar. Haykal
joined  Ṭāhā  Ḥusayn,  then  dean  of  the  Faculty  of  Arts  at  the 
Egyptian University, in opposing al-Marāġī’s request. Both feared 
Azhar encroachment into the area of  state education. . . .  Haykal 
stood  fast  in  refusing  to  appoint  Azhar  graduates  to  teaching 
positions in state schools unless they passed tests supervised by his 
ministry.  . . .  Azhar  students  took  to  the  streets  against  Haykal. 
Clashes ensued between them and students from Dār al-ʿUlūm who 
staged counter demonstrations. Matters reached a peak at the end of 
1938 when Azhari protests were so intense that police drove them 
from the streets into the confines of Azhar mosque where they fired 
on them. Confronted with Haykal’s obstinacy, al-Marāġī could only 
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declare that ‘Haykal Pasha has deceived me’ (CD Smith 1983, 149-
151; cf. Costet-Tardieu 2005, 118-120).
Perhaps al-Marāġī  had  not  fully  understood  the  implications  of 
Ḥayāt Muḥammad when writing its preface. In reality, his view of Islam 
was incompatible with Haykal’s. Nor does he seem to have displayed, at 
any time during his career, anything approaching Haykal’s commitment 
to nationalism, although he indicated a moderate degree of support for it 
from time to time  (e.g.  Costet-Tardieu 2005,  36-37). He  seems to  have 
viewed  Egypt  primarily  as  the  rightful  centre  of  the  Islamic  world 
(Costet-Tardieu 2005, 141, 147); hence his advocacy of the restoration of a 
Caliphate in Egypt. He probably hoped, as the British ambassador put it, 
that ‘he himself . . . would be the power behind the throne of an Egyptian 
Caliph-King’ (quoted in Costet-Tardieu 2005, 131).
By writing the preface to  Ḥayāt Muḥammad,  al-Marāġī  seems to 
have unwittingly consecrated a project that he would not have agreed 
with.  In sum,  Ḥayāt  Muḥammad can be characterised as one of  those 
strategies that, as Bourdieu (1996b, 271) puts it,
function as  double plays, which, while neither expressly conceived 
as such nor inspired by any kind of  duplicity,  operate in several 
fields at once – in such a way that they are invested with all the 
subjective and  objective attributes of sincerity, which can greatly 
enhance  their  symbolic  efficacy.  . . .  The  structural  ambiguity 
evident  in  the  polysemy of  a  discourse  endowed  with  as  many 
registers  as there are  current  or  potential  fields  of  reception – a 
discourse we might call spontaneously polyphonic – sometimes gets 
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separated out and exposed retrospectively. This occurs particularly 
in  the  critical  situations  when  a  choice  must  be  made  between 
hierarchized loyalties. . . .
Such a critical situation seems to have occurred in Haykal’s conflict 
with  al-Marāġī  over  the  value  of  Azhar  diplomas  on  the  job  market. 
Ḥayāt Muḥammad was  fashioned in such a way as to serve a  double 
purpose. On one hand, it deflected the accusations of atheism that had 
been damaging Haykal’s political career, and attracted an audience whose 
respect for religious authority was as great as, or greater than, its respect 
for nationalist  authority.  On  the  other  hand,  ‘[t]he  composition  of 
modernist  biographies  of  the  Prophet  and  his  Companions  by  non-
ʿulamāʾ intellectuals was an implicit challenge to the dominant position of 
the  ʿulamāʾ as  the  authoritative  interpreters  of  the  Islamic  heritage’ 
(Gershoni and Jankowski 1995, 75). Thus Haykal implicitly claimed the 
symbolic  power  to  determine  who  is  qualified  to  make  authoritative 
statements about Islam. Ḥayāt Muḥammad presented Islam as a religion 
with  no  need  for  its  own  specialists,  a  religion  that  could  best  be 
interpreted by intellectuals such as Haykal rather than by members of the 
ʿulamāʾ such as al-Marāġī.
This  strategy  does  not  seem  to  have  been  successful.  The  very 
polysemy  of  Haykal’s book no  doubt  enabled  many  of  its tens  of 
thousands of readers to remain unaware of these implications, and to read 
it instead as an act of penitence. Authors of newspaper articles, including 
Ḥasan al-Bannā and one of his supporters, rejoiced in astonishment that 
‘the  Dr.  Haykal  who  had  once  submitted  to  French  and  Pharaonicist 
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influence’, who had promoted a secularism that was ‘far from the spirit of 
Islam’, based on ‘the thought and philosophy of the West’, had done the 
unimaginable and written a biography of the Prophet Muḥammad; surely, 
they said, this was ‘a clear triumph for Islam’  (Gershoni and Jankowski 
1995, 72-75).
Conclusion
I  have  argued  in  this  chapter  that  the  afandiyya were  at  the 
forefront  of  nationalism  in  Egypt  in  the  early  20th century,  because 
nationalism lent  itself  to  the  social  ambitions  of  this  new category of 
readers  and  writers  with  non-religious  training  based  on  European 
models.  In  order  to  transform their  new forms of cultural  capital  into 
greater  influence  in  society,  they  needed  a  strategy  for  breaking  the 
clergy’s  monopoly  of  symbolic  power,  and  nationalism  served  this 
purpose  as  well.  Nationalist  intellectuals  such  as  Muḥammad  Ḥusayn 
Haykal  advocated  the  concept  of  an  all-powerful  waṭan that  could 
become  an  object  of  worship  in  addition  to  the  God  of  monotheistic 
religion, promoted nationalist devotional practices based on the evocation 
of  ancient  Egypt,  and  assigned  nationalism  precedence  over  religion. 
Above all,  they portrayed themselves,  the ‘great  men’,  as  the ultimate 
authorities  on  this  waṭan,  and  thus  began  to  act  collectively  as  a 
nationalist priesthood.
In  this  they  were  only  partly  successful.  Haykal  and other  like-
minded  intellectuals  used  nationalism  to  legitimise  a  type  of  cultural 
production – the writing of novels – that had previously been considered 
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morally suspect. They also introduced lessons in ‘nationalist education’ in 
schools. No doubt these lessons, by durably shaping the habitus of young 
people, helped produce a receptive market for these intellectuals’ writings.
However,  the  priesthood  of  nationalism  faced  grave  challenges. 
They were unable to curtail the influence of their main rivals, the Muslim 
clergy.  Most  Egyptians  had tremendous  respect  for  the  clergy  and  no 
interest in Pharaonism. While nationalists such as Haykal attempted to 
subordinate  religion  to  nationalism,  the  ‘new  afandiyya’,  such  as  the 
Muslim Brotherhood, subordinated nationalism to religion. Haykal and 
others like him responded by producing the  Islāmiyyāt genre, but  this 
could  be  no  more  than  a  tactical  manoeuvre,  suitable  for  fending  off 
accusations  of  atheism.  It  could not pose an effective  challenge to  the 
symbolic power of the clergy, nor could it broaden public  acceptance of 
nationalism  as  the  dominant system  of  symbolic  power.  Nationalist 
intellectuals did,  however,  find  a  strategy  for  swaying  the  dominated 
classes, and it is to this strategy that we now turn in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4: Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm, the Priest Who 
Called for a Prophet
In  the  previous  chapter,  I  argued  that  the  central  problem  in 
Muḥammad  Ḥusayn  Haykal’s  nationalism  was  the  inability  of  the 
nationalist  to  persuade  most  Egyptians  to  embrace nationalism and to 
give it priority over religion, and their resulting inability to gain symbolic 
power outside the confines of the dominant fraction of the afandiyya. In 
this chapter, I  show that Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm’s celebrated novel ʿAwdat al-
Rūḥ (The Return of the Spirit, 1933) made a case for what would become 
the most successful solution to this problem. This proposal was based on 
al-Ḥakīm’s  interpretation  of  the  1919  uprisings  against  British  rule  in 
Egypt.  In his view, these uprisings had been a response to the Egyptian 
nation’s worship of  Saʿd Zaġlūl.  Thus he inferred that the majority of 
Egyptians  will  spontaneously  engage  in  nationalist  activism whenever 
such an ‘object of worship’ appears. I demonstrate that this inference was 
enthusiastically embraced by critics of the novel, and that it was  most 
probably a major influence on Gamal Abdel Nasser’s use of the strategy 
of prophethood to become a charismatic autocrat.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First I interpret al-Ḥakīm’s literary 
vocation  in relation to his interrupted social trajectory.  Next I examine 
the  source  of  some of  the  key  concepts  in  ʿAwdat  al-Rūḥ:  a  work  of 
Christian  mysticism  by  Dmitry  Merezhkovsky,  a  Russian  writer  and 
literary critic, who advocated an unorthodox synthesis of Christianity and 
ancient pagan religion. I then proceed to an analysis of ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ. I 
characterise the novel’s hero, Muḥsin, who would serve as a model for the 
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young Nasser,  as  a  young man with the requisite  cultural  capital  and 
habitus to become either a nationalist  priest  or a nationalist  prophet. I 
show that the novel gives priority to nationalism over Islam as an object 
of allegiance, and that it embraces Haykal’s environmental determinism 
and his view of peasants. I point out some of the logical inconsistencies in 
al-Ḥakīm’s nationalism. Then I turn to the core of the novel’s argument, 
which hinges on the idea of a nationalist ‘object of worship’, and is based 
on  a  blend of  Pharaonism  and  Merezhkovsky’s ideas.  Next  I  survey 
critics’ embrace of the novel’s nationalist message, and their formulation 
of  a nationalist  concept of  Sufism detached from Islam. I  consider the 
novel’s influence on Nasser and its consecration of his rule, as well as 
Nasser’s  consecration  of  Tawfīq  al-Ḥakīm.  I  draw on al-Ḥakīm’s  self-
critical essay, ʿAwdat al-Waʿy (The Return of Awareness, 1974), to argue 
that  this  mutual  consecration  severely  restricted  al-Ḥakīm’s  ability  to 
criticise Nasser. Finally, I bring together the key elements of nationalist 
habitus that I have analysed thus far in this thesis, and show how they fit 
together in a single conceptual blend.
An Interrupted Trajectory
Tawfīq  al-Ḥakīm  (1898-1987)  was  born  in  Alexandria  into  an 
educated  family.  His  father,  a  successful  lawyer  with  an  interest  in 
literature,  came  from  a  family  of  landowners  with  a  dwindling 
inheritance; he had studied at the School of Languages founded by al-
Ṭahṭāwī, then at the School of Law, where his classmates had included 
Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid and the future prime minister Ismāʿīl Ṣidqī, and 
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the three of them had founded a magazine together. Tawfīq’s mother’s 
family had moved from Turkey to Egypt, and her father had taken part in 
the ʿUrābī revolt of 1881-82. A strong-willed woman, she had taken the 
unusual  step of  insisting on being taught  how to read and write,  and 
seems to  have been  highly  assertive in  her  relationship with Tawfīq’s 
father. Disappointed to find that her husband had no income other than 
his salary as an assistant attorney, she managed to augment the family’s 
economic  capital  by securing a  loan  to  buy land  (Brugman 1984,  277; 
Starkey 1987, 17-18).
Tawfīq’s family’s frequent moves disrupted his primary education; 
he largely taught himself to read literature, did poorly in other subjects, 
and  failed  exams.  His  parents  sent  him to  Cairo  to  attend  secondary 
school  there  while  living  with  his  paternal  uncles,  but  he  was  more 
interested  in  literature,  cinema  and  theatre  than  in  his  studies.  He 
obtained  his  law  degree,  but  without  the  high  marks  needed  for  a 
government job.  Hence his  father,  on Aḥmad Luṭfī  al-Sayyid’s  advice, 
paid to send him to France to get a PhD in law. Tawfīq stayed in Paris for  
three  years  (1925-1928),  but  devoted  himself  mainly  to  literature  and 
theatre,  and  once  again  failed  his  exams.  He  returned  to  Egypt  a 
disappointment to his family, and found an unglamorous position in the 
judiciary, the first of a series of civil service jobs. (We will consider his 
later career below.) By then he had developed a vocation for writing, and 
in particular for the theatre; in Paris he had written a play (Ahl al-Kahf) 
and a novel (ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ), both of which were published in Egypt to 
critical acclaim in 1933 (Brugman 1984, 277-279; Starkey 1987, 18-20, 23-
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29; El-Enany 2000, 165). Al-Ḥakīm’s literary vocation thus corresponds to 
what Bourdieu describes as
a relation to culture . . . which stems from an interrupted trajectory 
and the effort to extend or re-establish it. Thus, the new occupations 
are the natural refuge of all those who have not obtained from the 
educational system the qualifications that would have enabled them 
to  claim  the  established  positions  their  original  social  position 
promised them. . . .  It  can immediately be seen that, precisely by 
virtue of their actual and potential indeterminacy, positions which 
offer  no guarantees  but,  in  return,  ask for  no guarantees,  which 
impose  no  specific  condition  of  entry,  especially  as  regards 
certificates, but hold out the promise of the highest profits for non-
certified cultural capital,  which guarantee no career prospects (of 
the type offered by the well-established occupations) but exclude 
none, not even the most ambitious, are adjusted in advance to the 
dispositions typical of individuals in decline endowed with a strong 
cultural capital imperfectly converted into  educational capital. . . . 
Furthermore, these positions, which are ultimately less risky and, at 
least in the long run, more profitable, the more capital one brings 
into  them,  present  a  further  advantage  for  people  seeking  an 
honourable  refuge  to  avoid  social  decline,  perhaps  the  most 
important advantage in the short term and in the practical shaping 
of a ‘vocation’ (Bourdieu 1984, 357-358, cf. Bourdieu 1989, 171-172).
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Les Mystères de l’Orient
According  to  Hutchins  (2003,  23-24),  Tawfīq  al-Ḥakīm borrowed 
some of the core ideas in ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ from a book called Les mystères  
de  l’Orient,  by  the  Russian  writer  and  literary  critic  Dmitry 
Merezhkovsky  (1865-1941).  Merezhkovsky’s  book  was  published  in 
Russian in 1925, and a French translation (which I use here) appeared the 
same year in Paris, where its author was then living, as was al-Ḥakīm. Its 
main argument is that all the gods of all religions are real, that all ancient 
religions were  manifestations of Christianity, and that the gods of pre-
Christian  antiquity  (such  as  the  ancient  Egyptian  god Osiris)  were 
precursors of Jesus (Bedford 1963, 151-153). Here it will be worth noting a 
few details of this argument, to which we will return in our discussion of 
al-Ḥakīm’s novel.
 Merezhkovsky  presents  his text as  a  paean  to Christianity,  and 
particularly to the Trinity, against the forces of atheism and Communism 
(Mérejkovsky 1925/2010,  7-15).  He  argues that  a true understanding of 
Christianity must incorporate the truths of ancient pagan religion.  Pre-
Christian religion  was not just  a belief  in false  gods;  if  Christianity is 
truth, so is paganism. ‘There are no false gods; all are real’ (Mérejkovsky 
1925/2010, 16-22). All religions express the same truth, ‘that of the God 
who dies and rises from the dead’, e.g. Osiris (Mérejkovsky 1925/2010, 23-
24).
One of the book’s two main parts deals with Egypt, while the other 
is  on  Babylonia;  the  part  on  Egypt  is  the  more  relevant  one  for  our 
purposes here.  Merezhkovsky  writes: ‘Christianity began with the flight 
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into Egypt, and if Christ has not died forever in men’s hearts, if He is to  
be reborn there, He will flee to Egypt again’ (Mérejkovsky 1925/2010, 59). 
He dwells at length on the importance of resurrection in ancient Egyptian 
religion,  asserting  that  ‘Holy  Egypt  is  the  fatherland  (patrie)  of  God’ 
(Mérejkovsky 1925/2010, 60-62). ‘In general, [ancient] Egyptians seem to 
be no more than savages and children to us. . . . But the amazing thing is 
that three thousand years before Christ, these children and savages knew 
more about Christianity than we do’ (Mérejkovsky 1925/2010, 125).
He  invokes  the  environmental  determinism  that  we  have 
encountered  already,  describing  the  Nile  floods  as  ‘regular,  slow  and 
calm, like the respiration of a sleeping child. The mind of men bears the 
stamp of this  calm and of this  eternity of nature.  . . .  Eternal Egypt is 
eternal truth’ (Mérejkovsky 1925/2010, 65). Referring to the mystery of the 
Trinity, he asserts: “One day, if Christ is not dead in our hearts, we will  
understand that Egypt is the only way towards this mystery. That is the 
meaning of our flight into Egypt’ (Mérejkovsky 1925/2010, 73). Calling on 
Christians to embrace ancient Egyptian religion, he writes that while ‘the 
Renaissance of Greco-Roman antiquity’ was ‘atheist’, ‘the Renaissance of 
Egyptian  antiquity’  would  be  ‘religious’,  ‘triumphant  over  death’  and 
‘resurrecting’ (Mérejkovsky 1925/2010, 83). He  rejects Herotodus’s claim 
that the pharaohs were tyrants who forced people to build tombs out of 
vanity:
No,  these  kings  were  not  cruel  tyrants,  but  liberators  who freed 
humanity from the most shameful kind of slavery – the slavery of 
death – and led it victoriously towards Resurrection. . . . A hundred 
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thousand men toiled to build the pyramid of Cheops, not in servile 
sadness, but in intoxicating joy, in  a  wise madness, in a perpetual 
extasy of faith and prayer (Mérejkovsky 1925/2010, 89-90).
Discussing animal worship in ancient Egypt, he asserts:
Such is the Egyptian adoration of animals. They adore their holy 
innocence, their eyes from which the scales have not yet fallen. In 
the  face  of  the  animal,  like  that  of  the  child,  there  is  the  same 
radiance  of  “transcendent  holiness,  the  dew  of  Paradise”’ 
(Mérejkovsky 1925/2010, 95).
Merezhkovsky  devotes  two chapters  to the ancient  Egyptian god 
Osiris.  In  his  view,  Osiris  is  ‘the  principal,  the  only  god  of  Egypt’ 
(Mérejkovsky 1925/2010, 100). He equates the dismemberment of Osiris 
with  the  crucifixion  of  Jesus  (Mérejkovsky  1925/2010,  103-104).  In  this 
fusion of paganism and Christianity, God dies and is reborn repeatedly: 
‘Osiris is an eternal mummy, a dead man forever rising from the dead, 
but never  resurrected,  for  there is  no final resurrection, but simply an 
unending effort to reach it’ (Mérejkovsky 1925/2010, 167). Thus:
In each cosmic cycle the body of a dead man is preserved. When a 
new cycle arrives, this body is ressurected, and this man becomes 
God. Then he dies, is resurrected, and so on through the centuries. 
He is in all ages, in all eternities, as the sun is in all drops of dew 
(Mérejkovsky 1925/2010, 238).
Clearly  there  are  many  complex  conceptual  blends  in 
Merezhkovsky’s  text,  but  for  our  purposes  in  interpreting  Tawfīq  al-
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Ḥakīm’s novel, the key blend is between Osiris and Jesus, illustrated in 
Figure 9.
In all this, it is clear that Egypt means only ancient Egypt, which for 
Merezhkovsky  is  a timeless,  personified,  disembodied essence.  He does 
not seem to be at all interested in modern Egypt. His call for a ‘flight into 
Egypt’  does  not  mean  physically  visiting  Egypt  or  getting  to  know 
contemporary  Egyptians;  it  means  embracing  the  religion  of  ancient 
Egypt as  part of  Christianity.  As  far  as  he  is  concerned,  Egypt  was 
destroyed long ago, and has become a wasteland where Bedouin desecrate 
the  ancient  ruins  (Mérejkovsky  1925/2010,  161-162).  We  will  see  in  a 
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Figure 9: Merezhkovsky’s blend of Osiris and Jesus
moment how an Egyptian reader, Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm, interpreted this view 
of Egypt in a way that Merezhkovsky never envisaged.
ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ
The hero of ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ is an adolescent called Muḥsin; like the 
young al-Ḥakīm, he is enrolled in school in Cairo, he lives with his uncles, 
he is devoted to literature, his parents have an estate in the countryside, 
and his father (the village mayor) appears to be dominated by his mother,  
who is of Turkish descent. The narrator refers to Muḥsin’s household in 
Cairo as the  šaʿb (‘the  people’), thus suggesting that they  represent the 
Egyptian nation in miniature. One by one, all the men of the household, 
especially Muḥsin, fall  in love with Saniyya, the neighbours’ daughter, 
who is a bit older than Muḥsin and considers him little more than a child.
Saniyya is portrayed as the ideal woman for the novel’s soon-to-be-
afandī  protagonist.  In  some  respects,  she is  resolutely  modern.  The 
narrative  associates  her  beauty  with  her  Europeanised  education  and 
tastes;  she wears fashionable dresses,  plays the piano,  and seasons her 
conversation with French expressions such as parole d’honneur (al-Hakīm 
1933/2008,  75).  When  Muḥsin  first  visits  Saniyya’s  family’s  flat,  she 
invites him to sing for her while she accompanies him on the piano. Her 
very traditional mother refuses to come out into the living room to meet 
him, considering it an impropriety to entertain a male visitor, and scolds 
Saniyya in religious terms: ‘Rabbina yihdīkī [May the Lord guide you]!’ 
Saniyya holds her ground, and scolds her mother in non-religious terms: 
‘Don’t make people laugh at us!’  (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 77) At the same 
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time, Saniyya is marked with signs of Egyptian authenticity. The songs 
she plays with Muḥsin are from the Egyptian canon of classical Arabic 
music (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 72-74, 81-83), and the narrator’s description of 
her beauty echoes the conventions of classical Arabic poetry: ‘her black 
eyes, like those of a gazelle, with long, black lashes’ (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 
71) and  ‘her  regular  teeth,  like  inlaid  precious  stones’  (al-Hakīm 
1933/2008, 74). Saniyya’s father is a doctor who served in the Egyptian 
army in  Sudan,  who participated in  the campaign that  suppressed the 
Mahdist  rebellion  there  in  1898,  and  whose  flat  is  full  of  Sudanese 
artefacts  that  recall  the  Egyptian  nationalist  claim  of  legitimate 
domination of Sudan (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 75, 211-222). Thus Saniyya is 
an exemplar of the Egyptian nationalist ‘image of modernity’ of the 1930s, 
which  was  characterised  by  ‘confident  possession  of  such  European 
customs as were deemed desirable, coupled with a fine discrimination of 
how far  one  could  go  in  such  behaviour  and  remain  truly  Egyptian’ 
(Armbrust 1996, 84). Moreover, in the character of Saniyya, these qualities 
are blended with the concept of the rebirth of the eternal spirit of the 
Egyptian nation. Contemplating Saniyya’s face, Muḥsin sees her as the 
ancient  Egyptian  goddess  Isis  (al-Hakīm  1933/2008,  120),  who  was 
believed to have gathered together the scattered pieces of the god Osiris’s 
body after his murder, so that he could be resurrected. We will  consider 
possible implications of this Saniyya-Isis blend below.
Although Muḥsin completely lacks the sort of charisma that would 
enable him to win Saniyya’s heart, he possesses another kind of charisma 
that could qualify him to become a prophet of nationalism, in addition to 
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the  cultural  capital  that  would  enable  him  to  join  the  nationalist 
priesthood. When he tries to persuade one of his friends to join him in 
enrolling in the Faculty of Literature at university, his classmates ask him 
what future there is in that. In his reply, he articulates the basic creed of  
both priests and prophets of nationalism:
Tomorrow it’s  us  who will  be  the  voice  of  the  nation  [lisān il-
umma il-nāṭiq]. . . . Tomorrow our job will be to express what’s in 
the nation’s heart. . . . If only you knew the value of the ability to 
express what’s in . . . people’s hearts! . . . The nation [umma] . . . has 
a  heart  that  guides  [yihdī],  and  a  voice  [lisān]  that  directs  its 
material forces (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 108).
Here the self-interest of the priestly role, which is implied by the 
words ‘job’ and ‘value’, is misrecognised as disinterestedness, thanks to 
the  personification of  the  nation,  which makes  the  role  of  the  ‘voice’ 
(literally ‘tongue’) appear disinterested by naturalising it. Called upon to 
make  a  speech  in  class,  Muḥsin  realises  that  he  ‘sees  and  feels  great 
things’  that  his  teacher,  a  Muslim  shaykh,  cannot  see  (al-Hakīm 
1933/2008, 111). He then demonstrates his charisma by giving a speech 
about  love;  his  classmates  are  enthralled  as  he  embodies  his  earlier 
argument and ‘expresses what’s in their hearts’ (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 112). 
It  is  worth  comparing  this  scene,  in  which  an  audience  of  young 
intellectuals  is  spellbound  by  the  charisma  of  Muḥsin’s  nationalist 
habitus, with Maḥmūd Ṭāhir Lāšīn’s short story ‘Ḥadīṯ al-Qarya’,  which 
we considered in  Chapter 3 and was written at nearly the same time, in 
which  an  audience  of  peasants  is  spellbound  by  the  very  different 
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charisma of a shaykh. As the comparison illustrates, different individuals 
are charismatic for different audiences; or to be more precise, charisma is 
a type of  relation between the habitus of a speaker and the habitus of a 
particular sociological category of listeners.  I will return to this point in 
Chapter 5.
The novel’s stance regarding Islam is consistent with the views of 
Muḥammad  Ḥusayn  Haykal.  One  chapter  of  the  novel focuses  on  a 
conversation among strangers on a train.  A passenger is  looking for a 
place to sit in a crowded compartment, and the other passengers squeeze 
together to make room for him. One says, ‘Please sit down, sir. We’re all 
Muslims who should  help  each other.’  An  afandī describes  this  as  an 
example  of  ‘the  feelings  of  connectedness  and  solidarity  between  the 
people of Egypt [ahl Miṣr]’ and mentions that, when traveling in Europe, 
he found that Europeans lacked this  quality. A shaykh opines that it’s 
because there’s  no Islam in Europe.  There is  an awkward silence,  and 
some of the passengers notice that the afandī has a tattoo of the cross on 
his wrist, meaning that he is a Christian. One of them attempts to defuse 
the  tension  by  reinterpreting  the  shaykh’s  statement  to  mean  that 
Europeans don’t have ‘hearts’. An ‘enlightened man [mutanawwir]’ (i.e. 
an afandī intellectual) then argues that the word ‘Islam’, as commonly 
used in Egypt, has nothing to do with religion; instead, it simply refers to 
compassion, good-heartedness and ‘the linking of hearts’,  qualities that 
are found in Egypt but not in Europe. This view elicits the agreement and 
admiration of  all  those  present,  ‘both  the fez-wearers  and the turban-
wearers’  (i.e.  the  afandiyya and the clergymen),  who feel  as if  he has 
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revealed to them ‘the truth that had been hidden within this word’ (i.e. 
‘Islam’). Thus the  afandī intellectual trumps the man of religion; under 
cover of the apparently disinterested principle of religious tolerance, he 
imposes a non-religious definition of Islam, and consecrates the view that 
nationalist bonds are more fundamental, indeed more real, than religious 
ones.  (Recall  the  sentence  quoted  in  the  previous  chapter,  from  a 
newspaper article written at about the same time: ‘The [Egyptian] nation 
does not know any religion except the religion of patriotism.’) The first 
afandī adds that Egyptians are an ancient people (šaʿb), have lived in the 
Nile Valley for eight thousand years, and were civilised when Europeans 
weren’t even barbarians yet. The ‘enlightened man’ agrees, stating that 
the Egyptian nation is social by nature (bi-l-fiṭra)  (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 
232-236). In other words, it is national character, rather than religion, that 
should be credited for Egyptians’ moral behaviour towards each other.
The novel embraces Haykal’s idea that this national character is the 
result of environmental determinism, as well as Haykal’s conception of 
peasants.  When  Muḥsin  visits  his  parents  at  their  country  estate,  his 
mother is portrayed as haughty and domineering,  and  convinced of her 
cultural superiority to her husband, thanks to her Turkish origins. She has 
nothing but scorn for peasants, including those who work on her estate, 
and disparagingly calls Muḥsin’s father a ‘fallāḥ mayor’; the latter then 
uses the epithet fallāḥ to scold his son (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 240). Muḥsin 
feels estranged from his parents, and comes to wear the word fallāḥ as a 
badge  of  honour  (al-Hakīm 1933/2008,  242-243).  (Thus  he  symbolically 
renounces his biological family in favour of the national family, a concept 
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we will  encounter again.)  He converses  with a  Bedouin,  who sees  the 
lineage (maḥtid) of Bedouin as superior to that of peasants; the latter are 
‘slaves  descended from slaves  [ʿabd ibn ʿabd]’.  Muhsin remembers  his 
history teacher telling him that Egyptian peasants had been tilling the 
same soil since before the Bedouin were Bedouin. Ages had come and 
gone, nations (umam) had come and gone, but the peasant had stayed the 
same,  because  he  lived  in  villages,  far  from the  cities  where  political 
change occurred and races (ʾaǧnās) mixed together. Is it fair to accuse the 
peasant of having no lineage, when he is the origin of origins (aṣl al-
uṣūl)?  But  this  accusation  is the  peasant’s  own  fault,  because  he  is 
ignorant of his lineage, while the Bedouin remembers his own. Surely the 
peasant’s good-heartedness reflects a noble lineage, whereas the Bedouin 
are  clearly  barbaric  (al-Hakīm  1933/2008,  249-252).  Environmental 
determinism, as Mondal (2003, 171) observes,
is  apparent  in  the  words  of  the  ‘history  teacher’  which  Muḥsin 
recalls  after  his  encounter  with  the  bedouin tribesman,  ‘his  [the 
Egyptian peasant’s] goodness and love of peace were a consequence 
of his deeply rooted agricultural heritage’.
Indeed, in an article published in 1933, the same year as ʿAwdat al-
Rūḥ,  al-Ḥakīm  argued  for  environmental  determinism  as  Haykal  had 
articulated it:
There  are  in  Egypt  enduring  world  views  which  have  barely 
changed from the era of  ancient myths until  the present.  This is 
because they are tied to the innermost essence of this earth, deriving 
their inspiration from the soul of the clay of this fertile valley and 
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from the  spirit  of  this  eternal  Nile.  For  man’s  world  views,  his 
beliefs, his religions and his superstitions are generated by the forms 
of  life  which  surround  him  (quoted  in  Gershoni  and  Jankowski 
1986, 135).
In a scene that echoes Merezhkovsky’s statements about the ancient 
Egyptians’ closeness to animals, Muḥsin comes across a small child and a 
calf who are both suckling at a cow, and is awed by a feeling of the unity  
of with all creatures; he realises that contempt for those who are different 
from oneself destroys this feeling of the oneness of the universe, which is 
the feeling of God (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 255-256).
These scenes seem to pose some logical  problems for  al-Ḥakīm’s 
nationalism. People do not necessarily see themselves as part of a nation, 
since as the example of the Bedouin shows, they may classify themselves 
in other ways instead. If the author sees Bedouin as inferior, and devoid 
of the national character that he finds in the peasants, he cannot logically 
include them in the Egyptian nation, but it is not clear how he means to 
classify these residents of Egypt,  or how he can explain that the same 
environment has not given them the same character. The idea of the unity 
of all  being is incompatible with al-Ḥakīm’s nationalism, which, as we 
saw  above  in  the  conversation  among  the  train  passengers,  posits  a 
greater solidarity with the members of one’s own nation than with other 
human beings.
It would be a mistake, I think, to try to resolve these inconsistencies. 
Nationalism is the product of what Bourdieu calls ‘practical logic’, the lax 
logic of everyday practices, ‘which is only ever coherent roughly, up to a 
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point’  (Bourdieu  1990,  10).  There  are  practical  reasons  why  ‘the 
procedures  of  practical  logic  are  rarely  entirely  coherent  and  rarely 
entirely incoherent’ (Bourdieu 1990, 12):
[S]ymbolic systems owe their practical coherence – that is, on the 
one hand, their unity and their regularities, and on the other hand, 
their  ‘fuzziness’  and  their  irregularities  and  even  incoherences, 
which are both equally necessary . . . – to the fact that they are the 
product of practices that can fulfil their practical functions only in 
so far as they  implement, in the practical state, principles that are 
not only coherent . . . but also practical, in the sense of convenient, 
that is, easy to master and use, and because they obey a ‘poor’ and 
economical logic (Bourdieu 1990, 86).
Nationalism’s vagueness and lack of logical rigour are convenient, 
because  they  make  it  possible,  for  example,  first  to  reject  Bedouin  as 
barbarians,  and  later  to  embrace  them as  part  of  the  Arab  nation,  as 
expediency demands.
The  narrator’s  use  of  the  word  ‘God’  can  be  interpreted  as  a 
concession  to  the  symbolic  power  of  the  Muslim  clergy,  who  might 
otherwise have accused him of atheism, or perhaps polytheism. But it is a 
half-hearted concession – ‘God’ is simply equated with ‘the unity of the 
universe’ – and remains incongruous, considering the novel’s glorification 
of  ancient  Egyptian  religion.  Muḥsin  is  filled  with  admiration  for  the 
Egyptian  peasant,  and  with  ‘luminous  joy  . . .  like  life  returning  after 
death’; he feels  as if  ‘eternity is nothing more than the extension of a 
moment like  this’.  The  narrator  agrees,  and approvingly  mentions  the 
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ancient Egyptian belief that is no heaven other than Egypt, and no eternal 
life other than rebirth in Egypt. When Muḥsin hears the peasants singing 
in the fields, he supposes that they are singing ‘the morning hymn [našīd] 
to celebrate the birth of the sun, as their ancestors did in the temples’, or 
perhaps  a  hymn to  the  harvest,  ‘their  object  of  worship [maʿbūd]’,  to 
which  they  have  given  their  toil,  their  hunger  and  their  cold  ‘as  an 
offering [qurbān]’  all  year  long.  (Both  Muḥsin and the  narrator  seem 
oblivious to the feudal economy.) Muḥsin then realises that he worships 
Saniyya,  and asks  himself  whether  he,  too,  would  be  able  to  sacrifice 
himself,  and  endure  pain  and  suffering  for  the  sake  of  his  object  of 
worship – for is he not of the same blood as those peasants  (al-Hakīm 
1933/2008,  259-261)?  The  significance  of  these  statements  will  become 
clear in a moment.
An  English  irrigation  inspector  and  a  French  archaeologist  are 
guests  at  Muḥsin’s  family’s  estate,  and  we  overhear  a  conversation 
between them  (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 272-282).  As  Hutchins  (2003, 23-24) 
observes,  the  Frenchman’s  views  are  partly  based  on  Merezhkovsky’s 
book. The Englishman considers Egyptian peasants ignorant, and scoffs at 
them for sleeping in the same rooms as their livestock; the Frenchman 
replies that ‘they know more than us’, adding: ‘This people [šaʿb] that you 
consider ignorant knows many things, but it knows them with its heart, 
not with its mind’67. He asserts that if one removed the heart of one of 
these  peasants,  one  would  find  in  it  the  sediment  (rawāsib)  of  ‘ten 
thousand years of experience and knowledge, which has collected there 
67 Al-Ḥakīm has transformed  Merezhkovsky’s statement about ancient Egyptians and 
Christianity (‘these children and savages knew more about Christianity than we do’) 
into a statement about modern Egyptians and nationalism.
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without  his  realising it’.  Egypt’s  millennia  of  experience,  he  says,  are 
genetically  transmitted  thanks  to  ‘the  law  of  inheritance  [qānūn  al-
wirāṯa]’,  and  come to  its  aid  in  critical  moments.  Europe’s  success  is 
based only on superficial knowledge, which ‘we stole from these ancient 
nations [šuʿūb]’, not on knowledge of the essence of things; if you open a 
European’s heart, you will find it empty. Any moral corruption in Egypt 
is ‘not from Egypt’, but rather from ‘other nations [umam], such as the 
Bedouin or the Turks’. The Frenchman warns the Englishman to ‘watch 
out for this nation [šaʿb]’.
European  language,  says  the  Frenchman,  deals  with  the  senses; 
Europeans therefore cannot understand the feelings that once made the 
Egyptian nation act as a single individual. The Pyramids emerged from 
the heart of the Egyptians; those who carried the stones to build them did 
so joyfully, not because they were forced to. They were happy to suffer 
and bleed, out of ‘faith in the object of worship [al-īmān bi-l-maʿbūd]’, 
the Pharaoh Khufu (Cheops), just like their descendants who work in the 
fields today. The peasants do backbreaking work, but they are obviously 
happy, since they sing while working68.  This is  part  of  Egypt’s  eternal 
essence (ǧawhar).
The novel opens with a quote from the ancient Egyptian Book of 
the Dead on the resurrection of the individual in the afterlife, ‘where all 
68 In the 19th century in the United States, ‘John Little, a former slave, wrote: “They say 
slaves  are  happy because  they laugh,  and are  merry.  I  myself  and three  or  four 
others, have received two hundred lashes in the day, and had our feet in fetters; yet,  
at  night, we would sing and dance, and make others laugh at the rattling of our 
chains. Happy men we must have been! We did it to keep down trouble, and to keep 
our hearts from being completely broken: that is as true as the gospel! Just look at it, 
– must not we have been very happy? Yet I done it myself – I have cut capers in 
chains”’ (Zinn 1980, 168).
262
are  in  one’  (al-Hakīm  1933/2008,  7).  The  French  archaeologist,  in  his 
conversation with the Englishman, cites the same quote, arguing that this 
idea remains deeply rooted in the heart of the Egyptian peasant, who has 
maintained ‘the spirit of the temple [rūḥ al-maʿbad]’ to this day. The only 
thing  the  Egyptian  nation  lacks  now  is  ‘the  object  of  worship 
[maʿbūd] . . . that man who comes from it [the nation], who represents all 
its feelings and hopes, who is the symbol of its goal’. When such a man 
appears, the Egyptian nation will be able to achieve ‘other miracles like 
the Pyramids’ (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 280-282).
Rather than a simple transposition of Merezhkovsky’s ideas, this is a 
complex  blend  of  Merezhkovsky’s  concepts  with  Egyptian  nationalist 
concepts.  While  Merezhkovsky envisaged a  renaissance  of  Christianity 
through the embrace of the truth of ancient Egyptian religion, leading to 
the future resurrection of Osiris-Christ, al-Ḥakīm envisages a renaissance 
of  modern Egypt through the revival of the ‘spirit’ of ancient Egyptian 
religion and the reappearance of an Osiris-like object of worship. It is not 
surprising  that  al-Ḥakīm  formulated  this  blend,  given  the  difference 
between  what  the  word  ‘Egypt’  meant  to  Merezhkovsky  and  what  it 
meant to him. For Merezhkovsky, it  was a metonymy for the timeless 
essence of an ancient, vanished civilisation, but for al-Ḥakīm, it referred 
to  the country where he had grown up.  While  al-Ḥakīm undoubtedly 
understood the  limitations  of  Merezhkovsky’s  conception  of  Egypt,  he 
seems to have chosen to interpret Merezhkovsky’s book in a way that its  
author  could  not  have  imagined,  by  reading  ‘Egypt’  as  referring  to 
modern Egypt as well as to ancient Egypt. The resulting blend could then 
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generate  inferences  that  are  not  in  Merezhkovsky’s  text.  We  will  see 
below how al-Ḥakīm developed this blend further at the end of the novel.
While at the estate, Muḥsin receives a letter that he believes to have 
been  written  by  Saniyya  on  behalf  of  his  aunt  Zannūba;  in  reality, 
Zannūba  had  it  written  by  a  public  letter-writer.  Driven  by  wishful 
thinking,  Muḥsin  interprets  the  letter’s  banalities  as  cleverly  disguised 
expressions of  the love that  he hopes Saniyya feels  for  him  (al-Hakīm 
1933/2008,  283-288),  unaware that she has in fact fallen in love with  a 
factory owner’s  son, Muṣṭafā.  Upon his  return to  Cairo,  he learns the 
truth about the letter  and about  Saniyya’s  courtship  with Muṣṭafā  (al-
Hakīm  1933/2008,  304-309).  He  is  humiliated,  but  consoles  himself  by 
recalling  that  he  was  always  the  ‘object  of  worship  [maʿbūd]’  of  his 
classmates  (al-Hakīm 1933/2008,  312).  His  heartbreak makes  his  uncles 
realise  that  ‘they are  beneath him,  and that  his  rare  heart  makes  him 
superior  to  them’  (al-Hakīm  1933/2008,  329).  He  recalls  the  peasants 
toiling in the fields and singing ‘for the sake of the harvest, their object of 
worship [maʿbūd]’, and how he asked himself whether he, too, would be 
able to sacrifice himself for his object of worship. Even though he knows 
that  the  letter  was  not  really  from  Saniyya,  he  deludes  himself  into 
believing that it was; as the narrator observes, ‘sometimes imagination is 
stronger  than  truth’.  Thus  Muḥsin  continues  to  cherish  the  letter,  to 
‘recite it [yatlūhu]’ (the same verb is used to designate recitation of the 
Qurʾān) and interpret it, finding meanings in it that are not really there, 
‘as if illusion had become doctrine [ʿaqīda]’ (the same word is used for 
religious doctrine); ‘and how could truth defeat doctrine, unless the mind 
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could defeat the heart?’  (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 383) This passage  can be 
read  as an allegory for  religion in  general:  sacred texts  have ordinary 
human authors,  but people’s  emotional need for  religious  belief  makes 
them imagine that these texts are messages from divine beings.
Muḥsin is forced to share his precious letter with the other men in 
the  house.  They  play  along  with  his  fantasy,  and  send  him  as  their 
emissary to visit Saniyya. He is ‘moved by the transformation of “I” into 
“we”’,  and  realises  that  he  is  responsible  for  the  happiness  of  his 
household – which is designated, as usual, as ‘the people [šaʿb]’. It is as if 
Muḥsin is a sort of proto-prophet, chosen to speak for his people because 
they perceive him as a  superior being,  but his prophethood has not  yet 
fulfilled its potential, not only because he is too young, but also because 
he worships a false god.
All that remains is for Muḥsin to convert to the creed of Egyptian 
nationalism,  his  spirit  awakened  by  the  arrival  of  Saʿd  Zaġlūl,  the 
nationalist prophet whose exile by the British sparked the 1919 uprising. 
Egypt has become pregnant, the narrator says, and it has given birth to ‘a 
prodigious newborn’, i.e. Zaġlūl. After sleeping for centuries, it is rising 
up:
It was waiting, as the Frenchman said, for its its son, the object of 
worship [maʿbūd], the symbol of its suffering and its buried hopes, 
to  be  reborn.  And this  object  of  worship was  reborn of  peasant 
stock! (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 423)
(Although Zaġlūl was in reality a wealthy lawyer, the concept of 
the peasant hero was a standard part of the Zaġlūl myth.) We can make 
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sense of the Frenchman’s statements if we postulate that al-Ḥakīm has 
taken Merezhkovsky’s Osiris-Jesus blend and used it as the input for a 
further blend with Saʿd Zaġlūl, represented in Figure 10. We have already 
seen, in our discussion of al-Ṭahṭāwī and Haykal, evidence for a waṭan-
as-god blend. Arguably this  waṭan-as-god blend helped to motivate this 
new blend involving  Saʿd Zaġlūl.  In the first input space, Osiris-Jesus is 
conceptualised as the son of God.  In the second input  space,  Egypt  is 
conceptualised as a god. Since, as the text says, Zaġlūl is Egypt’s son, he, 
too, is the son of a god. This makes it easy to connect the two deity-child  
relations. Moreover, like Osiris-Jesus,  Zaġlūl  is described as ‘reborn’: the 
resurrection of Osiris-Jesus has been projected into the blend.
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Figure 10: Saʿd Zaġlūl as object of worship (maʿbūd)
When news of the uprising is announced at Muḥsin’s school, the 
students  spontaneously  assemble  outside,  ‘as  if  it  is  Judgement  Day’ 
(another  religious  concept  appropriated  for  nationalism).  Everyone  is 
talking about Zaġlūl; Muḥsin has never heard of him, but immediately 
decides that he must devote his life to him. The uprising is described as 
something utterly spontaneous that has suddenly occurred to everyone at 
the same time, simply because they are all ‘children of Egypt [abnāʾ Miṣr] 
who  share  a  single  heart’.  All  fourteen  million  Egyptians,  says  the 
narrator, are thinking only of Zaġlūl, who has expressed what they feel, 
and who has been exiled and imprisoned in the sea, like Osiris (al-Hakīm 
1933/2008,  424-425).  All  the  members  of  Muḥsin’s  household  throw 
themselves into the ‘revolution’.  Muḥsin, like his uncles, has transferred 
his worship from Saniyya to the waṭan (cf. Ḥaqqī 1975/2008, 126):
All the cruelly disappointed love in his heart had been transformed 
into warm nationalist  [waṭaniyya] feelings, and all his feelings of 
self-sacrifice for his heart’s object of worship had been transformed 
into  daring  feelings  of  self-sacrifice  for  his  waṭan’s  object  of 
worship (al-Hakīm 1933/2008, 427).
Note  that  this  sentence  prompts  for  a  conceptual  blend  that 
connects  ‘heart’  with  waṭan,  suggesting  a  conception in  which  all 
Egyptians  have  a  single,  shared  waṭan in  place  of  a  heart;  this  can 
generate  the  inference that  the  waṭan,  like  a  god,  is  responsible  for 
people’s feelings.
The revolution, says the narrator, was necessary in order to let flow 
the  feelings  of  these  heartbroken  men  (al-Hakīm  1933/2008,  427).  No 
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doubt  frustration or rejection in  love was something that  many of al-
Ḥakīm’s readers could relate to. The novel offers them nationalism as a 
cure for their suffering: in effect, a promise of salvation if they transfer 
their love to the waṭan.
The  Saniyya-Isis  blend  noted  earlier  seems  as  if  it  ought  to  be 
connected somehow with the Zaġlūl-Osiris blend, but it is not clear how 
this is possible, since the novel does not link Saniyya with Zaġlūl in any 
other  way,  and  could  hardly  do  so  without  giving  up  its  premise  of 
compatibility with historical fact.  It seems that the  relationship between 
Isis and Osiris is not actually projected into either of these two blends. 
One might look for a Merezhkovskian trinity consisting of waṭan, Zaġlūl 
and Saniyya, but there does not seem to be sufficient evidence for this in 
the text. Since Egypt has often been represented as a woman in nationalist 
discourse  (cf.  Baron  2005),  it  is  tempting  to  ask  whether  Saniyya 
represents Egypt, but it seems difficult to support this reading. However, 
we  can infer  that  since  Saniyya-Isis is  a  goddess,  and  the  male šaʿb 
transfers its love from her to the waṭan, the waṭan is also conceptualised 
as a goddess.
What are the social consequences of the promise of salvation as a 
reward for love of the waṭan? When we turn to nationalist martyrdom in 
the next chapter,  we will consider in depth  the concept of self-sacrifice, 
which  facilitates the military  uses of nationalism that we  have already 
considered. Let us focus here on the symbolic power of the nationalist 
prophet  (the  ‘object  of  worship’),  and the  effect  of  this  power  on  the 
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nationalist  priesthood.  In  order  to  do  so,  we  must  briefly  consider 
Egyptian critics’ reception of the novel.
Critical Enthusiasm and Nationalist Sufism
When ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ was published in 1933, Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm was 
already famous in literary circles, thanks to his play Ahl al-Kahf, which 
had been published earlier the same year (Ḥammād 1933a). In his letters, 
al-Ḥakīm noted that the publication of  Ahl al-Kahf coincided with the 
founding of the literary magazine al-Risāla, and that he was immediately 
celebrated at the magazine as a great writer. Distinguished writers treated 
him as  a  peer,  and  Aḥmad Luṭfī  al-Sayyid  said  to  him:  ‘You  are  the 
shaykh of a Sufi order [Anta šayḫ ṭarīqa]’ (ʿAṭiyya 1984).
Critics  from the 1930s  to  the 1980s  have  agreed that  the French 
archeologist  is  a  mouthpiece  for  al-Ḥakīm’s  own  views,  and  that  his 
statements  are the main idea that  the author sought  to express in the 
novel (Ḥammād 1933b, 41, Ḥammād 1934b, 479; Ḥaqqī 1975/2008, 127; al-
Rāʿī  1958;  Dawwāra  1960;  Mūsā  1987).  The  critic  Muḥammad  ʿAlī 
Ḥammād published several articles celebrating  ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ in major 
literary  magazines  shortly  after  the  novel’s  publication.  For  Ḥammād, 
ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ is the first Egyptian story in Egyptian literature, and is 
genuinely Egyptian in every way; when you read it, ‘you’ feel that a bond 
of Egyptianness connects you to the characters. Indeed, he says, the main 
characteristic  of  the  novel  is  its  Egyptianness  (Ḥammād 1933b).  ‘Pure 
Egyptian blood runs in its veins’. Its dialogue is written in ‘the Egyptian 
language [al-luġa al-miṣriyya]’. Egyptians prefer this language above all 
others, even above the Arabic language, which ‘we’ use from time to time 
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in certain situations, for ‘we’ are Egyptians above all else, ‘in spirit, body 
and language’ (Ḥammād 1934a, 326). (Interestingly, this paean to Egyptian 
Arabic is written in extremely formal Modern Standard Arabic.)
Ḥammād praises the novel for glorifying the peasant, who is ‘the 
authentic  [ṣamīm] Egyptian’  (Ḥammād 1933b). He quotes an open letter 
that al-Ḥakīm addressed to Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, in which al-Ḥakīm claimed that 
the peasants are meek not because they are enslaved, but because of their 
‘noble  origins [karam al-aṣl]’  and because their  stable  agricultural  life 
requires  them  to  be  so.  (Here  again  is  environmental  determinism.) 
Ḥammād notes that various characters denigrate Turks and Arabs in the 
novel, and sees this as al-Ḥakīm’s revenge, on behalf of the peasant, ‘i.e. 
the  Egyptian’,  against  these  ‘elements  that  entered  his  waṭan and 
considered themselves the masters of  the house,  though they were the 
intruders  [daḫīla]’.  In  Ḥammād’s  view,  al-Ḥakīm  gives  the  Egyptian 
countryside ‘an air of sacredness [qadāsa], as if it were a priest’s prayer 
niche [miḥrāb kāhin]’, and drives us forcefully back to Pharaonic Egypt. 
A ‘Sufi image’ emerges from the countryside and its inhabitants, in their 
cameraderie, their toil and their enthusiasm for the sake of the object of 
worship, who has had different ‘names, shapes and symbols’ throughout 
Egypt’s history: Khufu in Pharaonic times, when Egypt’s spirit produced 
the miracle of the Pyramids, and Saʿd Zaġlūl in modern times, when it 
produced the miracle of the 1919 ‘revolution’,  Egypt’s second ‘miracle’ 
after  the  pyramids.  Thus  the  ‘spirit  of  the  temple’  has  returned  after 
having been  ‘hidden  in  the  sand’  (Ḥammād 1934b,  478-480).  Ḥammād 
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describes wanting to ‘kiss’ the ‘sacred pages [al-ṣafaḥāt al-muqaddasa]’ 
that describe the uprising in the novel (Ḥammād 1933b).
Ḥammād’s reference to Sufism  acknowledges  the Sufi practice of 
Islam  that  was  and  is  widespread  in  Egypt.  But  while  Sufism  is 
emphatically  Islamic,  and  places  great  emphasis  on  devotion  to  the 
Prophet Muḥammad and his family (Schielke 2007; Hoffman-Ladd 1992), 
Ḥammād seems to evoke a notion of Sufism as mysticism in the most 
general  sense,  detached  from  Islam.  Indeed,  like  Muḥammad  Ḥusayn 
Haykal’s  account of religion in Egypt as the product of environmental 
determinism, Ḥammād’s abbreviated reference to the history of worship 
in Egypt elides the very existence of Islam (as well as Christianity). Like 
the  French  archeologist  in  ʿAwdat  al-Rūḥ,  Ḥammād’s  account  of  the 
‘spirit of Egypt’ skips directly from Khufu to Saʿd Zaġlūl, with no Islam 
(or Christianity) in between. The inference to be drawn seems to be that 
Egypt’s spirit was ‘hidden in the sand’ during the Christian and Islamic 
periods of Egyptian history, until Saʿd Zaġlūl’s arrival.
Yaḥyā Ḥaqqī, writing in 1934, uses the word ‘Sufism’ in a similarly 
un-Islamic sense when discussing Ahl al-Kahf and ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ (Ḥaqqī 
1975/2008, 123-125). He describes Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm’s doctrine (maḏhab) as 
‘a mixture of Sufism [al-taṣawwuf] and Einstein’s theory’. He then asks 
whether  ‘Sufi  tendencies  have  any  place  in  Egypt’,  a  country  that  is 
engaged in a material struggle for its independence. Sufism, he says, ‘may 
be understandable in England, Belgium, or France’, since those countries 
have  ‘armies  and  fleets  to  protect  their  dignity  [karāma],  but  it  is 
incomprehensible  in  Egypt,  in  its  present  state  of  weakness;  perhaps 
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Gandhi’s  doctrine [maḏhab]  is the only Sufism [taṣawwuf]  that is not 
harmful to Egypt’.
These  unrealistic  uses  of  the  word  ‘Sufism’  arguably serve  a 
nationalist  function.  They  enable  afandī intellectuals  to  grudgingly 
acknowledge the existence of a very widespread form of religious practice 
in Egypt (so grudgingly, in fact, that Ḥaqqī associates it with European 
countries rather than with Egypt),  while at  the same time denying its 
Islamic character, in order to implicitly deny the legitimacy of the afandī 
intellectuals’  main  rivals  for  symbolic  power,  the  Muslim  clergy 
(including the leaders of the Sufi orders). By detaching Sufism from Islam, 
an afandī intellectual  can  imagine  that  Egyptian  peasants’  religious 
beliefs  have  hardly  changed  since  Pharaonic  times,  and  present 
nationalism as the latest manifestation of those beliefs. This is possible 
only because of nationalism’s social and cognitive similarity to religion. 
Thus the novel depicts the countryside as ‘a beacon of the power of pure 
doctrine  [ʿaqīda] and pure faith [īmān]’  (Ḥammād 1934b, 479), i.e. free-
floating  doctrine  and  faith  detached  from any  particular  religion,  and 
implies  that  Osiris,  the  pharaohs,  the  harvest  and  Saʿd  Zaġlūl  are  all 
‘objects of worship’ that the peasants can worship interchangeably. This 
view would  be  sheer  sacrilege  from the  point  of  view of  the  Muslim 
clergy in  Egypt,  not  least  because  of  the  polytheism  of  Pharaonic 
religion69.
69 In an apparent  concession to the symbolic power of  the Muslim clergy,  Egyptian 
nationalist historiography of ancient Egypt has tended to deny pharaonic polytheism, 
by claiming that the pharaoh Akhenaten’s exceptional monotheism was the religious 
orthodoxy  of  the  entire  Pharaonic  period;  in  reality,  Akhenaten’s  heresy  was 
abolished  after  his  brief  reign  (Colla  2007,  145-148). For  a  history  of  similar 
historiographical misuses of Akhenaten, see Montserrat (2000).
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Later  interpretations  of  ʿAwdat  al-Rūḥ reiterated  this  view  of 
Sufism,  continuing  to  enlist  it  in  the  service  of  nationalism.  Fuʾād 
Dawwāra (1960) argued that al-Ḥakīm’s portrait of peasant life overflows 
with ‘Sufi love’, and sees beauty in everything ugly. The peasants do not 
mind sharing a dwelling with animals, because they have inherited from 
the ancient Egyptians ‘their awareness of the oneness of the universe and 
the unity of the great chain of being’. While afandī intellectuals lavished 
praise on peasants for sharing rooms with animals,  it seems likely that 
they,  the  intellectuals,  would  never  have  dreamed of  doing  the  same 
thing. The idea of the unity of the great chain of being serves to legitimise 
the  social  order:  the dominated should  be content  with their  position, 
since all are united in theory.
Indeed, the Prophet Muḥammad is not only completely absent from 
these  nationalist evocations of Sufism; he  is replaced by the charismatic 
nationalist leader.  Writing at  the height of Nasser’s power, ʿAlī  al-Rāʿī 
(1958) replied to critics who had objected that the 1919 uprising breaks out 
too suddenly in  ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ.  Elaborating the argument of the French 
archaeologist in the novel, al-Rāʿī explains that the eternal Egyptian spirit 
portrayed in the novel is eternally revolutionary:
Egyptians are in a state of permanent readiness for great acts. Their 
spirit is in a state of volcanic eruption/revolution [ṯawra], which 
sleeps as long as it  Egypt lacks its symbol,  its  leader [zaʿīm], its 
commander [qāʾid], and awakens when it finds this leader. What 
happens in  ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ is that the leader appears suddenly, so 
people’s  spirits  rally  round  him  and  are  inflamed,  and  the 
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revolution breaks out, not thanks to particular efforts exerted by a 
group  of  people,  but  because  the  propitious  moment  has  come 
unexpectedly,  just  as  the  moment  of  communication  with  God 
comes unexpectedly to the Sufi. . . . Those efforts would not have 
been  useful if they had been exerted before the appearance of the 
leader lit the magic spark that ignited fire in people’s spirits.
This  aspect  of  the  novel had undoubtedly  not  been  lost  on  one 
particularly  enthusiastic  reader,  Gamal  Abdel  Nasser,  who was fifteen 
years  old  (approximately  Muḥsin’s  age)  when  it was  first  published. 
According to  ʿAlāʾ al-Dīb  (1978), it  was well-known that  ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ 
was Nasser’s favourite novel. ʿAlī Šalaš states that it was the literary work 
that  had  the  strongest  influence  on  Nasser,  ‘the  great  leader  [zaʿīm]’; 
Nasser liked the novel so much that he named his protagonist Muḥsin in a 
story he wrote during his youth, but never finished, called  Fī Sabīl al-
Ḥurriyya (In the Way of  Freedom) (Šalaš 1970).  Perhaps Nasser initially 
envisaged becoming a ‘national writer’, but was unable to do so because 
he  had insufficient  cultural  capital,  while  his  habitus  made him better 
qualified to employ the strategy of prophethood. As Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm put 
it, ‘circumstances transformed him from the author of a Muḥsin on paper 
into Muḥsin himself in flesh and blood’ (al-Hakīm 1974/1988, 55).
Aḥmad Muḥammad ʿAṭiyya (1971) recalls the well-known story of 
US president Abraham Lincoln meeting Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of 
the novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin, during the American Civil War, and saying, 
‘So you're the little woman who wrote the book that started this great 
war.’ ʿAṭiyya cites this as an example of the importance of novels in ‘the 
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nationalist [waṭanī] struggle’, and contends that the importance of Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, in this respect, is equalled only by ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ. He asserts 
that, just as Uncle Tom’s Cabin sparked ‘a nationalist [waṭaniyya] war’ in 
the US,  ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ ‘helped form the thought and spirit’  of Nasser, 
‘leader [qāʾid]’ of the revolution of 1952, and gave a great impetus to the 
Egyptian resistance movement and the spread of the spirit  of  national 
unity, with its famous call, ‘All in one’.
According  to  ʿAbd  al-Raḥmān  Abū  ʿAwf  (1986),  Nasser  himself 
claimed that he had ‘emerged from [ḫaraǧ min] ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ’. This is, 
of course, an exaggeration.  Nasser’s habitus was the product of a social 
trajectory; a variety of experiences contributed to his ability to implement 
the  strategy  of  the  prophets  within  a  nationalist  framework.  We will 
consider a few aspects of this trajectory in the next chapter. For now, let 
us simply note that it is plausible that  ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ suggested to the 
young Nasser an idea, that of the nationalist ‘object of worship’, which he 
later became able to put into practice thanks to his habitus, his cultural 
and social capital, and his social position in the military.
Al-Ḥakīm’s Heteronomy
Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm enjoyed a prolific and successful literary career in 
the 1930s and 40s. He also held a series of increasingly high-ranking civil 
service posts; everything seems to indicate that he successfully converted 
his symbolic capital as an afandī nationalist intellectual into prestigious 
government sinecures70. Unlike Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, al-Ḥakīm
70 ‘In 1934 he  was appointed director  of  the Inquiries  Department (taḥqīqāt)  of  the 
Ministry of Education and in 1939 director of the Information Service of the Ministry 
of  Social  Affairs  which  had  been  established  in  that  same  year.  The  latter  two 
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consistently  refused  to  identify  himself  with  any  political  party, 
arguing that a writer must maintain his independence in order to 
preserve  his  moral  authority;  his  articles  attacked  all  parties 
indiscriminately, accusing them of having abandoned the spirit of 
the 1919 revolution (Starkey 1987, 30).
Thus his very claim to autonomy was based on nationalism. This, in 
itself,  limited his autonomy.  On 28 May 1954,  two years into Nasser’s 
military  dictatorship,  Nasser  sent  al-Ḥakīm a signed copy of  the  book 
Falsafat al-Ṯawra (Philosophy of the Revolution), which had been ghost 
written  for  Nasser  by a  close  associate,  the  journalist  Muḥammad 
Ḥasanayn Haykal  (Jankowski 2002, 25). The book bore a dedication ‘to 
Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm, who has resurrected literature, asking him for another 
Return  of  the  Spirit after  the  revolution’  (ʿAwaḍ  1970).  ‘What  Nasser 
probably wanted was a novel glorifying his coup d’État as the fulfillment 
of the dream and prophecy the novel contained’ (Selaiha 2008). Although 
no such novel was forthcoming, this dedication was  part  of a cycle of 
mutual consecration between the writer and the military ruler. Al-Ḥakīm 
had consecrated Nasser in advance,  by disseminating the idea that the 
nation’s  revival depended on the appearance of a nationalist ‘object of 
worship’. Nasser would soon become that object of worship; over the next 
few years, he would appropriate the symbolic power of  ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ’s 
nationalist  ideals,  representing his  own rule  as  the fulfilment  of  those 
positions may have been sinecures upon his suddenly becoming rather famous after 
the publication of  his  play  Ahl al-Kahf.  .  .  .  [I]n 1951 he became director of  the 
National  Library,  Dār  al-kutub  al-miṣriyya,  in  all  likelihood  another  sinecure’ 
(Brugman 1984, 279). The creation of the Ministry of Social Affairs ‘had itself been 
his own proposal’ (Starkey 1987, 29), and his appointment as director of the National 
Library was ‘made by his friend and colleague Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, at that time Minister of 
Education in the last Wafdist government’ (Starkey 1987, 32).
276
ideals  (on  this  type  of  political  strategy,  see  Bourdieu  1980a,  187-188). 
Thus his régime proceeded to shower al-Ḥakīm with official honours71. 
Moreover,  in  1963,  ʿAwdat  al-Rūḥ was  made  into  a  radio  drama and 
broadcast on Ṣawt al-ʿArab (Voice of the Arabs) (ʿĀbidīn 1963), an official 
state radio station and one of the régime’s major propaganda instruments 
(Jankowski 2002, 54-55). In 1965, it was made into a play and performed 
by  the  Theatre  of  the  Republic  (Masraḥ  al-Ǧumhūriyya),  to  critical 
acclaim (al-ʿĀlim 1965).
I will  explore Nasser’s relationship to the nationalist priesthood in 
greater  depth  in  the  next chapter;  here  I  focus  on  that  relationship’s 
effects on Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm, who occupied a dominant position in that 
priesthood. In 1974, al-Ḥakīm himself provided a lucid insight into these 
effects, in an essay called ʿAwdat al-Waʿy (The Return of Awareness). A 
few years earlier,  Egypt’s  defeat in the June 1967 war with Israel  had 
caused a  ‘crisis  of  hegemony’  (Shukrallah 1989,  53);  it  had called into 
question the validity of nationalist doctrine, and thus the symbolic capital 
of Nasser and of the nationalist priesthood. After Nasser’s death in 1970, 
intellectuals  began to write  about the injustices  and atrocities  that the 
dictatorship had committed during the previous two decades, including 
the imprisonment without trial of thousands (perhaps tens of thousands) 
of  suspected  political  opponents,  in  prison  camps  where  torture  was 
71 ‘In 1954 he was – somewhat reluctantly – elected a member of the Arabic Language 
Academy in Cairo. Two years later he became a member of the Supreme Council for 
Literature and the Arts. . . . In 1958 he was awarded the Order of the Republic for his 
services to literature. In 1959 he was appointed Egyptian delegate to UNESCO in 
Paris, but relinquished this position after only one year to return to his former post. 
In 1961 he received the First State literature prize. Two years later his contribution to  
the Egyptian stage was officially recognised with the founding of the “Al-Ḥakīm 
Theatre”  in Cairo,  the theatre  opening with a production of  his  own  Pygmalion’ 
(Starkey 1987, 33). The Order of the Republic (Qilādat al-Ǧumhūriyya) was the state’s 
second-highest decoration (ʿAwaḍ 1970).
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commonplace.  Many  nationalist  intellectuals  searched  desperately  for 
ways to avoid the question of Nasser’s responsibility for this oppression, 
and  their  own  complicity  in  it,  having  consecrated  Nasser  and  been 
consecrated by him (Geer 2009). ʿAwdat al-Waʿy is  al-Ḥakīm’s tentative 
mea culpa for this complicity.
He recalls that he once received a visit from a journalist close to 
Nasser, who came to convey an invitation to meet the president in his 
house for tea,  just  the two of them. When al-Ḥakīm protested that he 
lacked the necessary rank to meet the president, the journalist laughed 
and said,
‘He is not inviting you in your capacity as a government employee 
but as the author of  ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ, which he has read and which 
he says has influenced the formation of his nationalism.’ ‘Even so,’ I 
replied, ‘please keep me away from men in power.’ . . . I heard that 
Nasser was astonished at my keeping my distance from him, and 
said,  ‘Have we not  done that  about  which he  thought,  felt,  and 
wrote? The revolution is really his revolution.’ The fact is that his 
view was reasonable and logical. What kept me away was the well-
known principle about which I have often written: a ruler does not 
want a thinker’s free thought; he wants his loyal thought. He wants 
to hear support from him, not  opposition. But the essence of the 
thinker’s mission is honesty and freedom. He may make mistakes, 
be misled or lose awareness, but he will never consciously betray 
his mission (al-Hakīm 1974/1988, 48-50).
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It seems that, in writing those lines, al-Ḥakīm was still attached to 
the  belief  that  an  intellectual  could  protect  his  autonomy  simply  by 
avoiding meetings with men in power. But in subsequent pages, the flaws 
in this position start to become apparent:
Nasser  became  the  first  man  in  the  country  [al-bilād].  . . .  The 
country got used to the rule of an individual they trusted and loved. 
And when the masses love, they do not debate. Little by little, the 
voices of those who were accustomed to debate died down, and the 
beloved ruler himself began to become accustomed to rule without 
debate.  . . .  It  is  not  surprising  is  that  the  people  [šaʿb],  in  the 
enthusiasm of their feeling, received these speeches with jubliation 
and glorification [al-tahlīl wa-l-takbīr]72. What is surprising is that 
someone  like  me,  an  intellectual,  accountable  to  the  country 
[balad], whom the revolution overtook when he was middle-aged, 
could also be led behind this enthusiastic feeling. It did not occur to 
me  to  think  about  the  truth  of  the  picture  which  was  being 
manufactured for  us. . . .  Trust had apparently paralysed thought 
(al-Hakīm 1974/1988, 50-52).
What  has  not  occurred  to  al-Ḥakīm  is  that  his  thought  was 
paralysed  and  he  became  unable  to  criticise  Nasser  –  i.e.  he  lost  his 
autonomy  –  precisely  because  he  saw himself  as  ‘accountable  to  the 
country’, i.e.  precisely because he was a  nationalist intellectual. Nasser 
was recognised as the ‘voice of the nation’; it would therefore have been 
logically inconsistent to criticise Nasser in the name of the nation. This is 
72 These two Arabic words literally mean: exclaiming ‘There is no god but God’ and 
‘God is great’. The religious metaphor is undoubtedly intentional here.
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a consequence of the nationalist programme that al-Ḥakīm had outlined 
in  ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ:  just as al-Ḥakīm had imagined the pyramid builders 
happy to bleed and suffer for their object of worship  (Khufu), he could 
have  imagined  his  contemporaries  gladly  enduring  arbitrary 
imprisonment and torture for their object of worship (Nasser). Al-Ḥakīm 
is well aware that Nasser fulfilled this programme to the letter:
He  became  the  people’s  object  of  worship  [maʿbūd  al-šaʿb].  . . . 
Once I had become certain of the manifestations of the worship of 
his person over a period of time, I began to wonder what he had 
liked  about  my  book  ‘Awdat  al-Ruh.  Could  it  have  been  the 
paragraph that says that Egypt always needs one of its own as an 
object  of  worship?  When  he  read that  as  a  young  man,  did  he 
dream that one day he  would be the object of worship? There is 
nothing wrong with that. Everyone has the right to dream that he 
will be the object of worship of the masses. What is wrong, even 
dangerous, is for a human object of worship to become so sacred 
that people see him as infallible [maʿṣūm] and his power paralyses 
their minds, so that they see nothing except what he sees and are 
permitted no opinion contrary to his opinion. But this is what in 
fact happened. . . . This was perhaps the first time in the modern 
history  of  Egypt  that  an  object  of  worship  had  appeared  who 
wanted  his  will  to  have,  throughout  the  Arab  countries,  a 
sacredness,  greatness  and power  that  not  even the  prophets  had 
possessed. The  prophets who were sent from heaven found people 
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who debated with thim and opposed them (al-Hakīm 1974/1988, 58-
59).
Here al-Ḥakīm has used the word ‘infallible [maʿṣūm]’, the same 
word that  is  traditionally  used by the  Muslim  ʿulamāʾ to  refer  to  the 
Prophet Muḥammad’s infallibility (Brown 1996, 60-80). This is an implicit 
acknowledgement  that  the  religious  prophets  have  indeed  been 
considered infallible, just like Nasser, and thus undercuts his argument. 
Moreover, the idea of an infallible object of worship is precisely what al-
Ḥakīm had called for in ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ. Indeed, heteronomous fields such 
as religion  and  nationalism,  in  which  strategies  of  power  depend  on 
attracting the largest possible number of lay followers, lend themselves to 
precisely this phenomenon.
Suppose we grant al-Ḥakīm, however, that Nasser was even more 
successful as a prophet – at least before 1967 – than the religious prophets 
of  the past. Why might this be the case? Perhaps because, while those 
religious prophets had to rely on the human voice and on word of mouth, 
Nasser and his priesthood could use the technology and resources of the 
modern state – including a centralised school system and the media – to 
standardise  the reproduction of  nationalist  habitus  throughout  a  much 
larger population.  (I  will  return to this  point in the next chapter.)  Al-
Ḥakīm was at least dimly aware of this; he recalls his surprise at learning 
that a friend of his was employed by the Arab Socialist Union (Nasser’s 
mass  political  organisation)  to  lead  carefully  scripted  cheers  praising 
Nasser at mass rallies. He then wonders:
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how could a person like me have seen and heard all that and not 
been greatly affected by what he had seen and heard, and still have 
good feelings  towards  Nasser?  Had he  lost  awareness?  Was  it  a 
strange  case  of  anaesthesia?  . . .  The  strange  thing is  that  I  was 
content  to  smile  tolerantly.  Why? Perhaps it  was  because of  the 
hope I had placed in Nasser, a hope that was the product of my 
imagination, and because of an image of the leader, for whom I had 
waited for thirty years (al-Hakīm 1974/1988, 67-68).
This is the closest al-Ḥakīm comes to an admission that he, too, fell 
under  the  spell  of  Nasser’s  charisma  and  was  thus  dominated  by  his 
symbolic power. This  would have been difficult for him to avoid, since 
that power was the product of the same nationalist  concepts and beliefs 
that al-Ḥakīm had internalised and expressed in ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ. Like any 
priest, al-Ḥakīm was also a believer. It was thus highly likely that, once a 
successful  prophet  appeared,  he  would  fall  under  that  prophet’s 
domination and lose his autonomy as an intellectual.
A  premise  of  nationalism  is  that  the  country’s  demands  are 
necessarily legitimate.  Because the nation seemed to have chosen Nasser 
(cf. Younis 2005, 38), fulfilling its duty to the country, it would have been 
difficult  for  the  nationalist  priesthood  to  consider  him a  tyrant  or  to 
persuade  the  laity  of  such an  idea,  just  as  it  would  be  difficult  for  a  
religious believer to accept that God might subject the faithful to the rule 
of a tyrannical prophet.
In  the  introduction to  the second edition of  ʿAwdat  al-Waʿy,  al-
Ḥakīm noted that the first edition had aroused the fury of Nasserists, ‘as 
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though  Nasserism  was  a  sacred  religion  [dīnan  muqaddasan]  which 
should not be touched, or as though Nasser was a superhuman being who 
could  not  be  held  accountable  by  mortals  for  his  errors’  (al-Hakīm 
1974/1988, 11). We are now in a position to see just how accurate this 
assessment was.
Nationalist Habitus as a Blend with a Religious  
Input
If we combine the key nationalist concepts that we have examined 
thus  far  in  this  thesis,  we  can  represent  them  schematically  as  the 
conceptual  blend  in  Figure 11.  The  input  space  on  the  left  contains 
religious concepts: God, priests, prophets and the laity. The input space on 
the right contains a geographical region (such as Egypt), the two main 
types of nationalist cultural producers that we have encountered thus far 
(intellectuals and charismatic politicians), and their target audience (the 
inhabitants  of  the  region).  This  blend produces  inferences  about  the 
relationships  between  the  elements  in  the  second  input  space: 
intellectuals, politicians and citizens are to the country as priests, prophets 
and laypeople are to God. Moreover, this blended conceptual space is in 
effect  a  partial,  miscrecognised  model  of  the  nationalist  field,  whose 
structure is similar to that of the religious field as analysed by Bourdieu 
(1971a).  It  follows  that  one  cannot  understand  nationalism  except 
relationally,  that the meanings of nationalist concepts depend partly on 
their  relations  to  religious  concepts  (on  this  type  of  relational 
understanding, see Bourdieu 1980a, 17).
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In the nationalist  field as in the religious field,  the prophets and 
priests provide services of legitimation to the dominant class of the laity, 
in  exchange  for  symbolic  power.  For  example,  as  we have  seen,  both 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal’s Zaynab and Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm’s ʿAwdat al-
Rūḥ used nationalism to legitimise  a social order in which  landowners 
dominated peasants.
We can find  this  conceptual blend  reflected in a wide variety of 
nationalist cultural  products  and  social  practices,  e.g.  pilgrimages  to 
Karnak Temple, the bestowing of honours on Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm, and the 
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Figure 11: Nationalist habitus as a blend with a religious input
adoration  of  Nasser73.  As  part  of  a  habitus,  this  blend  has  generally 
functioned unconsciously, shaping perceptions and decisions by  making 
them seem intuitively reasonable74. However, as we have seen, aspects of 
it occasionally rise to the level of consciousness. For example, Tawfīq al-
Ḥakīm consciously used the word ‘object of worship [maʿbūd]’ to refer to 
a charismatic nationalist leader in ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ. Similarly, as we saw in 
our chapter on al-Ṭahṭāwī,  members of the French Legislative Assembly 
declared in 1792 that ‘the image of  the  patrie is the sole divinity it  is 
permissible to worship’.
When a habitus spectacularly fails to produce the expected results, a 
crisis  of  faith  may occur,  leading  to  greater  conscious  awareness  and 
examination of the conceptual blend itself. We can see an example of this 
after Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 war, in  ʿAwdat al-Waʿy, when al-Ḥakīm 
consciously realised that the nationalism he had believed in was akin to a 
religion75. The book’s title, The Return of Awareness, is thus appropriate.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued in  ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ, Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm 
correctly  identified  a strategy  capable  of  converting  the  majority  of 
Egyptians  to  nationalism:  the  strategy  of  prophethood,  based  on  the 
habitus  of  a  charismatic  leader.  Al-Ḥakīm’s  impassioned  case  for  this 
strategy found  a keen pupil in Gamal Abdel Nasser, who succeeded in 
putting it into practice in order to become an adored autocrat. Al-Ḥakīm 
73 On the relationship between habitus and practices, see Bourdieu (1979, 190, 512-513, 
1980a, 88-99, 159).
74 On the unconscious functioning of habitus, see Bourdieu (1979, 543-546, 1980a, 113-
114) and cf. Fauconnier and Turner (2002, 56-57).
75 See Geer (2009) for other examples.
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had  not  invented  this  strategy,  but  he  articulated  it  in  a  particularly 
effective  manner.  To  the  extent  that  his  own  fortunes  as  a  writer 
depended on his recognition as a nationalist writer, i.e. on his nationalist 
symbolic capital, his call for a prophet led logically to a relationship of 
mutual consecration between prophet and priest. But the success of this 
strategy  came  at  the  price  of  the  autonomy  of  intellectuals  such  as 
himself.
In his study of the literary field in 19th-century France, Bourdieu 
(1998) argues that writers such as Flaubert and Baudelaire were engaged 
in a struggle for autonomy from political and economic power. This was a 
struggle to create a mode of cultural production that can disregard the 
judgements of anyone except the writers’ own peers. In contrast, religion 
and nationalism aim for the approval of large segments of the laity. As I 
suggested  in  the  introduction  to  this  thesis,  this effort  on  the  part  of 
cultural producers to meet the demands of  the laity is  essential  to the 
success of both religion and nationalism. The struggle to be recognised as 
a nationalist intellectual, or a nationalist political leader, is thus a struggle 
for  heteronomy rather than for autonomy. Hence it is incompatible with 
the  very  freedom  that  Tawfīq  al-Ḥakīm  argued  was  an  essential 
characteristic of the intellectual, the freedom to criticise those in power 
and, more importantly, the mechanisms of power itself. This freedom is 
restricted not only by the symbolic power of charismatic leaders, which 
makes them appear infallible and therefore difficult to criticise. It is also 
restricted  by  the  nationalist  habitus  itself,  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
imposes a set of mythical categories (foremost among them ‘nation’ and 
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‘country’),  based  on  misrecognised  social  interests  and  forms  of 
domination, on the perception and cognition of intellectuals (and other 
believers)76, thus preventing them from perceiving  important aspects  of 
social reality. Other things being equal, the more effectively these myths 
serve intellectuals’ interests, the less likely they are to take an interest in 
reasons to doubt them:
The  basis  of  the  pertinence  principle  which  is  implemented  in 
perceiving the social world and which defines all the characteristics 
of persons or things which can be perceived . . .  is nothing other 
than  the  interest  the  individuals  or  groups  in  question  have  in 
recognizing a feature. . . .  [I]nterest in the aspect observed is never 
completely independent of the advantage of observing it (Bourdieu 
1984, 475).
In other words, it is in intellectuals’ interest not to perceive their 
own  interests,  and  to  believe  instead  that  they  are  disinterested  and 
autonomous from political and economic power. As Bourdieu argued, real 
autonomy  can  be  achieved,  by  means  of  a  collective,  global  struggle 
(Bourdieu 1998, 543-558). But as I have tried to show here, that struggle is 
incompatible with nationalism.
76 On misrecognition, see Bourdieu (1979, 549, 1980a, 219, 267-268, 384-385, 1989, 12).
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Chapter 5: Iḥsān ʿAbd al-Quddūs, Nasser and 
Nationalist Martyrdom
This  chapter  focuses  on  Iḥsān  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  (1919-1990),  a 
widely-read  and influential  journalist,  newspaper  editor  and  writer  of 
prose fiction; ‘a poll conducted in 1954 for the American University in 
Cairo  found him to  be  the  most  popular  living  Arab  writer’  (Starkey 
1998). In particular, I will concentrate on his novel  Fī Baytinā Raǧul (A 
Man in Our House, 1956), and its film adaptation (1961).
ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  wrote  many successful  novels  and stories  about 
women’s problems in Egyptian society (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 50-51). In this 
chapter, I will be focusing not on this aspect of his work, but rather on his 
nationalism, his role as a political  journalist,  and his  relationship with 
Gamal Abdel Nasser. I suggest that although ʿAbd al-Quddūs displayed at 
least  some inclination  towards  political  liberalism,  his  nationalism 
legitimised  the  establishment  of  autocracy and  motivated  his 
transformation into an instrument of  Nasser’s  propaganda machine.  Fī  
Baytinā  Raǧul expresses  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs’s  longstanding  nationalist 
beliefs,  including  the  belief  that  the  nation  should  be  ruled  by  a 
charismatic  hero.  I  argue  that  the  novel  legitimised Nasser’s  rule,  and 
indirectly helped promote military conscription, by glorifying a concept 
of nationalist martyrdom based on the concept of religious martyrdom.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First I note some key elements of 
traditions  concerning  martyrdom  in  Islam.  Then  I  recount  ʿAbd  al-
Quddūs’s social trajectory, his rise to stardom as a priest of nationalism 
by means of journalism, his political views, his relations with the Free 
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Officers before and after the 1952 military coup, his imprisonment in 1954 
and his subsequent integration into Nasser’s propaganda machine. I then 
turn to the origin and development of Nasser’s charisma, focusing on the 
importance  of  the  concept  of  martyrdom  in  the  construction  of  this 
charisma,  which  enabled  him  to  exercise  symbolic  domination  over 
intellectuals like ʿAbd al-Quddūs. Finally, I analyse Fī Baytinā Raǧul and 
its film adaptation, tracing the links between its nationalist concepts, their 
religious models and their social functions in Nasser’s Egypt.
Islamic Sources of ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s Concept of  
Martyrdom
It  will  not be possible to give a complete picture of the complex 
history  of  martyrdom in  Islam  here;  for  such  a  treatment,  I  refer  the 
reader  to  David  Cook’s  (2007) comprehensive  study,  to  which  my 
discussion is indebted. Instead, I will mention only the specific aspects of 
Islamic martyrdom that are directly relevant to the concepts of nationalist 
martyrdom examined later in this chapter. As Cook observes, ‘martyrdom 
means witness’.  In  missionary religions,  it  serves  as  an advertisement, 
promoting one belief system and expressing opposition to another belief 
system. Moreover,  it  sets  an example of proper conduct,  by which the 
martyr’s fellow believers can be judged. Thus it delineates a boundary 
that separates the true believers from the unbelievers or the insufficiently 
committed believers. In order to carry out this function successfully, it 
must  have  ‘communicative  force’;  there  must  be  an  audience  and  a 
‘communicative  agent’,  typically  a  hagiographer.  Martyrology  ideally 
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portrays the martyr’s adversaries as utterly evil; often, it  also  condemns 
those  who profess  neutrality,  attempting to  make them feel  guilty  for 
their passivity in order to mobilise them as converts (Cook 2007, 1-3). The 
martyr’s last  words are often reported as a stirring speech, typically a 
prayer emphasising that the martyr is dying for God’s sake, and calling 
for God’s vengeance (Cook 2007, 10, 22, 30, 68).
Though  the  Prophet  Muḥammad  was  not  martyred,  the  idea  of 
martyrdom was present in early Islam. One paradigmatic early Muslim 
martyr is Bilāl ibn Rabāḥ, an Ethiopian slave who was tormented, though 
not killed, for his adherence to the group of the first Muslims in Mecca. 
The persecution faced by the community of the early Muslims led to their 
migration (hiǧra) to the more hospitable environment of Medina in the 
year 622 (Cook 2007, 13-14; Berkey 2003, 61). The Arabic word for martyr, 
šahīd (pl. šuhadāʾ) appears in the Qurʾān mainly in its more general sense 
of ‘witness’  (Raven 2010), but there are several verses in which Muslim 
exigetes agree that it refers specifically to martyrdom. One such passage 
is Q 3:138-143, which is believed to have been revealed after the Battle of 
Uḥud in 625, a military defeat for the early Muslims (Cook 2007, 16-17): 
‘We deal out such days among people in turn, for God to find out who 
truly believes, for Him to choose martyrs [šuhadāʾ] from among you’. The 
same sūra contains what are probably the most commonly cited verses on 
martyrdom, Q 3:169-70, which are also associated with the Battle of Uḥud:
[Prophet], do not think of those who have been killed in God’s way 
[fī  sabīl  Allāh]  as  dead.  They  are  alive  with  their  Lord,  well 
provided for, happy with what God has given them of His favour; 
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rejoicing that for those they have left behind who have yet to join 
them there is no fear, nor will they grieve.
The formula ‘in God’s way’ (fī sabīl Allāh) came to mean jihad in 
the sense of  ‘warfare against infidels’  (Landau-Tasseron 2010),  and we 
will encounter it below in a modified form in a nationalist context. The 
key aspects of the Qurʾān’s statements on jihad, for our purposes, are that 
it  is  a  type  of  warfare  that  ‘is  seen  as  divinely  sanctioned,  with  the 
promise  of  either  victory  or  death  with  the  rank  of  martyr  as  the 
inducement to fight’, and that many of the Qurʾānic verses on the subject 
are aimed at countering the early Muslims’ reluctance to fight (Cook 2007, 
18-19).
Thus with the concept of jihad comes the concept of the fighting 
martyr. One well-known example that will be relevant to our discussion 
of ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s novel below is that of Ǧaʿfar al-Ṭayyār, who was 
killed while attacking the town of Muʾta (now in southern Jordan) in 629.
His martyrdom is described, as him fighting from horseback until 
his horse was hamstrung, then he continued fighting on foot, until 
both of his arms were cut off.  Initially he took the banner in his 
right hand, until it was cut off, then in his left until it was cut off 
and he bled to death while uttering a war poem (Cook 2007, 26).
Classical treatises on jihad cite hadith specifying that jihad must be 
carried out only ‘to raise the Word of God to the highest’, and insisting 
that ‘someone who fights for this world . . . merely gains what he was 
fighting for’ (Cook 2007, 36); as we will see, this point can be readily used 
as a means of distinguishing religious jihad from nationalist jihad.
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It will also be significant, for our purposes here, to take note of the 
sexual  inducements  to  martyrdom  offered  in  classical  jihad  and 
martyrdom literature. Among the delights of paradise mentioned in the 
Qurʾān,  and  frequently  cited  in  jihad  literature,  are  the  ‘beautiful 
companions  [ḥūr]’  (e.g.  Q  56:22),  who  are  referred  to  in  European 
languages  as  houris.  Classical  Muslim  exegetes  unanimously  identify 
these as ‘women whose purpose was to provide sexual pleasure for the 
blessed in heaven’ (Cook 2007, 32-33; cf. JI Smith and Haddad 1975). Jihad 
and martyrdom literature abounds in ‘frequent and graphic descriptions 
of the sexual delights of paradise . . . especially descriptions of women’, 
and  early  historical  accounts  of  Muslim  martyrs  refer  to  ‘battlefield 
marriages  to  houris’.  Chroniclers  report  that  houris  descended  from 
heaven during the early Muslim conquests to encourage the soldiers on 
the battlefield, and to offer themselves to those who had just died in battle 
(Cook 2007, 37-38).
Finally, Islamic martyrdom narratives are sometimes set within the 
genre of apocalypse. A description of this complex genre would take us 
too far afield here, but it will be relevant to note that one of the signs of 
the  end of  the  world  in  this  type  of  narrative  is  the  appearance  of  a  
messianic figure – the Mahdī or Jesus – who appears ‘to lead the Muslim 
community  into  ultimate  victory  and  establishes  the  messianic  state’ 
(Cook 2007, 125-126).
292
ʿAbd al-Quddūs and Nationalist Journalism
ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s mother was Fāṭima al-Yūsuf, a.k.a. Rūz (Rose) al-
Yūsuf,  a Lebanese immigrant who had a successful career in Egypt,  first 
as a stage actress, then as the owner of the magazine Rūz al-Yūsuf, which 
she named after herself77. In 1925, she abandoned her theatrical career and 
founded a weekly magazine, Rūz al-Yūsuf (Temimi 2008, 16, 112). It was 
one of a number of publications that responded to an increasing demand 
for  a  nationalist  press.  She insisted  on  classifying herself  as  Egyptian, 
although this self-classification did not always convince others. During a 
libel  lawsuit  against her,  the plaintiff’s  lawyer called her an ‘intruder’ 
(daḫīla); she replied that if all the intruders in Egypt were like her, the 
country would have long since achieved its independence. Yet her self-
classification was accepted for the most part (Temimi 2008, 55, 65-66, 117-
118).
The magazine’s readers, like its editors and journalists, were urban 
afandiyya ‘more or less endowed with cultural capital’ (Temimi 2008, 473-
474); they were represented visually in its comics by the popular character 
al-Miṣrī  afandī,  which  the  magazine  described  as  ‘the  emblem of  the 
public’  (Temimi 2008,  344-345).  In keeping with the  afandī stances we 
considered in Chapter 3, Rūz al-Yūsuf incessantly mocked the ʿulamāʾ of 
al-Azhar,  accusing them of  misusing religion,  and portraying them as 
opposed to all reform, innovation and progress in Egypt  (Temimi 2008, 
147-152). During the Wafd’s conflict with al-Azhar in the late 1920s, the 
magazine naturally took the side of the Wafd. In 1926, its editor  argued 
77 The most  comprehensive  study of  the  magazine  Rūz  al-Yūsuf and its  founder  is 
Temimi (2008), on whose superb research I have relied here.
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that the position of Shaykh of al-Azhar should be abolished, and that the 
institution should instead be run by a mere manager (wakīl) employed by 
the state; as Temimi  (2008, 150) notes, this ‘would of course enable the 
Wafd to  win its  battle  against  the religious  institution’.  The magazine 
likewise followed the Wafdist party line according to which ‘“there are no 
longer Christians and Muslims . . . there are Egyptian citizens above all’” 
who follow “the national religion of Saʿd [Zaġlūl]”’ (Temimi 2008, 153).
During the authoritarian rule of the Liberal Constitutionalist  party 
(1928-30),  which  Muḥammad  Ḥusayn  Haykal  defended  by  praising 
Mussolini’s fascism (CD Smith 1983, 81-83), Rūz al-Yūsuf established its 
reputation  as  a  magazine  of  liberal  activism  that  fought  to  defend 
democracy  and  freedom  of  the  press  (Temimi  2008,  208).  It  praised 
journalists of the past who had paid with ther blood for ‘their honesty 
towards the country and their loyalty to the national question’; by means 
of their struggle, it said, they had accumulated ‘the journalist’s capital’ 
(Temimi 2008, 224-225),  i.e.  nationalist  symbolic capital.  The magazine’s 
editors regularly claimed to speak on behalf of the nation (Temimi 2008, 
223-224, 502, 506), and its comics frequently satirised the government and 
its supporters (including Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid and Muḥammad Ḥusayn 
Haykal) by accusing them of betraying Egypt (Temimi 2008, 209-225, 279-
285).
In 1936,  Rūz al-Yūsuf broke  with the Wafd party  and switched its 
allegiance to the King of Egypt, becoming a ‘palace newspaper’; one of its 
cartoons, for example, explicitly identified the crown as ‘the  will of the 
nation  [umma]’.  This formula proved to be a commercial failure.  This 
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period ‘signalled the failure of the newspaper’s political project’, which 
had  relied on its  alignment with the Wafd.  This sequence of events is 
probably what convinced  Iḥsān ʿAbd al-Quddūs  to abstain,  throughout 
his  career,  from affiliation with any political  party  (Temimi 2008,  510-
535).
Iḥsān ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s father was Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Quddūs, a 
civil  engineer  involved in  theatre;  he married  Fāṭima al-Yūsuf  in 1917. 
Muḥammad’s  father,  Aḥmad  Riḍwān,  an  Azhar  graduate  and  court 
employee, who was very conservative in religious matters, was opposed 
to his marriage with an actress, and responded by disowning Muḥammad. 
The  latter  then  quit  his  civil  service job  and  devoted  himself  to the 
theatre.  Iḥsān  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  was  born  in  Cairo  in  1919;  by  then, 
Muḥammad and Fāṭima were divorced. Aḥmad Riḍwān took Iḥsān from 
Fāṭima and raised him in his own house, while trying with little success 
to keep him away from his father. Iḥsān would live at his grandfather’s 
house until he was 18 years old, during which time he was allowed to 
visit his mother once a week; he then moved back in with her  (Abū al-
Futūḥ 1982, 11-17; al-Niqāš 1991, 17-18; Temimi 2008, 56).
During Iḥsān’s childhood, the division between religious and non-
religious cultural  capital,  and between the shaykhs and the  afandiyya, 
was  mirrored  in  the  split  between  his  grandfather’s  house  and  his 
mother’s house. He listened to the religious seminars that his grandfather 
held at home in the company of other Azharites. He also attended the 
cultural and political seminars that his mother held at her home in the 
company of prominent  afandī writers,  politicians and artists.  Later,  he 
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recalled that  moving back and forth between ‘these two contradictory 
environments [hāḏayn al-manāḫayn al-mutanāqiḍayn]’ was disorienting 
at  first.  The  contradiction  between them caused  him to  have  nervous 
breakdowns during adolescence, but he grew accustomed to it. He loved 
both of  these ‘clashing poles  [al-quṭbayn al-mutanāfirayn]’  in his  life, 
and would defend each one against the criticisms of the other  (Abū al-
Futūḥ 1982, 11-13, 27, 38). In the long run, however, his parents’ influence 
was decisive. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Quddūs never remarried, and remained 
actively  involved  in  his  son’s  schooling,  moving  him  from  one  state 
school to another, always in search of a better education for him (Abū al-
Futūḥ  1982,  18).  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  also  learned  a  great  deal  from  his 
mother, and described himself as ‘her pupil’ (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 20).
ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  graduated  from  law  school  in  1942,  and  began 
working as a  trainee lawyer and as a  journalist  for  Rūz al-Yūsuf.  His 
earnings  were low,  and he later  described himself  as ‘a failed lawyer’ 
(Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 22-27).  He thus had a strong incentive to take bold, 
risky stances as a journalist.  In 1945, while working as secretary to the 
editor of Rūz al-Yūsuf, he wrote an article calling for the removal of Lord 
Killearn,  the British ambassador to Egypt.  The Wafdist  Prime Minister 
Nuqrāšī immediately had ʿAbd al-Quddūs arrested, thus furnishing him 
with  impeccable  nationalist  credentials.  His  mother  saluted  him  for 
upholding ‘the honour of jihad for the cause of Egypt’, and turned over 
the magazine to him upon his release from prison (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 70-
74).
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In recalling this episode, he refers to Fārūq, then king of Egypt, as ‘a 
foreign [aǧnabī] king from an intruder  [daḫīla] family’  (Abū al-Futūḥ 
1982,  70).  Yet  Fārūq was in  fact  widely  considered an ‘Egyptian’  king 
during his reign, in contrast to the previous rulers of his dynasty, and 
indeed was seen as ‘the first Egyptian to govern the country since the 
Pharaohs’,  partly  because  his  mother  was  Egyptian  (de  Gayffier-
Bonneville  2002,  77-78).  Ironically,  as  we have  seen,  ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s 
mother was an immigrant, she herself had been labelled an ‘intruder’ in 
Egypt, and her magazine had been staunchly royalist in the late 1930s, 
even before Fārūq became king. This is an example of the arbitrariness of 
the boundaries of nations, and the practice of drawing those boundaries in 
such a way as to include oneself and exclude – or rather, excommunicate 
– one’s adversaries (cf. Bourdieu 1987b, 171; Younis 2005, 29).
During the 1940s, ʿAbd al-Quddūs explored Marxism and Islamism, 
but was dissatisfied with both (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 67-82). He never joined 
any political party or organisation; in justifying this choice, he said that 
he saw himself as expressing the opinions of ‘the political street [al-šāriʿ  
al-siyāsī]’  (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 65-66). His ‘bias  towards the man in the 
street’, he explained, is ‘the only bias I have permitted myself to have all 
my life’; he considered himself ‘a faithful son of the political street’ (Abū 
al-Futūḥ  1982,  78).  This  concept  of  ‘the  street’  seems  well-suited  to 
obscuring  class differences. However, ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s lack of political 
affiliation also enabled him to maximise his social capital.  During this 
period, most newspapers and magazines in Egypt
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were  aimed  much  more  at  propaganda  and  agitation  than  the 
dissemination  of  news  and  information.  Each  editorial  office 
became  a  sort  of  meeting  place  where  activists,  supporters  and 
sympathisers of the political current or party of the publication in 
question would meet,  in the absence of  political  clubs  (Makarius 
1960, 33).
By not allying the magazine with a particular political group, ʿAbd 
al-Quddūs was able to hire, for example, both Communists and Muslim 
Brothers  (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982,  83-84).  Under his  direction,  Rūz al-Yūsuf 
became the most prominent political  and literary magazine of  its time 
(Abū  ʿAwf  2007,  12), no  doubt  partly  because  of  his  prestige  as  a 
nationalist activist.
One  event  that  seems  to  have  enhanced  that  prestige was  his 
assistance to the assassin of the former cabinet minister Amīn ʿUṯmān; 
this incident would later serve as part of the basis of his novel Fī Baytinā 
Raǧul.  A small nationalist militia, armed and trained by Anwar  Sadat, 
assassinated ʿUṯmān as punishment for his pro-British statements (Reid 
1982,  633-634).  After  the  assassination,  the  radio  began  broadcasting, 
every half hour, the police’s offer of a 5,000 EGP reward for information 
leading to  the assasssin’s arrest, and the threat of a death sentence for 
anyone who  helped him.  ʿAbd al-Quddūs  was  asked for assistance  in 
hiding the fugitive. Later, he recalled that he had seen this as a test: if he 
accepted, he would prove to the revolutionaries that he was really one of 
them. If not, he would be seen as a mere ‘merchant’ selling empty words 
on  ‘the revolution market’. He  therefore  hid the  assassin in his  flat for 
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four days  (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 89-92). In reality, the alternative between 
the  ‘merchant’  and  the  ‘revolutionary’  is  illusory;  intellectuals  are 
simultaneously  merchants  of  cultural  goods  and  sincere  supporters  of 
causes.  Since they have ‘an interest in disinterestedness’  (Bourdieu 1993, 
40, Bourdieu 1994b, 200), they can become more successful merchants by 
demonstrating a willingness to risk their lives for their principles. This is 
arguably what ʿAbd al-Quddūs did in this case.
He was then in a position to upbraid others for not displaying the 
same courage. In an article in 1948, he faulted Egyptians for not being 
willing to sacrifice their lives for Egypt, lamenting that ‘the living person 
does not want to be a dead person or a martyr [šahīd]’. ‘Put your heads in 
the nooses  and chant “Down with injustice”’, he urged his readers (Abū 
al-Futūḥ 1982, 78). During this period, he says, he was looking for hidden 
revolutionaries. His goal as editor of the magazine was to reveal the sins 
(ḫaṭāyā)  of  the  ‘treacherous  regime  [al-sulṭa  al-ḫāʾina]’  to  the  people 
(šaʿb),  believing that this would increase the number of revolutionaries 
and thus hasten ‘the explosion that would eliminate the enemies of the 
nation [aʿdāʾ al-šaʿb]’ (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 79).
In 1949,  he published what was probably the biggest scoop of his 
career,  accusing the Egyptian government of  supplying its  troops with 
defective weapons in the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 97-
102; Muṣṭafā 1991). This scandal was ‘incontestably the most important 
affair  of  this  period  because  of  the  damage  it  did  to  the  monarchy’ 
(Temimi  2008,  38).  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs’s  contacts  with  young,  disaffected 
army officers – including Nasser, who had fought in that war – date from 
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this  period.  The  stories  of  defective  weapons  were  later  disproved 
(Gordon 2006, 24-25), but in publishing them, ʿAbd al-Quddūs arguably 
succeeded – at least in his readers’ eyes – in living up to the standard of 
dissident  journalism that  the magazine  had set  in  the 1930s,  and thus 
gained more of the ‘journalist’s capital’ mentioned above.
In 1951, when prime minister Muṣṭafā al-Naḥḥās abrogated Egypt’s 
1936  treaty  with  Britain,  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  praised  him in  an  editorial, 
writing  that  the  Egyptian  government  was  ‘the  government  of  the 
revolution’ and that ‘we are all on its side, united in sacrifice and jihad’78; 
this decision must be ‘baptized with blood and vouched for with money 
and sons; it is a call to every Egyptian to prepare for the great sacrifice’. 
Recalling  this  episode,  he  asserts  that  the  government’s  decision 
represented ‘the will  of the nation [šaʿb]’,  and that while there should 
therefore have been huge demonstrations in support of this decision, in 
reality only small demonstrations happened. There were attempts to form 
an  ‘unofficial  popular  front’  of  nationalist  organisations,  but  these 
attempts all failed due to ‘differences’ between the participants  (Abū al-
Futūḥ 1982, 129-132).  Here one could ask: if only small demonstrations 
took place, how did he know that the decision reflected ‘the will of the 
nation’? It is as if he just knew intuitively, thanks to his privileged insight 
as priest  of the nation. Yet according to his  own account,  instead of a 
single  ‘will  of  the  nation’,  we  find  opposing  wills  even  among 
nationalists, who were unable to agree and cooperate.
78 Note again the use of ‘we’.
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In  1951,  he  joined  an  armed  nationalist  group  and  became  its 
treasurer;  he  was  responsible  for  furnishing its  members  with  money, 
food,  weapons  and  ammunition.  The  offices  of  the  magazine  were 
‘transformed  into  an  arms  depot’  (Abū  al-Futūḥ  1982,  138-139).  In  an 
article  published on  4  December  1951,  he  asked:  ‘Where  is  the  armed 
revolution that encompasses all of Egypt. . . ? Where is the leader [zaʿīm] 
of  the  revolution,  the preacher  [ḫaṭīb] to  the  masses,  the organiser  of 
groups,  the  planner  of  attacks?’  On  11  December  1951,  in  an  article 
entitled ‘The Missing Man’,  he wrote:  ‘The  battle is now being led by 
fedayeen who have given themselves to death; it is they who have blown 
up water stations and sewers, and carried out these attacks on English 
camps’. Where, he asked, is ‘the man responsible’? On 25 December 1951, 
he wrote: ‘Go to battle, Egyptians, and commit suicide  [intaḥirū] facing 
the Englishmen’s bullets’, adding that there are no social classes in times 
of  revolution  (Abū  al-Futūḥ  1982,  133-135).  On  11  February  1952,  he 
wrote: ‘Egypt is in temporary need of a dictator . . . who will act for the 
people, not against them, for and not against freedom, a dictator who will 
push Egypt forward, not hold her back’ (Gordon 1989, 229). On 24 March 
1952, he ‘wrote . . . of the need for a “popular hero” to lead the nation’ 
(Gordon 1989, 232). A few days before the June 1952 coup, he wrote: ‘The 
only thing that can drive the nation forward is a man who believes in the 
nation, whom the nation trusts and around whom it unites’ (Abū al-Futūḥ 
1982, 142).
Thus in ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s political writings before the  1952  coup, 
we find the concepts of ‘jihad’ and ‘martyr’ used in nationalist senses, 
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rather  than  religious  ones,  as  well  as  repeated  calls  for  Egyptians  to 
sacrifice  their  lives  for  the  nationalist  cause.  There is  an emphasis  on 
drawing the boundary between the nation on one hand, and the ‘traitors’ 
or ‘enemies of the nation’ on the other hand. Moreover, there is a clear 
call for a prophet-like national leader. ʿAbd al-Quddūs was not alone in 
issuing this call. At the end of the 1940s, Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm published an 
article  calling  for  the  closure  of  Parliament  for  three  years  and  the 
establishment  of  a  ‘just  tyrannical  government  [ḥukūma mustabidda 
ʿādila]’;  he  suggested  that  it  should  be  led  by  veteran  politician  ʿAlī 
Māhir, who had been one of the foremost proponents of the idea of the 
‘just tyrant’ (al-mustabidd al-ʿādil) since the 1930s (Abū ʿAwf 2007, 22-23; 
cf. Gordon 1992, 65). Joel Gordon observes:
The notion of appointing a popular strong man who stood above 
and  apart  from  party  squabbles,  who  could  institute  sweeping 
reform legislation and restore order to a political process gone awry 
had gained a growing number of proponents. . . . Popular discontent 
with  ‘party  politics’  had  reached  a  fever  pitch  by  early  1952 
(Gordon 1989, 224; cf. Younis 2005, 207).
Gordon  is  referring  to  the  Arabic  term  ḥizbiyya (literally 
‘partyism’), which had become a pejorative term by the 1930s (Gershoni 
and Jankowski 1995, 4; Aclimandos 2002, 49). In the summer of 1952, even 
‘for those who remained loyal to the liberal ethos, a myth of the savior 
prevailed’ (Gordon 1989, 236, Gordon 1992, 37). As we saw in Chapter 4, 
this  myth  was  not  simply  a  pragmatic  response  to  the  failure  of 
parliamentary politics; it had long since become part of the belief system 
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of  nationalism,  having  been  blended from  a religious  frame into  a 
nationalist one.
As Tewfik Aclimandos  (2002,  15-16) observes,  the 1930s and 40s, 
‘broad sectors of the Egyptian population’, including the Free Officers and 
many  experienced  politicians,  were  attracted  to  certain  aspects  of  the 
European  far  right,  including  ‘a  fascination  with  the  image  of  an 
“awakened” nation, united by a strong leader’. Sadat had been involved in 
contacts  with  the  Axis  powers  during  World  War  II  and  ‘made 
preliminary efforts to join Marshal Rommel and the Nazi war campaign’; 
ʿAlī  Māhir,  too,  was  known for  his  ‘acknowledged fascist  sympathies’ 
(Abū  ʿAwf  2007,  20-23;  Botman  1998,  298-299).  Scholars  are  not  in 
agreement about the extent of admiration for German or Italian fascism 
in Egypt during this period. Gershoni and Jankowski (2009) give evidence 
of both positive and negative attitudes towards fascism in Egypt during 
the 1930s. On the other hand, the reformist intellectual Ḫālid Muḥyī al-
Dīn recalls Egyptians’ admiration for Hitler during the 1930s and 40s:
Our  admiration  for  him was  immense.  Many  people  called  him 
Muḥammad Hitler, seeing him as a Muslim sent by God to punish 
and educate the colonialists. Conversations dealt with dreams sent 
by God, in which Egyptians dreamed of Hitler. I have not forgotten 
that during this period, I saw him in a dream, as the muezzin of al-
Azhar, performing the call to prayer in dazzling Arabic. . . . One of 
my friends believed that Hitler was the Mahdī, that he would soon 
announce his conversion to Islam, and that he would bring victory 
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to Islam and to Muslims everywhere  (quoted in Aclimandos 2002, 
15-16).
The  notion  of  a  Muslim  Hitler  aside,  this  was  not  an  entirely 
fanciful impression of the Nazi belief system. Without equating Egyptian 
nationalism with Nazism, we can usefully observe that Nazism had drawn 
from the  same  intellectual  sources  as  Egyptian  nationalism (e.g.  from 
Thomas Carlyle) in its glorification of ‘great men’  (Ball  1942; Schapiro 
1945,  115;  McCollum  2007),  and  that  ‘on  several  occasions  [Hitler] 
presented himself as a “prophet”’ (Burrin 1997, 336).
ʿAbd al-Quddūs and the Free Officers
Thanks  to  his  contacts  with  disaffected  army  officers,  ʿAbd  al-
Quddūs became friends with Nasser in 1949 or 1950 (Abū ʿAwf 2007, 35, 
180). Nasser was an enthusiastic reader of  Rūz al-Yūsuf (Abū al-Futūḥ 
1982, 196), and Sadat wrote articles anonymously for the magazine before 
the coup  (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982,  142-143). ʿAbd al-Quddūs noticed that in 
discussions, Nasser and Sadat were among the officers that talked least 
and listened most,  then uttered the right words to settle the matter at 
hand;  for  him,  these  are  among  the  most  important  qualities  in  a 
revolutionary  leader.  From  this  he  concluded  that  if  there  was  a 
revolutionary organisation in the army, Nasser and Sadat must be among 
its most prominent members (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 143-144).
On the morning of 23 July 1952, immediately after the Free Officers 
seized power, Nasser called ʿAbd al-Quddūs to invite him to a meeting of 
the  Council  of  the  Revolution.  The  coup  leaders  had  no  political 
programme and did not know what to do. ʿAbd al-Quddūs suggested that 
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they  appoint  ʿAlī  Māhir as  prime  minister,  and  this  suggestion  was 
adopted. The officers sent ʿAbd al-Quddūs with Sadat and another officer 
to meet ʿAlī Māhir and convince him to accept the appointment. ʿAbd al-
Quddūs dominated the meeting, silencing Sadat when he tried to speak up 
(Abū ʿAwf 2007, 16-18; Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 146-147).
In the autumn of 1952, when ʿAlī Māhir opposed the officers’ land 
reform law,  ʿAbd al-Quddūs wrote an article  calling  for  his  dismissal. 
Nasser  told  ʿAbd al-Quddūs that while  he had complete confidence in 
Iḥsān’s loyalty (iḫlāṣ) and agreed with the content of the article, he had 
personally censored it, because he did not want the people (šaʿb) to get 
used to the idea ‘that people can make suggestions to the revolution and 
that the revolution will implement their suggestions, even if they’re good 
suggestions’.  He  added:  ‘If  we  implemented your  suggestion  –  you,  a 
journalist – what would there be left for us to do?’ The article was finally 
published, but ʿAbd al-Quddūs was left with a bitter feeling about this 
episode  (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 156-158), which suggests that Nasser feared 
the competition of the nationalist priesthood at that time.
ʿAlī  Māhir was  dismissed  on  6  September  1952  and replaced  by 
Muḥammad Naǧīb, the Free Officers’ figurehead (Gordon 1992, 4, 66-67). 
ʿAbd al-Quddūs and Nasser  continued to  disagree frequently;  ʿAbd al-
Quddūs  ‘looked  for  excuses’  for  Nasser  in  order  to  explain  these 
disagreements.  He was,  he recalls,  ‘unable to give up the cause of  the 
revolution,  which  I  had  faith  in’  (Abū  al-Futūḥ  1982,  158-159).  On  8 
September 1952, he published an article referring to the army officers as 
‘angels’  that  had  deposed  the  king,  then  ascended  to  heaven  before 
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finishing their  job;  he called on them to ‘destroy the ranks  of  evil’  in 
Egypt, i.e. the powerful politicians of the pre-coup era. He believed that 
the officers were the only ones who could offer protection from this evil, 
since they represented ‘a vast popular [šaʿbbiyya] force’  (Abū al-Futūḥ 
1982, 167-168). In a series of articles published in Rūz al-Yūsuf starting on 
11 October 1952, under the title ‘How We Want Egypt to Be Governed79’, 
he wrote:
Before  the  army  movement,  we  were  looking  for  a  new leader 
[zaʿīm] for the people [šaʿb]. The reactionaries didn’t believe that 
this man could exist or appear from the ranks of the people. But 
Muḥammad  Naǧīb  and  Gamal  Abdel  Nasser  and  others  have 
appeared (Abū ʿAwf 2007, 31).
On 17 November 1952, he published an article revealing that Nasser 
was the real leader of the Free Officers, and praising Nasser highly (Abū 
ʿAwf 2007, 31-32, 36). At the same time, he had embarked on the ill-fated 
campaign for liberal democracy that would lead to his imprisonment in 
1954. He argued that Egypt should become a democratic republic; for this, 
he was accused on the radio of being an enemy of the revolution (Abū al-
Futūḥ  1982,  160-162).  Nevertheless,  the  Council  of  the  Revolution 
proclaimed Egypt a republic (if only in name) in June 1953 (Gordon 1992, 
83-84). In ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s opinion, opposition to the idea of a republic 
arose because ‘thousands of years of monarchy had drawn a dark curtain 
over  people’s  minds,  or  some  people’s  minds,  so  that  their  political 
imagination could not encompass any other system of government’ (Abū 
79 Note once again the use of ‘we’ instead of ‘I’.
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al-Futūḥ 1982, 160). Yet this assertion is incompatible with the idea of the 
‘will  of  the  nation’  and  with  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs’s  view of  his  role  as  a 
vehicle for the expression of ‘the political street’.
In  another  article  in  the  same series,  he  warned that  a  republic 
requires  a  nation  to  be  ‘strong and aware  and to  keep its  eyes  open,  
otherwise the first president will become a dictator with the powers of a 
king’. In an article entitled ‘There Is No Just Tyrant, Nor Any Tyrannical 
Person of Justice’, published on 9 February 1953, he attacked the idea of a 
just tyrant, arguing that it is a contradiction in terms (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 
162-163). Yet on 12 January 1953, he wrote an article declaring that ‘we 
believe [nuʾmin]’ in the leaders of the army coup, on the grounds that the 
officers had taken part in nationalist movements before the coup, ‘because 
they are Egyptian, nationalist [waṭaniyyūn] and of the nation [min al-
šaʿb]’. The army movement might be military in its means, he said, but it 
is not military in its principles or goals; though its leaders wear military 
uniforms, they have put ‘popular [šaʿbiyya] principles’ in their hearts, ‘the 
principles of democracy, freedom and the constitution’. This, he added, is 
why he had wanted the officers to take over ministerial posts themselves 
after the coup. It was not because he wanted a military dictatorship; the 
officers were incapable of becoming dictators  (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 163-
164).
In private discussions, ʿAbd al-Quddūs advised the officers to leave 
the army and become the leaders of a new political party, which would 
compete with other parties in elections. Shortly afterwards, on 16 January 
1953, all political parties were outlawed and a single party was founded, 
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the Liberation Rally (Hayʾat al-Taḥrīr); all its leaders were officers (Abū 
al-Futūḥ  1982,  181-182;  Gordon  1992,  80-81).  Disappointed,  ʿAbd  al-
Quddūs wrote on 9 February 1953: ‘There will be no victory without a 
battle, and the battle will not be fought if there are none to struggle with’ 
(Gordon 1992, 82).
Judging  by  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs’s  own  recollections  of  his  political 
stances, democracy was not one of his primary concerns before the 1952 
coup;  he  was  mainly  preoccupied  with  promoting  armed  nationalist 
resistance to the British occupation and attacks on ‘traitors’, and did not 
hesitate to advocate dictatorship, or to support an advocate of dictatorship 
such as  ʿAlī Māhir. Perhaps the military coup prompted him to reassess 
the  value  of  democracy.  In  any  case,  the  events  of  1954  would 
demonstrate that this change of heart was too little, too late.
The Struggle Between Nasser and Naǧīb
By 1953, there was still little sign of widespread enthusiasm for the 
junta,  and  the  officers,  including  Nasser,  were  repeatedly  heckled  in 
public  (Gordon 1992, 82). Still,  Muḥammad Naǧīb, the figurehead, who 
was  widely  seen  as  a  ‘father  figure’  (Gordon  1992,  121,  125),  had 
demonstrated that he possessed charisma for a broad audience. ‘The army 
is  the  nation  and  every  Egyptian  a  soldier’,  he  had  told  enthusiastic 
crowds in September 1952. (This is a conceptual blend, from which it can 
be inferred that the leaders of the army are the leaders of the nation.) He 
also likened the junta to a god that was creating a new world: ‘“Patience,  
patience”, he beseeched his audience. “It took God six days to create the 
world”, he told them, and asked for six months’ (Gordon 1992, 73-74).
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In March 1954, a bitter power struggle between Nasser and Naǧīb 
reached its conclusion: Naǧīb was permanently sidelined, and Nasser and 
his supporters consolidated military rule  (Gordon 1992, 120-142). During 
this confrontation, those who advocated a return to parliamentary rule 
rallied around Naǧīb (Gordon 1992, 125), while Nasser used the Liberation 
Rally to organise demonstrations at which crowds chanted: ‘No political 
parties  and no democracy’ and ‘Don’t  leave us,  Gamal’  (Gordon 1992, 
135).
ʿAbd al-Quddūs took a stand in favour of parliamentary rule during 
the  March  crisis.  This,  he  recalls,  meant  reluctantly  giving  up  his 
friendship with Nasser. In articles published in  Rūz al-Yūsuf,  the most 
famous of which was entitled ‘The Secret Organisation that Rules Egypt’ 
(22 March 1954), he called for a democratic republic. He called on Nasser 
‘to set a new example of jihad by leaving his organisation and joining the 
ranks of the nation, to struggle as one of the nation’s leaders’  (Abū al-
Futūḥ 1982, 180-182; Abū ʿAwf 2007, 15). Nasser retaliated by having ʿAbd 
al-Quddūs arrested and imprisoned from 28 April to 31 July 1954, on the 
charge of attempting to overthrow the government. He was tortured, and 
kept in solitary confinement for 45 days, but recalls that what was even 
more painful for him was the accusation of treason, since his ‘faith’ in the 
revolution had inspired him to devote his life to hastening ‘the day of 
salvation  [ḫalāṣ]’  (Abū  al-Futūḥ  1982,  188-194;  Abū  ʿAwf  2007,  24). 
Arguably, his own insistence on drawing a boundary between ‘the nation’ 
and ‘the traitors’ had come back to haunt him.
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Submission to Nasser
While  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  was  in  prison,  his  mother  took  over  the 
magazine, and responded to her son’s imprisonment by refusing to print a 
single word about the military coup or the regime  (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 
195-196).  At  the  same  time,  she  printed  eye-catching  headlines  that 
implied criticism of the officers without attacking them directly, e.g. ‘The 
Mahdī appears in Egypt’.  Nasser  then sent representatives to negotiate 
with  her,  but  she  refused  to  negotiate  (Abū  al-Futūḥ  1982,  200).  This 
suggests  that  Nasser  was  still  unable  to  exercise  total  symbolic 
domination over nationalist intellectuals.
Immediately after ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s release, he accepted a number 
of invitations to Nasser’s house. Nasser explained these invitations as a 
kind of psychological treatment for ʿAbd al-Quddūs (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 
202-204); in reality, the military ruler was probably trying to enlist the 
journalist in the régime’s propaganda machine. ‘A battle began between 
me and my pen,’ ʿAbd al-Quddūs recalls (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 204). A few 
months later, he was arrested again,  accused of conspiracy against the 
revolution and incitement to overthrow the regime, taken to a cell, and 
released the same day after a phone call from Nasser (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 
209-215). ʿAbd al-Quddūs then realised that something had gone seriously 
wrong with the ‘revolution’, but blamed the ‘perversion of the revolution’ 
on  ‘centres  of  power’  (i.e.  Nasser’s  colleagues),  rather  than  on  Nasser 
himself. He says that he decided to give his unconditional support to ‘the 
revolution as a theory’, and ignore the ‘centres of power’  (Abū al-Futūḥ 
1982, 216-217).
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From then on,  however,  his  newspaper articles  expressed fervent 
support for Nasser; by 1956, he had become a leading figure within the 
regime  (Gordon 1992, 196). In 1960, he wrote: ‘Gamal Abdel Nasser . . . 
represents  a  truth,  the  truth  of  these  throngs.  When  we  rally  around 
Gamal  Abdel  Nasser,  we experience  ourselves  as  a  nation  [šaʿb].  The 
truth springs from us, from the nation, but Gamal Abdel Nasser embodies 
it’  (Younis 2005, 155). In the same year, he wrote that Nasser’s ‘standard 
in every word he says is his principles’  (Younis 2005, 134). In 1961, he 
wrote that it is Nasser who sets out the philosophy of ‘our principles and 
political orientations, and explains and analyses them’ (Younis 2005, 135). 
In 1962, he wrote that Nasser’s personality was ‘the personality of the 
hero’,  and  ‘could  therefore  encompass  everyone,  and  give  of  itself  to 
everyone. It has come to pass that all of us live in Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
He is love, a great love’  (Younis 2005, 159). In 1964, he wrote that the 
purpose of the Socialist Union (the name of the single party at the time) 
was to link everyone in the country so that when a low-level member of 
the party spoke in any remote village, he would express the opinion of the 
supreme leadership of the revolution, i.e. Nasser (Younis 2005, 142). After 
Nasser’s resignation speech following Egypt’s defeat in the June 1967 war 
with Israel, ʿAbd al-Quddūs wrote that Nasser could not resign, ‘because 
he is the will of the nation. . . . Abdel Nasser is our weapon, our strength 
and our will’ (Younis 2005, 196).
It is now time to consider the question of how Nasser attained such 
a high degree of symbolic domination over intellectuals such as ʿAbd al-
Quddūs and over Egyptians in general.
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Martyrdom, Habitus and Nasser’s Charisma
Nasser’s  popularity  in  Egypt  and  elsewhere  has  often  been 
attributed instrumentally to particular policies that he adopted, especially 
in the domain of  international  relations.  Moreover,  the changes  in his 
nationalist stances – such as shift from Egyptian nationalism to an Egypt-
centric Arab nationalism – are often explained instrumentally as well, in 
relation  to  changing  political  necessities.  This  type  of  explanation  is 
certainly valid to an extent,  but it  leaves many questions unanswered. 
Adeed Dawisha  argues  that  Nasser’s  Egyptian supporters  in  the  1950s 
were particularly keen to resist European and American domination of 
Egypt.  During the Cold War,  the US and Britain  sought  to form anti-
Soviet military alliances with several countries in the region. In order to 
safeguard Egypt’s independence, Nasser needed to prevent his neighbours 
from entering such alliances, and therefore ‘had to tap the most readily 
acceptable bond that drew Egyptians and the other Arabs together, that of 
Arab nationalism’  (Dawisha 2003, 140–142; cf. Vatikiotis 1978,  225–234). 
Yet this analysis is based on a tautology. Why was it necessary to draw 
‘the Arabs’ together, rather than, say, the Muslims? This would have had 
the advantage of including non-Arab Muslims such as those in Turkey 
and  Iran.  More  important,  Islamic  religious  faith  had  been  deeply 
entrenched in the habitus of most of the region’s inhabitants for over a 
thousand years, while Arab nationalism was less than a century old and 
had not yet gained wide acceptance, particularly in Egypt (Dawisha 2003, 
98–106, 135–138). Indeed, Nasser’s own ‘conversion’ to Arab nationalism 
does not seem to have occurred before 1954 (Dawisha 2003, 147).
312
Similarly,  Mahmoud  Hussein  argues  that  the  Nasser  regime 
embraced a watered-down ‘socialism’ in the early 1960s for instrumental 
reasons: faced with the increasing popularity of communists in the Arab 
world, and its own faltering popularity in Egypt as economic inequalities 
deepened,  it  fiercely  suppressed Egyptian communist  movements,  then 
embarked on a  programme of  nationalisations  and obtained assistance 
from the  Soviet  Union,  proclaiming  an  ‘Arab  socialism’  without  class 
struggle,  intended  to  benefit  the  regime  without  benefiting  Egyptian 
communists  (Hussein  1971,  163–169).  This  analysis  does  not  explain, 
however, why Nasser did not simply embrace communism. Yet another 
option, instead of ‘Arab socialism’, would have been ‘Islamic socialism’ 
(cf. Teitelbaum 2011). This would have had the advantage of forestalling 
attacks  by  rival  states  on  religious  grounds;  the  Saudi  monarchy,  for 
example, attempted to win the region’s Muslims away from nationalism 
by  denouncing  it  as  ‘based  on  atheistic  doctrine’,  and  offering  an 
alternative, Islamic path to political unity (Dawisha 2003, 233, 247–248).
Other  instrumental  explanations  raise  similar  questions.  One  of 
Nasser’s  popular  stances  was  his  participation  in  the  ‘non-aligned’ 
movement of states that refused to ally themselves with the US or the 
Soviet  Union  (Dawisha  2003,  166);  since  this  won  him  considerable 
acclaim  as  a  leader  in  the  struggle  against  imperialism  (de  Gayffier-
Bonneville 2002, 92–93), why did he not choose to rely mainly on ‘third-
worldism’ rather than Arab nationalism? In 1956, he nationalised the Suez 
canal,  defying  the  European  powers;  Britain,  France  and  Israel  then 
invaded Egypt, but withdrew at the insistence of the US. This political 
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victory ‘made Nasser into the Arab legend’ (Younis 2005, 131; cf. Gordon 
2006,  48–49). Why not  the  Muslim legend? ‘To  restless  and frustrated 
Arab  nationalists  he  indeed  seemed  a  second  Saladin’  (Dawisha  2003, 
181);  yet  Saladin  was  Muslim  but  not  Arab.  Alternatively,  why  was 
Nasser not simply an Egyptian, third-world or anticolonial legend? Nasser 
and his supporters viewed Israel as an instrument of imperialism, and the 
1956 invasion only confirmed this (Dawisha 2003, 141, 242–243). But when 
Nasser  sought  to  unite  neighbouring  countries,  including  his  Saudi 
enemies  (who  were  allies  of  the  US),  to  oppose  Israel’s  attempt  to 
monopolise the water of the Jordan River in 1963, he needed an argument 
other  than  anti-imperialism,  and  he  chose  ‘Arab  solidarity’  (Dawisha 
2003, 243–246). Could Muslim solidarity have been an alternative?
It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present  study,  with  its  focus  on 
intellectuals,  to  attempt  to  answer  these  questions.  However,  I  would 
argue  that  in  order  to  explain  why  Nasser  defined  himself  and  his 
audience  in  certain  ways,  and  why  those  conceptualisations  gained 
widespread acceptance and contributed to his popularity, one would need 
to analyse Nasser’s habitus and that of his audience, using the sociological 
and cognitive approach that I have been outlining in this thesis. Here I 
will  consider  only  a  few  elements  that  arguably  contributed  to  the 
development of Nasser’s charisma, and that are particularly relevant to 
our discussion of Iḥsān ʿAbd al-Quddūs.
Political  scientist  ʿAlī  al-Dīn Hilāl  affirms that  Nasser’s  charisma 
enabled the regime to draw a large part of  its legitimacy from Nasser 
himself and from ‘his direct relationship with the masses in Egypt and in 
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the  other  Arab  regions’;  in  Hilāl’s  view,  this  charismatic  leadership 
became  clear  during  the  Suez  crisis  of  1956  (Hilāl  1982,  22–23).  He 
observes that the main shortcoming of all political organisations in Egypt 
during  the  Nasser  years  was  their  inability  to  have  any  influence  on 
decision-making, since Nasser held a monopoly of political power, and 
argues  that  one  of  the  main  reasons  for  this  problem  was  Nasser’s 
‘charismatic  or  historic  personality’,  which  allowed  him  ‘to  converse’ 
(taḫāṭub)  directly  with  the  masses,  without  the  need  for  mediating 
institutions (1982, 31).
Similarly, historian Yūnān Labīb Rizq asserts that  Nasser's probity 
(istiqāma)  and good reputation made it  impossible for even those who 
opposed his policies to accuse him of anything.  The assassination attempt 
on him in 1954, his support for the Algerian revolution in the same year,  
his participation in the Bandung conference in 1955, the nationalisation of 
the  Suez  canal  in  1956  and  the  following  war  made  people  love  him 
passionately, and he became ‘the hoped-for hero [al-baṭal al-murtaǧā]’ in 
their eyes (Rizq 2008, 76). The outcome of the Suez conflict made it seem 
‘as if Saladin had risen from his grave’. A diffuse nationalist feeling (šuʿūr 
waṭanī) made people feel that criticising Nasser was forbidden, not by 
law, but by an overwhelming popular desire (raġba šaʿbiyya ǧārifa) (Rizq 
2008,  77).  Nasser  maintained his  popularity despite the setbacks  of  the 
1960s; during this period, Egyptians viewed Nasser as a father (abawiyyat  
al-raʾīs), perhaps for the first time since Saʿd Zaġlūl (Rizq 2008, 77). Two 
events  in  particular  reflect  this:  the  demonstrations  of  9-10  June  1967, 
calling for Nasser to return to power after his resignation in the wake of 
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Egypt’s  defeat  in  the  war  with  Israel,  and  the  ‘mass  hysteria’  that 
followed  his  death  in  1970,  expressing  the  feeling  that  Egyptians  had 
become ‘orphaned’ (Rizq 2008, 77–78).
The most insightful analysis of this issue that I have encountered is 
historian  Sherif  Younis’s  essay  Al-Zaḥf  al-Muqaddas (2005), which 
focuses on explaining the pro-Nasser demonstrations of 9-10 June 1967. 
While Younis’s postmodern Marxist methodology is quite different from 
the one used in this thesis, much of his analysis is compatible with the 
approach proposed here. Younis argues that ‘ideology’ is not necessarily 
‘political  thought  or  theory’,  but  rather  ‘a  state  of  consciousness  and 
political  feeling’,  ‘ideas  that  justify  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of 
particular policies, and values that constitute standards of acceptance or 
rejection’  (Younis 2005,  13). This definition is  very close to Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus,  and enables Younis to interpret the demonstrations 
following Nasser’s resignation as ‘spontaneous’ and yet as the product of 
‘mobilisation’  (Younis 2005,  14), because they were the expression of ‘a 
collective political impulse based on constants that had been instilled long 
before’ (Younis 2005, 180), or in the theoretical terms used here, concepts 
that had become entrenched in the habitus of Egyptians. As examples of 
how this entrenchment took place, Younis lists Nasser’s omnipresence in 
the  media,  the prayer-like  professions  of  loyalty  to  Nasser  that  young 
people recited at mass rallies, and the songs about Nasser that were taught 
to  schoolchildren  (Younis  2005,  138–139). Younis  rejects  Max  Weber’s 
concept of charisma as too vague (Younis 2005, 121–123), but I think that 
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Bourdieu’s  definition  of  charisma  in  terms  of  habitus  fits  Younis’s 
analysis very well. I will return to this analysis in a moment.
Debates about the meaning, validity and usefulness of Max Weber’s 
concept of charisma  (Shils 1958, Shils 1965; Schweitzer 1974; Ouedraogo 
1993),  and its  application to  the  study of  Gamal  Abdel  Nasser  (Bowie 
1976; Dekmejian 1976; de Gayffier-Bonneville 2002; Podeh and Winckler 
2004,  x,  2-26;  Binder  2004;  Younis  2005,  121-123),  have  not  produced 
satisfactory results. One common error is the attempt to define charisma 
in  terms  of  objective  characteristics  or  actions  of  the  charismatic 
individual, instead of considering it as a relation between the charismatic 
individual and the relevant audience. This error contributes to a second 
problem: the failure to deal with the problem on a sufficiently high level  
of abstraction, e.g. by getting lost in the minutiae of differences between 
different  sorts  of  charismatic  figures.  These  differences  cannot  be 
explained without an appreciation of the social functions of charisma, and 
of the relations of interdependence and competition between charismatic 
figures and other social actors, all of which are neglected in non-relational 
approaches.  The  result  has  tended  to  be  explanations  of  charisma  in 
general, and of Nasser’s charisma in particular, that amount to little more 
than  lists  of  apparently  arbitrary  characteristics  or  actions,  devoid  of 
theoretical coherence.
It  is  unfortunate  that  Bourdieu’s  analysis  of  charisma  (Bourdieu 
1971a,  Bourdieu 1971b,  Bourdieu 1987a) has  received little  attention in 
these debates, since it neatly solves all these problems, most importantly 
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by defining charisma as a particular relationship between the habitus of 
the prophet and the habitus of the prophet’s audience:
The  prophet  embodies  in  exemplary conduct,  or  gives  discursive 
expression to, representations, feelings and aspirations that existed 
before  his  arrival  –  albeit  in  an  implicit,  semi-conscious,  or 
unconscious  state.  . . .  It  is,  therefore,  only  by  conceiving  the 
prophet in his relationship with the laity . . . that one may resolve 
the problem of the  initial accumulation of the capital of symbolic  
power.  . . .  The aim in this context is to explain why a particular 
individual finds himself socially predisposed to live out and express 
with  particular  cogency  and  coherence,  ethical  or  political 
dispositions that are already present in a latent state amongst all the 
members of his class or group of his addressees. . . . Prophecy can 
play  such  a  role  only  because  it  has  as  its  own  generative  and 
unifying  principle  a  habitus objectively  attuned  to  that  of  its 
addressees (Bourdieu 1987a, 130-131).
Historians tend to agree that Nasser only began to acquire charisma 
for a broad audience in 1954, two years after the coup. Before the coup, he 
was  the  ‘driving  force  and  uncontested  leader’  of  the  Free  Officers 
(Gordon 1992, 55), and it seems clear that he possessed a charisma that 
was effective within that group (Aclimandos 2002, 91; Gordon 1992, 132-
133). But this charisma did not work for a broader audience. In April 1953, 
when the officers began to appear regularly in public, Nasser was a poor 
public speaker (Gordon 1992, 119-120). Workers greeted the officers with 
indifference and catcalls, and university students heckled Nasser (Gordon 
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1992, 82). He often spent a great deal of time harshly ordering crowds to 
be quiet during his speeches (Younis 2005, 125).
Several  scholars  have  pointed  to  the  attempt  on  Nasser’s  life 
(known as the Manšiyya incident), during a speech he gave in Alexandria 
on 26 October 1954, as the first occasion on which he displayed charisma 
for a broad audience (Gordon 1992, 175, 179; de Gayffier-Bonneville 2002, 
91-92;  Laurens  2005,  138).  The recording of  the  radio  broadcast  of  the 
incident is instructive. Nasser began his speech, once again scolding the 
crowd harshly an attempt to silence its chanting. After a few minutes, a 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood fired eight shots at Nasser at point-
blank  range,  but  missed.  Pandemonium  ensued.  Nasser  resumed  his 
speech  and  spoke  for  nearly  fourteen  minutes  in  the  language  of 
martyrdom:
My blood is a sacrifice [fidāʾ] for Egypt. . . . My blood is of you and 
for  you,  and  I  will  live  until  I  die  struggling  in  your  way  [fī  
sabīlikum]. . . . Let them kill me. . . . For I have instilled pride [ʿizza] 
in you. Let them kill me, for I have instilled dignity [karāma] in 
you. . . . Struggle, and if Gamal Abdel Nasser dies, each one of you 
will be Gamal Abdel Nasser. . . . The Rightly-Guided Caliphs were 
martyred. They were all martyred in God’s way [fī sabīl Allāh]. If 
Gamal Abdel Nasser is killed or martyred, I am prepared for that, 
by God, in your way, in God’s way and in Egypt’s way  (ʿAbd al-
Nāṣir 1954).
The crowd cheered wildly. The use of the phrase ‘in God’s way’ 
prompts for the conceptual frame of jihad, and is immediately followed 
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by the phrase ‘in Egypt’s way’, clearly prompting for a blend between 
God and Egypt as the entity for whom jihad is carried out. In Nasser’s 
jihad, martyrdom is primarily nationalist rather than religious.
Sherif  Younis notes  that  before this  incident,  Nasser’s  supporters 
had been trying to promote an image of him as ‘a kind ruler’, one who 
loves everyone, even his enemies, despite what Younis characterises as 
the  unprecedented  state  of  authoritarian  repression  that  prevailed  in 
Egypt at the time. But the Manšiyya incident created a different sort of 
public image for Nasser, that of the hero. Afterwards, Muṣṭafā Amīn, one 
of Nasser’s most ardent supporters, wrote: ‘I thank the perpetrator with 
all my heart’, because he ‘made people talk about [Nasser] as a legend; 
they were surprised to find in him a hero’. Younis’s analysis is astute:
This  heroism was  accompanied  by  the  supremacy  of  the  master 
who sums up the virtues of pride and dignity in his own person, 
and teaches them to a nation that is ignorant of them, or that was 
ignorant of them until Nasser arrived. . . . Moreover, he will accept, 
as compensation for his murder, nothing less than for all 23 million 
Egyptians  to  become  copies  of  him,  or  rather  to  become  his 
followers. . . . He himself, not the regime or the revolution, became 
the maker of pride and dignity (Younis 2005, 126-128).
This was a new type of performance for Nasser. Yet it cannot have 
sprung out of nowhere. Perhaps it was modelled on the sermons of Ḥasan 
al-Bannā,  founder  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood.  Nasser  joined  the 
Brotherhood in 1944, and became a member of its secret military branch 
in 1946  (Aclimandos 2002, 30).  He and other Free Officers attended al-
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Bannā’s sermons every Tuesday (Aclimandos 2002, 32, 39), and thus had 
ample opportunity to see al-Bannā’s charisma in action. Among the main 
themes  of  al-Bannā’s  discourse  was  ‘the  spirit  of  self-sacrifice’ 
(Aclimandos  2002,  49),  and  the  obligation  of  jihad,  in  the  sense  of 
sacrificing  one’s  life  for  God  (Aclimandos  2002,  57).  But  there  was  a 
crucial difference between al-Bannā’s views on armed struggle and those 
of  the  officers.  For  the  officers,  ‘the  enemy was  at  least  as  much the 
country’s enemy as religion’s enemy, and the distinction between the two 
registers  could be  blurred’  (Aclimandos 2002,  69).  Similarly,  they gave 
priority  to  non-religious  knowledge  over  religious  knowledge 
(Aclimandos 2002, 50-51).
A prophet’s ‘professional ethic’ is based on ‘the proclaimed refusal 
of  all  temporal  interests’  (Bourdieu  1971b,  317),  which  he  presents  as 
evidence of his disinterestedness, hence of his sincerity and credibility. 
For example, the Qurʾān repeatedly stresses that the Prophet Muḥammad, 
like other prophets before him, asks for no reward in exchange for his 
message: ‘I ask no reward of you, for my only reward is with the Lord of 
the  Worlds:  be  mindful  of  God  and obey  me’  (Q 26:109-100);  ‘Follow 
them:  they  are  not  asking  you  to  reward  them  and  they  are  rightly 
guided’ (Q 36:21; cf. 6:90, 11:51, 12:104, 25:57, 26:127, 26:145, 26:164, 26:180, 
34:47, 38:86, 42:23). Similarly, Nasser’s speeches establish ‘the altruism of 
Nasser and his colleagues. Before the revolution they “lived in prosperous 
conditions”, that is, they had a comfortable life which they risked for the 
people’  (Ismail 1992, 180). The willingness to embrace martyrdom is the 
expression par excellence of this refusal of temporal interests. A prophet 
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can thus  gain symbolic capital  by facing,  with equanimity,  a  martyr’s 
death for the sake of something that is widely seen as worth the sacrifice. 
As we saw in the chapter on al-Ṭahṭāwī, the very concept of the waṭan 
includes the idea that it makes moral demands on its ‘children’, and that 
it  is  their  duty  to  sacrifice  their  lives  for  its  sake.  It  is  therefore  not 
surprising that, as de Gayffier-Bonneville (2002, 92) observes, in Nasser’s 
speech  during the Manšiyya incident,  one thing that listeners admired 
was his readiness to sacrifice himself for Egypt.
As  Podeh  and  Winckler  (2004,  18) observe,  ‘Nasser’s  popularity, 
legitimacy, and mythology grew dramatically during the second half of 
the  1950s’.  They  note  that  ‘charismatic  authority  rests  on  heroic 
performances’.  Binder  (2004,  45) and  de  Gayffier-Bonneville  (2002,  92-
93) enumerate  some  of  the  performances  that  were  seen  as  heroic  in 
Nasser’s case,  such as  his nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 26 July 
1956. Similarly, Younis (2005, 131) writes that Nasser’s political victory in 
the Suez crisis made him into ‘the Arab legend’ (cf. Šaraf al-Dīn 1992, 42-
43). Acclaimed by crowds in his visit to Syria in 1957, he was seen as ‘a  
prophet [nabī], or a pure Mahdī’. On his return to Egypt, he announced: 
“The sacred  [muqaddas] march has begun. . . .” It was difficult to reject 
the flood of worship [ʿibāda]’ (Younis 2005, 131-132). Why were these acts 
seen as heroic? As I have suggested above, the answer should be sought in 
the relationship between the habitus of the charismatic leader and that of 
his audience.
Habitus can include familiarity with narrative structures, and Salwa 
Ismail  (1992) provides an analysis of the narrative structures of  Nasser’s 
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speeches. She notes that they repeatedly tell a type of story that resembles 
legendary tales of heroism.
The  ‘now’  is  set  in  opposition  to  the  ‘then’,  and  the  present  is 
represented as the antithesis of the past. The writing of the present 
unfolds as the story of  achievement; of conquering obstacles and 
overcoming  villains.  The  main  characters  in  the  story  are  the 
revolution and the people set against the colonial powers and the 
reactionaries. . . . The hero’s challenge and test is to acquire object 
values which he (as the embodiment of his people) was separated 
from by the opponent: imperialism and reaction. The revolution is 
the event or test in which the task is accomplished. The discourse 
tells of the actions taken to repossess the objects of value  (Ismail 
1992, 172-173).
Sherif  Younis  likewise  observes  that  Nasser  seemed  ‘to  produce 
miracles after the fashion of the heroes of popular epics’  (Younis 2005, 
131). Thus it seems as if one of the functions of Nasser’s speeches was to 
prompt for conceptual blends between his own actions and conventional 
narrative frames  that  were  part  of  a  habitus  that  he  and his  listeners 
shared. These blends enabled the audience to conceptualise certain of his 
actions as heroic. Moreover, Nasser made thousands of speeches, and each 
of  them was  broadcast  on the radio;  Egyptians  often gathered around 
radios in one another’s  homes and in cafés to listen to these speeches 
together (de Gayffier-Bonneville 2002, 98). The effect of any given speech 
should therefore not be attributed to that speech alone, but also to the 
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cumulative effect of all his previous speeches, and to the habitus that they 
were based on.
A detailed analysis of the conceptual blends in Nasser’s speeches 
would take us far beyond the scope of the present study. For our purposes 
here, it is worth emphasising that number of these blends arguably have 
religious  inputs  and  a  nationalist  output.  In  the  Manšiyya  incident, 
Nasser’s speech seems to prompt for a blend between himself  and the 
concept of a prophet who faces martyrdom with equanimity.
Nasser’s notion of the present as the antithesis of the past is perhaps 
also based on a religious concept.  The idea that ‘history began’ with the 
revelation of a new religion is common both to Christianity and to Islam, 
each of which identifies Year 1 with some particular event in the life of its 
prophet.  The  concept  of  ‘traitors  and  reactionaries’,  who  practice 
deception (Ismail 1992, 173), may likewise be based on the concept of the 
‘hypocrites’ (munāfiqūn) described in the Qurʾān  (Adang 2010; Brockett 
2010). More generally, the concept of ‘traitors’ lends itself to strategies of 
‘excommunication’,  i.e. drawing  a field’s  boundaries  in  a  way  that 
excludes one’s opponents (Bourdieu 1987b, 171). In a speech given in 1961, 
Nasser defined the nation and its enemies as follows:
The  nation  [al-šaʿb]  consists  of  all  the  groups  that  support  the 
socialist revolution . . . and the construction of socialism. Those who 
do  not  support  the  socialist  revolution  and  the  construction  of 
socialism are the enemies of the nation (ʿAbd al-Nāṣir 1961).
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Since Nasser was the leader of the ‘revolution’,  a logical inference 
was that anyone who opposed Nasser was an enemy of the nation.  As 
Younis (2005, 29) observes, the Nasserist concept of ‘unity’
is  not  a  general  unity  of  all  Egyptians;  instead,  it  is  based on a 
division  of  the  population  into  a  ‘nation’,  represented  by  the 
officers, and ‘the nation's enemies’,  whom the officers oppress in 
the nation’s name and for its sake. Thus the concept of ‘unity’ is 
revealed to be a policy aimed at isolating particular elites that were 
opposed to the ruling elite.
At the same time, in Nasser’s speeches, the concept of ‘nation’ (šaʿb) 
involves a religious blend that we have not previously encountered in this 
study.  Sherif  Younis  points  out  that  the  army  is  the  sole  legitimate 
representative of the nation in Nasser’s discourse, and that this idea
is  entirely  based  on  the  supposition  that  there  is  a  unified, 
homogeneous  political  entity  called  ‘the  nation’  [šaʿb],  which  is 
incarnated, or can find expression, in a  unified will, and that any 
dissenters  from  this  will  are  rebels80 against  the  nation.  This 
supposition is,  however,  a political  fantasy,  not  only because the 
nation is divided into classes and social groups that differ or clash, 
and into rural and urban inhabitants, and Azharites and university 
academics, etc., each group adhering to its view, its culture and its 
interests,  but  also because the very idea of  the public  interest  is 
divided according to the conceptions of these different groups, and 
therefore  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  concept  of  the  uniform 
80 The Arabic term here is Ḫawāriǧ, a religious allusion: it is the name given to an early 
Muslim sect, the Kharijites, that regarded all non-Kharijites as non-Muslims  (Della 
Vida 2010b).
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‘nation’ . . . i.e. a single bloc with a unified ‘correct’ expression of its 
shared interests. More importantly, this conception of the rule of the 
nation  exempts  the  officers  from any  commitment  to  prove  the 
affected nation’s consent to their policies, and denies the need to 
create any concrete, material means of transmitting the will of this 
hypothetical  totality to  the channels  of  power.  This is  what  will 
represent  the  basis  of  the  theological  conception  of  power  [al-
mafhūm al-lāhūtī  li-l-sulṭa]  that  prevailed during this  period . . . 
(Younis 2005, 23-24).
What precisely is this ‘theological conception of power’? In Younis’s 
analysis, which I find convincing, the ‘link between the regime and the 
‘nation’ [šaʿb] . . . is derived from a particular variety of the ideology of 
divine right’.  ‘The nation [šaʿb]  is  the original  god’,  ‘a  hidden,  higher 
source of power, which sends down the revelation [waḥy]’ to the officers, 
and in  particular  to  Nasser,  who  receives,  ‘in  some  obscure  way,  the 
secrets and hopes of the nation, as the National Charter put it’  (Younis 
2005, 38-39). Muḥammad al-Tābiʿī, the former editor-in-chief of  Rūz al-
Yūsuf,  wrote in 1956: ‘You alone, O nation  [šaʿb], hold power, with no 
partner [dūna šarīk]’ (Younis 2005, 153). The phrase dūna šarīk (‘with no 
partner’)  recalls the standard formulas used in the Qurʾān to assert that 
Allāḥ has no partner, i.e. is the only god (Q 6:163, 17:111, 25:2). Muṣṭafā 
Amīn wrote in 1957 that Nasser ‘receives in his heart and soul unknown 
signs’ from Egyptians  (Younis 2005, 153), ʿAlī Amīn wrote in 1959 that 
Nasser  ‘is  fulfilling  an  obscure  dream that  was  in  the  heart  of  every 
Egyptian and every Arab’  (Younis 2005, 155), and Fatḥī Ġānim wrote in 
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1960 that Nasser ‘is aware of what seethes in people’s innermost minds, 
before it reaches their consciousness’ (Younis 2005, 157). In a speech given 
on 16 October 1961, following the dissolution of the union between Egypt 
and Syria,
Nasser repeated, in connection with his relationship with the nation 
[šaʿb], the idea of inspiration [ilstilhām] . . . :  ‘I  have spent these 
past days thinking, and in my feelings, I was everywhere with our 
great nation [šaʿb]. . . . My fingers were on the pulse of this nation 
[umma]. . . . My ears were on the beating of its heart. . . . I wanted 
my choice to be an echo of its choice.’ . . . Thus the consultation of 
the nation [umma] takes place inside its leader’s heart, by virtue of 
a special ability, the ability of a prophet [nabī] in the exact sense of 
the term, rather than through mechanisms of representation (Younis 
2005, 158).
This  belief  that  there  was  no  need  for  concrete  mechanisms  of 
representation is reflected in an article written by Muḥammad al-Tābiʿī in 
1965,  shortly  before  the  single-candidate  referendum  that  renewed 
Nasser’s presidency. The regime organised huge demonstrations ‘calling’ 
for  the Council  of the Nation (Maǧlis  al-Umma)  to ‘nominate’  Nasser, 
who was in any case the only conceivable candidate. Al-Tābiʿī wrote that 
there was no need for the Council to meet, since ‘the nation [šaʿb] has 
already expressed – not only in Egypt – its opinion, and announced that 
there is no president except Nasser [lā raʾīs siwā ʿAbd al-Nāṣir]’ (Younis 
2005, 161). (The form of the sentence ‘there is no president except Nasser’ 
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is  reminiscent  of  the  šahāda,  the standard expression of  Muslim faith: 
‘There is no god but Allāḥ’.)
In short, the basis of ‘the worship of Nasser’ was the notion that his 
function was to act personally and directly as an intermediary between 
the nation and itself  (Younis 2005, 152). Faced with this idea, ‘one could 
only choose between belief and unbelief (kufr), knowing that there were 
limits to apostasy (ridda) from the regime’ (Younis 2005, 38). Citing one of 
Nasser’s speeches, Younis explains that, having received revelation from 
the nation, Nasser’s function was then to make the nation itself aware of 
this revelation:
The revolution had arisen based ‘on principles . . . that spring from 
the feelings of this nation [šaʿb]’, and Nasser will continue ‘in every 
word  I  say,  to  remind  you  of  them  [afakkirkum  bīhā],  to 
demonstrate them and confirm them, until they are stamped in your 
minds, souls and hearts’ (1956). The nation’s feelings are the source 
of  these  principles,  but  the  nation  will  not  become aware  of  its 
feelings,  or  of  the principles that spring from its  feelings,  except 
through  his  mediation,  which  reminds  them  [yuḏakkiruhum]  of 
these  principles  and  ‘stamps  them’  in  the  nation’s  souls  (Younis 
2005, 152-153).
This is precisely the strategy of prophethood according to Bourdieu, 
as we saw at the beginning of our discussion of Nasser’s charisma earlier 
in this chapter. In the term ‘remind’, there is an echo of the role that the 
Qurʾān assigns to the Prophet Muḥammad: he is described as a muḏakkir, 
‘one  who  reminds’  or  ‘warns’  (88:21).  The  Qurʾān  instructs  him  to 
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‘remind’ (ḏakkir) his listeners of God’s teachings (50:45, 51:55, 52:29, 87:9), 
and refers  to  itself,  as  well  as  to  the  revelations  brought  by  previous 
prophets, as a ‘reminder’ (ḏikr, taḏkīr, taḏkira or ḏikrā) (7:2, 10:71, 12:104, 
20:3, 21:10, 21:48, 23:71, 38:1, 40:54, 43:44, 68:52, 69:48).
If  the  nation  (šaʿb or  umma)  is  not  merely  the  community  of 
believers but is also a god, what of the country (waṭan)? One possible 
interpretation is that we are dealing here with a polytheistic belief system, 
in which the country has not only created the nation, but has endowed it 
with the status of a secondary god, like Zeus creating Athena.  Another 
possibility  is  that  a  blend  has  been  introduced  between  country  and 
nation, producing a hybrid concept that integrates aspects of both, while 
still preserving each of them as a distinct concept that remains available 
to produce inferences on its own. Further research would be needed in 
order to answer this question conclusively, but this would take us beyond 
the scope of the present study.
Finally, we should not neglect the role of educational institutions 
and  the  culture  industry  in  marketing,  and  thus  amplifying,  Nasser’s 
charisma.  Dozens  of  newspapers  and  magazines  were  closed  down in 
1954; the few that remained were utterly loyal to the regime (Younis 2005, 
46).  Until  1961,  Nasser  regularly  visited  printing  houses,  ‘personally 
overseeing the layout of newspapers, correcting texts, choosing titles and 
fonts’  (de  Gayffier-Bonneville  2002,  97).  In  1960,  the  press  was 
nationalised (Abū ʿAwf 2007, 7).  The objective was ‘to exercise complete 
control  over  the  owners  and directors  of  the  institutions  of  the press’ 
(Younis  2005,  50). Radio  and  television  ‘tirelessly  reported  [Nasser’s] 
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activities’;  all  his speeches were broadcast in their entirety.  His portait 
was  omnipresent  in  both  public  and private  spaces.  Songs  by  popular 
singers glorified him (de Gayffier-Bonneville 2002, 98-99; Gordon 2006, 1-
2, 9). Schoolchildren were taught to sing songs praising him (Younis 2005, 
139).
Naturally, intellectuals were indispensable tools in all this cultural 
production  (Reid  1990,  197,  200–206). Recall  that  for  Bourdieu,  the 
functions of any priesthood include systematising prophetic discourse and 
adapting it to the demands of different audiences (Bourdieu 1971a, 17-20). 
Muḥammad Ḥasanayn Haykal, a close confidant of Nasser, editor of the 
state-run newspaper  al-Ahrām and one of Nasser’s main propagandists 
(not  to  be  confused  with  Muḥammad  Ḥusayn  Haykal,  the  subject  of 
Chapter 3), is a clear example; he is credited with ghostwriting Nasser’s 
book  Philosophy of the Revolution (Jankowski 2002, 25; cf. Younis 2005, 
33). As we will see in a moment, Iḥsān ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s novel Fī Baytinā 
Raǧul, and the film based on it, are also examples of this type of cultural 
production.
ʿAbd al-Quddūs was typical in this regard. There seem to be very 
few  examples  of  Egyptian  intellectuals  who  directly  criticised  Nasser 
between the consolidation of his  power in 1954 and his death in 1970. 
Indeed, from the second half of the 1950s onward, liberal, socialist and 
communist intellectuals helped legitimise the regime’s authoritarianism. It 
is true that censorship was strict, and that open disagreement with official 
doctrine was  severely  punished.  However,  many intellectuals  went  far 
beyond  mere  passive  compliance  and  gave  the  regime  their  fervent 
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support,  even  though  this  was  not  required  of  them  (Meijer  2008). 
Egyptian communists were staunch nationalists, and had believed since 
the 1940s that a nationalist revolution had to precede the achievement of 
communism in  Egypt.  They  suffered  severe  repression  throughout  the 
1950s, were imprisoned by the thousands in 1959, and were not released 
until 1964, but the vast majority of them supported Nasser, even while 
they were in prison. In 1965, the main Egyptian communist organisations 
voluntarily dissolved themselves, on the grounds that Nasser’s regime had 
become ‘socialist’  (Younis  2008).  After  the  regime’s  purge  of  about  60 
university  professors  (mostly  Marxists  but  also  some liberals)  in  1954, 
some academics, like the dissident journalism professor Ibrāhīm ʿAbduh, 
went  into  exile  (Reid  1990,  169–173),  while  others  enthusiastically 
answered the regime’s call for their active support (Gorman 2003, 52–61). 
Only  in  the  mid-1970s  did  it  become  possible  to  openly  criticise  the 
policies of the Nasser years, but even those who voiced these criticisms 
tended to avoid blaming Nasser himself  (Geer 2009). Moreover, it seems 
that  there  were  no  anti-nationalist  Egyptian  intellectuals  during  the 
Nasser years. Nationalism appears to have been an integral part of the 
doxa of the intellectual  field, i.e.  something that all  participants in the 
field took for granted, regardless of their disagreements.
A scientific account of Nasser’s charisma would need to consider all 
these aspects of the relationship between his own habitus and that of his 
audience,  and no doubt  others  as  well.  Having sketched out  this  vast 
research programme,  we must  now turn our  attention  back to  one  of 
those priests, Iḥsān ʿAbd al-Quddūs, and consider the contribution of his 
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novel  Fī  Baytinā  Raǧul to  one  aspect  of  nationalist  habitus  that  was 
particularly useful to Nasser: the concept of nationalist martyrdom.
A Martyr in Nasser’s Image: Fī Baytinā Raǧul, the 
Novel
ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s novel Fī Baytinā Raǧul (1956) begins with a quote 
from the author as an epigraph: ‘The hero does not create himself;  his 
nation [umma] creates him’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 6). Its first pages draw 
a link between virility and violence, using guns as a phallic symbols. The 
protagonist, Ibrāhīm, is in hospital under guard. He takes out the revolver 
hidden in his mattress, and laughs at it because it is small, like a toy. His 
first gun, when he was an adolescent, was like this one. ‘Then he grew up 
and became a man, and the gun grew with him. It became a big gun’ 
(ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 7-8).
Ibrāhīm is amazed that although important things are happening in 
Egypt, people are still preoccupied with film stars, ‘as if all of Egypt was 
unaware that one of its sons was going to die in its way [fī  sabīlihā], 
executed on the gallows’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 8). Note once again the 
use of the expression  fī  sabīl (‘in the way of’),  which, as noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, has traditionally meant ‘fighting for’ (in jihad) 
when followed by the word ‘God’. Here the concept of Egypt has taken 
the place of the concept of God, and thus evokes a nationalist jihad rather 
than a religious one.
The  narrator  describes  Ibrāhīm:  His  emotions  never  show in his 
face, only in his eyes. He always wears the same expression, ‘a soothing, 
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calm expression that attracted you to him, and stole your heart and mind. 
So you loved him and trusted him, without imagining that he might be a 
hero’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs  1997,  8).  Thus the  reader  is  invited  to  imagine 
herself as responsive to Ibrāhīm’s charisma. This description of Ibrāhīm’s 
habitual,  charismatic  facial  expression  is  repeated  several  times 
throughout the novel, in almost exactly the same words.
A  long  flashback  begins.  Ibrāhīm  reflects  that  perhaps  he  never 
intended to be a hero; he never thought he was more daring than any 
other  young man,  or  more extreme in  his  nationalism (waṭaniyya).  In 
high school, he participated in the ‘nationalist  [waṭaniyya] revolutions’ 
that his friends were carrying out (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 8-9). Here and in 
many other places, the narrator uses the word ‘revolution’ (ṯawra) to refer 
to any sort of rebellious action, or even an individual’s sudden feeling of  
rage  (e.g.  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  1997,  14).  Ibrāhīm  would  stay  in  the 
background of these ‘revolutions’ and do practical work without making a 
fuss, such as devising makeshift weapons for students to use in clashes 
with police. His classmates gradually came to see him as ‘a silent leader 
[zaʿīm]’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 9).
Yet,  the  narrator  tells  us,  Ibrāhīm did not  bother  thinking about 
politics, and ‘had not chosen for himself any particular political principle’. 
His nationalism (waṭaniyya) was ‘just a powerful feeling’ that pushed him 
along with the group. He hated the English, and felt ‘a wound in his pride  
[karāma]  every time he saw one;  he also hated the king,  the political 
leaders and the ministers. He took stands on nationalist issues without 
really  understanding  why,  because  he  had  a  ‘keen  feeling’  for  ‘the 
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demands of the nation [šaʿb]’. When one of his classmates who ‘believed 
in him’ gave him his first revolver, he felt powerful, as if he could now 
‘get rid of all his enemies, all the enemies of his waṭan’; he could use this 
power to play ‘a great role’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 10).
Having prompted for  a  conceptual  blend between Ibrāhīm’s  gun 
and his penis, and thus between violence and virility, the narrative then 
blends the gun/penis with a hypothetical desirable woman, and draws the 
inference that Ibrāhīm’s love of nationalist violence leaves no possibility 
for him to love a real woman. Thus, he ‘loved the gun’; he would sleep 
with it and think about it all day long, as if he was ‘in love’. He would 
‘play with it as if caressing a lover’, and ‘take it apart as if undressing a 
lover’. Just as someone in love reads love stories, he read detective stories 
and  watched  Westerns.  When  he  went  out  to  the  desert  for  target 
practice, the sound of the gunshots was like ‘the sound of kisses’ to his 
ears. He talked to his gun, and called it ʿAzīza, a woman’s name meaning 
‘dear’. There was ‘nothing in his heart except his nationalist [waṭaniyya] 
feelings’, and he had no hobby in high school except his gun. He then 
went to law school (like Nasser), and had the same prestige (makāna) as 
always among his classmates, ‘the prestige of the silent leader [zaʿīm]’. 
He stayed away from female students, and seemed to disdain them. This 
was simply his nature, says the narrator; girls had no effect on his life. As 
if to forestall any suspicion of homosexuality, the narrator adds that there 
was, in Ibrāhīm’s love for his male friends, ‘an intense manliness’, as well 
as  ‘noble-mindedness  and  self-sacrifice’;  he  was  ready  to  sacrifice 
anything for them, even his life (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 11-14).
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Ibrāhīm ‘believed in his  waṭan’s right to be free’, and felt that the 
English had ‘raped its freedom’. Therefore he decided to wage an armed 
struggle  against  them;  this  would  be  ‘an  honourable  war’  (ʿAbd  al-
Quddūs 1997, 17). The personification of the  waṭan,  and the conceptual 
blend of colonial occupation and rape, arguably motivate the  use of the 
word ‘honourable’.  As  Beth Baron  (2005,  40-56) argues,  nationalists  in 
Egypt ‘tapped into the regional code of family honor,’ which requires men 
to avenge a sexual offense against one of their female kin, ‘appropriated 
it, and redirected the passion behind it for their own purposes’; hence the 
idea of avenging ‘the “rape of the nation”, which by 1919 was depicted as 
a woman’.
Ibrāhīm decided to create a ‘secret organisation [ǧamʿiyya sirriyya]’ 
to kill English soldiers (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 17). This recalls not only the 
group  that  Ḥusayn  Tawfīq  belonged  to,  but  also  the  Muslim 
Brotherhood’s  secret  organisation,  to  which  Nasser  had  belonged,  and 
perhaps  especially  the  title  of  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs’s  famous  article,  ‘The 
Secret  Organisation  that  Rules  Egypt  [Al-Ǧamʿiyya  Al-Sirriyya  Allatī  
Taḥkum Miṣr]’ (22 March 1954), on the political role of the Free Officers 
after the coup (discussed above).
Ibrāhīm looked forward to ‘a world full of corpses and blood, the 
corpses and blood of the English’. He enlisted a friend as his first recruit,  
by means of a technique that he will use repeatedly in the novel: instead 
of telling his friend directly about his plan, he brought him round to the 
idea  in  such a  way that  the  friend thought  it  was  his  own idea,  and 
suggested  it  on  his  own  initiative  (ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  1997,  18).  This  is 
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arguably  a  side  effect  of  charisma:  the  correspondences  between  a 
prophet’s  habitus  and  that  of  his  audience  ensure  that,  with  minimal 
prompting, his  audience  will  be  able  to  construct  the  same  sorts  of 
concepts that he himself has constructed, and draw the same inferences.
Ibrāhīm’s secret organisation grew to seven members, and ‘the guns 
got bigger’. He was the unacknowledged leader:
They all talked a great deal, then turned to him, so that he would 
have the last word. . . . They had agreed that they would have no 
leader,  but  this  was  his  nature:  to  have  the  last  word  (ʿAbd al-
Quddūs 1997, 20).
The portrait of Ibrāhīm given thus far – the ‘silent leader’ who has 
the last word at meetings – thus resembles ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s assessment 
of  Nasser  and  Sadat  before  the  military  coup,  mentioned  above  and 
published many years later.
Ibrāhīm then decided that it was useless to kill British soliders, and 
that  they  should  instead  kill  the  Egyptian  ‘agents’  and  ‘traitors’  who 
carried out British policies. But how to be sure who was an agent/traitor? 
One person, Ibrāhīm concluded, was undoubtedly guilty: the ‘man’ of the 
British in Egypt. Ibrāhīm once again planted his idea in his friends’ minds 
without their realising it. He carried out the assassination, and everything 
went according to his plan, ‘as if he were a little god  [ilāh] controlling 
destiny’. (Since the hero carries out the will of the godlike nation, it is not 
surprising  to  find  godlike  powers  attributed  to  him  as  well.)  But  the 
getaway car broke down, and he fled. Crowds caught him, but when they 
saw his ‘soothing,  calm expression that  attracts  you to him and steals 
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your heart and mind’, they seemed to regret it. The police arrested him 
and  his  accomplices.  He  heard  someone  whisper  that  the  victim  had 
deserved to die; he felt that the people (al-nās) had acquitted him. (Thus 
he, like Nasser, receives telepathic messages from the nation.) He became 
famous, and many people sent him fan mail in prison, ‘blessing the hand 
that had fired the shot’.  This was how he knew that he had become a 
hero. By faking an illness, with doctors’ complicity, he was transferred 
from prison to a hospital, at the beginning of the holy month of Ramadan 
(ʿAbd al-Quddūs  1997,  21-25).  The officer  guarding him fell  under  the 
spell of his ‘soothing, calm face that attracts you to him and steals your 
heart and mind’. His charisma likewise won over the doctors and soldiers 
at the hospital. He planned to escape and hide out for a short time with 
his classmate Muḥyī, who was shy, apolitical and utterly devoted to his 
studies at law school; the police would never think to look for him there. 
Ibrāhīm recalled that whenever Muḥyī looked at him, he would seem as 
timid ‘as if he was standing before God’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 26-27).
Thus ends the flashback. Ibrāhīm escapes to Muḥyī’s family’s flat 
and is greeted by Muḥyī’s beautiful sixteen-year-old sister, Nawāl. The 
narrator mentions ‘her innocent lips, unsullied by makeup or kisses’ and 
‘her black eyes, in which there was loneliness, mystery, fear, intelligence, 
vivacity and joy, and in their depths, a light that shows you the way’ 
(ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 31). A blend is possible here  with the concept of 
the waṭan guiding the hero, since as we will see shortly, Nawāl is blended 
with the  waṭan.  She falls immediately under the spell  of his charisma, 
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‘suspended on his glances, as if she was a butterfly that could not keep 
away from the fire’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 32).
Muḥyī,  too,  is  under  the  spell  of  ‘the  calm,  soothing  face  that 
attracts  you to  him and steals  your  heart  and mind’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 
1997, 36). Faced with the risk of sheltering Ibrāhīm, Muḥyī hesistates but 
says that he ‘believes in’ Ibrāhīm; everyone believes in Ibrāhīm and in 
Ibrāhīm’s  nationalism  (waṭaniyya)  (ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  1997,  38).  As  for 
Nawāl, she can barely contain her enthusiasm for Ibrāhīm. It is Muḥyī’s 
father, however, who must take the decision; he wavers between what 
seems to be a semi-conscious nationalism and a perception of Ibrāhīm as 
a young troublemaker. Overall, Muḥyī’s parents  are portrayed  as naïve, 
ignorant  and  indecisive  in  comparison  with  Ibrāhīm  (ʿAbd  al-Quddūs 
1997, 39-42). Thanks to the conventional concept of the nation as a family 
(Baron  2005,  4-5),  an  inference  is  possible  here:  the  authority  of  the 
national  family  is  more  reliable  than  the  (parental)  authority  of  the 
biological  family.  Finally,  Muḥyī’s  father  agrees  to  hide Ibrāhīm, 
surrendering ‘to something stronger than him, to a force that sprang from 
his heart and that he could not resist with his mind’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 
1997, 45); here we have the concept of nationalism as something innate 
and intuitive, which we encountered in Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm’s novel ʿAwdat 
al-Rūḥ.
Ibrāhīm’s  charisma  pervades  his  interactions  with  others.  Nawāl 
and her older sister  ‘steal  glances at him, as if  looking at a wondrous 
being [maḫlūq ʿaǧīb] that they did not have the right to look at’ (i.e. a 
being that  was sacred and therefore taboo). When he speaks, everyone 
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pays attention to him ‘as if he was a god [ilāh]’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 49-
50). Muḥyī feels proud of his friendship with ‘this hero that he had looked 
upon from afar as a god [ilāh]’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 54).
Meanwhile,  Ibrāhīm is increasingly aware of Nawāl’s  charm; the 
description of  her  eyes,  ‘in  which there  was  loneliness,  mystery,  fear,  
intelligence, vivacity and joy, and in their depths, a light that shows you 
the way’ is repeated verbatim  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 50).  When Nawāl 
sees his gun, she stares at it with great curiosity ‘as if seeing something 
that she had heard a great deal about but never seen before’; Ibrāhīm feels 
embarrassed  and  hastens  to  put  it  back  in  his  pocket  ‘as  if  hiding 
something shameful [ʿār]’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 53), i.e. as if it was his 
penis. Thus the blend between virility and violence introduces a conflict, 
which will be developed throughout the novel: this blend attracts Nawāl, 
but as we have seen, it also produces the inference that Ibrāhīm cannot 
have a sexual interest in a woman. As we will see, nationalist concepts 
will be used to resolve this conflict.
The radio broadcasts  an announcement that Ibrāhīm has escaped 
from custody, that there is a 5,000 EGP reward for information leading to 
his  arrest  (the  same  amount  that  was  offered  in  the  case  of  Amīn 
ʿUṯmān’s assassination), and a three-year prison sentence for anyone who 
helps him (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 55-56). Reflecting on what he has done, 
Ibrāhīm says  to  himself  that  he  ‘killed  the  traitor  for  the  sake  of  his 
waṭan,  for  the  sake of  the people  [al-nās]’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997,  56). 
Similarly, in Nawāl’s opinion, Ibrāhīm ‘killed for his  waṭan, as a soldier 
kills his enemy in war’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 103). This reflects the idea 
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of a moral obligation to kill and to risk death for the sake of the waṭan, 
which we first encountered in al-Ṭahṭāwī.
An  intuitive,  wordless  understanding  develops  between  Ibrāhīm 
and  Nawāl,  much  like  the  alleged  mystical  understanding,  discussed 
above,  between  Nasser  and  the  nation;  for  example,  just  when  he  is 
longing to read a newspaper, she offers to go buy him one, ‘as if she had 
read his thoughts’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 66). Soon she is madly in love 
with him (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 127). At the same time, it is clear that he 
cannot become attached to her:
He had freed himself from fear, from images of prisons and gallows, 
and had no fear of them for his future; indeed, he had freed himself 
from his future. . . . This freedom from fear, and from his personal 
future,  is  what  endowed  him  with  strength,  and  drove  him  to 
violent acts (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 107).
The ability to renounce any possible future existence is essential for 
a martyr: not to envisage the future is to embrace death. How can Ibrāhīm 
reconcile this attitude with his attraction to Nawāl? One option is to blend 
her with the inhabitants of Egypt, i.e. with the nation. He experiences ‘a 
new feeling’; it is ‘focused on a single person’, Nawāl; it seems to him that 
this feeling does not ‘encompass all of Egypt’, but rather that ‘everyone 
had become one person’, that ‘in all of Egypt there was no longer more 
than one person’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 144-145). At the same time, on the 
basis  of  the  concept  of  nation as  family,  a  similar  blend is  developed 
between Egypt and the house: Ibrāhīm ‘felt that all of Egypt was like this 
house’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 77).
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Ibrāhīm’s plan for leaving the house unnoticed and returning to the 
protection of his comrades requires Nawāl to visit one of the latter and 
collect an ‘officer’s uniform’ from him, which Ibrāhīm wears as a disguise 
when leaving the house. She gives him the uniform (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 
176);  later,  she  imagines  him  wearing  it,  thinks  he  would  look  very 
handsome in it, and has a sexual fantasy about him (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 
195). The narrator tells us that Ibrāhīm is ‘the first one to have broken the 
seal of her virgin heart’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 190). Shortly before the 
end of his  stay at  her house,  he feels  pity for  her because his  destiny 
requires  them  to  lose  each  other  (ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  1997,  198-199) (i.e. 
because he will be a martyr). Her father congratulates himself on having 
protected Ibrāhīm,  and  concludes  that  nationalism  (waṭaniyya)  is 
‘morality, manliness and noble-mindedness’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 204). 
Nawāl  finds  that  Ibrāhīm  is  indeed  breathtakingly  handsome  in  the 
officer’s uniform (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 208-209). As he is about to leave 
the house, her sister looks at him ‘as if looking at the corpse of a martyr 
[šahīd]’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 210). They take their leave of him ‘as if 
carrying  a  coffin  [ka-annahum  yušayyiʿūn  faqīdan]’  (ʿAbd  al-Quddūs 
1997, 211). The father flatters himself again on his good deed, recalling 
that he was always nationalist, and felt that nationalist writings expressed 
his own feelings, though he had never expressed them himself. He always 
needed someone else to take action instead of him, ‘someone to write, 
someone to revolt, someone to be martyred [yustašhad]’; yet he ‘was no 
less  a  nationalist’  than  the  demonstrators,  or  the  writers,  or  even  the 
martyrs (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 214).
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As Nawāl lies in bed that night, her imagination is full of the image 
of  Ibrāhīm  wearing  the  officer’s  uniform  (ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  1997,  218). 
Later she longs for him ‘like a mother longing for her son who has gone 
off to the battlefield’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 251). When Muḥyī is arrested 
(as we will see in a moment), she believes that Ibrāhīm can save Muḥyī 
somehow, and expects him to take on this responsibility ‘as a hero, as a 
leader [zaʿīm], as a brother, and as a man for whom her heart throbs with 
love’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 327). (Note that the word  zaʿīm was often 
used to refer to Nasser.) She hopes that he will kill all policemen (ʿAbd al-
Quddūs 1997, 328). On his way to the coast  to flee on a boat to France, 
Ibrāhīm realises that he does not want to leave Egypt; he feels that he will 
have no value in France, and that a life lived outside his  waṭan would 
have no value. He would have no goal, no future, nothing to love. He 
would not see this land (arḍ) on which he was born. He would not see his 
mother or father or participate in ‘jihad’ with his friends. He would not 
see Nawāl. He thinks: ‘Egypt... Nawāl...’ (The simple juxtaposition of their 
names prompts for a blend.) Being a fugitive makes him feel weak (i.e. not 
manly); he wants to be continuously on the attack, shooting his enemies 
and those of his country (i.e. to fight with honour) (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 
348-349).  He  decides  to  stay  in  Egypt.  He  is  full  of  ‘the  energy  of 
revolutionary hate’ and needs to expend it; he wants to take revenge on 
those who have deprived him of his freedom and his love. ‘Every time he 
became absorbed in nationalist  [waṭanī] thoughts, the spectre of Nawāl 
preoccupied him’; he wants his heart to be ‘a sacrificial offering [qurbān]’ 
for  her  (ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  1997,  355).  The  word  qurbān specifically 
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designates  a  sacrificial  offering  in  a  religious  context,  but  since  the 
sacrifice is offered to Nawāl, who has been blended with both the nation 
and the waṭan, it must signify here a nationalist sacrifice, i.e. a blend that 
transfers the religious concept of sacrifice into a nationalist frame, with 
the nation/waṭan/Nawāl taking the place of God.
The  officer’s  uniform,  and  the  family’s  reactions  to  it  and  to 
Ibrāhīm’s departure from their house, can prompt for a blend between 
Ibrāhīm  and  an  idealised  military  officer,  one  who  exemplifies  the 
masculine  virtues  that  Nawāl’s  father  identifies  with  nationalism.  A 
military  officer  is  someone for  whom violence is  a profession.  On the 
basis  of  the  earlier  violence/virility  blend,  it  can  be  inferred  that  the 
nation/waṭan/Nawāl loves Ibrāhīm because he commits acts of violence 
‘in the way of [fī sabīl]’ Egypt, i.e. for ‘her’ sake. Since it is she who gives 
him the  uniform, the Ibrāhīm/officer  blend can generate  the  inference 
that the nation/waṭan perceives him as having the virtues of an idealised 
army officer. At the time the novel was written, Egypt was ruled by a 
highly  charismatic  army  officer,  Gamal  Abdel  Nasser.  Thus  the 
Ibrāhīm/officer blend can in turn be blended with Nasser; we will see an 
even  clearer  motivation  for  this  blend  at  the  end  of  the  novel.  This 
Ibrāhīm/Nasser blend can generate two complementary inferences: first, 
that  Nasser  has  the  same virtues  as  Ibrāhīm,  is  inspired  by  the  same 
nationalism, and would likewise have embraced martyrdom (as Nasser 
himself  demonstrated  in  the  Manšiyya  incident),  and  second,  that  by 
embracing martyrdom, a young man like Ibrāhīm can ‘be Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’ (as Nasser said in the Manšiyya speech). More specifically, the 
343
blend of Nawāl with a mother whose son has gone to war generates the 
inference that a young man can accomplish this martyrdom not only by 
attacking the state, as Ibrāhīm does, but also by fighting as a soldier in the 
army. At the same time, the father’s reflection that he needs someone else 
to take nationalist action for him, ‘someone to write, someone to revolt, 
someone to be martyred’ on his behalf, can be taken as a justification of 
what  Sherif  Younis  describes  as  the  Nasserist  ideology  of  nationalist 
political  passivity.  In  the  Nasser  era,  the  officers  took  care  of  the 
‘revolution’, the single party organised the demonstrations, and the army 
sent  the  soldiers  off  to  be  martyred.  Crucially,  Nasser  was  the  only 
political actor; he
took  the  place  of  the  nation  [šaʿb],  which  was  transferred  to 
spectator  seats  [maqāʿid  al-mutafarriǧīn]  in  political  matters  for 
thirteen years. . . . Nasser was . . . a condition of the existence of the 
nation.  In  the  absence  of  any  mechanisms  of  political 
representation, and given the leader’s absolute monopoly of power, 
the nation becomes  a  nation  only  when it  is  listening to  Gamal 
Abdel Nasser talking about it . . . (Younis 2005, 180).
Ibrāhīm ‘cannot spend his whole life hiding like a mouse’ (because 
this would be dishonourable). He is furious when he learns of Muḥyī’s 
arrest and torture. Muḥyī, he says to himself, is not an activist; he is ‘one 
of the simple, passive people who sit in the spectator seats [maqāʿid al-
mutafarriǧīn]’  (note  that  these are  exactly the words  that  Younis uses 
above, except that here they are used affectionately). Moreover, Muḥyī 
‘was the nation [šaʿb], the whole nation. And the nation had stood beside 
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him. The nation had endured torture for his sake. . . . He must repay the 
nation’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997,  360). Here Muḥyī, rather than Nawāl, is 
blended with the nation, and the difference in gender leads to a different 
inference: the nation’s job is not to love, but to make manly sacrifices (e.g. 
enduring torture) for the sake of the hero’s jihad. Ibrāhīm feels that ‘he 
can compensate everyone by means of his martyrdom  [istišhād] in the 
way of  the  revolution  [fī  sabīl  al-ṯawra]’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs  1997,  368). 
(Note  that  ‘the  revolution’  is  deified  here.)  Thus  a  martyr  can  be 
conceptualised as a sacrificial offering,  who dies  to  repay a debt to the 
nation.
What of religion as such in the novel, as opposed to nationalism 
modelled on religion? The few religious symbols in the novel are dwarfed 
by the abundance of nationalist ones. The characters discuss and think 
about nationalism a great deal, but hardly ever bring up the subject of 
religion. Before Ibrāhīm leaves the house, Nawāl has him write the first 
half of the  šahāda, the Muslim profession of faith (‘There is no god but 
God’),  on a piece of paper; she writes the second half  (‘Muḥammad is 
God’s messenger’), and tears the paper in half, so that each can keep the 
part the other has written, as a good-luck charm to ensure that they will 
meet again (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 198-199). Her mother gives him a small 
copy of the Qurʾān to take with him, as if for good luck (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 
1997, 206). It is also noteworthy that, as mentioned above, the story takes 
place during the sacred month of Ramadan. In general,  these religious 
references seem to be portrayed as touching relics of an older generation. 
Nawāl proposes writing the šahāda as a good-luck charm simply because, 
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as she says, it is something her parents do; the act is not accompanied by 
any mention of the šahāda’s religious significance. It is Nawāl’s mother, 
and not  Nawāl,  who gives  Ibrāhīm the  Qurʾān.  In  the  hospital  at  the 
beginning of the novel, he twice mentions that although it is Ramadan, he 
is not fasting (because he is supposed to be ill) (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 28-
29); presumably he could have mentioned (or at least thought to himself) 
that he would compensate by fasting at a later date, but he does not. He 
fasts only at the family’s home, under the parents’ authority. As we saw 
above, he expects to be a martyr ‘in the way of’ Egypt, not in the way of 
God. Indeed, at no point in the novel do his thoughts turn towards God. 
The novel  even  explicitly points the way towards scepticism about the 
existence of God. This occurs as a result of a subplot involving a romance 
between  Nawāl’s  older  sister  Sāmia  and  her  amoral  cousin,  ʿAbd  al-
Ḥamīd, who wants to turn Ibrāhīm in to the police in order to collect the 
reward. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd is, of course, the least nationalistic character in 
the  story;  he  says  to  himself  that  ‘it  is  not  a  matter  of  nationalism 
[waṭaniyya],  but  rather  a  matter  of  five  thousand  pounds’  (ʿAbd  al-
Quddūs 1997, 161), and acknowledges to himself that he is ‘not nationalist 
[waṭanī]  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997,  265).  He goes to the police in a fit  of 
anger, then changes his mind, but as a result of his impulsive action, he 
and Muḥyī are arrested and tortured. In prison, Muḥyī reflects:
Does  God  punish  nationalists  [waṭaniyyīn]?  Was  this  policeman 
[who arrested him] a messenger [rasūl] from God, sent to punish 
and  drive  away  nationalists?  Why  did  God  allow  policemen  to 
remain free to  torture people?  Why did God not  save him now, 
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immediately,  before  the  police  began  to  question  him?  He  was 
afraid of these thoughts, and his shiver intensified. He felt himself 
asking God for forgiveness, and  recited the Throne Verse, as if he 
was afraid of losing his only hope: God (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 287-
288).
Thus the novel takes the first steps towards philosophical scepticism 
about God’s existence, using ‘the argument from evil’  (cf.  Martin 2007, 
166-180), then abruptly retreats, without so much as a theodicy.
Muḥyī  nearly dies  under torture (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997,  297-326). 
Ironically, this episode, which can be interpreted as a condemnation of 
the lawlessness of the pre-1952 regime, closely resembles accounts of the 
extrajudicial arrest and torture of dissidents during Nasser’s regime  (cf. 
Geer 2009).
Ibrāhīm, confined to the flat in which he is hiding out, protected by 
his comrades, increasingly takes on the mystical, ascetic appearance of a 
Sufi shaykh. As he ponders how to overthrow the regime, his eyes shine 
‘as if  trying to  penetrate the clouds of  the supernatural  [al-ġayb]’.  He 
thinks that if he could assemble a force of two hundred young fedayeen, 
he would be able to seize power. Then he decides that this would not be 
sufficient: ‘Two hundred armed revolutionaries do not grow in cold, hard 
land; they grow in blazing, revolutionary land. The land  [al-arḍ] must 
revolt first. The nation [šaʿb] must flare up’. (Here once again we find al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s idea that people grow like plants on the land of the  waṭan.) 
Everyone must feel ‘the spirit of the revolution’. So Ibrāhīm should begin 
by spreading this spirit. But he could not do so alone; he would need the 
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help  of  other  groups.  He  finds  out  that  there  are  a  number  of  secret 
revolutionary organisations, including some in the army (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 
1997,  361-363).  By blending Ibrāhīm’s  hypothetical  revolution with the 
‘revolution’  that  actually  took place  in  1952,  the  reader  can  draw the 
inference that the Free Officers’ military coup must have had close links 
with  widespread  organised  revolutionary  activity.  Historians  disagree 
with this view. Sherif Younis emphasises
the independence of the officers’ movement from all the political 
forces that existed at  the time. . . .  [A]fter  the military coup, the 
country  was  faced  with  a  reformist  military  regime  that  was 
independent not only from political forces, but also from the various 
mass  organisations  (e.g.  the  trade  unions).  . . .  In  these 
circumstances, the most obvious course of action for these military 
newcomers to the political scene was, first, to purge political life in 
general,  then  to  present  themselves  as  the  representatives  of  the 
nation  [šaʿb]  as  a  whole,  since  they  could  not  represent  any 
particular part of it,  or engage in a political battle to represent a 
given part, or face any political force in an open arena, and because 
their ideology was so vague as to prevent them from going beyond 
broad generalisations (Younis 2005, 19-20; cf. Gordon 1992, 48-49).
Ibrāhīm realises  that  there is  not  much he can do as  a  fugitive, 
confined to a flat. How can he serve his  waṭan? He concludes that he is 
‘finished’; his only option is ‘to commit suicide [yantaḥir]’, to carry out ‘a 
nationalist suicide operation [ʿamaliyya waṭaniyya intiḥāriyya]’. He will 
show ‘how much an individual can sacrifice in the way of his country [fī  
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sabīl waṭanihi]’. This, he thinks, is his role: to be ‘the first shot of the 
revolution’,  to die ‘so that the revolution can live’,  to be ‘a victim for 
people to cry over, a martyr [šahīd] whose blood people can use as a flag 
for the revolution’. He sits by himself in a dark room (like an ascetic), and 
his comrades come to him only to receive his instructions. Having decided 
to carry out a suicide mission, he is now calm, for he knows ‘his destiny’.  
His mustache and beard have grown, making him seem older than he is. 
As he formulates his plan in his mind, he has ‘the mentality of a thorough 
scientist  [ʿālim]’  performing  an  experiment  on  one  of  his  inventions, 
whose purpose is to spark revolution in Egypt. At the same time, ‘he sees 
light emanating from afar, from the depths of his soul, from the depths of 
his  thought’.  Scenes  of  his  life  pass  before  his  eyes,  and  he  smiles 
contentedly (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 363-366). Arguably these are prompts 
for the blended concept of nationalist Sufism, divorced from Islam, which 
we saw in  Chapter 4; the asceticism and mystical insight of a Sufi are 
blended with the idea of service to the  waṭan  (rather than to God), and 
with the mentality of a scientist doing experiments (rather than, say, a 
religious scholar).
Ibrāhīm recalls that his father had wanted him to be a judge or a 
government minister. But he will be something better than that: ‘he will 
die a martyr [šahīd]’. Thus he will be remembered forever, and his father 
will be proud of him  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 367). Here any young man 
reading the novel, before being called up for military  service or joining 
the army, can blend himself with Ibrāhīm, and draw the inference that by 
dying in battle, he, too, can become something better than whatever his 
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father  hoped  he  would  become.  Without  an  afterlife  of  its  own, 
nationalism cannot offer its martyrs the paradise promised to religious 
martyrs;  its  closest  possible  approximation  is  the  promise  of  being 
remembered forever in this world.
Such  a  reward  is  perhaps  a  less  appealing  than  paradise.  And 
although blending Nawāl with the nation or the waṭan enables Ibrāhīm to 
express  his  love  for  her  by  committing  suicide,  the  sacrifice  of  their 
tangible, unblended relationship may seem disappointing to the reader – 
who is, perhaps, in fact being  prompted to blend himself with Ibrāhīm 
and risk sacrificing just such a relationship, as many conscripts do, by 
going off to war and dying in battle. These considerations may account 
for  the  presence of  a  few prompts  for  a  blend between the  houris  of 
Islamic  martyrdom  and  the  virginal  Nawāl.  Ibrāhīm  has  given  her  a 
regular appointment to meet him in a public square, but each time she 
goes to the appointment, he fails to appear  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 328-
330). As his comrades drive him to the location of his suicide mission, he 
asks them to pass through the same square, in order to feel close to her,  
though he knows that she will not be there at that time (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 
1997, 376). Thus she is metonymically present just before his martyrdom, 
like houris that appeared to soldiers on the battlefield in classical Islamic 
martyrdom literature. After Ibrāhīm’s death, Nawāl marries a man she 
does not love, because ‘this is the function that every girl is made for. .  . . 
Society urges her to get married, not to love’. But she keeps the piece of 
paper on which he wrote half of the  šahāda,  and hopes to be reunited 
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with  him ‘in  heaven’  (ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  1997,  436-437),  like  the  houris 
designated as wives for martyrs on the battlefield.
The battle that leads to Ibrāhīm’s martyrdom roughly follows the 
pattern  exemplified  by  Ǧaʿfar  al-Ṭayyār  in  629  AD,  discussed  at  the 
beginning  of  this  chapter.  Under  cover  of  darkness,  Ibrāhīm  sets  off 
dynamite under tanks and lorries in a British military camp; chaos ensues, 
and he attempts to flee the camp. He crawls under barbed wire, shredding 
his back, but ‘it does not matter’. Running again, he is shot in the right 
shoulder, but ‘it does not matter’; he keeps running. Unable to throw hand 
grenades with his right hand because of his injured shoulder, he throws 
them with his left hand. (Recall Ǧaʿfar al-Ṭayyār switching the flag from 
his right hand to his left.) He climbs over the wall of the camp; the metal  
spikes on top of the wall cut his hands, but ‘it does not matter’ (ʿAbd al-
Quddūs 1997, 382-386).
Like the classical martyrs, he makes a speech (albeit silently, in his 
mind)  just  before  his  death.  But  while  the  classical  pre-martyrdom 
speeches were typically prayers, emphasising that the martyr was dying 
for  God’s  sake,  Ibrāhīm invokes  Egypt  rather  than  God.  In  the  street 
outside the camp, Egyptian police chase him. He addresses them in his 
thoughts: ‘Stay away from me, you fools! I have done all this for your 
sake, for Egypt’s sake. I have put fear in the hearts of your enemies. They 
will leave you. Believe me, they will leave you. All of you will revolt, like 
me, to expel them.’ As an Egyptian policeman approaches him, he thinks: 
‘Let me be, brother. I am a revolutionary for your sake. If you searched in 
your heart, you would find my revolution there. It is your revolution.’ 
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(This  is  the  idea  of  the  communion  of  the  nation’s  souls,  which  we 
encountered in Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm’s novel.)  Ibrāhīm aims his gun at the 
policeman, but ‘something in him refused to kill an innocent Egyptian, 
something stronger than him, stronger than his safety, stronger than his 
life’. The policman shoots him instead, and he dies with a smile on his 
face (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 386-387).
After learning of Ibrāhīm’s death,  Muḥyī’s father reflects  that he 
would have been willing to ‘sacrifice his son’, by allowing him to die in 
prison, if this could have saved the life of the ‘martyr [šahīd]’, Ibrāhīm 
(ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 392-393). Given the Nasser/Ibrāhīm blend that we 
encountered earlier,  the inference can be drawn that  Egyptian parents 
should be willing to sacrifice their sons for Nasser.  Perhaps one could 
even make this inference apply specifically to those parents whose sons 
were imprisoned without trial by Nasser’s secret police, by arguing that 
(as  is  sometimes  said)  the  arrest  of  innocent  people  was  a  necessary 
sacrifice in order to protect the revolution (cf. Geer 2009). Muḥyī’s father 
wants  to  tell  people:  ‘O people  [nās],  one  of  your  sons  has  sacrificed 
himself in your way [fī sabīlikum], in the way of your liberation, to expel 
the English, to expel corruption, and to restore your dignity [karāma] and 
pride  [ʿizza]’  (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997,  393).  This  sentence  cannot  fail  to 
recall the theme of ‘pride and dignity [al-ʿizza wa-l-karāma]’ that was 
common in Nasser’s speeches; as we saw earlier, in our discussion of the 
Manšiyya incident, Nasser claimed that he had personally instilled pride 
and dignity in Egyptians. Hence here again, we are prompted for a blend 
between Ibrāhīm and Nasser.
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Muḥyī’s father feels that he has played his role in the revolution by 
sheltering Ibrāhīm, and that he is creating the revolution and its heroes 
along with millions of other people. All these heroes are ‘carrying on the 
mission  of the martyr [šahīd] and leading the ranks of the revolution’ 
(ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  1997,  393-394).  Muḥyī  and  his  fellow  prisoners  see 
Ibrāhīm as  a  martyr  (šahīd)  as  well  (ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  1997,  408,  411). 
Another  charismatic,  Ibrāhīm-like  young  man  appears  among  the 
prisoners, ‘a new hero carrying on the mission of a martyred hero [baṭal  
šahīd]’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 412-413). Ṣalāḥ Ǧāhīn, who ‘was known as 
the  semiofficial  poet  of  the  July  1952  revolution’  (Armbrust  1996,  60), 
composes a ‘hymn [našīd]’ in Egyptian  colloquial Arabic in honour  of 
Ibrāhīm; it says that ‘the sun will be red with the blood of every martyr 
[šahīd]’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 426).
Muḥyī’s  cousin  ʿAbd  al-Ḥamīd  undergoes  a  conversion  from 
amorality  to  a mixture of  nationalist  and religious  faith,  in  which the 
nationalist aspect predominates by far; he concludes that Ibrāhīm was a 
hero because he died ‘in the way of [fī sabīl]’ of a principle and a goal 
(rather than ‘in God’s way’), and therefore must have died happy (ʿAbd 
al-Quddūs 1997, 423-425); there is no mention here of  Paradise. By the 
time ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd is  released from prison, he has become a militant 
nationalist ‘in the way of the principles that he has put his faith in, and in 
the  way of  of  atoning for  his  national  sin  [al-takfīr  ʿan ḥaṭīʾatihi  al-
waṭaniyya]’. He then marries Sāmia and begins a ‘jihad in the way of’ 
becoming a  good family  man,  applying  principles  that  his  ‘nationalist 
feeling’ has set down for him (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 434-435). Note that 
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his sin, his jihad and his principles are identified as nationalist rather than 
religious.
In prison, Muḥyī is transformed into a nationalist intellectual. He 
reads the complete works of the nationalist historian ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Rāfiʿī81,  and many other  books  on  history  and  politics,  as  well  as  the 
Qurʾān.  He  then  reads  Marx’s  Capital and  begins to  understand  why 
Ibrāhīm  was  martyred  (ustušhida).  His  head  fills  with  ideas  that  can 
‘rouse a whole nation [umma]’. When he is finally released, he is filled 
with  nationalism  (waṭaniyya)  (ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  1997,  426-427).  It  is 
significant that except for the Qurʾān, all his readings are  non-religious. 
There  is  also  no  mention  of  the  possibility  that  the  Qurʾān  might  be 
incompatible with Marxism. Muḥyī’s father reflects: ‘His son had proved 
that he was a man who could handle responsibility: he had carried the 
responsibility of the whole family when he went to prison, and he and his 
comrades could handle the responsibility of all of Egypt’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 
1997,  430).  Note the blending between the family and the nation.  This 
passage can generate the inference that nationalist intellectuals (like ʿAbd 
al-Quddūs himself) are fit to rule the country.
Under Nasser’s rule, this could only be wishful thinking; moreover, 
the last pages of the novel thorougly undermine this idea by legitimising 
Nasser’s rule. One day, Muḥyī wakes up and finds that ‘the revolution’ 
81 Al-Rāfiʿī,  a  lawyer  and  self-taught  historian  who  worked  outside  academia,  saw 
history  primarily  as  (in  his  own  words)  ‘an  instrument  for  education  and  for 
enhancing the national consciousness in the hearts of the people’, rather than as a 
scientific project autonomous from politics. He ‘is considered a politically affiliated 
and biased historian’ (Di-Capua 2004), or in Bourdieuian terms, a heteronomous one. 
After the Free Officers’ coup, the new regime showered  al-Rāfiʿī  with distinctions 
and official  posts,  and used his  books as high-school textbooks.  This  is  the same 
process of consecration – specifically, conversion of nationalist symbolic capital into 
specific capital in other fields, via the prophet’s mediation – that we found in the 
career of Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm.
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(i.e. the 1952 military coup) has taken place. When he sees ‘the new hero’ 
(undoubtedly Nasser), he feels as if he has known him for a long time. He 
thinks:
Heroism is not a single individual who can die; it is a force that is 
renewed in successive individuals, a force that is created not by an 
individual,  but  by  a  nation  [umma]  which  incarnates  it  in  an 
individual. If this individual is martyred [ustušhida] or goes astray, 
the nation incarnates it in another individual. Heroism never dies or 
goes astray. Ibrāhīm’s heroism had not died or gone astray, nor had 
the heroism of Saʿd Zaġlūl, Muṣṭafā Kāmil or ʿUrābi, not for a single 
day.  It  had  always  been  alive,  in  the  life  of  this  nation  [šaʿb], 
incarnated  in  one  leader  [zaʿīm] after  another  (ʿAbd  al-Quddūs 
1997, 438-439).
This passage, which recalls Nasser’s speech at Manšiyya, prompts 
for a blended in which a series of leaders – including Nasser and national 
heroes of the past  – is compressed into the abstract idea of  ‘heroism’, 
which is reincarnated again and again to  lead the nation. This is very 
similar to the idea of the ‘idol’ (maʿbūd) embodying Egypt’s eternal spirit, 
which we found in Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm’s novel  ʿAwdat al-Rūḥ,  and indeed 
to  Merezhkovsky’s  concept  of  God  eternally  reborn. Moreover,  the 
appearance of Nasser,  who ushers in a new era, can prompt for a blend 
with the Messiah of apocalyptic Islamic martyrdom literature.
Critical Responses to the Novel
As noted above, the novel Fī Baytinā Raǧul (1956) was based partly 
on  the  assassination  of  the  former  cabinet  minister  Amīn  ʿUṯmān  by 
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Ḥusayn Tawfīq in 1946. At the time of the novel’s publication, the story of 
the assassination was well-known, and much had been written about it 
(al-Niqāš 1991, 23); readers would therefore have been well aware of the 
correspondences between the novel and the historical event.
The  novel  was  published  in  instalments in  Rūz  al-Yūsuf.  An 
indication of its popularity is ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s assertion that it caused 
the magazine’s circulation to rise considerably  (Abū al-Futūḥ 1982, 43). 
Another such indication is that, in 1961, it was made into a play at the 
National Theatre (Mandūr 1961) and, as we will see, into a film. However, 
it  seems to have received little attention from critics. According to  the 
critic Raǧāʾ al-Niqāš (1991, 21-23), this is true of ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s literary 
works  in general:  they were extremely popular,  and he was for  many 
years  the  most  successful  writer  of  his  generation  among the  reading 
masses, but critics spurned him. Al-Niqāš attributes this disdain mainly to 
the fact that ʿAbd al-Quddūs aimed for success among the masses rather 
than among critics; therefore he wrote in a very simple, journalistic style. 
He did not respond to new developments in world literature, and since his 
writing was commercially successful, he had no incentive to do so. ʿAbd 
al-Quddūs  thus  seems to  fit  Bourdieu’s  (1998,  235-236) definition  of  a 
heteronomous writer: one whose works satisfy a pre-existing, widespread 
demand for a certain type of writing and are commercially successful in 
the short term.
Nevertheless,  a  few critics  have  written  about  Fī  Baytinā Raǧul, 
focusing mainly on the idea of heroism that it presents. For Fuʿād Dawāra 
(1959),  it  is  an  excellent  novel.  One  cannot  read  it,  he  says,  without 
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remembering  ‘ʿAbd  al-Quddūs’s  fiery  nationalist  [waṭaniyya] writing’ 
during  the  British  occupation,  or  recognising  real  people  amongst  the 
characters. Dawāra emphasises the view, clearly expressed in the novel, 
that  millions  of  Egyptians,  like  the  members  of  Muḥyī’s  family  and 
Ibrāhīm’s ‘jihadi [muǧāhidīn] student comrades’, play a role in ‘creating 
the hero’, a view summed up, as he points out, in the novel’s epigraph: 
‘The hero does not create himself;  his  nation creates him’.  This stance 
recalls Nasser’s statement at Manšiyya: ‘My blood is of you and for you, 
and I will live until I die struggling in your way’.
Raǧāʾ  al-Niqāš  (1961) sees  Fī  Baytinā  Raǧul as  one  of  the  best 
literary  works  on  the  meaning  of  heroism.  He argues  that  portraying 
revolution and heroism is among the greatest things literature can do, and 
cites ancient Greek epic poetry, Nietzsche’s concept of the superman and 
Wagner’s  operas as examples.  The heroism in modern Arab life needs 
literary  expression  as  well,  he  says,  because  such  literature  can  give 
readers  moral  examples  to  follow.  Heroes,  he  adds,  established  our 
political  traditions,  our  slogans and principles,  all  of  which have their 
heroes and their martyrs. (This recalls Thomas Carlyle’s theory of the role 
of ‘great men’ in history.) Al-Niqāš argues that Ibrāhīm is ‘a Sufi who 
passionately  loves  his  country  [bilād] and risks  his  life  in  its  way [fī  
sabīlihā]’. (Here again we have the concept of non-Islamic Sufism that we 
encountered in our discussion of Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm.) Ibrāhīm, he adds, is 
‘full of the enthusiasm of the prophets and their belief in their mission’. 
He is  a  great  symbol  of  national  liberation;  protecting him becomes a 
‘sacred [muqaddas] goal’ for the family.
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Fī Baytinā Raǧul, the Film
Fī Baytinā Raǧul was made into a radio series and a play before 
being adapted for the cinema by director Henri Barakāt in 1961; according 
to newspaper reports, it ‘was a huge success’ in all these media (Tawfīq 
1961; Abāẓa 1998). It has remained, I think, one of the best-loved films of 
the  black-and-white  era  of  Egyptian  cinema,  and  is  still  shown  on 
television.
The film’s director was Henri Barakāt (1914-1997), one of the most 
prolific Egyptian filmmakers; he directed ‘eighty-five full-length fiction 
films between 1942 and 1993’ (Shafik 2001, 92). Barakāt was an intellectual 
in the style of Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm. His family owned land in Fayūm, and his 
father  had  served  as  deputy  Minister  of  Health  and  received  the 
aristocratic title of bey (al-Ḥusaynī 1991, 12-13). Henri was educated in a 
French Catholic primary school in Cairo, and recalled in an interview that 
he often spoke French at home, but never mastered Arabic; he was also 
well-versed in European classical music, and played the piano from an 
early age (al-Ḥusaynī 1991, 13-16, 21). After secondary school, he taught 
French literature, history and algebra at the school he had just graduated 
from, and took evening courses in law at the French law college in Cairo. 
He got his law degree in 1935 and worked briefly as a lawyer, but found 
that  the  legal  profession  did  not  live  up to  his  ideals,  and decided to 
pursue a career in cinema instead. He went to Paris and learned as much 
he could about cinema there, largely by observing filmmakers at work (al-
Ḥusaynī 1991, 14-23).
358
Returning  to  Egypt  shortly  before  the  Second  World  War,  he 
worked on several films in different capacities. His first film as director, 
Al-Šarīd (The Drifter, 1942) was a commercial failure.  When attending 
screenings of the film, Barakāt was shocked to hear the audience laugh 
during a scene that was meant to be tragic: the death of an unfaithful 
wife. This response baffled him, until he learned that the audience was 
gloating: they felt that the wife had got the punishment she deserved for 
her infidelity, and were therefore happy to see her die (al-Ḥusaynī 1991, 
23-27). This episode illustrates the dissimilarity between the habitus of an 
aristocrat steeped in European high culture and the habitus of the broader 
Egyptian  film  audience.  Barakāt  resolved  to  understand  his  audience 
better and take it into account from then on, because, in his words,
a  film with  no  audience  is  worthless,  even  if  it  is  a  great  film, 
because, in all simplicity, cinema is a mass art, produced like any 
other  artistic  commodity  that  is  consumed by  the  audience  and 
offers it artistic and spiritual enjoyment. The audience that does not 
find itself on the screen turns away, because the screen is a mirror 
that reflects the ideas, values and feelings of those who sit in front 
of it (al-Ḥusaynī 1991, 27).
 This is, in effect, an acknowledgement of the relative heteronomy 
that,  for  financial  reasons,  characterised  the  film  industry  worldwide 
throughout the twentieth century  (cf.  Duval 2006).  Barakāt’s  next film, 
Al-Muttahama (1942), was a huge commercial success, and the audience 
cried when he wanted them to (al-Ḥusaynī 1991, 28-29).
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He made  the  film  version  of  Fī  Baytinā  Raǧul during  what  he 
referred to as the most commercially successful period of his career  (al-
Naḥḥās 1994, 54), and we can see the same logic of heteronomy at work in 
it. The plot of the film is, for the most part, an abridged version of the plot 
of the novel, and its nationalist discourse is very much the same; I will 
focus on the differences that are significant for our purposes here. Nawāl 
has a more central role than in the novel, and the romantic attachment 
between  her  and  Ibrāhīm  is  more  fully  developed,  while  Ibrāhīm’s 
romance with his gun is absent. The film thus conforms more closely to 
the  conventions  of  romantic  drama  than  the  novel  does.  This  was 
reflected in its advertising posters; Zubayda Ṯarwat, who played Nawāl, 
was given top billing among the film’s stars. Her name is followed by that 
of  Omar  Sharif,  one  of  Egyptian  cinema’s  most  successful  stars,  who 
played  Ibrāhīm.  Commenting  on  Sharif’s  career  overall,  Viola  Shafik 
notes  that  ‘[w]ith  his  large  expressive  eyes  and  an  overall  handsome 
appearance he convinced more through his appearance than by his acting, 
and seemed the perfect manifestation of adolescent girls’ dreams’ (Shafik 
2001, 124). In this film, conformity to the conventions of the popular genre 
of  romantic  drama was  probably  a  way  of  responding  to  an  existing 
demand,  and  perhaps  especially  a  demand  among  young,  female 
cinemagoers who could identify with Nawāl. In a conventional romantic 
drama, the hero falls in love with the heroine, not with his gun; therefore 
Ibrāhīm’s love for his gun was removed.  This seems to be an effect of 
cinema’s  greater  overall  heteronomy in  comparison  to  literature,  even 
though this particular novel was already very heteronomous.
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Another sign of the film’s greater heteronomy is that it praises the 
1952 ‘revolution’ not only at the end of the narrative, but at the beginning 
as well. It begins with a slide show of drawings of pre-revolutionary life, 
accompanied by a voice-over narration that says: 
Before  the  miracle  [muʿǧiza]  of  the  revolution  occurred,  Egypt 
toiled  under  the  yoke  of  the  occupation  for  more  than  seventy 
years.  Colonialism  put  its  paid  protégés  in  government,  and 
succeeded  in  dividing  Egyptians  into  parties  that  competed  for 
power  and  fought  one  another,  forgetting  the  common  enemy. 
Despair  might  have  crept  into  the  hearts  of  the  most  faithful 
nationalists, if had not been for the faith of the children of Egypt in 
their waṭan’s right to freedom and to life. At that time, despite the 
deepening darkness, dawn was about to break. A spark of freedom 
flew. Souls, hearts and blood were boiling with rebellion.
The use of drawings to represent the pre-revolutionary era gives the 
impression  that  it  belongs  to  the  ancient  past  (the  ‘period  of  pagan 
ignorance’ (ǧāhiliyya) discussed above), a past so distant that there is no 
photographic  record  of  it.  The  text  is  official  Nasserist  discourse.  In 
addition to nationalist conceptual blends with religious inputs (‘miracle’ 
and ‘faith’) and al-Ṭahṭāwī’s concept of the ‘children’ of the country, we 
have Nasser’s (and al-Ṭahṭāwī’s) rejection of multiparty democracy, on 
the grounds that it divides the nation. Paradoxically, this text, like ʿAbd 
al-Quddūs’s writings and Nasser’s speeches, also ‘divides’ the nation into 
good Egyptians and traitors.
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The next scene emphasises this  division. At a nationalist  student 
rally at Cairo University, the speaker says, ‘We will not keep silent about 
those who sell the waṭan to its enemies. We will not keep silent about the 
traitors.’ The crowd chants, ‘Down with the traitors!’ The speaker says, 
‘We want our freedom. We want our dignity [karāma]. We will not let 
anyone sell this  waṭan and this dignity. We will not let anyone restrict 
and rape this right. The nation’s right, and death to the nation’s enemies 
[aʿdāʾ al-šaʿb], all the nation’s enemies!’ The crowd chants: ‘Death to the 
nation’s enemies!’
This  is  followed  soon  afterwards  by  a  scene  adapted  from  the 
notorious ʿAbbās  Bridge  incident  of  9  February  1946,  when the  police 
chief, Salīm Zakī, allowed hundreds of demonstrators, mostly students, to 
march onto  a  moveable  bridge over  the Nile,  then  opened the bridge, 
causing them to fall into the water (Reid 1990, 136). The mechanics of the 
incident  are  different  in  the  film,  but  the  result  is  similar.  Ibrāhīm is 
among the demonstrators. One of his young comrades has jumped into 
the water, but cannot swim. Ibrāhīm dives in and pulls him out, but the 
boy dies anyway, a martyr for his country; with his last breath, he makes 
a simple martrydom speech: ‘Ibrāhīm, tell Dad and Mum not to be angry. 
Long live Egypt.’
The university is closed and parliament dissolved. Ibrāhīm meets 
with his comrades to discuss what to do. One of them suggests that they 
should resume their former activity, killing British soldiers, but Ibrāhīm 
says this is useless, because there are always new ones to take the place of 
those killed. Another comrade says: ‘Who deserves more to be killed: the 
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British  soldier  who  serves  his  country  [balad],  or  the  Egyptian  who 
betrays his country?’ This statement implies that the moral obligation to 
serve one’s country should affect judgements about the morality of any 
particular act, however heinous. Hence colonial military occupation may 
be immoral, but the severity of this immorality is diminished if it is done 
to serve one’s own country. Similar arguments have often been used to 
justify all sorts of colonial atrocities.
Thus  Ibrāhīm and  his  comrades  decide  to  assassinate  the  prime 
minister82. The blending of Ibrāhīm with a military officer, which in the 
novel relies on the ‘officer’s uniform’, is given an additional prompt in the 
film: when Ibrāhīm sets off to carry out the assassination, the soundtrack 
is a military march. The military march theme is repeated throughout the 
film, nearly every time Ibrāhīm sets off somewhere, or when others go on 
errands for him. The film also stresses his readiness to sacrifice himself. 
Before departing on his mission, he writes a letter to his parents, to be 
delivered if he does not survive. When he takes leave of his comrades to 
carry out the assassination, he tells them that if they realise he cannot 
escape, they should not wait for him. When he is arrested, the police chief 
threatens him with torture, but he refuses to talk, and is beaten.
Ibrāhīm is transferred to hospital; here the plot of the film rejoins 
that of the novel. During the family’s debate about whether they should 
protect him, Nawāl’s support for him is more explicitly nationalist than in 
the novel. In the novel, Nawāl’s mother says,  ‘But he’s not a thief or a 
82 The novel leaves the victim’s political title unspecified, and Amīn ʿUṯmān, the victim 
of the assassin that ʿAbd al-Quddūs sheltered, was only a former cabinet minister. 
However, two prime ministers were assassinated by nationalist militants during the 
same  period,  Aḥmad  Māhir  in  February  1945  and  Muḥammad  al-Nuqrāšī  in 
December 1948 (Reid 1982).
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criminal. It’s just that they tricked him with that disgusting thing called 
politics, and made him do what he did. Still, it’s none of our business.’ 
Nawāl replies, ‘They didn’t trick him, Mum!’ Her mother interrupts her, 
scolding her and telling her to be quiet (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 41). In the 
film, Nawāl gets to finish her sentence: ‘How can we we call ourselves 
Egyptians and not see it as our business?’
As in the novel, the father asks Ibrāhīm why he killed the victim. In 
the novel,  Ibrāhīm says it  was because the victim ‘served the English. 
Everyone  knows  he  was  a  traitor  and  an  agent  for  the  English.  . . . 
Everyone condemned that man for treason, and I carried out the sentence’ 
(ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 45). In the film, he says essentially the same thing, 
adding: ‘If I’d had my way... but he who wants to serve his waṭan has to 
disregard personal considerations. I had to forget myself, so I did.’ Once 
again,  this  emphasises  his  disinterestedness  and  his  willingness  to 
sacrifice himself.
In the film, when ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd says he finds Ibrāhīm’s actions 
perplexing,  Ibrāhīm  attributes  them  to  ‘faith’,  adding:  ‘If  you  had  a 
principle that you believed in, that question wouldn’t perplex you.’ Note 
that this is faith in ‘a principle’, not necessarily faith in God. This scene 
seems to be loosely inspired by a section of the novel in which ʿAbd al-
Ḥamīd,  in prison, realises that he is a failure because he has never had 
‘faith’ (ʿAbd al-Quddūs 1997, 423-425). There, as we saw above, the novel 
alludes  to  both  religious  and  nationalist  faith,  with  the  latter 
predominating;  in  the  film,  the  words  ‘faith’  and  ‘principle’  are  left 
ambiguous.
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Overall,  though,  the  association  of  Ibrāhīm’s  nationalism  with 
religion is stronger in the film than in the novel. Before leaving the house, 
he tells the family that he has found more ‘nationalism [waṭaniyya] and 
noble-mindedness’  in  this  house  than  anywhere  else.  The  cannon 
announcing the end of the daily Ramadan fast is then fired, and just this 
once,  as  he  leaves  and  rejoins  his  comrades  (wearing  the  officer’s 
uniform), we hear the call to prayer instead of the usual military march. 
Recall that the novel seemed to portray him as a Sufi mystic when hiding 
out at his comrades’ flat and giving them orders. In the film, we instead 
see him giving orders to  his  devoted followers while still  wearing the 
officer’s uniform, but he then appears in religious garb: when the police 
search the hideout, he escapes, disguised as a shaykh.
When ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd has his change of heart, he says, ‘I forgot that 
the person I was going to inform on sacrificed himself and considered his 
own life cheap, in the way of [fī sabīl] my dignity [karāma], your dignity 
and the dignity of all of us.’ Once again, this is Nasserist discourse,  and 
recalls Nasser’s Manšiyya speech.
In  keeping  with  Nawāl’s  increased  importance  in  the  film,  the 
romantic drama is heightened by prolonging and intensifying the contact 
between  her  and  Ibrāhīm.  While  in  the  novel,  he  never  keeps  his 
appointments with her in the square, in the film he first sends a comrade 
to give her a telephone number where she can call him; on the phone, 
they say how much they miss each other. At the next appointment, he 
meets her himself, posing as a taxi driver, and drives her around Cairo.  
He tells her that they will not see each other again. She says she cannot 
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believe that; things will change, and he will return to his family, to his 
waṭan and to those who love him. He says that he, like millions of others, 
is living on the hope that things will change; surely Egypt will be free one 
day,  but  that  could  take  a  year  or  ten  years.  She  says  it  makes  no 
difference to her; she will wait for him. He tells her not to do so: ‘I’m not 
the future; I’m the past, the past that you must forget. Promise me you’ll 
forget it.’ She promises the opposite: that she will never forget him. This 
scene can generate the inference that,  by proving his  disinterestedness 
through self-sacrifice, the martyr gains the undying love of a woman (or 
the waṭan) as well as immortality as a martyr.
When Muḥyī and ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd are imprisoned, Nawāl prays to 
God that Ibrāhīm will find out. Meanwhile, at the port in Alexandria, just 
before he is to leave Egypt, he has second thoughts. He says to one of his 
colleagues: ‘I wonder which is more honourable: for me to live in France, 
or to die in Egypt?’ Memories of Nawāl come back to haunt him, and he 
repeats to himself the sentence about dying in Egypt. Thus dying in Egypt 
is blended with being reunited with Nawāl. He then changes his mind and 
decides to return to Cairo. When he hears that Muḥyī and ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd 
are in prison, he thanks God for inspiring him to go back to Cairo. We can 
thus  infer  that  Nawāl’s  prayer  was  answered,  and  hence  that  she  is 
responsible  for  his  death.  The  same inference  can be  drawn from the 
blend between her and the  waṭan:  he  dies in order to fulfil  his  moral 
obligation to his country, hence his country (i.e. Nawāl) is responsible for 
his death. In keeping with the film’s closer assocation between religion 
and nationalism in  comparison  with  the  novel,  the  plot  device  of  the 
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prayer  thus  makes  God  an  intermediary  between  the  martyr  and  his 
country.
The details of Ibrāhīm’s suicide mission are different to those in the 
novel, but the basic sequence of events still corresponds to the classical 
martyrdom narrative discussed earlier in this chapter. Ibrāhīm’s mission 
is to blow up a British weapons depot. He shoots a guard, who falls but 
manages to shoot Ibrāhīm. Badly wounded, Ibrāhīm is on the verge of 
succumbing  to  his  injuries,  but  suddenly  finds  renewed  strength;  he 
crawls, with great difficulty, to an air shaft above the weapons depot, and 
drops a hand grenade into it. He dies with Nawāl’s good-luck charm in 
his hand (hence the houri is metonymically present on the battlefield), 
and the weapons depot explodes.
The last scene of the film shows Nawāl reading a letter from him. In 
the  letter,  he  notes  that  he  is  writing  to  her  just  before  the  religious 
festival at the end of the month of Ramadan, and adds: ‘The real festival 
[al-ʿīd al-ḥaqīqī] will be the day that our waṭan is freed from occupation. 
I have decided to give myself as a sacrifice [fidāʾ] to my  waṭan’.  This 
prompts  for  a  blend  between  the  1952  military  coup  and  a  religious 
festival, and implies that the religious festival is not a ‘real’ festival; only 
the nationalist festival will be ‘real’. From this it is possible to draw the 
inference that nationalism is more real than religion. In the letter, he then 
tells her to teach her children that a person who is martyred ‘in the way 
of his country [fī sabīl bilādihi]’ does not die. We see Muḥyī and ʿAbd al-
Ḥamīd released from prison, suggesting that the revolution is under way. 
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Instead of ‘The End’, the final title card says, ‘This was the beginning’ (i.e. 
of the revolution).
The film thus appears to take a less autonomous stance than the 
novel.  Not  only  does  it  conform  more  closely  to  the  conventions  of 
romantic drama, it also makes greater use of purely religious concepts to 
legitimise nationalism. This is probably because of differences between 
the small  audience for  novels  and the much larger audience for  films. 
Novels  require  their  readers  to  have a  relatively  high volume of  non-
religious cultural capital (e.g. familiarity with the conventions of modern 
prose fiction), which seems not to be as widespread as religious cultural 
capital in Egypt83. Thus it is not surprising that the film makes greater use 
of religious concepts than the novel it was based on. At the same time, 
like the novel, the film also relies heavily on blended nationalist concepts 
that have religious inputs. In contrast, political concepts with no religious 
basis are almost completely absent from the film; multiparty democracy, 
for example, is portrayed solely as a reprehensible division of the nation 
against itself.
The  film  shares  the  novel’s  heteronomy  towards  the  military 
regime,  referring to  the ‘revolution’  as a ‘miracle’.  Yet  the ‘new hero’ 
celebrated  at  the  end  of  the  novel,  i.e.  Nasser,  is  not  specifically 
83 Sales of a novel in the Arab world ‘only in very rare cases exceed five thousand 
copies’  (Mehrez 2008, 44). In one recent survey, book readers in Egypt ‘mentioned 
that they mostly read the Holy Quran. Frequencies of other books mentioned were 
minor  and suggests  that  no  strong preference  of  books  after  the  Quran resonate 
among  Egyptian  readers’  (Next  Page  2007,  3).  In  the  1980s,  Shaykh  Muḥammad 
Mitwallī al-Šaʿrāwī (1911-1988), one of the most popular Muslim preachers in Egypt, 
who  served  as  Minister  of  Religious  Endowments  and  hosted  a  live  television 
programme on  the  interpretation  of  the  Qurʾān  (Zeidan  1999,  65-66n),  stated  on 
television that he had not read any book other than the Qurʾān in the preceding forty 
years (Ibrāhīm 1992, 306). Much of his audience probably shared his lack of interest 
in non-religious texts.  No empirical  data  exists  on the reading habits  of  different 
social classes in Egypt; research is needed on this subject.
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mentioned at the end of the film. Durriya Šaraf al-Dīn’s (1992) analysis of 
the  effect  of  the  military  regime  on  the  film  industry  can  help  us 
understand why.  The new regime made it clear from the outset that it 
desired a didactic cinema that embodied the slogans of the revolution, and 
filmmakers initially hastened to express their readiness to comply (Šaraf 
al-Dīn  1992,  13-14).  However,  in  reality,  most  were  inclined  ‘to  give 
predominance to entertaining films’; this view reflected ‘the demands of 
reality and of the commercial market, and considerations of profit and 
loss in the world of film production’ (Šaraf al-Dīn 1992, 15). Moreover, the 
regime’s ideological stances were vague. In the absence of a clear political 
programme,  filmmakers were concerned that,  if  they made the sort  of 
films  the  regime  was  asking  for,  they  might  unwittingly  offend  the 
officers. As ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s imprisonment in 1954 shows, the risks of 
producing anything that  could be perceived as criticism of the regime 
were high. Even propaganda films could be risky (Šaraf al-Dīn 1992, 19-
20). Faced with a regime that was clearly proceeding by trial and error, 
and that brutally repressed anything it perceived as dissent, filmmakers 
chose  to  play  it  safe.  When  they  made  films  that  lent  some  form of 
support to the regime, they usually did so not by praising ‘the new era’, 
but by criticising ‘the past’, i.e. the period before the 1952 military coup. 
Šaraf al-Dīn (1992, 35) calls this type of filmmaking ‘the cinema of fear’.
Egyptian cinema of the 1960s took the past as its framework. . . . 
Filmmakers avoided dealing with the current situation. . . . Fear and 
the military’s iron grip on one hand, and the lack of any real desire 
to enter into a conflict and to pay the price of confrontation on the 
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other hand, created a barrier between cinema and the present. The 
world of the past became a safe haven (Šaraf al-Dīn 1992, 94).
This  arguably  explains why the film  Fī  Baytinā Raǧul omits  the 
novel’s glorification of the ‘new hero’, the leader of the 1952 ‘revolution’. 
Any explicit representation of Nasser would run the risk of offending him 
somehow. Fī Baytinā Raǧul was one of a number of films made in Egypt 
in the 1960s on the theme of ‘self-sacrifice for one’s  waṭan’;  nearly all 
these films held fast to ‘the framework of the cinema of the past’ in order 
to justify the present (Šaraf al-Dīn 1992, 99, 100-101, 111).
Critical Responses to the Film
For  Saʿd  al-Dīn  Tawfīq  (1961),  Fī  Baytinā  Raǧul is  ‘an  excellent 
film’. In his view, ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s novel has been so successful, in book 
form  as  well  as  in  its  adaptations  for  the  theatre,  the  radio  and  the 
cinema, because it is ‘a realistic picture of our life before the revolution’.  
ʿUṯmān al-ʿAntablī  (1961) praised the novel for its portrait of ‘that dark 
period in Egypt’s recent history . . . before the revolution’. In his view, the 
film  adaptation,  like  the  theatre  and  radio  adaptations  before  it,  has 
succeeded in presenting a subject that ‘wells up from the depths of our 
soul [ṣamīminā]’. Both the novel and the film present Ibrāhīm not as a 
hero,  but  rather  as  ‘an  expression  of  the  heroism of  the  masses’.  Al-
ʿAntablī praises the film for using a visual language that ‘speaks to the 
masses  in  a  language  that  they  understand,  and  also  pleases  the 
intellectual  elite’.  He  objects  to  the  omission of  some elements  of  the 
novel, particularly its penultimate chapter, which shows the development 
of some of the secondary characters, such as Muḥyī and ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd 
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(who, as we saw above, are transformed into nationalist activists); these 
examples of the intensification of nationalist feelings among the  general 
population ‘justified the occurrence of our great white revolution, which 
emerged from the innermost core of the nation [ṣamīm al-šaʿb]’.
More recently, Muḫtār Nūḥ  (1998) argued that the film promotes 
terrorism, and should be renamed A Terrorist in Our House, since Ibrāhīm 
makes himself into judge, prosecutor and executioner. Ibrāhīm al-Mawǧī 
(1998) agreed, emphasising that nobody gave Ibrāhīm the right to kill; he 
gave it to himself. In my view, the focus of these reviewers on ‘terrorism’ 
disregards  the  importance,  in  the  novel  and  in  the  film,  of  the  more 
general – and more salient – concept of martyrdom, which can be applied 
as easily to wars between states (and hence to army conscription) as it can 
to guerilla warfare.
Conclusion
In  this  chapter,  we have seen evidence for  a blended concept  of 
nationalist  martyrdom.  Figure 12  sums  up  what  is  probably  the  basic 
structure of this blend. The first input contains elements of the frame of 
religious  jihad,  while  the second contains  elements  from the frame of 
nationalist armed conflict. The correspondences follow straightforwardly 
from the discussion in this chapter. This blend is readily motivated by an 
inference  that  can be  drawn from the  pre-existing blended nationalist 
concept of ‘country’, shown in Chapter 2, in which God is blended with a 
geographical territory. This inference can be drawn as follows: if jihad is a 
duty to God, and if one’s country is like God, then jihad is also a duty to 
371
one’s country. In the chapter on al-Ṭahṭāwī, we saw that he imported the 
idea of a duty to die for one’s country from France, and expressed it in his 
war poetry and in his political thought. The social function of the blended 
concept of nationalist martyrdom is to make this idea of self-sacrifice for 
one’s country more persuasive, by linking it with a conventional frame, 
jihad,  in  which  the  concept  of  a  duty  to  sacrifice  one’s  life  plays  a 
prominent role. Iḥsān ʿAbd al-Quddūs probably did not invent this blend; 
further research would be needed to find out who did.
We have  also  seen  how both  Iḥsān  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  and  Gamal 
Abdel Nasser made use of the concept of nationalist martyrdom to gain 
372
Figure 12: Nationalist martyrdom
symbolic  capital  as  priest  and  prophet  of  nationalism.  In  particular, 
Nasser’s demonstration of his willingness to become a martyr for Egypt, 
in  his  speech  during  the  Manšiyya  incident,  seems  to  have  been  the 
decisive performance that, for the first time, earned him symbolic capital  
outside the army. ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s novel Fī Baytinā Raǧul, and the film 
based  on  it,  promoted  the  idea  of  martyrdom  for  one’s  country,  and 
prompted for the inference that Nasser exemplified the heroism found in 
martyrs.
I  have  also  proposed  avenues  for  further  research  aimed  at 
explaining  Nasser’s  charisma,  arguing  that  it  must  be  analysed  as  a 
relationship  between  Nasser’s  habitus  of  the  speaker  and  that  of  his 
audience.  While it was Nasser’s political power as military autocrat that 
enabled  him  to  have  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs  imprisoned  in  1954,  this  is  not 
sufficient to explain ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s subsequent transformation from an 
advocate  of  liberal  democracy  into  one  of  Nasser’s  most  enthusiastic 
apostles. In order to explain this, it seems necessary to take into account 
both ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s symbolic interests in the field of nationalism and 
Nasser’s symbolic power. Arguably, ʿAbd al-Quddūs could  simply have 
avoided conflict with the regime by limiting himself to writing novels and 
stories about  romantic relationships,  a genre in which he was already 
successful.  But  by  doing  so,  he  would  have  lost  the  considerable 
nationalist capital that he had earned as editor of the magazine  Rūz al-
Yūsuf,  building on his mother’s years of investment in establishing the 
magazine as a prestigious platform for nationalist discourse; in a word, he 
would have ceased to be a priest  of  nationalism. In order to remain a 
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member  of  the  priesthood,  he  was  obliged  to  submit  to  the  symbolic 
domination of the prophet. Thus this domination served his interests, at 
the  expense  of  his  liberal  principles  and  his  capacity  to  critique  the 
regime.  Tragically,  the nationalist  beliefs  to  which he had devoted his 
career were the very beliefs that turned him into a propaganda tool of a 
military autocracy.
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Conclusion
This thesis has used a detailed analysis of Arabic primary sources to 
propose a new account of the history of nationalism in Egypt, and it has 
used this evidence to support a new sociological and cognitive approach 
to the study of nationalism. Nationalism is not, as has often been claimed, 
a political principle; instead, it is basically a moral one. From a cognitive 
point  of  view,  the  abstract  concept  underlying  diverse  nationalisms 
represents  a  nation  as  a  group  of  human  beings  with  (normally) 
hereditary membership and a shared moral duty towards a geographical 
area  (a  ‘country’).  Like  all  abstract  concepts  in  human cognition,  this 
concept is based on concrete concepts that relate to everyday experiences. 
Specifically, the concept of duty towards a geographical area is generated, 
through conceptual blending, from the concept of duty towards a person, 
such as a parent. By using the theory of conceptual blending, Chapters 1  
and  2  of  this  thesis  have  been  able  to  specify  the  precise  differences 
between  the  nationalist  concepts  that  appeared  in  Arabic  in  the  19 th 
century, in the work of Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭāwī, and the pre-nationalist concepts 
that al-Ṭahṭāwī built on. In particular, the notion of selective projection 
onto a conceptual blend has made it possible to show that pre-nationalist 
concepts in Arabic also represented land as a parent, but that the concept 
of filial duty was not projected onto these blends. Al-Ṭahṭāwī seems to 
have  introduced  this  projection  into  Arabic  after  encountering  it  in 
French nationalist concepts during his studies in France.
The  sociological  aspect  of  this  study  has  shown that  nationalist 
concepts lend themselves to the formation of particular social structures, 
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which are found in the Egyptian case. Specifically, the lack of objective 
criteria for determining duties towards national territory lends itself to 
the formation of a highly heteronomous field in the Bourdieusian sense, 
in which actors compete for symbolic capital consisting of the ability to 
successfully  claim  to  make  authoritative  statements  about  correct 
nationalist beliefs. To this end, they employ two main strategies, both of 
which are also found in religious fields. The first of these, ‘the strategy of 
the prophets’,  is  based on charisma, defined by Bourdieu as a relation 
between the habitus  of  a  speaker  and the  habitus  of  an audience:  the 
speaker’s habitus generates words and actions that, for an audience with a 
certain habitus, appear to be manifestations of ideals. The second strategy, 
which this thesis has focused on, is ‘the strategy of the priests’,  and is 
based on the conversion of cultural capital into symbolic capital. To use 
this  strategy,  cultural  producers  must  successfully  claim  that  the 
particular types of knowledge and skills that they possess qualify them to 
define and describe the nation and the country.
This analysis helps explain the many similarities – often noted by 
scholars but not well understood – between religion and nationalism. The 
concept of national territory is similar to the concept of God:  both posit 
the existence of a personified entity that makes legitimate demands on 
human beings, but that cannot be observed objectively. Like belief in God, 
belief in a national territory can only be an act of faith. Since gods and 
national territories cannot be studied scientifically, human beings are free 
to make up ideas about them as they please, and convince others of the 
validity  of  those  ideas  using  any  available  social  strategies.  The  most 
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effective  strategies  for  this  type  of  persuasion  are  the  strategies  of 
prophethood and priesthood; hence these strategies are commonly used in 
nationalism as  in  religion.  A  key  difference  between  nationalism  and 
religion is that while God is conceptualised as being in Heaven, national 
territory  is  conceptualised  as  being  on  Earth.  Many  practical 
consequences  follow  from  this.  Above  all,  one  can  ‘fight  for  one’s 
country’ through the conquest and control of territory. Thus one of the 
main  uses  of  nationalism  has  been  to  justify  war  and  militarisation. 
Moreover, the French and Egyptian nationalist concepts analysed in this 
thesis are conceptual blends in which one of the inputs is drawn from the 
frame  of  religious  belief.  The  abstract  similarities  between  nationalist 
concepts and familiar religious concepts, and the use of religious concepts 
as  inputs  in  nationalist  conceptual  blends,  can  help  explain  why 
nationalist  concepts,  even  when  new,  could  appear  plausible  to  their 
audiences.
This  thesis  has  shown how a  priesthood  of  nationalism can  use 
nationalist concepts to advance their own interests in a variety of ways. In 
Chapter 2, we saw how military and economic projects in Egypt in the 
19th century led to the establishment of a state-run system of European-
style education, headed by al-Ṭahṭāwī and his successors. That chapter 
argued that al-Ṭahṭāwī used nationalist concepts to persuade his young 
students to devote themselves to the acquisition of non-religious cultural 
capital,  and that his success in doing so enabled him to gain symbolic 
capital for a generation of students and graduates of this new educational 
system; thus he became the first  priest  of  nationalism in Egypt.  These 
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graduates  constituted a  new social  category,  the  afandiyya,  who were 
distinguished by  their  possession  of  non-religious  cultural  capital,  and 
who  were  the  main  advocates  of  nationalism  by  the  end  of  the  19 th 
century. Those who became teachers in the expanding state school system 
inculcated their own nationalist habitus in their students, turning these 
schools into a powerful means for reproducing and spreading nationalist 
beliefs.
Chapter  3  showed  how  afandī cultural  producers,  such  as 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, used the priestly strategy to gain symbolic 
capital in the nationalist field; they then used this capital to advance a 
wide range of class and professional interests. For example, Haykal used 
nationalism to make a successful,  unorthodox claim for the novel as a 
legitimate literary genre in Arabic. More important, he and other afandī 
nationalists engaged in a political struggle to improve job opportunities 
for  the  afandiyya in  the  competition  for  state  employment.  In  this 
struggle,  their  main  competitors  were  the  Muslim  clergy,  who  had  a 
considerable  advantage  thanks  to  the  widspread  and  long-standing 
entrenchment of Islamic religious faith in the habitus of most Egyptians. 
Moreover, by the 1930s, the expansion of public education had led to the 
emergence  of  a  ‘new  afandiyya’,  composed  of  individuals  from  less 
privileged backgrounds  who  embraced nationalism,  but  whose  habitus 
was more strongly shaped by Islamic concepts.  Afandī nationalists now 
found themselves  on  the  defensive,  accused  of  atheism or  of  reviving 
ancient Egyptian polytheism. Some, like Haykal, responded by attempting 
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to use Islamic concepts to challenge the authority of the Muslim clergy, 
but this attempt failed.
At  the  same  time,  some  nationalist  intellectuals  envisaged  that 
nationalism could gain greater legitimacy in the eyes of a wide audience 
in  a  different  way:  they  posited  that  the  nation  needed,  in  effect,  a 
prophet-like nationalist leader who could inspire the masses as they could 
not. This idea is an example of a conceptual blend with an input space 
drawn  from  the  frame  of  religious  belief.  It  ultimately  succeeded  in 
promoting  nationalism,  but  backfired  on  the  intellectuals  who 
championed it by severely restricting their autonomy. Chapter 4 analysed 
this  idea  in  the  work  of  Tawfīq  al-Ḥakīm,  and  showed  how  it  was 
adopted by Gamal Abdel Nasser, a reader of al-Ḥakīm who went on to 
become a successful nationalist prophet. Nasser’s charisma enabled him to 
dominate  the  nationalist  field  and  to  give  considerable  institutional 
support to nationalist cultural producers such as al-Ḥakīm; it also helped 
him become an absolute dictator. Once Nasser was widely accepted as the 
voice of the nation, nationalist intellectuals were left with no grounds on 
which  to  challenge  any  of  Nasser’s  policies.  Most,  like  al-Ḥakīm, 
submitted willingly to his symbolic domination.
Chapter  5  considered  the  career  of  Iḥsān  ʿAbd  al-Quddūs,  an 
intellectual who used nationalism to become a successful journalist, and 
who then abandoned his  advocacy for  democracy in order to give his 
unconditional  support to  Nasser.  That  chapter  focused on one concept 
that  figures prominently in ʿAbd al-Quddūs’s  work,  and also played a 
crucial  role  in  the  development  of  Nasser’s  charisma:  the  concept  of 
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nationalist martyrdom, or dying for one’s country, which is particularly 
useful for motivating sacrifices of life and limb at war. This, too, was a 
conceptual blend with a religious input.
In  sum,  nationalism was  useful  for  Egyptian  intellectuals  in  the 
short term; it helped them to acquire a measure of symbolic capital and to 
advance their careers in various fields. At the same time, it often led them 
to misrecognise the pursuit of own interests as the disinterested pursuit of 
the common good. In the long term, it severely restricted their autonomy, 
making it almost impossible for them to challenge social orthodoxy and 
state policies.
Besides  solving  the  vexed  problem  of  the  similarity  between 
nationalism and religion, the analysis proposed here makes it possible to 
study,  in  a  unified,  comparative  manner,  two  sets  of  closely  related 
phenomena that have mostly been studied in isolation from one another, 
namely prophets,  priests,  temples,  pilgrimages,  hymns, martyrs, etc.,  in 
religion and their counterparts in nationalism. It also suggests ways to 
analyse the different sorts of interactions that take place between religion 
and nationalism. For example, one could hypothesise that religious and 
nationalist commitments are represented as harmonious when the same 
individuals occupy dominant positions in both the nationalist field and 
the  religious  field,  as  seems  to  have  occurred  in  Iran  after  the  1979 
revolution  (cf.  Ram  2000). Conversely,  the  potential  for  competition 
between  religious  and  nationalist  discourses  arises  when  the 
corresponding positions in the two fields are not occupied by the same 
individuals, as in Egypt in the 20th century.
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The theoretical framework proposed here is quite likely in need of 
refinement,  and  its  ability  to  explain  a  wider  variety  of  nationalisms 
needs  to  be tested.  In  the first  section of  Chapter 2,  and elsewhere in 
passing,  I  have  tried  to  suggest  that  it  can  be  applied  to  French  and 
German nationalisms. In the French case,  Napoleon and de Gaulle are 
examples of the strategy of prophethood, and in the German case there is 
of course Hitler. American nationalism, which I grew up with, also strikes 
me as a good fit, and one can readily see the strategy of prophethood at 
work  in  the  careers  of  George  Washington  and  Abraham  Lincoln. 
American nationalists, like French ones, have been particularly diligent at 
imitating religious  practices  within a  nationalist  framework.  There are 
clearly  prayers  (the  Pledge  of  Allegiance  that  children  say  to  the 
American  flag  every  morning  in  school),  temples  (the  Washington 
Monument  and  the  Lincoln  Memorial,  to  which  Americans  go  on 
pilgrimages), hymns (the national anthem), sacred texts (the Declaration 
of  Independence and the Constitution),  catechisms (civics  lessons)  and 
martyrs (who are sometimes even referred to as such). And there are of 
course  legions  of  politicians,  media  personalities,  writers  and  scholars 
who,  with  greater  or  lesser  amounts  of  charisma  or  cultural  capital, 
advance  their  careers  by  successfully  claiming  the  authority  to  make 
statements about ‘America’ and ‘America’s interests’.
Zionism is another nationalism that I think this approach could be 
applied to. Zionist strategies of prophethood are not hard to find:
Ben Gurion . . . thought of himself (and was considered by others) 
as the ideal  hero-leader.  . . .  [H]is followers described him as the 
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ideal leader and the successor to the great leaders of the biblical 
period,  possessed  of  their  qualities.  Moshe  Dayan,  for  example, 
compared him to Moses. There is evidence that in the early years of 
statehood  Ben  Gurion  was  turning  into  the  object  of  national 
cult. . . . In more extreme instances, particularly in the presence of 
new immigrants, adulation of Ben Gurion took on the overtones of 
Messianic  ceremony.  Immigrants  kissed  the  soles  of  his  feet, 
touched his clothing, brought sick children forward so that he might 
heal them with his touch, and called him the Messiah. . . . [Theodor] 
Hertzl’s  remains  were  transferred  to  Israel  in  1949  amid  an 
elaborate state ceremony and reinterred on a mountain in Jerusalem 
named for him. . . . Mount Hertzl became a sacred site. . . . Speaker 
of  the  Knesset  Joseph  Sprinzak  . . .  called  Hertzl  ‘the  prophet  of 
Israel’s freedom’. . . . Incredible spiritual and physical qualities were 
attributed  to  Herzl,  all  contributing  to  his  transformation  into  a 
mythic hero of almost superhuman proportions (Liebman and Don-
Yiḥya 1983, 94-96).
Nor is it difficult to  identify priestly strategies in the work of the 
many knowledge producers, ‘in the media, think tanks, and academia’, in 
Israel but also in the US and elsewhere, whose credibility depends partly 
on their ability to successfully claim knowledge of, or knowledge that is 
useful for, Israel and the Jewish nation  (cf. Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 
168-196). The complex relationship between religion and nationalism in 
this case is very interesting and merits careful study (cf. Dieckhoff 2006).
Turkish nationalism seems to be another good example:
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According  to  Kemalist  historiography,  the  project  of  creating  a 
modern nation-state was developed in the mind of the great leader, 
Kemal  Ataturk  himself.  . . . Indeed,  early  revolutionary  literature 
during  the  time  of  Kemal  Ataturk  usually  described  him  as  a 
prophet of the modern times.  . . . Similarly, just as every religion 
has a sacred book, so does Kemalism. . . . Michael Meeker compares 
the parallel and rival shrines of Islam and Kemalism in Ankara, that 
is,  the  Kocatepe  Mosque  and  Kemal  Ataturk’s  Mausoleum 
[Anıtkabir].  . . . Likewise,  the  anthropologist  Carol  Delaney 
observes:  Anıtkabir  ‘is  referred  to  even  by  taxi  drivers  as  “our 
kabe”. . . Like its Meccan counterpart, Anıtkabir is also a place of 
pilgrimage.  . . .’ Perhaps  the  most  striking  similarity  between 
Kemalism  and  the  religious  mode  of  thinking,  however,  can  be 
found in the repressive atmosphere around which the ‘belief in’ or 
the ‘love for’ Kemal Ataturk and his ideology are cultivated – just 
like Islam and other monotheistic religions, where love of God and 
fear of Him are inseparable (Gülalp 2005, 363-364).
The  most  important  conclusion of  this  thesis  is  that  nationalism 
restricts  the  autonomy  of  cultural  producers,  and  not  only  when  a 
nationalist prophet takes power. The autonomy of the nationalist field is 
limited by the fact that nationalist concepts do not represent any objective 
reality.  Because  the  inherent  heteronomy  of  the  nationalist  field 
subordinates  intellectuals  to  demands  emanating  from  outside  their 
specialised fields of competence, it undermines their ability to challenge 
social  hierarchies,  political  authority and economic inequality,  and has 
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been  more  readily  used  to  legitimise  new  forms  of  domination  in 
competition with old ones.  The practical consequence of this analysis is 
clear: in order to act as an autonomous force capable of critiquing social 
norms  and  political  and  economic  power,  intellectuals  must  abandon 
nationalism and base their credibility on a mastery of scientific concepts. 
This conclusion may be disturbing for some readers who perceive their 
own nationalism (which they may prefer to call ‘patriotism’) as devotion 
to  the  common  good.  Since  intellectuals  have  ‘an  interest  in 
disinterestedness’  (Bourdieu  1993,  40,  Bourdieu  1994b,  200), it  is  often 
particularly difficult for them to acknowledge their own self-interest. Yet 
paradoxically,  it  is  only  by  doing  so,  and  by  engaging  in  a  global, 
collective struggle to create the social conditions of their own autonomy, 
that they can truly work for the common good (Bourdieu 1996a, 337-348). 
This can and should be done without nationalism84.
This leads us to another important direction for future research: the 
investigation of cosmopolitan strategies that enable knowledge producers 
to increase their own autonomy and that of the fields they work in. What 
sorts of global institutional arrangements and networks do these strategies 
require? Once knowledge producers have established credibility through 
integration into relatively autonomous global fields, how can they best 
use  this  credibility  to  participate  in  projects  of  political  mobilisation? 
These are questions that can be studied empirically.
84 No doubt some will object that although nationalism may be an illusion, to abandon 
it  is  to  lose  a  powerful  means  of  political  mobilisation.  Bourdieu’s  remark  is  
pertinent: ‘Do you really think that one can mobilise only on the basis of illusions?’ 
(Bourdieu 1980b, 47).
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The  prevalence  of  what  has  been  called  ‘methodological 
nationalism’ in the social sciences (Wimmer and Schiller 2003; Beck 2006) 
is a sign that these fields are still not autonomous enough. In order to 
increase the autonomy of social science,  researchers must require – of 
themselves and of their peers – mastery of powerful theories that break 
decisively with everyday, commonsense concepts  (Bourdieu et al.  1991, 
13-31). By combining theoretical tools that have emerged from what I see 
as the most autonomous poles of the fields of sociology and linguistics, I 
have tried to contribute to this effort.
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Appendix 1: Patrie translated as Awṭān in a 
French Proclamation
On  23  October  1798,  during  the  French  occupation  of  Egypt,  a 
proclamation was issued in the name of the council of shaykhs that the 
French had assembled to act as their intermediaries in Cairo; Egyptians 
were told that they should abstain from rebellion ‘in order to protect your 
homes [li-aǧl an taḥfaẓū awṭānakum]’ (al-Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 151-152, al-
Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:143) or (in a variant) ‘your property and your homes 
[amwālakum wa-awṭānakum]’  (al-Ǧabartī  and al-ʿAṭṭār  1801/1998,  66). 
The  French  version  of  this  proclamation  appeared  in  the  French 
newspaper in Egypt,  Courrier de l’Égypte, in the issue dated 31 October 
1798 (10 Brumaire VII in the French republican calendar); the word awṭān 
in the Arabic text corresponds to the word foyers (‘homes’) in the French 
text85 (Anon. 1798a).
In November, another proclamation, also issued in the name of the 
shaykhs on behalf of the French, criticised the Mamluk beys, Ibrāhīm and 
Murād, who had fled Cairo, for ‘leaving their dependents and their awṭān 
[yatrukūn  ʿiyālahum  wa-awṭānahum]’.  It  also  exhorted  Egyptians  to 
abstain from rebellion and pay their taxes, ‘in order to be safe in your 
ʾawṭān [li-takūnū fī awṭānikum sālimīn]’  (al-Ǧabartī 1798/1999, 153-155; 
al-Ǧabartī and al-ʿAṭṭār 1801/1998, 67-68; al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:146-147). 
In the French version, the French word patrie corresponds to the Arabic 
word  awṭān in  both  places86 (Anon.  1798b).  Does  this  mean  that  the 
85 ‘Gardez-vous bien donc d’exciter le désordre afin que vous jouissiez dans vos foyers 
de la tranquillité et de la sécurité.’
86 The proclamation accuses Ibrāhīm and Murād of disseminating forged messages from 
the  Ottoman  Sultan,  then  says:  ‘Si  vous  cherchez  la  raison  de  ces  mensonges 
politiques, vous la trouverez dans leur dépit  et  leur rage contre les  Ulemas et les 
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shaykhs understood awṭān to express the same meaning as patrie? There 
are ample reasons to doubt this.
First,  we  do  not  know  how  these  texts  were  composed,  but 
considering the power relation between the French government and the 
shaykhs, it seems likely that the Arabic version was translated from the 
French.  The  shaykhs  did  not  know French.  Little  is  known about  the 
translators  employed  by  the  French  government  in  Egypt.  We  saw in 
Chapter 1 that  Napoleon’s  initial  proclamation  to  the  Egyptians  was 
translated into Arabic by the French Orientalist Jean Michel de Venture 
de Paradis, perhaps with Maltese assistants. On a few occasions, when al-
Ǧabartī  mentions  translators  who worked for  the  French,  he  refers  to 
them as Syrian Christians (al-Ǧabartī 1806/1997, 4:118, 526). It is possible 
that they did not fully understand the meaning of patrie. What is clear is 
that  their  Arabic  was  not  very  good;  many  of  the  proclamations  are 
written  very  badly.  Others  are  in  a  highly  polished  style,  no  doubt 
improved by the shaykhs, but since the shaykhs could not read French, 
they would not have been able to correct mistranslated words.  If  they 
read the word awṭān in a draft translation of the proclamation, they may 
well have interpreted it to mean ‘homes’ (as in the previous proclamation) 
and accepted it as such, without suspecting that the original French text 
contained a different meaning.
However,  there is a deeper problem here.  Even if we postulate a 
translator who fully understood the meaning of the French word  patrie 
sujets qui n’ont pas voulu les suivre et qui n’ont pas abandonné leur patrie et leurs 
familles. . . . N’oubliez pas aussi qu’il est de votre devoir de payer les droits et les  
impositions que vous devez au gouvernement et aux propriétaires des terres, afin que 
vous jouissiez au milieu de votre famille et dans le sein de votre patrie du repos et de  
la securité.’
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and  whose  Arabic  was  excellent,  the  question  remains:  if  no  Arabic 
equivalent of  patrie existed, what would the translator have done? No 
doubt he would  have used an Arabic word whose meaning was at least 
similar in some ways, and that would be intelligible in the context. In the 
introduction  to  this  thesis,  I  have suggested  that  concepts  of  ‘national 
territory’,  such as  patrie,  are  linked  to  the  concept  of  ‘nation’  by  the 
concept of a collective moral duty. Before the 19th century, as we have 
seen,  waṭan could have the sense of a place to which an individual was 
emotionally attached, but without, it seems, the concept of a moral duty. 
Hence  both  patrie and  waṭan represent  places  to  which  one  or  more 
human beings are attached in some way. This abstract similarity could 
have motivated the choice of awṭān in the translation87.
In short, a translation such as this gives us little evidence of what 
waṭan actually meant to Egyptians at the time, or how they viewed Egypt 
or  the  French.  Much  more  instructive  are  examples  of  non-translated 
discourse, such as those considered in Chapter 1.
87 It  is  perhaps  worth  noting  that  if  the  author  of  the  French  text  conceptualised 
Ibrāhīm’s and Murād’s  patrie as  Egypt,  the text  contains a  factual inconsistency: 
although Ibrāhīm Bey was in Syria at the time, Murād Bey had fled to Upper Egypt,  
where he remained until he died of plague a year or two later (Cole 2007, 69, 92, 112, 
157, 167, 230, 236, 239-242).
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Appendix 2: Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār
While a student at  al-Azhar,  Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭāwī was the favourite 
disciple of Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār (1766-1835), an exceptional scholar in several 
respects88. Al-ʿAṭṭār does not seem to have written about political issues, 
but  he was convinced of  the need for  a  revival  of  intellectual  culture 
(Delanoue 1982, 344). He seems to have made unusual efforts to seek out 
types  of  knowledge  that  ‘did  not  have  a  direct  relationship  with  the 
Arabic language or religious law’. He gave Arabic lessons to some of the 
French  scientists  who  accompanied  Napoleon’s  occupation  of  Egypt 
(1798-1801), and it appears that his contacts with them convinced him of 
the need for a scientific renaissance in Egypt. He travelled widely outside 
Egypt, probably from 1802-1815; few details of these trips are known, but 
he  does  not  seem  to  have  ventured  outside  the  Ottoman  Empire 
(Delanoue 1982, 345; Gran 1979, 77-78). Peter Gran notes that al-ʿAṭṭār 
worked  on  a  text  on  ‘ʿilm  al-handasa (geometry,  including  topics  in 
astronomy and engineering)’ upon his arrival in Istanbul in 1802, and that 
he  studied  medicine  there,  probably  between  1808  and  1810,  having 
indicated that ‘he had sought to study medicine in his youth, but this was 
not possible for him in Egypt’ (1979, 103-104).
Though he was the son of a humble perfume and spice merchant, 
al-ʿAṭṭār enjoyed a rising social trajectory, no doubt especially thanks to 
his good relations with Egypt’s ruler Mehmed Ali; signs of this success are 
al-ʿAṭṭār’s appointment as editor of the official bureaucratic bulletin  Al-
88 The  available  information  about  al-ʿAṭṭār’s  life  is  scanty,  vague  and  based  on 
uncertain sources.  Most of  what is  known about him comes from the three-page 
biographical  note  in  ʿAlī  Mubārak’s  Al-Ḫiṭaṭ  al-Ǧadīda  (1888);  this  note  was 
apparently written by an anonymous contemporary of al-ʿAṭṭār (Delanoue 1982, 344).
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Waqāʾiʿ  al-Miṣriyya  (then  Egypt’s  only  newspaper) in  1828,  and  as 
director of al-Azhar in 1831 (Delanoue 1982, 345-347; Gran 1979, 78, 126; 
Newman  2004,  37).  However,  he  remained  ‘in  a  situation  of  relative 
intellectual  isolation’  (Gran 1979,  127).  In 1833,  a French diplomat,  the 
Baron de Boislecompte, met al-ʿAṭṭār in Cairo, and wrote that the latter 
had told him: ‘I enjoy having Europeans as guests, but I invite them over 
at times when no one else is likely to visit; otherwise, I would acquire a 
bad reputation among the ʿulamāʾ’ (Delanoue 1982, 347).
It pained him to observe the sterility of the cultural milieu that he 
lived  in,  and  his  own  isolation.  His  judgements  reflect  a  harsh 
lucidity, in their irony towards the  ʿulamāʾ of his day, as can be 
seen  in  the  following  lines,  which  are  a  digression  in  his 
commentary  on  the  Ǧamʿ  al-Ǧawāmiʿ89.  After  relating  the 
biography of a famous Šāfiʿī jurist, Ibn Surayǧ (d. 306 AH / 918 AD), 
whose intellectual curiosity and literary talent he praises, he writes: 
‘Such men, who were well-versed in the sciences of divine law and 
the commandments  of  religion,  also  had extensive knowledge  of 
other sciences. . . . What is even more admirable is that they went 
so far as to study the works of non-Muslims. . . . But if we look at 
how  we  have  ended  up,  in  the  present  day,  it  is  clear  that  in 
comparison with those men, we are like the common people of their 
time.  At  best,  we  are  able  to  transmit  what  they  said,  without 
inventing  anything  of  our  own.  . . .  Our  present  situation  is 
analogous  to  that  which Ibn  al-Ǧawzī  referred  to,  in  one  of  his 
89 A 14th-century compendium of Islamic jurisprudence.
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sermons in Baghdad, in these lines: “Not a single lovestruck man, in 
this  country,  with  whom we  could  speak  of  great  things;  not  a 
single  close  friend  who  could  be  our  travelling  companion.”’ 
(Delanoue 1982, 353-355)
Peter  Gran’s discussion and annotated bibliography of  al-ʿAṭṭār’s 
writings  (Gran 1979, passim) seems to confirm that this unconventional 
scholar’s  work  on  natural  science,  technology  and  medicine  was 
composed almost entirely of commentaries and marginal notes on earlier 
works90.  In any case,  it seems clear that  his interest in these topics was 
highly unorthodox, and frowned upon by mainstream ʿulamāʾ.
90 There may be exceptions, perhaps among al-ʿAṭṭār’s writings on medicine. A more 
complete study of the manuscripts themselves, many of which have not been found, 
would be necessary in order to say for sure.
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Appendix 3: ʿAbd Allāh al-Nadīm
The  writer,  orator  and  journalist  ʿAbd  Allāh  al-Nadīm (1843-96) 
(Sadgrove  2011) was,  in  some  ways,  an  afandī manqué.  His  formal 
education  took  place  mainly  at  an  Azhar-like madrasa in  Alexandria 
(Hafez  1993,  114-115).  He  did  not  attend  a  state  school,  ‘knew  no 
European  languages  and  never  traveled  to  Europe’  (Selim  2004,  28). 
Nevertheless, he was a formidable autodidact.  Like  al-Ṭahṭāwī,  he ‘was 
thoroughly familiar with classical Arabic culture and acquainted himself 
with European thought and literature’, albeit by means of translations and 
through contact with Alexandria’s  large European community.  In Cairo, 
he also  attended the informal lessons of the Muslim reformer Ǧamāl al-
Dīn al-Afġānī  (Hafez 1993, 114-115), whose advocacy of modern science 
was  similar  to  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  (Hourani  1983,  121-129).  He  worked  as  a 
telegraph operator in the civil service, a post that must have brought him 
into close contact with the  afandiyya.  Like  al-Ṭahṭāwī,  he directed an 
innovative school; it was ‘dedicated to disseminating the teachings of al-
Afghani’ (Selim 2004, 28). He ‘clearly identified with an emergent middle 
class,  distinct  and  qualitatively  different  from  both  the  acculturated, 
aristocratic upper classes and the vulgar, teeming masses of the poor, both 
urban and rural’ (Selim 2004, 6), and this ‘new middle class’ was his main 
audience  (Hafez 1993, 116). In short, while he was not qualified to be a 
doctor or engineer, he was nevertheless qualified to be a journalist who 
wrote for an audience of doctors and engineers.
‘Nadim started his literary career in the early 1870s’  (Hafez 1993, 
115),  just  at  the  moment  when  a  significant  market  for  newspapers 
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develoed in  Egypt. The number of ‘new literates’ produced by the state 
schools  ‘increased  at  a  far  higher  rate  than  the  Azharites  until  they 
outnumbered  their  predecessors’  (Hafez  1993,  65). This  created  a  new 
market  for  printed  materials.  A  state-run  printing  press  had  been 
established in 1821, but over the next twenty years it had published only 
about 250 titles; these were mostly technical works intended for the army 
(Hafez 1993, 55-56), and were ‘unsuitable for general reading’ (Heyworth-
Dunne  1939,  228).  However,  starting  in  the  1870s,  book production 
increased rapidly (Hafez 1993, 56).
Newspapers were a new phenomenon in Egypt. The official bulletin 
that al-Ṭahṭāwī had edited, Al-Waqāʾiʿ al-Miṣriyya (Egyptian Events), had 
published little more than administrative announcements and panegyrics 
to  the  viceroy,  apart  from  a  brief,  ill-fated  attempt  by  al-Ṭahṭāwī  to 
include  essays  on  political  philosophy  (Delanoue  1982,  402-403).  The 
newspaper industry was still only barely beginning to develop in the late 
1860s (Brugman 1984, 63), at the end of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s career. No more than 
six  Arabic  newspapers  were  published in  Egypt  before  Ismāʿīl’s  reign; 
twenty-seven were published during it (Hafez 1993, 49). Between the end 
of his reign in 1879 and the end of the century, this number increased to 
310.  Because  of  the  low  literacy  rate  and  the  high  price  of  printed 
materials, ‘the circulation of newspapers and periodicals in the nineteenth 
century was extremely low’. In 1882, the total number of subscribers to 
Egyptian newspapers was no more than 5,000; fifteen years later, it was 
perhaps 20,000 (Hafez 1993, 83-84). But since newspapers’ main audience 
(and,  no  doubt,  their  main  source  of  writers  and  journalists)  was  the 
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category of  afandiyya,  they provide  valuable  evidence of  the concepts 
that appealed to this audience.  Not surprisingly,  as  soon as newspapers 
became a significant form of cultural production in Egypt, they expressed 
the nationalist beliefs that, as we saw in Chapter 2, already formed part of 
the ethos of this audience. Examples are Yaʿqūb Ṣannūʿ’s Abū al-Naẓẓāra 
al-Zarqāʾ (The  Man  with  the  Blue  Glasses,  1877)  and  ʿAbd  Allāh  al-
Nadīm’s Al-Tankīt wa-l-Tabkīt (Jesting and Censure, 1881) and Al-Ustāḏ 
(The Teacher,  1892–3),  which were essentially vehicles  for  the editors’ 
satirical essays and stories rather than for the publication of news (Selim 
2004, 25-30, 50-59).
Al-Nadīm seems to have found a considerable audience as public 
intellectual, particularly from the late 1870s until the early 1890s  (Selim 
2004,  28-29).  Here  I  will  consider  two of  his  essays,  which indicate  a 
nationalism that is basically similar to that of al-Ṭahṭāwī.
The essay Tarbiyat al-Abnāʾ (The Education of Children) (al-Nadīm 
1901,  2:104-109) begins by boasting about the good education that was 
formerly dispensed in ‘the East’.  Al-Nadīm claims that there were two 
separate kinds of instruction: shaykhs dispensed religious education, and 
professors  (asātiḏa)  dispensed the  non-religious  (madrasī)  kind.  (He is 
perhaps thinking of the situation in Egypt in the mid-19th century, not 
realising that  this  situation was new at  the time and already reflected 
ideas imported from Europe.) But now, he says, Europeans have become 
the measure of all things, ‘we’ have stopped inquiring into the teaching 
methods  of  ‘the  Easterners’,  and  civilisation  (tamaddun)  has  come  to 
mean imitating  Europeans.  ‘We  Easterners’  must  imitate  ‘the  civilised 
394
nations  [al-umam  al-mutamaddina]’  in  order  to  rise  up  out  of  ‘the 
barbarity that is attributed to us’, and this means imitating their teaching 
methods,  in  which  religious  and  non-religious  education  is  mixed 
together,  and every school  contains  a  church.  Every teacher,  even the 
ones who teach mathematics, is a priest, and all the schoolbooks are full 
of  religious  examples.  (Al-Nadim  is  no  doubt  overgeneralising  from 
Christian missionary schools in Egypt.) Everyone is required to display 
outward  signs  of  piety,  even  the  atheists,  who  keep  their  atheism  to 
themselves. This, he thinks, is the reason for the basic unity of Europe, 
despite its diversity in secondary matters.
European schoolbooks, he says, are written in the language of each 
waṭan.  This is necessary in order to preserve nationality (ǧinsiyya). No 
state  dispenses  education  in  the  language  of  another  state.  Thus  each 
nation (umma) maintains its distinctiveness. Those who live abroad and 
whose children are educated in a foreign language lose their ǧinsiyya and 
give  up  their  true  selves  (taslīm  al-ḏāt).  European  schools  teach  ‘the 
bonds of nationality [ǧinsiyya] and the need to protect them’; thus each 
pupil ‘loves his race [abnāʾ ǧinsihi]’ and safeguards ‘the history of his 
people [qawmihi]’ and ‘the unity of his nationality [ǧinsiyyatihi]’. Thus 
the members of each race (ǧins) in Europe are bound together like the 
members of a household (ahl bayt wāḥid). Europeans also teach national 
history (al-tārīḫ al-waṭanī), so that every pupil knows the origins of his 
forefathers and those who live in his waṭan, and what has happened to it 
through history, including the nations (umam) that have attacked it and 
the men who have served it, including politicians, warriors and writers. 
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Thus the nation (umma) follows first-class men (riǧāl al-ṭabaqa al-ūlā). If 
a great man (ʿaẓīm) embarks on a project that is useful for the waṭan, he 
finds the nation (umma) before him, calling with his voice. Great men 
serve their  awṭān and nations (umam) for no purpose other than to be 
remembered by the nation that they serve. Foremost among these men are 
kings and their ministers. Thus each pupil sees the pictures of the kings of 
his  waṭan, and studies their deeds; thus he knows their stature and the 
honour of protecting the king’s household and their exalted position. For 
the nation (umma) that has no king has no honour. Hence Europeans are 
very protective of their kings. One of their principles is to warn each pupil 
against revolution (ṯawra)  and against causing strife (fitna)  among his 
people  (qawm).  They  teach him examples  of  past  revolutions  and  the 
damage they caused. Thus the pupil is attached to the good of his waṭan 
and its inhabitants. 
This, he says, is the kind of education that has enabled the European 
nations (umam) to attain the height of perfection. Thus the clergy (riǧāl  
al-dīn)  in  Europe are  the professors  of  politics,  and politicians are  the 
guardians of  religion. This is the opposite of  the situation in the East, 
where the  ʿulamāʾ stay away from politics and are ignorant of it. Thus 
princes do not bother to involve them in political matters. But the ʿulamāʾ 
are the most deserving of involvement in politics. So why, asks al-Nadīm, 
are we failing to imitate European education, and persisting in ways that 
cause  us  Easterners  to  lose  our  national  bonds  (rawābiṭ  al-ǧins),  our 
language, our  waṭan and our religion? Why do we give our children to 
European  teachers,  who  return  them  to  us  assimilated  to  their 
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nationalities (mutaǧannisīn bi-ǧinsiyyātihim)? The Egyptian, the Syrian, 
the Turk or the Iraqi who has studied with the teachers of the Frères, the 
Protestants or the Jesuits have become a ‘third category [qisman ṯāliṯan]’ 
between the Easterners and the Westerners. Wealthy Easterners should 
create charitable organisations, under the protection of the state, to create 
national  schools  (al-madāris  al-waṭaniyya)  based  on  the  principles  of 
European education. 
We can see from this text that, like al-Ṭahṭāwī, al-Nadīm uses the 
terms  ǧins (‘race’),  ǧinsiyya (‘nationality’)  and  umma (‘nation’) 
interchangeably. This is the earliest of the texts considered in this thesis 
in which  qawm appears as another  word for this concept.  As Wendell 
(1972, 149-150) observes,
Al-Nadim  employs  the  term  ǧins (race,  species,  Volk)  in  a  way 
reminiscent  of  the  terminology  of  the  jingoist  nationalists  of 
nineteenth-century  Europe.  . . .  Evidently  ǧins and  umma were 
virtually  equivalent  notions  for  al-Nadim,  as  they  were  for  the 
extreme European nationalists of that era.
How  can  we  explain  al-Nadīm’s  nationalist  call  to  increase  the 
involvement  of  the  clergy  in  education  and  in  politics?  He  was  a 
journalist, not a clergyman, and his interests were not tied to those of the 
clergy per se. A plausible explanation for his stance is his investment in 
written Arabic, an important component of his cultural capital. If more 
and  more  people  were  educated  mainly  in  foreign  languages  and 
therefore did not read Arabic well, the audience for his journalism could 
decrease. If the clergy were more involved in education, they could be 
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expected to strive to make sure that all students mastered Arabic. Hence 
al-Nadīm  stance  is  actually  similar  to  al-Ṭahṭāwī’s  employment  of 
Azharites in his School of Languages, and his call for modern sciences to 
be taught at al-Azhar. Aside from al-Nadīm’s use of the Orientalist notion 
of  ‘the  East’,  which  he  seems  to  conceptualise  as  a  sort  of  family  of 
nations91, his nationalism in this essay is thus basically that of al-Ṭahṭāwī. 
This indicates that, by this time, al-Ṭahṭāwī’s nationalist concepts were 
widely accepted; thus al-Nadīm could use them to legitimise his stance on 
education.
In  another  essay,  Aštāt  al-Šarq  wa-ʿAṣabiyyāt  Ūrūbbā (The 
Dispersion of  the  East  and the  Solidarities  of  Europe)  (al-Nadīm 1901, 
2:120-126),  al-Nadīm  expresses  political  views  that  are  similar  to  al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s. The East in ‘the first eras [al-aʿṣur al-uwal]’ was powerful and 
advanced, but has regressed and fragmented in the past four centuries, 
splitting into ‘races and tribes’ (šuʿūban wa-qabāʾil). Each group (farīq) 
has  isolated  itself  on  a  piece  of  land  that  it  has  taken  as  a  national 
territory (waṭan)  and defends.  In this  passage,  the phrase  šuʿūban wa-
qabāʾil is from Q 49:13 (‘People, We created you all from a single man and 
a single woman, and made you into races and tribes so that you should 
recognize one another’). Since al-Nadīm asserts that each of these ‘races’ 
(šuʿūb,  pl.  of  šaʿb)  now has  a  waṭan,  this  essay seems to  be an early 
example of the use of šaʿb to mean ‘nation’. Al-Nadīm might have picked 
up this usage from  Ǧamāl al-Dīn al-Afġānī;  Wendell  (1972, 179) notes: 
‘Within  the  Umma  Muḥammadiyya,  al-Afġānī refers  to  its  political 
91 On the history of this concept, see Lockman (2004).
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subdivisions, corresponding to the Oriental ‘nations’ of the Europeans, as 
‘peoples’, šuʿūb.’
In al-Nadīm’s view, because of the East’s  diversity – in terms of 
race, language, religions and  waṭan – Easterners have have abandoned 
the unity that linked the Arab race (ǧins) which once ruled many parts of 
Europe.  He claims that  in  this  Arab empire,  all  religious  communities 
(ʿaṣabiyyāt)  enjoyed  complete  equality,  and  that  Christian  and  Jewish 
communities  fought  alongside  the  Muslim to  defend  their  waṭan and 
king. (We saw in Chapter 1 how far from the truth this  claim is.)  Al-
Nadīm’s use of the term  ʿaṣabiyya perhaps reflects familiarity with Ibn 
Ḫaldūn, who used it to mean ‘group solidarity’  (Gabrieli 2011), but here 
al-Nadīm  uses  it  in  a  somewhat  different  sense.  Europeans,  he  says, 
learned this type of political system from Easterners during the Crusades, 
and thus different political  factions (aḥzāb)  flourished in Europe.  Each 
faction  (ʿaṣabiyya)  had  its  own means  of  safeguarding  the  life  of  the 
nation  (umma)  and protecting the  waṭan.  These  ideas  developed  until 
they led to the election of ministers by members of political parties. This 
system  increased  people's  confidence  in  government,  and  the  king’s 
confidence in his ministers; hence the European states are strong.
Meanwhile,  says  al-Nadīm,  the  East  has  been  regressing:  each 
minister follows only his own personal opinions, and is surrounded by a 
coterie  of  favourites  from  among  the  rabble;  ministers  are  ignorant, 
predatory and unaccountable. This has harmed the national interest (al-
maṣlaḥa al-waṭaniyya).  Foreigners and intruders have gained influence 
with rulers who were afraid of the intelligent men of their own people 
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(qawm). The increasing reliance of Eastern rulers on foreigners has been a 
grave error.
Clearly al-Nadīm’s view of the effects of foreigners in Egypt is very 
different from al-Ṭahṭāwī’s. Nevertheless, he argues for the adoption of 
the British parliamentary system (using both ḥizb and ʿaṣabiyya to mean 
‘party’). ‘Much sobered by the crushing of the rebels’ of the ʿUrābī revolt 
in 1881-82, ‘the quick and total defeat, and the occupation of Egypt by 
England’, al-Nadīm wrote this text as a ‘tribute to the great power which, 
after all, exemplified to the nth degree the kind of umma he would have 
desired for his own country’  (Wendell  1972,  154), echoing al-Ṭahṭāwī’s 
admiration  for  the  British  Empire.  In  al-Nadīm’s view,  competition 
between two political parties has enabled the British to spread throughout 
the world.
Egypt and and the East are not, in his view, ready for elections and 
freedom of thought, but if the nation (umma) agreed on submission to the 
monarchy as a nationalist principle (mabdaʾ waṭanī), a multi-party system 
could be established92. If the prime minister knew he was responsible to 
his party, and that other parties were observing his work, he would be 
filled  with  enthusiasm for  serving  his  country  (ḫidmat  al-waṭaniyya). 
Such parties  could only  be formed by nationalists  (waṭaniyyīn)  whose 
ancestors were buried in the country, because they would fear the tread of 
foreign hooves on their ancestors’ graves and on the monarchy’s honour. 
They would resolve, first of all, to ‘sanctify [taqdīs]’ the rank of king or 
92 As with al-Ṭahṭāwī, there is no limitation on royal power here; the king remains 
unaccountable.
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prince,  then seek leaders  who would  strive  to  protect  the king or  the 
prince from any violation of his ‘sacred rights [ḥuqūqihi al-muqaddasa]’.
The word ʿaṣabiyya, he adds, should not be taken to imply any call 
for  rebellion.  Rebellion against Europe would be futile and doomed to 
failure.  Instead,  Egyptians  should  imitate  Europe  in  the  ways  of 
civilisation (madaniyya). He also reminds his readers that they under the 
supervision of  a  ‘great  state’  (i.e.  the Ottoman Empire)  that  strives  to 
advance their civilisation, to lead them to understand ‘our national rights 
[ḥuqūqinā al-waṭaniyya]’, and to spread European learning throughout 
Egypt.  Therefore,  he  says,  Egyptians  should  follow  its  guidance  and 
increase  its  pride  in  Egypt’s  national  development  (našʾatinā  al-
waṭaniyya)  and  in  its  parties  (ʿaṣabiyyāt);  otherwise,  they  will  be  a 
disgrace  among  nations  (umam).  Each  party  should  have  its  own 
newspapers,  which  should  advise  it  according  to  its  principles; 
newspapers are the schools of ideas. This statement no doubt reflects  al-
Nadīm’s own interests; his newspaper al-Ṭāʾif had been ‘the mouthpiece 
of the ʿUrābists’ (Selim 2004, 28).
Thus, in his conception of civilisation and service to the waṭan, as 
well  as  in  his defence  of  absolute  monarchy  and  his  loyalty  to  the 
Ottoman Empire, al-Nadīm is in agreement with al-Ṭahṭāwī. Though he is 
less sanguine about the wisdom of relying on foreign advisers, he is by no 
means opposed to the importation of  ideas from Europe, and  echoes  al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s view that Egyptians must imitate Europeans in order to become 
a more civilised nation. Even his argument for greater involvement of the 
clergy  in  education  is  justified  on  the  grounds  that  it  would  make 
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Egyptian  schools  more  like  European ones.  These  ideas  seem to  have 
found a receptive audience among an  afandī readership that had been 
raised on al-Ṭahṭāwī’s nationalism and whose professional qualifications 
depended on ideas imported from Europe.
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